Sarah F. Anzia
I am a fifth year Ph.D. candidate in
political science at
Stanford University
Department of Political
Science
Encina Hall West, Room
100
sanzia(at)stanford(dot)edu
Publications
Anzia,
Sarah F. 2011. “Election Timing
and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups.” Journal of Politics 73 (2): 412-427.
Abstract:
It is an established fact that off-cycle elections attract lower voter
turnout than on-cycle elections. I argue that the decrease in turnout that accompanies
off-cycle election timing creates a strategic opportunity for organized
interest groups. Members of interest groups with a large stake in an election
outcome turn out at high rates regardless
of election timing, and their efforts to mobilize and persuade
voters have a greater impact when turnout is low. Consequently, policy made by
officials elected in off-cycle elections should be more favorable to the
dominant interest group in a polity than policy made by officials elected in
on-cycle elections. I test this theory using data on school district elections
in the United States, in which teacher unions are the dominant interest group.
I find that districts with off-cycle elections pay experienced teachers over 3%
more than districts that hold on-cycle elections.
Anzia, Sarah F., and
Christopher R. Berry. 2011. “The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect:
Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?” American
Journal of Political Science 55 (3):
478-493.
Abstract: We argue that
the process of selection into political office is different for women than it
is for men, which results in important differences in the performance of male
and female legislators once they are elected.
If voters are biased against female candidates, only the most talented,
hardest working female candidates will succeed in the electoral process. Furthermore, if women perceive there to be
sex discrimination in the electoral process, or if they underestimate their
qualifications for office, then only the most qualified, politically ambitious
females will emerge as candidates. We
argue that when either or both forms of sex-based selection are present, the women who are elected to office will
perform better, on average, than their male counterparts. We test this central implication of the
theory by using legislators’ success in delivering federal spending to their
home districts as our primary measure of performance. We find that congresswomen secure roughly 9
percent more spending from federal discretionary programs than
congressmen. This amounts to a premium
of about $49 million per year for districts that send a woman to Capitol
Hill. Finally, we find that women’s
superiority in securing particularistic benefits does not hurt their performance
in policymaking: women also sponsor more bills and obtain more cosponsorship
support for their legislative initiatives than their male colleagues.
Anzia, Sarah F.
Forthcoming. “Partisan Power Play: The Origins of Local Election Timing as an American
Political Institution.” Studies in American
Political Development.
Abstract: Eighty
percent of American cities today hold their general elections on different days
than state and national elections. It is
an established fact that voter turnout in these off-cycle local elections is
far lower than turnout in local elections held concurrently with state and
national elections. In this paper, I
demonstrate that the timing of city elections has been an important determinant
of voter turnout since before the Civil War.
By examining three large cities over the course of the 19th century, I
find that American political parties regularly manipulated the timing of city
elections in order to secure an edge over their rivals. I show that the decisions to change the
election dates of these cities were contentious, partisan, and motivated by an
expectation of subsequent electoral gain.
The Progressive municipal reformers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries
continued in this tradition when they separated city elections from state and
national elections, and the local election schedule they implemented has
largely persisted until today.
Working Papers
Legislative
Organization and the Second Face of Power:
Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures
Working
paper, with Molly J. Cohn.
Abstract: Do legislative
institutions give majority parties gatekeeping power? In this paper, we exploit variation in U.S.
state legislative institutions to test whether majority party gatekeeping
rights affect majority roll rates. We
begin by developing hypotheses about the institutional features of legislatures
that could enable the majority party to block bills. Then, we test these hypotheses using an
original dataset on the legislative organization and majority party roll rates
of the 99 U.S. state legislative chambers.
Our findings show that the presence of majority party gatekeeping rights
at various stages of the legislative process is negatively and significantly
associated with majority roll rates.
Specifically, in legislatures where majority-appointed committees can
decline to hear bills or decline to report them to the floor, or where the
majority leadership can block bills from appearing on the calendar, majority
roll rates are significantly lower than in legislatures where those veto points
are absent.
The
Election Timing Effect: Evidence from a
Policy Intervention in Texas
Working
paper.
Abstract: Many
governments in the U.S. hold elections on days other than national Election
Day, but we know little about whether off-cycle election timing – and the low
voter turnout that accompanies it – matters for electoral and policy
outcomes. I argue that off-cycle
election timing enhances the influence of interest groups, both because their
members turn out at disproportionately high rates, and because their
mobilization efforts are more likely to tip election outcomes when turnout is
low. To test the theory, I leverage a
policy intervention in Texas that forced 20 percent of the state’s school
districts to switch to on-cycle elections.
Using matching and district fixed effects regression, I estimate the
causal effect of this switch on teacher salaries, since teacher unions tend to
be the dominant interest group in school elections. Consistent with expectations, the districts
forced to switch to on-cycle elections responded by granting lower salary
raises to teachers.
Teaching
Head
Teaching Assistant (Winter 2010, Winter 2011)
PS
2: Introduction to American National
Government
Professors
Morris Fiorina and Tammy Frisby
Graduate
Student Mentor (2009-2011)
Stanford
Political Science Honors Program
Teaching
Assistant (Spring 2009)
PS
150C/350C: Political Methodology III
Professor
Jonathan Wand
This
course covered experiments and randomization, regression discontinuity design,
instrumental variables, matching, models of choice, and basics of nonparametric
functions.
Writing
Tutor (Spring 2009)
PS
247R: Politics and Economics in Democracies
Professor
Jonathan Rodden
Teaching
Assistant (Winter 2009)
PS
2: Introduction to American National
Government
Professors
Morris Fiorina and Tammy Frisby
Teaching
Assistant (Autumn 2008)
PS
150A/350A: Political Methodology I
Professor
Jonathan Wand
This
course was an introduction to probability and statistical inference designed
for first year political science graduate students.