Andy Skrzypacz Research

Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz Research

My main research interests are Economic Dynamics, Auctions, Bargaining and Repeated Games.

Published/Forthcoming Papers

"Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions" with Hugo Hopenhayn (2004)
Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 114, Issue 1 , pp. 153-169, January 2004.
A full version of the paper is Stanford GSB research paper # 1698R2, August 2001 (this version contains corrected proofs);
(Previously known as "Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions", RCER working paper #463, July 1999)

"Uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining" with Yossi Feinberg (2005)
Econometrica 73 (1) pp. 69 - 91, 2005.
A previous version (with a different set of equilibria) is: Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1765, September 2002.

"Bidding with Securities - Auctions and Security Design" with Peter DeMarzo and Ilan Kremer (2005)
American Economic Review 95 (4) pp. 936 - 959, September 2005.
(received Best Paper award, 14th Utah Winter Finance Conference, 2004)

"Inflation and Price Setting in a Natural Experiment" with Jerzy D. Konieczny (2005)
Journal of Monetary Economics 52(3), pp. 621-632, April 2005. Link to the journal's website, Stanford GSB Research Paper #1695, July 2001.

"Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Shares" with Matthew Mitchell (2006)
Economic Theory 29 (3) pp. 621-648, November 2006. (Link to the journal's website) (June 2003, revised April 2004).

"Dynamic signaling and market breakdown" with Ilan Kremer (2007)
Journal of Economic Theory 133(1) pp. 58-82.
Additional examples are in the working paper version "Ratings, certifications and grades: dynamic signaling and market breakdown" Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1814RR.

"Collusion under Monitoring of Sales" with Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2007)
RAND Journal of Economics, 38(2), pp. 314-331.

"Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production", with Yuliy Sannikov (2007) American Economic Review, 97(5), pp. 1794-1823.

"Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders" with William Fuchs (2008) forthcoming in American Economic Review

"The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions" with Yuliy Sannikov (current version: June 2009), forthcoming in Econometrica. Plus, ONLINE APPENDIX with additional proofs.

Working Papers:

"Beliefs and Private Monitoring" with Christopher Phelan (2006, current version 2009). This project has been previously called "Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories".
MATLAB ROUTINES to compute the belief sets described in the paper (ZIP file containing the main program and sub-routines).

"A Theory of Market Pioneers" with Matthew Mitchell (2008).

"Limited Records and Reputation" with Qingmin Liu (2009).

"Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices" with Joseph Harrington (2009)

"Bargaining with deadlines" with William Fuchs (coming soon)

"Bargaining with Interdependent Values and Generalized Coase Conjecture" with William Fuchs (coming soon)

"Selling Information" with Johannes Horner (coming soon)

"Optimal Auctions with Bidders Arriving over Time" with Simon Board (coming soon)

Unfinished projects:

"Information Aggregation and the Information Content of Order Statistics" with Ilan Kremer (2003, revised 2005).

"Auction Selection by an Informed Seller" with Ilan Kremer (March 2004).

"Bargaining under Asymmetric Information and the Hold-up Problem" (April 2004).

"Optimal selling rules for repeated transactions" with Ilan Kremer - early notes PDF

"Search, Costly Price Adjustment and the Frequency of Price Changes –Theory and Evidence.", with Jerzy D. Konieczny (first draft February 2001, current version July 2006).
This paper has both a theory part, in which we construct a market equilibrium with costly search and costly price adjustment in inflationary environment; and an empirical part, where we test some of its implications. Previous title "New Test of the Menu Cost model"

"The Behavior of Price Dispersion in a Natural Experiment", with Jerzy D. Konieczny
- Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1641, July 2000