Tim Landvoigt
Job Market Candidate

Stanford University
Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305
650-862-7166
timl@stanford.edu

Curriculum Vitae

Fields:
Macroeconomics, Financial Economics, 
Real Estate Economics

Expected Graduation Date:
June, 2013

Thesis Committee:
Martin Schneider:
schneidr@stanford.edu

Monika Piazzesi:
piazzesi@stanford.edu

Bob Hall:
rehall@stanford.edu

Timothy Bresnahan:
tbres@stanford.edu

Research

Aggregate Implications of the Increase in Securitized Mortgage Debt (Job Market Paper)
Securitization added 30 percent to the peak of mortgage debt in 2006 by reducing intermediation frictions. I reach that conclusion in a dynamic model of borrowers, savers, and financial intermediaries that is calibrated to the different stages of US housing finance in the postwar period. Banks lend funds to borrowers in the form of mortgages and raise those funds by issuing equity and deposits to savers. Deposits are over-collateralized claims on the banks’ portfolios of mortgages. Securitization allows banks to sell part of the loans directly to savers after origination. It further allows the same allocation of risk among savers with diverse risk aversion, but at lower cost. Two developments change the behavior of the financial system over time. Rising securitization gradually reduces intermediation costs and frictions. At the same time, the rising quantity of mortgages requires savers to hold more risky assets. As result, savers’ limited funding capacity leads to more gradual adjustments in response to shocks, and savers earn higher risk premia on mortgage-backed securities. The dynamic model shows that, when agents temporarily underestimate the default risk of mortgages, the economy undergoes a boom-bust episode in debt and house prices.

The Housing Market(s) of San Diego (with Monika Piazzesi and Martin Schneider)
(Revise and Resubmit, AER)
This paper uses a quantitative assignment model of the housing market to understand the cross section of house prices within a metro area. In the model, equilibrium house prices are determined to assign indivisible houses that differ by quality to movers who differ by age, income and wealth. We measure distributions of house prices, house qualities and mover characteristics from micro data on the San Diego Metro Area over the recent housing boom. The model suggests that cheaper credit for poor agents was important in generating higher capital gains at the low end of the market.

Housing Demand during the Boom: The Role of Expectations and Credit Constraints
Optimism about future house price appreciation and loose credit constraints are commonly considered drivers of the recent housing boom. This paper infers short-run expectations of future house price growth and minimum down payment requirements from observed household choices. The expectations and credit constraints are implied by a life-cycle portfolio choice model that encompasses home ownership, housing demand, and financing choices. I estimate the parameters of this model using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances from 1995 to 2007. The main result is that both aggregate expectations of future price growth and minimum down payment requirements were declining throughout the boom. The separate identification of the two channels comes from their differential impact on the intensive and extensive margins of housing demand.

Information Acquisition and Consumer Choice (with Timothy F. Bresnahan and Pai-Ling Yin)
We specify and estimate a model of demand for new goods implementing Simon’s idea that consumers may not know their entire choice set.  The model is identified in data, like ours, in which there is information about both what consumers say about their choices and about their actual choices.  Learning what consumers do not know about their choice set from what they say about their choices is difficult, but solvable.  We apply our model to software upgrade demand in the era before automatic upgrading.  We find that much of the consumer inertia in electronic markets around default changes arises from incomplete information about choice sets, not from high adjustment costs.