This Ph.D. level course covers research in positive political economy with
special emphasis on macroeconomic aspects. First, the course will survey
topics in business cycles theory such as political business cycles, monetary
policy delegation and central bank independence, and optimal fiscal policy
(political determinants of short-run macroeconomic management). Second,
the course will cover topics in the political economy of economic growth,
such as the interplay of political instability, income inequality, human
capital accumulation and growth (political determinants of long-run economic
performance). Third, the course will cover new issues in international
political macroeconomics, with specific focus on the political economy
of trade protection, the economics of country formation and international
policy coordination.
Textbooks: The course will rely
on two required textbooks in addition to the assigned articles and books:
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, Political Economics, Explaining Economic
Policy, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. (PT1)
Drazen, Allan, Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000. (AD)
In addition, you may find the following collection of seminal papers useful,
since it will contain a lot of the required articles, which will save you
the bother of having to locate them separately:
Persson and Tabellini, Monetary and Fiscal Policy (2 volumes), Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1994 (contains a collection of articles, some assigned below).
(PT2, vol. 1 and vol. 2)
Other useful books that you should own if you are serious about doing research
in political macroeconomics are:
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, MIT
Press, 1997.
Alesina and Spolaore, The Size of Nations, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA forthcoming
2003.
Prerequisites: First-year graduate
micro, first-year graduate econometrics. First-year macro and a Ph.D. course
in formal political economy (especially voting theory) will prove very
useful but are not prerequisites.
Requirements: The requirements if
the course are 4 problem sets (for a total of 50% of the grade) and a final
paper (50%).
Problem sets: The problem sets will be due roughly every two weeks
in class. They will be returned promptly with solutions sets. You are urged
to work on the prob-lem sets alone. The goal of the problem sets is to
make sure you learn the mechanics of the main workhorse models in political
macro.
Final paper: The paper will be due on the last day of class. The
final paper can take one of two forms: 1) a critical survey of part of
a literature we saw in class, includ-ing directions for future research.
Such a survey would be useful to those who anticipate writing on political
macroeconomics, but are not yet familiar with the field. The scope of the
survey should not exceed the scope of one or two lectures in the course.
2) A piece of original research. This option is preferable for those who
already know part of the litera-ture, and are confident of the topic they
wish to write a thesis about (or have already started). The goal of the
final paper is to get you committed to a topic so that you can start working
on a more substantial project as soon as the class ends. There are no space
constraints, either as a lower or as an upper bound.
Administrative details: My office is
in the Lou Henry Hoover Building room 222. You can drop by anytime but
it is a good idea to email me first ()
or call (650 723 1086) to make sure I am in. On Wednesdays I spend time
at the Institute for International Studies in Encina Hall, at the Center
for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, and you can find me at
my office there (CDDRL is on the first floor of the Central West wing of
Encina Hall).
)
or call (650 723 1086) to make sure I am in. On Wednesdays I spend time
at the Institute for International Studies in Encina Hall, at the Center
for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, and you can find me at
my office there (CDDRL is on the first floor of the Central West wing of
Encina Hall).