

Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz

CV June 2009

Stanford Graduate School of Business

518 Memorial Way

Stanford, CA 94305-5015

E-mail: andy@gsb.stanford.edu

WebPage: www.stanford.edu/~skrz

Phone: (650) 736-0987 **Fax:** (650) 725-9932

Education

Ph.D. Economics, University of Rochester, October 2000.

M.A. Economics, University of Rochester, May 2000.

M.A. (magisterium) Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland, June 1997.

B.S. (licencjat) Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland, June 1995.

Employment

Professor of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, since September 2009.

Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, July 2004-2009.

Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, July 2000-2004.

Research

Published and Accepted Papers

Yuliy Sannikov and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2009) "The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions." Forthcoming in *Econometrica*.

William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2008) "Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders." Forthcoming in *American Economic Review*.

Yuliy Sannikov and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2007) "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production." *American Economic Review*, 97(5) pp. 1794–1823.

Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2007) "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales." *Rand Journal of Economics*, 38(2) pp. 314 - 331.

Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2007) "Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown." *Journal of Economic Theory*, 133 (1) pp. 58-82.

Matthew Mitchell and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2006) "Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Shares." *Economic Theory* 29 (3) pp. 621-648.

Yossi Feinberg and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) "Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining." *Econometrica* 73 (1) pp. 69-91.

Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) “Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design.” *American Economic Review* 95 (4), 936-959.

Jerzy Konieczny and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) “Inflation and Price Setting in a Natural Experiment.” *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52(3), pp. 621-632.

Andrzej Skrzypacz and Hugo Hopenhayn (2004) “Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions.” *Journal of Economic Theory* 114 (1), pp. 153-169. (One of the 20 Most Cited articles 2004-2008 published in JET).

Working Papers and Work in Progress

Christopher Phelan and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2008) “Beliefs and Private Monitoring.”

Matthew Mitchell and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2008) “A Theory of Market Pioneers.”

Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2008) “Collusion with Monitoring based on Self-Reported Sales.”

William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2008) “Bargaining with Deadlines.”

Simon Board and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2008) “Optimal Auctions with Bidders Arriving over Time.”

Qingmin Liu and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2009) “Limited Records and Reputation.”

Johannes Horner and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2009) “Selling Information.”

William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2008) “Bargaining with Interdependent Values and Generalized Coase Conjecture.”

Earlier working papers:

Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2006) “Information Aggregation and the Information Content of Order Statistics.”

Jerzy Konieczny and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2006) “Search, Costly Price Adjustment and the Frequency of Price Changes – Theory and Evidence.”

Matthew Mitchell and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2006) “Market Structure and the Direction of Technological Change.”

Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2004). “Auction Selection by an Informed Seller.”

Andrzej Skrzypacz (2004) “Bargaining under Asymmetric Information and the Hold-up Problem.”

Main Non-Refereed Articles

Paul Milgrom, Gregory Rosston, and Andrzej Skrzypacz “Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants.” SIEPR Policy Brief, May 2009.

“Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants,” organized by Paul Milgrom, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, and Scott Wallsten, submitted to NTIA April 13 2009.

Gregory Rosston and Andrzej Skrzypacz “The FCC’s 700 MHz Auction.” SIEPR Policy Brief , December 2007

Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson “The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry,” submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 13 November 2007.

Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson “Comments on the FCC’s Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 73,” 31 August 2007.

Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Wilson “Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction” Working Paper, University of Maryland, 27 June 2007.

Main Professional Service

Associate Editor for the American Economic Review.

Associate Editor for the RAND Journal of Economics.

PhD Students advised (original placement in brackets):

As Principal Co-Advisor: Yuliy Sannikov (Berkeley), William Fuchs (Chicago), Michael Grubb (MIT), Qingmin Liu (Penn) Peter Lorentzen (Berkeley), Brendan Daley (Duke), Kyna Fong (Stanford), Brett Green (Northwestern).

As Committee member: Simon Board (Toronto), Ayca Kaya (Iowa), Tomasz Sadzik (NYU), Yuval Salant (Northwestern), Philip Tzang (Hong Kong BCG), Juan Escobar (U. of Chile).

Honors and Grants

NSF Grant # 0721090 for a research project with Christopher Phelan ““Beliefs and Private Monitoring.”

Joseph and Laurie Lacob Faculty Fellow for 2007-2008

Stanford GSB PhD Distinguished Service Award 2005

Best paper award, Utah Winter Finance Conference 2004, joint with Peter DeMarzo and Ilan Kremer for "Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design"

NSF Grant # 0318476 for a research project with Peter DeMarzo and Ilan Kremer “Bidding with Securities - Auctions and Security Design.”

MBA Class of 1969 Faculty Scholar for 2002-2003