Sarah F. Anzia
I am a third year Ph.D. candidate in political science
at
Mail:
Department of Political
Science
Encina Hall West, Room
100
Email:
sanzia(at)stanford(dot)edu
Research
Working Papers:
Election Timing
and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups
Abstract: This paper develops a theory of how the
timing of elections affects the representativeness of public policy by biasing
who is likely to turn out to vote. It is
an established fact that local elections held on days different than national
and statewide elections have lower voter turnout. I show that the decrease in turnout that
comes with off-cycle election timing does not occur uniformly across the
electorate; rather, it creates a strategic opportunity for special interest
groups. Members of interest groups with
a large stake in the outcome turn out at high rates regardless of election
timing, and their efforts to mobilize and persuade voters are more likely to
have an impact on the election outcome when turnout is low. Consequently, policy made by local
governments that hold off-cycle elections should be more favorable to interest
groups than the policy of governments that hold on-cycle elections. I test this theory using data on school
district elections in the
The
Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why
Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen? (with Christopher R. Berry)
Abstract: We argue that the process of selection into
political office is different for women than it is for men, which results in
important differences in the performance of male and female legislators once
they are elected. If voters are biased
against female candidates, only the most talented, hardest working female
candidates will succeed in the electoral process. Furthermore, if women perceive there to be
sex discrimination in the electoral process, or if they underestimate their
qualifications for office relative to men, then only the most qualified,
politically ambitious females will emerge as candidates. We argue that when either or both forms of sex-based
selection are present, the women who are
elected to office will perform better, on average, than their male
counterparts. We test this central
implication of the theory by using legislators’ success in delivering federal
spending to their home districts as our primary measure of performance. We find that congresswomen secure roughly 9
percent more spending from federal discretionary programs than
congressmen. This amounts to a premium
of about $49 million per year for districts that send a woman to Capitol
Hill. Finally, we find that women’s
superiority in securing particularistic benefits does not hurt their
performance in policymaking: women also sponsor more bills and obtain more
cosponsorship support for their legislative initiatives than their male
colleagues.
Teaching
Head Teaching Assistant
(Winter 2010)
PS 2: Introduction to American National Government
Professors Morris Fiorina
and Tammy Frisby
Teaching Assistant
(Spring 2009)
PS 150C/350C: Political Methodology III
Professor Jonathan Wand
This course covered
experiments and randomization, regression discontinuity design, instrumental
variables, matching, models of choice, and basics of nonparametric functions.
Writing Tutor (Spring
2009)
PS 247R: Politics and Economics in Democracies
Professor Jonathan Rodden
Teaching Assistant
(Winter 2009)
PS 2: Introduction to American National Government
Professors Morris Fiorina
and Tammy Frisby
Teaching Assistant
(Autumn 2008)
PS 150A/350A: Political Methodology I
Professor Jonathan Wand
This course was an
introduction to probability and statistical inference designed for first year
political science graduate students.