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CIVIL WARS, INSECURITY, AND  
INTERVENTION

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## 5 Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention

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Dagaal waa ka-dare (War is worse)

Somali proverb

### Abstract

The sources of the spiraling civil war in Somalia after President Siyaad Barre was deposed in 1991 are not to be found in the specifics of the Somali lineage system (as many area specialists claim) nor in the more general security dilemma (as some international relations experts insist). Rather, the war can best be explained by the war of attrition set off by the declining resources made available to coup winners in Africa after the end of the cold war. Under conditions of a war of attrition, international pressures on new leaders to democratize may enhance rather than reduce the chances for civil war. A modest proposal is offered to reduce the spiraling and enhance the chances for democracy in Somali-like civil wars.

Somalia, situated on the Horn of Africa, borders on the Red Sea to the north of the former British Somaliland and on the Indian Ocean to the east of the former Italian colony and then trust territory of Somalia. The two territories united when they achieved independence in 1960. Unlike nearly all other African states that contended with vast cultural heterogeneity within their boundaries, thereby hampering nation-building projects, Somalia is religiously (in Islam) and linguistically (in Somali, a Cushitic language) homogeneous. Its leaders did not need to grapple with the problem of na-

tional definition; rather, they faced the problem of refusal by the Organization of African States and the United Nations to acknowledge Somalia's rights to rule over contiguous land in neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti that were largely populated by Somalis. Inability to reclaim these unredeemed lands (along with mischievous interventions by the Soviet Union, large-scale corruption, and factional bickering by a multitude of acephalous clans and the parties that represented them) broke the backbone of the postcolonial democratic regime and fostered a military coup in 1969, led by Mohammed Siyaad Barre. After about eight years of relatively meritocratic assignment of jobs and successful economic reform, along with a state ideology of scientific socialism, Siyaad put his energies behind a war to reclaim the Somali lands in the Ogaadeen desert of eastern Ethiopia. Initially a stunning success, due in part to Ethiopia's near breakdown with the fall of the emperor Haile Selassie, the effort was eventually repulsed when the Soviets switched sides to lend support to the Marxist military government that came to power in Addis Ababa. Somalia's defeat in 1978 led to recriminations and counterrecriminations and eventually the reemergence of the clan conflict that Siyaad had originally attenuated. Siyaad began to use U.S. foreign military assistance—justified as protection of Somalia from Ethiopian predation but in reality funded to balance Soviet power in the Horn and to secure a base for America's Rapid Deployment Force—to give arms to his clan allies to help them gain advantage over rival claimants to water holes and grazing lands. By the late 1980s Siyaad's inner coalition of three clans (Marreexaan, Ogaadeen, and Dhulbahante, called MOD) were in full-scale war against the Isxaags of the former British colony in the northwest (organized into the Somali National Movement, the SNM), the Maajeerteens in the northeast (organized as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the SSDF), and the Hawiyes to Mogadishu's immediate west and south (organized as the United Somali Congress, the USC).<sup>1</sup>

The USC army drove Siyaad out of the country in 1991 and a Hawiye businessman (Ali Mahdi) was installed as president, with the encouragement of the Italian ambassador. The Isxaag and the Maajeerteen armies refused to accept Hawiye rule (proximity to the capital and old colonial ties to the Italians were not sufficient justification for non-Hawiyes) and continued to fight. The issue was especially complex for the SNM. The Isxaags fought Siyaad Barre with the greatest loss in personnel (and their major metropolis, Hargeisa, leveled) and were angry that their army did not get to Mogadishu (where Isxaags had major land holdings) before the armies of the UPC. They were thus reluctant to return to their homeland in the north, but eventually

did, creating a rump state. Meanwhile, a military leader of the USC army, Mohammed Farah Aided, from a different subclan than Ali Mahdi's, challenged Mahdi's right to the presidency. By late 1991 not only was there an interclan war for control over Somalia, but an intraclan war for control over Mogadishu. Throughout the south, and in Mogadishu especially, warlords (*warranle*) claimed control over bands of well-armed youths, who with their armed Land Rovers (called "technicals") roamed the cities and roadways plundering, extorting, and killing. By late 1992, due to the civil war, the entire infrastructure of the country was ruined, mass killing, starvation, and disease afflicted much of the population, there was no central government that could negotiate on behalf of the state, and international relief workers were nearly as vulnerable to attack as the Somali population.

The Somali civil war has not only had devastating consequences for Somalis but has had awesome implications for the international gendarmerie that sought to contain it. Those interested in creating a world order in which the conflicts that have the potential of causing civil wars can be peacefully negotiated, and one in which international actors can successfully cauterize the violence of those civil wars that in fact take place, will need to address two questions concerning the Somali civil war. First, "How might civil wars of the Somali type be prevented?" To address this question I shall first examine the causes of the Somali war, as delineated by the area specialists who know the case well. I will then briefly address the suggestion by many international relations specialists, and endorsed by the editors of this volume, that a major part of the explanation for the war is in the security dilemma. Having rejected both the area and international relations' specialists pet theories, I shall then propose an alternative, one that focuses on the resource extraction problem faced by coup victors, which has the potential of degenerating into a war of attrition. Identifying the cause of the Somali civil war allows me to address the first question, on how such wars might be prevented.

Second, "What sort of intervention is feasible, efficient, humanitarian, consistent with local norms of justice, and consistent as well with the gendarmerie's interests if such a civil war does break out?" My strategy for addressing this question is first to provide a short narrative of the actions of the international gendarmerie in Somalia. Second, I shall catalogue a set of tactical considerations that might be called lessons of international intervention, which have implications for future interventions, ones that might be equally humanitarian in intent but more efficient in operation. Third, I shall address a few strategic lessons of the Somali intervention, which should be helpful in designing a grand strategy of humanitarian military intervention in civil wars.

## How Might Civil Wars of the Somali Type Be Prevented?

### *Explanations Offered by Area Specialists*

The standard "story line" by country experts focuses on such factors as (1) the acephalous nature of Somali clans linked together in a segmentary lineage system that has from time immemorial fostered interclan wars, with the 1991 civil war no different from how lineage politics has operated in times past but now in the glare of humanitarian agency and CNN spotlights; (2) the particular brutality, corruption, and increasingly narrow base of Siyad's regime; (3) the vast stock of weapons made available to Siyad under the Somali-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, added to with the United States' providing weapons to Siyad throughout the 1980s in exchange for access to Berbera—a cog in the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force machine—and finally enriched by the delivery of Soviet weapons to Siyad by President Mengistu of Ethiopia in 1989, after the two military leaders agreed to a peace plan. These international agreements heavily militarized Somalia, thereby giving unremitting power to warlords (*warranle*) over mediators (*wadaads*); and (4) the ecological conditions of the late 1980s (breaking in 1991) in which rainfall was so sparse, at least in the Ogaadeen, as to bring greater competition in the bush for access to wells and grazing land.

### *The Segmentary Lineage System*

Linking the spiraling conflict in the Somali civil war to the segmentary lineage system is unsatisfactory. It can be (and has been) used to explain values on the dependent variable of the opposite sign than the value now being explained. The argument is that since segmentary lineage systems are acephalous, they operate a lot like realist models of interstate relations. Once conflict begins at any level, lineage elders seek to make strategic alliances with neighboring lineages, using affinal ties if necessary, to balance the power aggregated by their new enemy. With exogamy there is potential for a wide array of alliances. In its international relations analogue this system of relations is coded as a balance of power system. Most theorizing in international relations on balance of power systems, and in anthropology on the nature of segmentary lineage systems, emphasizes the high likelihood of war but also the high probability that wars would be short, since with a large number of smaller actors it is much easier for sets of weaker actors to ally in balance against the powerful.<sup>2</sup>

This describes well segmentary lineage politics in the Somali lands. Examples of conflicts that flare up and are put down through strategic nego-

tations of clan leaders, often through the intervention of well-respected mediators, pervade the work of leading students of the Somali social structure such as I. M. Lewis and S. S. Samatar.<sup>3</sup> For example, on the brink of the chaos, and foreseeing its horrors, S. S. Samatar wrote:

The instability, anarchy and murderous shiftings witnessed today in the Somali scene are inherently endemic, deeply embedded as they are in the very warp and woof of the Somali world, both as individuals and as corporate socio-political units. The splintering of the opposition movements to General Barre's rule into bewildering fragments . . . reflect[s] the schismatic nature of Somali society.<sup>4</sup>

But, post-1991, the value on the dependent variable was not "frequent outbreaks of violence quickly cauterized" but rather "a spiraling of violence in which all forms of mediation failed, and in which the *warranleh* thoroughly dominated the *waddads*." Samatar and others recognized this to be the case and have suggested that the existence of a centralized state and army allowed both for the use of clans for purposes of making war upon each other and also for the collapse of clans in their ability to build up new coalitions to recalibrate the balance of power, thereby cooling down violent conflict.<sup>5</sup> This is indeed an interesting explanation. The explanatory variable, however, is no longer the segmentary lineage system but the modern state's manipulation of it.

Most Somali scholars, especially I. M. Lewis, continue to explain the outcomes of interclan relations post-1991 with the same variables they used to explain the outcomes pre-1991. On the coding of the Somali social structure Lewis may well be correct.<sup>6</sup> But if we accept Lewis's claim that there is no significant change on the value on the independent variable, it is scientifically unacceptable—without at least specifying the functional relationship between the independent and dependent variables—to accept this factor as an explanation for a changed value on the dependent variable. Rather, some new factor has come into play that undermines the cauterizing role of the segmentary lineage system. This is the factor that requires emphasis as the source of the catastrophe.

#### Other Local Explanations

Nearly all other local explanations are more compelling than the one focusing on the segmentary lineage system, because in all of them there is

a changed value on the explanatory variable (moral worth of the regime in power, number of weapons pervading the society, ecological conditions on the range) that is plausibly linked to a vastly changed value on the dependent variable (the degree of societal violence). Despite the plausibility of these explanations, there is a compelling reason to hold under some suspicion causal theories that rely almost entirely on local conditions and factors. Such explanations give us virtually no purchase on the question of what type of civil war was fought in Somalia and what are general guidelines for reducing its likelihood. Accepting any of these explanations implies that we need special experts on every country who would be able to use their local knowledge to foresee devastating civil wars. The problem with this is not that it is costly. Rather, the problem is that the record of area experts (whether it be those who studied the Soviet Union, South Africa, or Somalia) in foreseeing catastrophe (or in the case of South Africa, in foreseeing that catastrophe would reach its full limits only within the townships) is not very impressive.<sup>7</sup> More important, by focusing principally on local conditions for a conflict that has already occurred, we get very little purchase on how to identify conditions in other places, where systematic third-party intervention could play a decisive role in dampening imminent civil war, with the possibility of unimaginable noncombatant suffering.

#### *Explanations Offered by International Relations Experts*

##### The Security Dilemma<sup>8</sup>

There are many places and times where the security dilemma might well have kicked in, in a way that nurtured the spiral of Somali violence. First, for all nomadic groups in a battle against unforgiving nature, every grazing area, every watering hole, is vital for survival. Increased measures by any clan to enhance security must therefore be seen by leaders of other clans as threatening their physical survival. The security dilemma can thus be seen as a permanent condition of life in the Somali bush. Second, as Siyaad seeded clan warfare through strategic distributions of weapons he received as foreign aid, he surely threatened the survival of enemy clans, who themselves were impelled to seek comparable arms to secure their future. Third, after the collapse of the Siyaad regime in 1991, all clans feared for their futures if an enemy clan captured the reins of state power. Surely they armed themselves in part because of the disastrous potential consequences for their security of not arming. Fourth, in the course of third-party intervention,

when international mediators promoted disarmament, each party was reluctant to disarm out of fear that it would give strategic advantage to the others. This calculation is the security dilemma in reverse, but it holds equally.

While it cannot be denied that the security dilemma helps explain the high levels of vigilance and active efforts at material acquisition by clan leaders, it is much more difficult to sustain the claim that the security dilemma itself, or the actions impelled by considerations by leaders of that dilemma, explain the continued spiraling of clan warfare that got out of control following the capture of the presidential palace by forces loyal to Ali Mahdi in 1991. I shall analyze this period carefully in order to show why in general the security dilemma dynamic was not the principal motivator of the violent spiral.

The Hawiye-led army, being the closest to the capital, delivered the conclusive blow to President Siyaad's security forces and captured the presidential palace well before other clan-based armies reached Mogadishu. Ali Mahdi, with support from the Italian embassy, and quasi legitimacy from the anti-Siyaad Manifesto Group, was sworn in as president two days after Siyaad's flight. Early on in his administration Mahdi called for a conference of national unity and reconciliation for March 1991. Most of the other armies of the fragmented opposition to Siyaad refused to attend this meeting. This is not because their leaders felt insecure, or that they feared physical annihilation if the USC's government came to power. They refused because they felt that Ali Mahdi had no right to declare himself president, since it was they who had fought harder and suffered greater under Siyaad's rule, and that they would be legitimizing his illegal action by agreeing to sit at his conference table. Meanwhile, in the north the Isxaaq-led SNM convened its own conference in Berbera, which included two of the major non-Isxaaq clans (both of them—the Warsangeli and the Dhulbahante—are Daarood). One might ask why the Isxaaq could convene a northern conference but not Ali Mahdi an all-Somali conference. The answer is that leaders of Somali clans other than the Abgaal (Ali Mahdi's Hawiye subclan) felt that Ali Mahdi had no right to convene a conference. They also felt that he who controlled the presidential palace would have power of appointment of ministers and power to accumulate wealth—both of which were valued goods. In fact, the leading negotiators from the Daarood clans demanded that negotiations take place in a neutral city, not Mogadishu, in the heart of Hawiye country, a city in which many Daarood had been massacred. This neutral city, they argued, should become Somalia's new capital. But these leaders were making a political calculation not about their physical security during the con-

ference or under a Hawiye-dominant regime but about their ability to control a future Somali state.

When the rivalry between two Hawiye clans (the Abgaal and the Habar Gidir) developed into full-scale war, there is no evidence that the war lords feared to make peace because the other side would engage in revenge. They refused to make peace because they both were after the same prize—control over the state apparatus, however emasculated it may have become. Aideed saw himself as the anointed leader of the USC and felt he earned the presidency because of his successful operation against Siyaad's army in Mogadishu. He had contempt for the Italians and Egyptians for supporting Siyaad to the bitter end and then shifting their support to a hotelier, Ali Mahdi, for whom Aideed had no respect.<sup>9</sup> Or, to put this in different terms, the war in Somalia was a fight over power. Clan membership was used by leaders as a means of recruitment. The question is not why they armed even if they wanted peace; the question is really why the leaders would have spent so much to gain so little.

In sum, the security dilemma is a fact of life in nomadic society. It explains why clans armed themselves against each other, especially as the Somali state began losing monopoly control over violence after the 1977–78 war in the Ogadeen. Furthermore, as the authors of chapter 1 of this volume point out, the perpetrators of the civil war put innocent civilians into a security dilemma, compelling them to arm themselves against civilians of other clans. But the security dilemma gives us little purchase on why clan warfare spiraled in 1991 and why the combatants were unable to negotiate a peace.

#### Commitment Problems Under Conditions of Uncertainty

A new theoretical tradition in the study of civil wars, associated with the papers by international relations specialists Barry Posen and James Fearon, tells a story about civil wars that is somewhat distinct from the security dilemma. In their different ways both focus on the question of the breakdown of a central state and the resultant anarchy that has violent potential. Posen focuses on strategic uncertainty, or a perceived window of opportunity, leading to calculations that may overestimate the probability of victory against traditional enemies within the state or underestimate the costs of such a war. Fearon focuses on the problem experienced by a group that inherits a state apparatus in making credible commitments to those groups that once had state protection but now fear, under the new regime, that protection would

be lost. Minority groups may find it rational to challenge the state at time  $t_0$  when the new state is still very weak, rather than wait for  $t_1$ , when the state would be strong enough to expropriate wealth and destroy the political autonomy of all minorities. The key here is that for the new state leaders an announcement that they have no intention of such expropriation would be incredible. Barbara Walter shows how control over the state apparatus (especially the military) by one side, due to this commitment problem, undermines any chance for reconciliation without Leviathan-like third party intervention.<sup>10</sup>

While the focus on uncertainty and commitment is extremely useful to give a general framework for thinking about the consequences of state breakdown, the spiraling interclan conflict in Somalia after 1991 isn't easily fit into this model. For one, going back to segmentary lineage politics, there are no permanent enemies in Somali clan relations. All contenders should have reckoned that ruling coalitions in Somali society are always subject to renegotiation. Losing the presidential palace does not mean, therefore, permanent loss of access to state office. Nor does it imply the likelihood of facing severe security risks once the new rulers consolidate their positions. (In fact, Ali Mahdi brought a leading Isxaaq politician into his coalition very early on. Experts point out only *ex post* that he was not a legitimate spokesperson for Isxaaq interests. The Isxaags had no reason to fear they would be especially threatened by Hawiye rule, although some Isxaaq leaders feared that Ali Mahdi would ally with Isxaaq subclans that were outside SNM power structures, but this isn't an issue of commitment.) In the case of the major "players" in the civil war in the south, it would be a wild exaggeration to say that the Abgaal had a historic enmity with the Habar Gidir, making the Habar Gidir fear that if Ali Mahdi were to consolidate his power the Habar Gidir's future would be in grave danger. (There was a conflict between these subclans exacerbated by Italian rule, whose agents favored the Abgaal over the Habar Gidir. But to speak of this as a historic humiliation, creating a mutual desire for extermination, is wildly out of proportion.)

Second, Fearon argues that the commitment problem may not be set by worries over physical security but rather by worries concerning future bargaining power in the state over the distribution of state resources. How could Mahdi, from this viewpoint, assure the Isxaaq leaders that they would not be shut off from the government gravy train once the Hawiyes got full control over the state apparatus? This is a cogent point and it will get attention in the context of the war of attrition model. My point here is that the inability of Ali Mahdi to make a commitment over future bargaining power was not

the issue that led to the failure of a Hawiye-Isxaaq or an intra-Hawiye compromise that would have averted a civil war.

Third, and here I'm challenging Posen's argument as it might be applied to Somalia, there is no evidence that the post-1991 collapse was seen as a window of opportunity for decisive control over the state, in which calculations about the ease of victory were systematically wrong due to the chaotic situation. A variant of Posen's argument, however, one that focuses on parties misreading the resolve of their enemies once civil war begins, will be developed in the course of my exposition of the war of attrition. My point is this: solving Ali Mahdi's commitment problem in 1991, or providing better cost estimates for victory to the SNM leadership or to Aideed, would not have helped prevent the Somali civil war.

### *The War of Attrition*

The Somali civil war is not precisely of the "type" that fits models developed by Posen and Fearon and relied upon by Walter as a modal problem for the understanding of the prolongation of civil wars. Rather, it shares many characteristics with the war of attrition model described in the literature in evolutionary biology and industrial organization. What is sparking these wars of attrition is the vast change in resource-extraction capacities of dictators.

Rulers of states are heavily constrained by the access they have to financial resources. Some (tinpot dictators), with a short time horizon, will plunder the society as quickly as possible, before they are deposed. Others (dynasts) might protect private property and encourage investment, in the hope of increasing long-term returns on the tax base.<sup>11</sup>

With this idea in mind, one way to characterize the postcolonial African state is as a "lame Leviathan."<sup>12</sup> The lame Leviathan state has the capacity to incarcerate its internal enemies, tax international agencies (by threatening to disintegrate) but not its own population, and provide domestic order through foreign-funded police surveillance. It also has the capacity to reward its sycophants with relatively attractive employment. The huge budgets of African states, in Larry Diamond's words, "dwarfed in wealth and power both existing social institutions and various new fragments of modern organization."<sup>13</sup> A small tax base but huge rewards for supporters kept these regimes alive, but not for too long. Anger and resentment of those not receiving payoffs would build up. Because the life expectancy of such regimes is therefore short, leaders had little interest in developing conditions, such as the rule of law, that would be encouraging to capital investment. Rather, without

a rule of law, rulers could confiscate profits and plunder the society for as long as they could maintain themselves in power, partly in order to fund a luxurious retirement after the coup d'état that throws them out of office.

The largest source of resource extraction for the rulers was the superpowers and the former colonial states. From 1965 (with the first military coup in independent Africa) through 1989, coups d'état generally involved a leader who claimed to have no "ethnic" affiliation and would rule the country as a nationalist (This was the case with Siyaad's coup in 1969). Once in control, leaders would ally either with the United States or the Soviet Union and get provided with military weapons and police surveillance technology far greater than any other group in the society could procure. (It is significant that a United States-Soviet condominium existed, in which once an African leader chose a side in the cold war, the other side would stop subsidizing his enemies. The superpowers learned how to do this after the ugly collapse of Congo-Kinshasa, when both sides struck with their man).<sup>14</sup>

From the superpower point of view, the key calculation was to give the new dictator sufficient weaponry to maintain order but not enough so that he could decimate all domestic rivals. If properly calibrated, the dictator would be optimally venal and would continue to redistribute resources to rival groups as insurance. From a domestic point of view, for a rival to challenge a postcoup leader—once he took control over the radio station, presidential palace, and customhouse—would be foolhardy. The enormous relative military and surveillance power (the "prize") garnered by the first entrant into the presidential palace after the incumbent was deposed gave that entrant excellent bargaining power. Usually, a bandwagon followed, with sympathants from all tribal or clan groups seeking to curry favor with the new regime, to get their "fair" share. (After Siyaad's coup I do not think there was one group in the country that feared they would suffer from a Marre-exaan general taking power. All groups cooperated in the setting up of the early cabinets). Civil war was preempted in pre-1985 coups because of the enormous relative power in international resource extraction to which the first entrants into the presidential palace had access. Over time dictators who got too venal faced challenges from groups no longer receiving the distributions they felt they deserved. Coups were then plotted, and if a coup were successful, the new leader would choose a superpower and the game would begin anew.

With Corbachev's rule in the Soviet Union the support system for the African tinpot changed enormously. With the end of the cold war there was no incentive for the United States or the Soviet Union to prop up lame

Leviathans. To be sure, there are areas of Africa that still command attention from the United States. The U.S. has a "special relationship" with Ethiopia and has helped mediate the conflict between the state and the Oromo-based guerrilla opposition. The Sudan, too, captures U.S. attention for fear of Islamic fundamentalism that could spread to Egypt. Michael Clough calls this two-track policy "cynical disengagement."<sup>15</sup> In any event, with the USSR defunct there is no bidding war between superpowers for the support of African dictators, and the size of the prize has therefore diminished substantially.<sup>16</sup>

Coincident with the end of the cold war the international arms markets opened up in Africa in a way that grain markets still have not done. The implication of the widespread availability of arms is that challengers to incumbents today have a more level playing field than they did in the cold war. While challengers cannot get superpower support, their resource extraction capabilities (for example, taxing their diaspora or people who share their religion) are not much lower than that of incumbents. The probability of a successful military challenge is consequently much higher post-1985 than it was during the cold war.

The result of these two changes is that after an African coup the relative military power of the first entrant into the presidential palace is not significantly greater than other hopefuls. While it is true that even during the cold war there were examples of state collapse (e.g., Chad, Uganda), after the end of the cold war the *pas de deux* of coup and countercoup, which had been relatively peaceful, has a far more incendiary possibility for blowing up into chaos and violence. Curr's Minorities at Risk data confirm this point. Since 1985 twenty-two African minority groups have been engaged in guerrilla activity against their state (or higher levels of rebellion), while in other periods (1960–65, nine groups; 1965–70, eight groups; 1975–80, twelve groups; 1980–85, ten groups) rebellion was far less pervasive. As for communal conflicts, the data report twenty-two groups engaged in rioting or more incendiary activities in the 1990s, while in earlier decades (1960s, eleven; 1970s, six; 1980s, five) there were many fewer.<sup>17</sup> Under conditions of post-cold war government collapse, then, regional and tribal aspirants have a greater incentive to contest for state power than compromise with it. Because of the nature of the African state over the past generation, there is insufficient capital investment in the society for there to be a strong bourgeois interest in peace. Moreover, since capital investment had been so paltry, the potential gains in plunder and corruption for controlling the state apparatus are greater than those of living in a countryside without any eco-

nomic dynamism at all. In sum: post-cold war control over the state apparatus, even though it has declined in its ability to tax superpowers, remains relatively remunerative as compared with other routes to wealth, and, after the collapse of a government, there is no longer certainty that the incumbent can garner sufficient military resources to stave off challenges to his rule.

This scenario has striking parallels to the "war of attrition" that was first developed by Maynard Smith and is now well-documented in the industrial organization and international relations literature.<sup>18</sup> The war of attrition game in biology explains animals' fights for prey. Fighting is costly. The goal is to get the other animal to give up. The winning animal keeps the prey; the loser is left wishing it had not entered the fight. In industrial organization this dynamic is seen with duopoly competition and marginal cost pricing. If there is declining demand and constant fixed costs, profits move toward the negative. Both firms, however, would stay in the market in the hope that the other would leave, the winner garnering monopoly price profits. In order to drop out, which would give zero profits from that date on, each firm's expected present discounted value of profits from any date on must equal zero for it to be indifferent. Under conditions of uncertainty (where firms do not know each other's cost structure) there could well be extended periods of mutual losses (the war of attrition), until one of the firms ceases production. The horror of the war of attrition model is the equilibrium possibility that each actor may pay more for the prize (in biology, the lost opportunities of hunting for another prey) than the prize itself was worth.

In Somalia, after the cold war ended, the value of the state declined (as Siyaad could no longer claim a large prize in aid for siding with one of the superpowers). His ability to retain power (due to loss of military and surveillance matériel coming from the superpowers) declined as well. Yet, given the economic poverty of the country, the state's control over the custom-house, the siphoning off of economic aid, and the rewards for approving private contracts, control over the state remained relatively attractive to clan groups, as compared to specializing only in the private economy. Thus, if any contending group faced the following calculation

$$A \text{ iff } P \cdot S - qS - C > 0$$

A = attack; iff = if and only if;  $P_r$  = probability of victory;  $S$  = value of the state;  $q$  = expected share for each member of the governing coalition;  $C$  = costs of the war.

it would contend for power. Two of these values ( $P_r$  and  $C$ ) were clearly moving in the direction supporting "attack."

What about the value of  $S$ ? If  $S$  is divisible, Fearon's commitment problem analysis helps explain the fighting, as both parties would be after the rewards of the state with the present war fought over future bargaining power over those resources.<sup>19</sup> But suppose running a state has fixed costs  $F$  (the minimal price of order, pomp, core support group, and necessary state services) plus variable costs  $V$  (rewards for a wide circle of support groups), and that  $q$  is a function only of  $V$ . Furthermore, in the post-cold war world, the taxing power of the African state plummeted toward  $F$ . In this case both incumbents and challengers recognize that rulers can no longer provide benefits to members of a broad coalition, thereby making  $qS$  approach zero. In a sense, along with Fearon's analysis, incumbents here are unable to commit to future distributions to allied clans in a broad coalition. In another sense, the lowered value of  $S$  itself lowers  $qS$  (even if  $q$  remains constant) and explains why challengers see little value in becoming coalition members. And so, even with a declining  $S$ , the higher value of  $P_r$  and the lower value of  $C$  lead contenders to have a positive expected value for fighting.

But can the declining value of the prize ( $S$ ) actually explain sustained warfare for its capture, especially as with apparently endless war it appears that  $S$  is falling below  $F$ ? Shouldn't it be the case that if  $S$  cannot support a coalition large enough to suppress civil war any clan that fights for it would not be able to hold onto it? How can it be rational to fight? In an incomplete information type of model that I am here informally elaborating, and consistent with Posen's point about miscalculation on the probability of winning, war could only be sustained if players were unsure about each other's resolve. While I have no direct information on this point, it is probably the case that in the war of the many clans against Siyaad there was mutual understatement about each other's resolve. In the war between the Abgaal and Habar Gidir Ali Mahdi long felt that he would ultimately get Western aid and support, yet such aid never came. Meanwhile, Aideded and his followers among the Habar Gidir felt that they were the real military force behind the overthrow of Siyaad and that ultimately the more urbanized Abgaals would cave in. These miscalculations of resolve may well have sustained the civil war to a point at which the costs of fighting inexorably increased and became far higher than the expected returns of capturing the state.

The logic of the model suggests that Aideded and Ali Mahdi continued fighting not so much because they feared being decimated by the other if they lost (and here segmentary lineage theory is useful, as it suggests that there are no permanent enemies) but because each leader strategized, if the war was costing more for the opponents, that they would sue for peace first.



If both leaders think this way, the war continues. I think the war of attrition model might also help explain post-cold war events in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo (former Zaire), Congo, and Uganda. As France is tentatively withdrawing from the use of military personnel to prop up dictators in its former colonies, my analysis suggests we will be seeing Somali-like civil wars in former French African colonies as well.<sup>20</sup>

### What Sort of Third-Party Intervention?

My second question concerns the logic of third-party intervention once civil war spirals out of control. The Somali civil war did indeed spiral out of control. Although it had elements of a traditional interclan war, as the warring factions defined themselves along segmentary cleavage lines, the ensuing devastation went far beyond the boundaries of an interclan war. Refugee centers in the bush, even those organized around religious shrines, became fair game for combatants. Farmers, who were outside the standard clan cleavage structure, and who weren't even participating in the war, faced murderous attacks by bands of warriors. Humanitarian relief groups were themselves in jeopardy. Although there is no evidence, as was the case in Rwanda, that the killing was part of a plan to exterminate members of enemy clans, the human degradation was unimaginable. How, then, did the international community respond?

Sadly, it took the UN more than a year after Siyaad fell from power before it brokered a cease-fire in February 1992 between Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aideded.<sup>21</sup> Six weeks later the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor the cease-fire and to provide emergency humanitarian assistance. The secretary general appointed Mohamed Sahnoun, a well-respected Egyptian diplomat, as his special representative, and he was provided with a staff of fifty unarmed monitors. The UN promised in its Resolution 751 (April 1992) to send as well a five-hundred-man security force, but it was not until September when lightly armed Pakistani troops arrived. Ill-equipped for combat, they could not safely patrol outside their own barracks. Frustrated, Sahnoun resigned in October.<sup>22</sup>

The United States had been a reluctant participant. Despite the fact that the U.S. was responsible for supporting the Siyaad regime when it was distributing weapons throughout the country, Bush ordered General Colin Powell to airlift all Americans out of Somalia amidst the chaos of Siyaad's abdication and to wash U.S. hands clean. With the gulf war eating up official

attention, the humanitarian crisis on Africa's Horn was of low priority. Later, the U.S. resisted the implementation of the security force envisioned in Resolution 751. However, with the breakdown of the UN-brokered cease-fire, and with the massive numbers of starving and diseased victims of the civil war gaining international attention, President Bush committed U.S. forces to airlift relief supplies to the civil war's victims. In this U.S.-support operation of UNOSOM I, called Provide Relief, more than twenty-eight thousand metric tons of relief supplies were delivered to Somalia. By November President Bush agreed to up the ante and offer U.S. troops to lead a UN military action to avert an even greater human tragedy. On December 3 the Security Council, combining language of Chapters 6 (on peacekeeping) and 7 (on peace enforcement) of the UN Charter, passed Resolution 794, creating the United Task Force (UNITAF), with a mandate to create a permanent UN peacekeeping operation to provide humanitarian assistance and to restore order to southern Somalia. From December 1992 through May 1993 UNITAF involved about thirty-eight thousand troops from twenty-one nations, including twenty-eight thousand Americans, whose parallel operation during the UNITAF period was called Operation Restore Hope. President Bush insisted that Restore Hope be seen merely as a humanitarian mission to save civilian lives and promised that the mission would be over in a few months' time. With this precommitment President Bush made clear that the U.S. had no intention of resolving the civil war or rebuilding the state. The only goal was to save the civilian population from self-inflicted extinction.

Bush appointed Robert Oakley, a former ambassador to Somalia, as head of Operation Restore Hope. In his postmortems Oakley presents an unconvincing strategic calculus (in which accommodating the warlords was a first step to seriously involving civil society in the reconstruction of the country).<sup>23</sup> In reality, his approach was quite simple. The warlords had the capacity to terrorize anyone who ventured into the countryside. Although anarchy in the bush made the success of humanitarian efforts precarious even with warlord acquiescence, they were the principal threats to the security of the refugee centers that humanitarian agencies sought to reach. Eliminating the warlords would be a major military and political undertaking, and, if that were the first step in a U.S. plan, nearly the entire population of the south would have been put in jeopardy. And such a strategy would have been counter to the presidential admonition that all U.S. troops be gone from Somalia within three months. Although he made several efforts to trim the warlords' sails, for example in the appointment of governors in the localities

and in the appointment of women in all local councils, he necessarily became hostage to the order that the warlords could provide, as this order was the key to the humanitarian effort. The long-term consequence of such a strategy was to make legitimate governance of Somalia (or even illegitimate governance by a hegemonic warlord) virtually impossible. There are many critics of Oakley's decision due to these consequences.<sup>24</sup> Yet it is undeniable that the quick opening-up of the humanitarian aid route saved thousands of lives.<sup>25</sup>

The U.S.-UN agreement in setting up UNITAF had ambiguous language in regard to the retransfer of the operation to UN command. The problem that faced President Clinton, who inherited Bush's operation that had no endgame, was how to get out of Somalia. Clinton wanted to pass the hot potato back to the UN, even though he knew full well that the UN would not be able to bring peace to the country. In March 1993, with Security Council Resolution 814, crafted by President Clinton's foreign policy team, UNOSOM II was mandated. This was an ambitious resolution calling for the rebuilding of state institutions. Moreover, it was the first ever Chapter 7 resolution that was explicit about enforcement, including the disarming of Somali clans. Yet it was to go into operation with fewer committed troops than during the UNITAF period.

The U.S. mission under the UNOSOM II rubric was led by Admiral Jonathan Howe. Given pressure from Secretary General Boutros-Chali, from the international lobby of humanitarian agencies, and from the realization that the Oakley strategy provided no easy exit, Howe became implicated in what critics of the Somali intervention call mission creep—the move from humanitarian intervention to nation building. To be sure, as Martin Ganzglass argues, if Oakley had paid more attention to the possibilities of recreating a decent set of local constabularies, the safety of the Somali population would have been substantially aided, at relatively low cost.<sup>26</sup> But due to Oakley's initial decision to accommodate the warlords, and with the full expectation on the part of all combatants that there would be no significant outside force in the country after May 1994, the warlords had an incentive to resist international attempts to construct a civil society.

In light of the incentive to warlords to outlast the international gendarmerie, UN troops were not logistically equipped to handle the new assignment. Aided took advantage of this in June 1993 when some of his supporters ambushed and killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers. In response, the UN authorized (through Security Council Resolution 837) U.S. Rangers to apprehend those responsible, but in October eighteen Americans were killed

and seventy-five wounded in their manhunt for Aided. President Clinton forthwith announced the phased withdrawal of American troops that would be completed by March 1994. Thus ended the role of the international gendarmerie in the Somali civil war. By the time it left there was a precarious division of Mogadishu between the forces of Aided and Mahdi, with no governing institutions for the rest of the country, although former British Somaliland had announced its formal though unrecognized secession and the Majerteen region was operating under informal institutions of quasi-sovereignty.

This analysis raises big questions: (1) Are there tactical lessons about Somali-type invasions that should be incorporated into future international interventions? (2) Can the U.S. (or any set of democratic states) make the necessary commitment to a Third World civil war ("We will stay there as long as necessary") that would give assurance to combatants that they need not store up weapons for the moment that the U.S. leaves? (3) Should the U.S. pick a warlord and shower him with weapons, on the condition that he hold elections once peace is restored? (4) Should the U.S. ignore the suffering of noncombatants in the short term in order to avoid propping up warlords? (5) Can the U.S. articulate a strategy of humanitarian relief that has a humanitarian exit option? (6) Must humanitarian relief missions give up any hope for a democratic future? I shall try to address these questions, first by looking at some tactical issues of administration and then by examining some strategic issues of general policy.

#### *A Catalogue of Tactical Lessons*

##### *Mission Creep*

As implied in the narrative, what has become known as the bogey of mission creep—where the goals of the operation expand with the length of time the intervening army is present—was not the result of small and imperceptible expansion of concerns. What occurred was an abrupt change in goals under the Clinton administration, whose analysts revealed little understanding of the tactical decisions made in the field that had already undetermined the possibility of success in UNOSOM II. The Clinton administration, through its drafting and supporting UN Resolution 814, changed the focus of policy from humanitarian relief to nation building.

The logic of Operation Restore Hope was seen quite early by Jennifer Parmelee, in her *Washington Post* article "Waltzing with Warlords" (June

25, 1993). "Time and again," she wrote, "I asked the powers that be—the UN, the United States—'Aren't you giving these guys too much prominence?' The reply invariably came back: 'They're the players. We've got to play ball with them.' And so, the world waltzed with the warlords." To assure a safe arrival of troops, Oakley did all he could to stroke these warlords. In fact, shortly after U.S. forces arrived they discovered a major arms cache, but since it belonged to Aideed's principal financier Osman Atto (who was also renting quarters to the U.S. mission), Oakley ordered that it not be destroyed. The military agreed that Oakley's diplomacy was making it easier to move supplies, and that was all there was need to know.<sup>27</sup>

Upon the arrival of the Howe mission, the warlords were essential for all agreements. In his first peace conference in March 1993 in Addis Ababa, an agreement that called for a truce and elections within two years was signed, but only by the warlords. This was a harsh lesson to him that, in Rosegrant's words, "their elimination had to evolve." Later on, when Howe sought to hurry up the evolution by ordering one of his assistants not to meet with Aideed, Aideed interpreted this as a threat, and he took successful enemy action against the U.S.

It is in this context that UN Resolution 814, which was drafted largely by the U.S. Mission, must be understood. As the U.S. ambassador to the UN waxed, the proposed operation was "an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a functioning member of the community of nations."<sup>28</sup> This resolution called for the secretary general "to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia" and to seek financing for "the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia." The Clinton administration, in showing its support, contemplated that eight thousand logistical troops would remain, along with a one-thousand-man Quick Reaction Force. John Bolton pointed out that this was not "mission creep"—rather it was a new policy of "assertive multilateralism."<sup>29</sup> Bolton was half-right. The goals were of "assertive multilateralism," but the means (compared with UNITAF) were paltry.

Howe's defense has been thoroughly disingenuous. "If . . . the UN is to be the agent of the international community," he wrote, "contributing nations should totally endorse its policy."<sup>30</sup> He neglects to mention that it was the U.S. that both pushed the UN's hand in passing Resolution 814 and blinded itself to the political realities it had already created through its agency in Operation Restore Hope. Mission creep was not guilty. Rather, the new policy was. Tactically, this means that we need not necessarily worry

about a structural problem endemic to such operations called "mission creep" as many postmortems have suggested. Rather, we should think about an endgame that will allow the international gendarmerie to leave after it has completed its humanitarian mission, without engendering the return of escalating violence.

#### The Role of the UN in Chapter 7 Interventions

In Somalia the UN showed itself unable to assume leadership of an international military engagement. It could not take the lead when member states entrusted it with leadership. The secretary general's special representative, Mohamed Sahnoun, was entrusted with the administration of Security Council Resolution 751, creating UNOSOM I. While working in Somalia, he learned that his superiors had allowed a Russian plane with UN markings to deliver shipments to Ali Mahdi, thus undermining the UN's impartiality. Later the UN announced a deployment of three thousand troops to Somalia while he was in delicate negotiations concerning the first five hundred. Exasperated with the UN's inability to articulate and sustain any policy, Sahnoun quit in October 1992. During UNOSOM II, when the UN again had command, the command situation hardly improved. After the failures of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force to ambush Aideed, the Italians openly defied the UN command by engaging in direct negotiations with Aideed's movement. There was no way the Italians could be policed or punished.

Furthermore, the UN's staffing remains an international embarrassment. During the negotiations between the U.S. and the UN over the establishment of UNITAF, for example, the secretary general did not develop a serious plan (as Resolution 794 called for) for transferring power to UNOSOM after UNITAF's withdrawal. When a U.S. interagency team went to New York to connect with the UNOSOM team, they were shocked that the secretary general had virtually no staff working on the problem. The best the UN team could do is drag its feet in the expectation that if it did nothing the Americans would continue keeping guard. There was no command center in the UN committed to getting the operation done correctly. Under UNOSOM II no UN planners were sent on site before the arrival of the commander and deputy commander. With the UN command operating with twelve thousand fewer troops than authorized, and many of the troops under strong restrictions as to what kinds of activities they could legally engage in, there was no way Admiral Howe could develop a coherent tactical

plan. Furthermore, Howe was authorized to have a staff of eight hundred, but it took months to reach one hundred, and he described the applicant pool as a bunch of "people that nobody else wants."<sup>31</sup> Stories of UN incompetence in the field are legion. Major General Lewis Mackenzie, a Canadian and former head of UN forces in Sarajevo, made this comment about UN managerial capacity: "A UN commander in the field should not get into trouble after 5 P.M. in New York, or Saturday and Sunday. There is no one to answer the phone."<sup>32</sup>

Are these failures inherent in UN operations or are they just examples of poor management that can be fixed? John Ruggie, in a subtle analysis of UN-sponsored military interventions, suggests that the enormous holes that the UN dug for itself were not necessary and that we should not give up hope, with a little fine-tuning, of a more effective international force under UN auspices.<sup>33</sup> The UN's record in Somalia was so egregious, however, that it is difficult to calculate the expected payoffs of reform. The issue goes beyond administrative reform, or the possibilities with a more efficient secretary general. As a consensual organization, oriented toward diplomacy, the UN is nearly compelled to reject decisive in-the-field military command. In light of this the best role for the UN is to vote for interventions, whether of Chapter 6 or 7 (or some hybrid, as was UNITAF), and then to subcontract the operation out to a state (usually the U.S.) capable of carrying it out. An equitable share-the-burdens taxation scheme for member states would of course be necessary, and this might be facilitated by the Secretariat. But the UN should not be involved in combat operations.<sup>34</sup>

#### The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations

NGOs have come under especially harsh criticism in the wake of recent international military operations. For example, drawing on his own experience as an aid worker and journalist in Somalia, Michael Maren examined the economic and humanitarian damage done in Somalia, ironically, by the very organizations that distributed free food and administered development projects in the name of famine relief. Maren estimates that approximately two-thirds of food shipments for refugees in the area of Somalia in which he worked were being stolen. Some of the stolen food was sold on the black market in order to purchase arms, which in turn escalated conflicts, often creating more refugees. Foreign aid destroyed what was left of local markets by flooding the country with cheap or free food, thus ruining the livelihood of many farmers. Others became "rich from food"; one Somali referred to

his second wife as "CARE wife," because the overabundance of relief food he sold enabled him to marry again. Save the Children Foundation, Maren shows with devastatingly powerful documentation, which ran heartbreaking advertisements throughout the world on the starving children in Somalia, had hardly an operating soup kitchen working in the country.<sup>35</sup>

NGOs were placed in unmanageable situations with the fall of Siyaad's government in 1991. The diplomatic community had evacuated, and there was no one else but the NGOs to take responsibility for those innocent people who were victims of the civil war that was not of their making. Yet, these NGOs, in order to survive, had to buy protection from the warlords, and soon many of these organizations became hostage to the warlords. Employees of NGOs would turn on their own employers for large sums of cash, making the helpers helpless. This is why many of them urged international military intervention. Once the intervention began, some of the NGOs were more of a nuisance to the gendarmierie's operations—in being easy targets for the warlords—than a help to the people. To an important degree the NGOs subverted the strategic space of the international gendarmierie, not allowing it to threaten quick departure and forcing its officials to bargain with warlords in the game of kidnap. Nonetheless, I think Maren's charges are far too general and unrealistic. Not all NGOs were as embarrassingly unhelpful as Save the Children. Furthermore, it is unfair to charge those organizations that were providing food with creating disincentives for farmers to plant their own crops, when thousands were dying of starvation. NGOs operated in a terrible environment; many made imprudent decisions. But living with NGOs—largely because they demonstrate international concern—must be part of the territory for any intervening force.

#### Investing in Local Knowledge

Anna Simons proposes that the dissolution of Somalia was caused by "misunderstanding" based not on "lack of information but a surfeit of partial information."<sup>36</sup> While she refers to the period before the entrance of international military force, it is reasonable to hypothesize that tactical errors in the administration of the international effort were due to insufficient investment in knowledge of the mores and the culture of the society that was being invaded. In the postmortems on the international military operations the claim of ignorance about local conditions is often made. James Mayall argues that Colin Powell's ideas were based upon his success in Desert Storm, but his dictum of "employ maximum controlled violence" on patrol

had implications for the distribution of wealth, matériel and power to clans about which he was unaware and that made peacemaking all the more difficult.<sup>37</sup> As evidence, Mayall and Lewis point out that the UN headquarters in Mogadishu was staffed mainly by Habar Gidirs, and this gave Aided a strategic advantage in preparing for police patrols, an advantage the Abgaals did not have.<sup>38</sup> Mayall and Lewis, and in a related fashion A. I. Samatar, make a deeper accusation. They argue that the outside forces misunderstood the Somali concept of clan (*tol*) and acted as if these clan groups were well-bounded and exclusive. In fact, if outsiders understood how fluid clan membership is, and how decentralized power within clans are, they would not have invested as much hope in the warlords as they did.<sup>39</sup> Said Samatar argued in vain to UN and U.S. authorities that more effort should have gone into arming poets with a broad audience—in the name of peace—rather than warlords in the name of security.<sup>40</sup> This would have shown a truer understanding of what motivates peace in the local context.

Two arguments can be used to weaken the impact of this powerful charge. First, as Lewis and Mayall note, Mohamed Sahnoun and Umat Kittani of the UN got considerable support from the Horn of Africa Center in Uppsala, funded by the Nordic countries and NGOs. Although the center's advisory group ignored voices that were opposed to vigorous UN action, it built its recommendations for UN action on a firm foundation of local input. Moreover, it had Ambassador Oakley's ear, whom the authors praise for his local knowledge. The group advocated a "bottom up" approach to "re-empower traditional community leaders." Oakley instead concentrated his efforts on the high-profile warlords, and, in Lewis and Mayall's judgment, gave them new and unwarranted legitimacy.<sup>41</sup> But it would be folly to argue that this was done out of ignorance. Rather, it was done because Oakley was under orders to get food quickly to the camps and not to reconstitute the society. The priorities of the Uppsala group were different from the American army, to be sure. But this isn't a question of local knowledge.

The second argument is strongly but inadvertently made by Maxamed Afax, from whom I have appropriated the epigraph for this chapter. He writes, "Culture and literature were among the areas most profoundly affected by the military regime." Theft, lying, hypocrisy, rape became indicators of *ragannimo* (manhood). Many of those who stood against Siyaad were his former military officers who turned against him, who were themselves implicated in torture. The Somali masses could give them little support, as they say: "Hal boooli ahi nining xalaal ah ma dhasho" (A stolen she-camel does not give birth to a rightful baby). Eventually the people bowed

to those with guns rather than to those with reason, reflecting "the new destructive political culture."<sup>42</sup> This point raises an important question. If traditional Somali political culture is reflected in the epigraph to this chapter, and if current activities reflect a new political culture, how could deep knowledge of tradition have helped the United States weather the post-1991 storm? If Somali political culture is so "new," why should the international gendarmerie learn about what no longer exists?

The dilemma is nicely revealed by Afax's very statement of the problem:

The entire fabric of Somali society has been ravaged. The very existence of the whole nation has sunk in a deep dark sea of unimaginable human and material disaster. . . . The communal mind of the society seems to be in a coma. No collective responsible effort, voicing national concern or calling for saving the savable, has so far emerged. For a nation proverbially known for its deep-rooted traditions of reasoning and a history of national consciousness, this is an utterly puzzling development. . . . Any attempt to deal successfully with this problem requires [my emphasis] a better understanding of Somali culture and society.<sup>43</sup>

And one can only ask, If the situation was so puzzling to a genuine expert of Somali society, what promise is there in requiring those who intervene to develop a better understanding of it? If Siyaad's "outrageous manipulations of the traditional kin system" were so devastating to its integrity,<sup>44</sup> what profit is there for outsiders seeking peace to study its (former) operations?

This is no plea for ignorance of the local. Rather it is a plea that we do not put too much weight on the insensitivities of international forces to the local scene as an explanation for its failures. In fact, with a secretary general and a U.S. ambassador who had professional backgrounds working in Somalia, the international gendarmerie had about as much local knowledge as we could ever hope for.

### *Is There a Third-Party Strategy of Intervention?*

#### *Triage*

Stephen Stedman argues with persuasiveness and sang froid that in regard to the issue of collapsed states the U.S. and UN policy should be sensitive to the logic of triage, that is, to "provide aid only to those countries that have

a chance to achieve sustainable development. The present policy—responding to a few crises at the expense of the needs of the many—is, he argues, “both unethical and untenable. It is a policy doomed to produce more, not fewer, humanitarian disasters.”<sup>45</sup> While this is a cogent recommendation that merits careful consideration, I do not believe that it can be easily implemented. There is an international audience for catastrophe, and one hundred thousand dying children in a refugee camp engages this audience (because it is specific) far more than the one million whose lives are threatened by potential cholera, say, in Nigeria (because the threat is diffuse, in that it is hard to picture these victims in a compelling and clear way). Suppose the cost were equal to remedy these two problems. Stedman would favor giving support for the one million. I would answer that the costs of getting support for the latter are gigantic; while it is possible to garner support for the former. While it would be wrong to set criteria for aid giving based solely upon who bleeds most in CNN footage, it would be callous to ignore immense suffering in humanitarian disasters because the expected returns of another investment would be higher. The specificity of catastrophe from human disasters makes intervention feasible. And, because it is feasible, it would be unconscionable to ignore. The international gendarmerie therefore needs a strategy for entering Somali-type conflicts, even though the expected humanitarian returns of helping sustain development in other countries might be higher.

#### Creating Safe Havens, and Nothing More

My preliminary answer to the question of whether there was a cheaper model out there, one that could save lives but not embroil the international gendarmerie into a losing street war, was to focus on the possibility of creating safe havens.<sup>46</sup> Suppose after Operation Restore Hope (in which the U.S. did a bit more to restore local constabularies and local authorities in areas that were not in the principal zones of combat) the United States committed itself only to the protection of relief routes and refugee camps. A frigate or battleship off of the Mogadishu and maybe the Kisimayo coasts, with a few airplanes for necessary sorties, might have been deployed in this strategy of protecting the port and the routes to the refugee centers. The threat of bombing if supply lines are attacked would be the deterrent for warlords to look for their plunder elsewhere. The U.S. would say that as long as the supply lines were open for relief, and as long as there were camp areas where refugees would be safe, the humanitarian problem was solved.

With this plan the U.S. could and should offer its “good offices” for negotiations between warring parties but not make the solution to the civil war a major part of its agenda. The U.S. could also (in line with my argument in response to the question of the causes of the spiraling violence in post-cold war civil wars) promise that, if the warring parties could agree on a solution, it would be willing to supply relatively large amounts of weapons and surveillance equipment to the chosen leader. The principal argument in support of this approach is that without the wherewithal to commit troops as mediators for the long term, it is dishonest (and even immoral) to press for wider nation-building goals.

The big problem with this approach is that the refugee camps would become the object of terror, with guerrilla armies formed principally to extract supplies from the camps to continue their warfare, which would not be monitored by the outside army. The kind of surveillance needed to keep the camps free from predators—while perhaps met in the case of Operation Provide Comfort for the Kurds in northern Iraq—is extraordinarily expensive. The likelihood that safe havens would not become supply camps for contending armies is quite low.

#### Promotion of Democracy, with High Risk

The implications of the war of attrition model are quite depressing. The thrust in American foreign policy of pressing for democracy and human rights as a precondition for U.S. aid may need to be questioned. If the key to civil war is the expectation that newly installed incumbents are not going to have world-class surveillance techniques in order to oppress challengers, and U.S. policy helps further that expectation, it might well be (through excellent intentions) encouraging civil war. Perhaps the U.S. should go back into the game—in the name of preventing humanitarian catastrophes—of propping up tinpot dictators?

I would reject this tack, largely because dancing with a single warlord seals the international gendarmerie to his fate. It is supremely difficult to compel one’s dance partner to subject himself to real elections and to abide by the results.

Rather than picking a warlord, it is worth speculating how the dynamics discussed herein could, through the reduction in the worth of the prize awarded to coup winners, enhance the probability of democracy. Suppose, for example, that after a coup with an insignificant superpower prize the probability of escalating violence by contenders to the palace is .7. Suppose

further, with the prospects of a big prize so low, a significant group of (the albeit small set of) businessmen in the country (and the diaspora involved in trade with their home country) agree not to fund a war of attrition. Instead, they agree to the rule of law and a democratic constitution (in which contests for power would be uncertain for all contenders) and the concomitant protection of property rights. For each businessman the expected return on investment would be higher than the expected return of his group getting in power multiplied by the contracts that would come his way by virtue of his group getting the reins of power. Such an agreement is hard to reach, as it involves a very difficult coordination problem for businessmen from different tribal backgrounds and a solution to a commitment problem that, if a member of its tribe won the election, the regime would not confiscate property from the others. Let us put the probability of reaching a satisfactory agreement at .3. Some might argue that reducing the prize for the capture of the palace would be worthwhile, even if the risks of civil war are high, because the post-cold war situation makes possible the foundation for a rule of law.<sup>47</sup>

The question then becomes, Is there a way with a minuscule prize to lower the probability of a spiraling civil war, without deterring (by making the prize too high) businessmen from allying qua businessman (and not with tribal fellows) in the name of protection of property rights and the rule of law? It may be possible to formulate such a strategy for the promotion of a rule of law, but first a clear distinction between "military" and "police" intervention needs to be made.

#### Decoupling Military and Police Operations

The logic of Walter's dissertation is clear in the case of international intervention amidst the Somali civil war.<sup>48</sup> The only way that President Bush could justify to the American public that the U.S. military should intervene was by saying that the intervention would be short in duration and limited in goals. But by announcing these aims publicly he was also informing the combatants that once the massive U.S. force left the scene they could continue their warfare as before. Whether the logic is of a security dilemma or of a war of attrition, as soon as a third-party enforcer leaves the scene the war will continue. Under such conditions it would be irrational for either party to disarm. In fact, all parties to the war cantoned their armaments during the period of UNITAF control, ready to bring them out in the open once the massive U.S. operation left the field. Here is the nub of the strategic

dilemma: if the international gendarmerie cannot commit to a long-term mediating role, it is likely to fail in getting a successful negotiated settlement to a civil war.

But as has been demonstrated in Cyprus, whose lessons are beginning to be taught to strategic planners in the contemporary cases of Haiti and Bosnia, leaders in the West can and should distinguish short-term military intervention from longer-term policing of a stalemate. Once massive military power creates a situation of peace, and there is a *modus vivendi* between the warring parties, it is then possible to subcontract the policing to another force. Canada, Finland, and Pakistan have developed expertise in their armies to play such a role. There is every reason that the UN should become the forum where countries negotiate a system of taxation (of countries) to pay for the policing. It should be made clear to all that, as in Cyprus, there is no guarantee of a stable peace and that the police force may be deployed for many years to come. Under conditions of an internationally created cease-fire with the gendarmerie (police, not military) in for the long term, domestic forces—as with the example of businessmen in the previous section—may be able to overcome the commitment problem that held back an agreement to promote the rule of law. More likely, however, the payoffs of having an expensive international police force—providing a new source of rents to distribute—will be high enough to deter an internal solution. But the long-term costs of having such police forces (even if they become permanent) seem far lower than the alternative: continued civil war, mass starvation, and killing.

Whether or not the decoupling option works, the solution to the endgame that was reflected in UNOSOM II's strategy of nation building seems worse. Without the U.S. willing to become trustees of collapsed states, it ought not devise strategies of intervention in which *de facto* trusteeship is the only route to success.

Part I of this chapter reviewed explanations for the civil war in Somalia that spiraled in the wake of Mohammed Siyaad Barre's fall in 1991. The standard explanation of area specialists, focusing on Somalis' segmented lineage system, was found wanting because such systems work well in ameliorating violent conflict after it breaks out. What needed to be explained, then, was the failure of the segmentary lineage system to produce a powerful peace coalition. The security dilemma, the standard explanation of international relations experts, and emphasized in several of the analyses in this volume, was not fully satisfactory in explaining the Somali case either. There

was little evidence that the principal aim of the clan armies was to protect their kin from the observed arming of other clans. Two other international relations approaches, one focusing on miscalculations of strength under conditions of anarchy and the other on the commitment problem, were found to have important insights for parts of the Somali puzzle but were not in themselves satisfactory causal theories. The essay then borrowed from evolutionary biology and industrial organization to propose that the spiraling of the civil war was due to the declining relative resources of African incumbents compared to challengers, which can, when a leader falls from power, set off a war of attrition among contenders.

Part 2 of this chapter examined the role of the international gendarmerie in response to the catastrophe in Somalia, in order to answer the question of how best to organize third-party intervention. The analysis questioned the appropriateness of UN direction of Chapter 7 missions, as the overarching diplomatic mission of the UN too easily subverts the decisive field actions that are necessary for Chapter 7 missions. Also questioned was the possibility for any gendarmerie of combining rapid humanitarian relief in civil wars (which requires compromises with illegitimate strongmen) with a program of national construction (which demands undermining the power of those strongmen).

An implication of the analyses in parts 1 and 2 might be for the international gendarmerie in response to contests for state power in Africa to choose a strongman and to shower him with prizes, thereby undermining the incentive for other contenders to fight, and undermining as well any hope of legitimate governance for the near future. The chapter suggests a less autocratic but perhaps riskier implication of the analysis. This would involve rapid Chapter 7-type action (subcontracted to a major power) to put down spiraling civil wars, followed by the introduction of an international police force that is committed to long-term monitoring. Under these conditions, with no big prizes for strongmen, diplomatic efforts should be used to encourage pacts cross-cutting clan or tribal groups that would promote the rule of law.

Humanitarian efforts in putting out the flames of civil war have floundered on the failure to design an endgame for international forces. The proposal herein is a modest suggestion in thinking long term about an endgame that would be as humanitarian as the original motivations for military action.

## NOTES

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The epigraph is taken from Maxamed Afax, "The Mirror of Culture: Somali Dissolution Seen Through Oral Expression," in Ahmed I. Samatar, ed., *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal* (Boulder: Rienner, 1994), p. 248. Readers may note the author but not the editor of the cited volume relies on Somali orthography in spelling his name and in reproducing the proverb above. In this chapter I shall use the Somali orthography to represent the names of clans and towns, except (as with Mogadishu) where there is a standard spelling in foreign media. Names of Somali authors are reproduced as in their publications, but, for the key actors in the narrative, I have used the common media spellings.

1. The Daarood, Isxaaq, and Hawiye are the largest of the clan-families of the Samaale branch of Somali society. The MOD alliance constituted three of the five major Daarood clans (the other two are the Warsangeli and the Majeerteen). Two Hawiye clans (the Abgaal and Habar Gidir) play an important role in this narrative. I shall not be discussing conflicts within so-called Somaliland (the rump republic of the former British colony), and therefore Isxaaq clan divisions are not relevant to this paper. The other branch of Somali society, the Sab, includes mostly agricultural clans that were victims of but not participants in the civil war.
2. Propositional claims in segmentary lineage theory are hard to come by. The locus classicus is E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Kinship and Marriage Among the Nuer* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1951).
3. I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 156–157, and chapter 8; Said S. Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
4. Said S. Samatar, *Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil*, no. 4 (London: Minority Rights Group Report, 1991), p. 26.
5. Samatar, *Somalia*, pp. 13, 27. Also making this point is Marc Michaelsen, "Somalia: The Painful Road to Reconciliation," *Africa Today*, 2d quarter (1993), pp. 53–73. Michaelsen insists that state centralization due to the military rule of Siyaad overshadowed the constraints of the segmentary lineage system, weakening traditional modes of conflict resolution.
6. See I. M. Lewis, "Segmentary Nationalism and the Collapse of the Somali State," in his *Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society* (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea, 1994), for a demonstration of the continued relevance and viability of the segmentary lineage system. Postmodern critics of Lewis, e.g.,



- Abdalla Omar Mansur (1995) "The Nature of the Somali Clan System," in A. J. Ahmed, *The Invention of Somalia* (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea, 1995), pp. 117-134, have yet to provide compelling field evidence that shows a different principle of social organization than the one Lewis has described. For a critique of Lewis's reliance on segmentary lineage explanations that parallels the one presented here, see C. Besteman, "Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence—The Dissolution of the Somali Nation-State" *American Ethnologist*, vol. 23, no. 3 (1996), pp. 579, 592.
7. Two area experts wrote in 1987 that, "indeed, there are already signs that a nascent civil war, and a potentially catastrophic one, is brewing in Somalia." Although they ended their book with a statement of "cautious [but unwarranted] optimism," their analysis correctly foresaw the chaos that could ensue should Siyaad be deposed. A better understanding of such expert analysis by outside powers and the UN could have helped cauterize the violence in 1991. See David D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp. 154, 161.
8. For a definition of the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, chapter 1, this volume, and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1978), p. 169.
9. This portrait of Aideed's motivations was painted by Robert Oakley, private communication.
10. Barry Posen "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47; James Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1994; James Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds. *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail," Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1994.
11. See Mancur Olson, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Dictatorship," unpublished manuscript; Douglass North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: Norton, 1981); and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), for resource-based theories of the state. See also Ronald Wintrobe, "The Timpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 84, no. 3 (1990), pp. 849-872.
12. See Thomas Callaghy, "The State as a Lame Leviathan," in Zaki Ergas, ed., *The African State in Transition* (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 87-116.
13. Stephen Sedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Michael Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

14. After coups there are short-term increases on military expenditures, best interpreted as coming from the "prize" awarded by international powers to coup victors. See William Foltz, "The Militarization of Africa: Trends and Policy Problems," chapter 7 in William Foltz and Henry Bienen, eds., *Arms and the African* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 172.
15. Discussed in Peter Schraeder, "U.S. Intervention in the Horn of Africa Amidst the End of the Cold War," *Africa Today*, 2d quarter (1993), pp. 7-27.
16. But note Peter Schraeder, "From Berlin 1884 to 1989," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3 (December 1995), who documents that French aid to its former African colonies has in fact doubled in the post-cold war years. These prizes give incumbency advantages to dictators that may help to preserve the cold war stability in those African states lucky enough to receive such aid.
17. Ted Robert Gurr, dir., *Minorities at Risk*, phase 3 dataset. The half-decade rebellion scores had to reach a level of "4," and the decadal communal conflict score had to reach a level of "5" to be counted in my enumerations. See also Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 38 (1994), pp. 347-377, where the author notes that Africa is the region with the greatest number of ethnopolitical conflicts to arise post-1987. Gurr denies that the collapse of the bloc system had anything to do with these conflicts, as "Africa [is] the region least affected by Cold War rivalries" (pp. 354). My interpretation here suggests an indirect effect on the level of ethnopolitical conflict in Africa due to the end of the cold war.
18. See John Maynard Smith, *Models in Ecology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), for the first exposition of the model. In industrial organization the state of knowledge in the field is summarized in Jean Tirole, *The Theory of Industrial Organization* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), pp. 311-314, 380-385. For possibilities for cooperative solutions under war of attritionlike circumstances, see Stergios Skaperdas, "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," *American Economic Review*, vol. 82, no. 4 (September 1992), pp. 720-739. For an analysis of bargaining in a war of attrition, see James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 88, no. 3 (1994), pp. 577-592.
19. James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization*, vol. 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.
20. Schraeder, "From Berlin 1884 to 1989," shows how France has winked at African state subterfuges of democratic reform in order to help its francophone African clients survive. Yet, as can be seen with political and communal conflicts in Congo, Mali, and Niger in the late-1990s, French legionnaires are less involved in propping up militarily puppet governments.
21. The short vignette on the history of international intervention in the Somali civil war that follows is drawn from Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar,

- Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995); and Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995).
22. Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1994).
  23. John Hirsch and Robert Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).
  24. Oakley's defense on this issue is presented in Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, pp. 56-64, 70-71, 78, and 191. Most of the papers in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Learning From Somalia* (Boulder: Westview, 1997), agree that Oakley sided too closely with the warlords.
  25. A ballpark figure is hard to come by. Steven Hansch, Scott Lillibridge, Grace Egeland, Charles Teller, and Michael Toole, *Lives Lost, Lives Saved: Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Emergency* (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, November 1994), provides reasonable statistical evidence that UNITAF input saved between 10,000 and 25,000 lives. Supporters of American efforts have given wildly inflated figures. Chester Crocker, in his "Lessons of Somalia," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 3 (1995), p. 3, gives a figure (without any empirical support) of 250,000. Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social World," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 1 (1996), p. 30, gives the figure of 500,000, again without any empirical justification. Meanwhile, detractors of the policy err in the other direction. Alex de Waal, *Times Literary Supplement*, December 29, 1995, asserts without statistical evidence that the rains of 1991 were the principal cause of the miracle that saved thousands. The overall cost of the operation for the U.S. from 1992-94 was \$2.3 billion, as estimated by John G. Sommer, *Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia, 1990-1994* (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugee Issues, 1994). A summary of the successes of Restore Hope, one that is open about the failures as well, is that of Allard, *Somalia Operations*.
  26. "The Restoration of the Somali Justice System," Clarke and Herbst, *Learning From Somalia*. Oakley argues that he did all that was possible to build up local constabularies in Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, pp. 87-92.
  27. Susan Rosegrant, "A 'Seamless' Transition: United States and United Nations Operations in Somalia—1992-1993," Case Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, CO9-96-13240, part A, and CO9-96-13250, part B, Part A, 1996, p. 18. After Aideed's death in July 1996, his son assumed leadership of the Habar Gidir forces, but relations broke down with Atto, leaving Mogadishu with two Habar Gidir armies fighting each other and the Abgaals. See U.S. Department of State, "Somalia: Profile of Asylum Claims

- and Country Conditions" (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, December 1996).
28. Rosegrant, "A 'Seamless' Transition," part A, p. 33.
  29. John Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs* (January-February 1994), vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 62-63. As assistant secretary of state for international organizations in the Bush administration, Bolton has an interest in emphasizing the differences between the Bush and the Clinton policies.
  30. Jonathan Howe, "The United States and United Nations in Somalia: The Limits of Involvement," *Washington Quarterly* (1995), vol. 18, no. 3, p. 54.
  31. Rosegrant, "A 'Seamless' Transition," part B, pp. 1-2. To be sure, during UNOSOM II, the secretary general's military adviser had a staff of only two officers. Two years later, with the Haiti operation underway, there were over one hundred experienced officers on this staff. Still, without the incentives and the capacity to make and administer decisions, the UN cannot effectively execute Chapter 7 missions. While Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, "Sustaining Success in Haiti," *Strategic Forum* (June 1996), vol. 79, see success in the close partnership between the U.S. and the UN, I believe the key to the success of the UN operation there (UNMIH) is that it operated simultaneously with the U.S.-controlled effort (MNF).
  32. Ramesh Thakur, "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The U.N. Operation in Somalia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (1994), vol. 32, no. 3, p. 393. This changed a bit in 1993, with a twenty-four-hour Situation Room phone in New York.
  33. John Ruggie, "The United Nations and the Collective Use of Force: Wither—Or Whither?" *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, no. 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 1-20.
  34. In the case at hand the UN was crippled by the secretary general's lack of objectivity on the issue. First, he strongly believed that the UN should do something big in Africa, largely because he got his political support from delegates of that continent. Second, he had a long-term antipathy to Aideed, going back to his days as Egyptian foreign minister. The UN was seen as a partisan from the moment the secretary general got involved in the issue. Here I want to avoid the particularities of the UNOSOM operations in order to examine more general areas of failure by the UN.
  35. Michael Maren, *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity* (New York: Free Press, 1997).
  36. Anna Simons, *Networks of Dissolution* (Boulder: Westview, 1995).
  37. James Mayall, "Introduction," in James Mayall, ed., *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 17.
  38. Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, "Somalia," in Mayall, *The New Interventionism*, p. 121.
  39. Lewis and Mayall, "Somalia," pp. 122-123; Ahmed I. Samatar, "The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the Collapse of the State in Somalia," in

- Ahmed I. Samatar, *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* (Boulder: Rienner, 1994), pp. 109–111.
40. Said S. Samatar, personal communication; but note that Robert Gosende of the USA, along with the head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Somalia (who had previous diplomatic experience in Somalia), got a lot of Somali poetry on Radio Station Rajo (Hope).
41. Lewis and Mayall, "Somalia," p. 113. Howe is another story. He had little sense of the society into which he was dropped, and the disastrous early days of his incumbency were not solely due to the total lack of staff support available to him.
42. Aftax, "The Mirror of Culture," pp. 248–249.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 233–234.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
45. Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation." His is not a case of *ex ante* support and *ex post* critique. In a policy paper of 1992, "Somalia: The Case for Triage," Stedman foresaw many of the problems that did occur.
46. This was mooted by Fred Cuny, a famine consultant, and many of the U.S. civilian agencies favored this plan. The NSC rejected it as it would require expensive surveillance. See Ken Menkhaus, with Louis Ortmyer, "Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention," *Pew Case Studies in International Affairs*, Case 464 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Publications, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1995), p. 4.
47. This idea was presented to me by Leonard Wantchekon of Yale University. See Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), for the notion of democracy as a contest with uncertain outcomes. See Barry Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," *American Political Science Review* (1997), vol. 91, no. 2, pp. 245–263, for the coordination problem involved in the emergence of a rule of law.
48. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars."

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## 6 War and Peace in Cambodia

Michael W. Doyle

Between May 23 and 28, 1993, the citizens of Cambodia voted in a long awaited election run by the United Nations. For Cambodia, a land that has seen war, devastation, national massacre, and foreign invasion all in the last generation, the election was the culmination of years of peace talks as well as fifteen months of peacekeeping by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Yet the news from Cambodia over the preceding months seemed uniformly bleak—massacres of ethnic Vietnamese, attacks on UN soldiers and civilians, harassment of opposition political parties, and incidents of renewed fighting. Journalists had been drawn to the setbacks, and many had written off UNTAC as a failure. But once the election was successfully completed, an opposite pattern was set in the reporting. All the problems that plagued the conduct of the eighteen-month operation were swept aside by the glow of a successful week of elections.

In the years since the 1993 election Cambodia continued to confound any straightforward assessment. On the one hand, Southeast Asia was, at last, at peace. Cambodia again was a recognized sovereign state. King Sihanouk, who embodied Cambodia's traditional legitimacy, again reigned. The Khmer Rouge, who abandoned the peace process, were increasingly marginalized and collapsed in fall of 1996. A coalition government of Prince Ranariddh's and Hun Sen's parties, the two predominant factions, ruled. The peace, on the other hand, was very fragile. Cambodia's borders with