Working Papers
(All
working papers are in PDF format; to view them, download a free copy of the Adobe Acrobat
reader, version 3.0 or higher.)
Candidate Inconsistency and Voter Choice
The consistency of the positions
that candidates take over their careers often becomes an issue in political
campaigns. How do voters respond when candidates change positions? Our survey
experiments, which focused on U.S.
tax policy, revealed three patterns. First, position-switching triggers a
negative “valence” reaction. Many voters interpret position-switching as
evidence of a character flaw and consequently punish candidates for changing
their stance. Second, position-switching encourages “discounting.” Voters
express greater doubt about the current policy statements of candidates who
changed positions than about ones who stood firm. Third, although voters
dislike inconsistency in general and look skeptically upon the recent promises
of inconsistent candidates, position-switching can be profitable. Candidates
can, under specific conditions, improve their lot by switching to a position
that better resonates with voters. Overall, our experiments expose the
penalties for changing positions, while also illuminating when doing so can be
an optimal strategy.
The Effect of
International Law on Preferences and Beliefs.
How does international law affect preferences and beliefs
about foreign policy? I investigate this question by offering the first-ever
experimental analysis of treaty commitments. The experiments, embedded in
interviews with U.S.
voters and British policymakers, reveal three patterns. First, international
law changes preferences and expectations. Individuals are far more likely to
oppose policies that would violate international law than to oppose otherwise
identical policies that would not trammel upon the law. Moreover many observers,
including expert policymakers, anticipate that signatories to treaties will
behave differently from non-signatories. Second, these effects arise, at least
in part, via a reputational mechanism. By publicizing international commitments
and embedding them in a legal framework, treaties raise the reputational ante,
making it more costly to renege. Third, the effect of international law is
additive, not absolute. If the material or moral case for violating
international law is sufficiently strong, large proportions of voters and
policymakers will advocate breaking the law and will expect foreign leaders to
do the same. Thus, the experiments reported here reveal both the power and the
limits of international law.
Interests, Information, and
the Domestic Politics of International Agreements. Currently R&R at American
Journal of Political Science.
This paper examines how citizens form preferences about
compliance with international agreements. The paper argues that compliance
creates domestic winners and losers through two channels, adjustment and
reputation. It then shows that the preferences of citizens vary systematically
with their exposure to the adjustment costs and reputational benefits of
compliance. The relationship between personal interests and policy preferences
holds mainly for the most informed portion of the electorate, though, whereas
the preferences of less knowledgeable citizens are harder to reconcile with
self-interest. This finding has potentially broad implications for models of
policy choice.
Brand Names
and the Organization of Mass Belief Systems (with Paul Sniderman).
Previous research finds that the political views of citizens
exhibit minimal constraint: it is difficult to predict the position citizens
take on one issue, given their position on another. We show that constraint is
much higher than previously recognized. In the world of real politics, parties
and elites attach brand names (e.g. "Democratic" and "Republican")
to issues, thereby sending signals that help citizens respond coherently to an
array of questions. Existing studies have measured policy preferences without
presenting political brand names. A sequence of experiments supports four
conclusions: political brand names (1) markedly increase constraint; (2)
enhance constraint across rather than within policy agendas; (3) promote
constraint among the politically unsophisticated as effectively as among the
sophisticated; and (4) generate ideological consistency as effectively as
ideological brand names.
Democratic Default: Domestic Audiences and Compliance with International
Agreements
This paper challenges an increasingly common claim about the
relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. Many political
scientists argue that, in a democracy, domestic audiences constrain leaders to
honor international commitments. I explain why this argument depends on three
assumptions that are unlikely to hold in a wide range of cases. I then offer an
alternative theory in which domestic audiences sometimes make compliance less
rather than more likely, and I test it with a unique collection of public
opinion polls about foreign debt in Argentina. The data reveal that
domestic audiences prevented Argentina
from suspending debt payments in 1999 but had the opposite effect two years
later, when they contributed to the largest default in financial history. The
results confirm the existence of a conditional, rather than direct,
relationship between democratic accountability and compliance, and they suggest
an important avenue for future research: investigating who favors default and
when they are likely to become electorally decisive.
Do International Agreements Make
Reforms More Credible? The Impact of NAFTA on Mexican Stock Prices
This paper argues that international commercial agreements
can enhance the credibility of trade liberalization by mitigating two problems
– adverse selection and time-inconsistency – that sometimes lead investors to
doubt the longevity of an otherwise well-designed commercial policy. Using
stock market data from Mexico,
the paper offers strong evidence that NAFTA made trade liberalization more
credible to domestic and foreign investors. The findings should be of interest
not only to scholars concerned about the consequences of international
institutions, but also to policy makers who are opening their economies to
foreign trade.
The Morality of Secession
(M.Phil. Thesis, Oxford
University, 1994)
In this monograph I develop a normative theory of state
secession. My argument, grounded in contemporary liberal political philosophy,
proceeds in three steps. First, I demonstrate that the liberal commitment to
freedom of association implies presumption in favor of secession, which can be
overturned only by showing that the act of secession inflicts morally
significant harm on others. Next, I specify the conditions under which secessionists
could inflict harm on others by breaking political obligations or violating
property rights. Finally, I indicate when an appeal to necessity -- an argument
that secession itself is necessary to avert moral harm -- can override
political obligations and property rights. To illustrate my arguments, I draw
on cases of successful and attempted secession in the 19th and 20th centuries.
A revised version of chapter 3 is presented in "Political
Obligation and Political Secession," which argues that political
obligations arising from consent and fair play can undermine the legitimacy of
secession.
Revised September 2009