SECULAR STAGNATION

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Minneapolis Fed Symposium on Secular Stagnaton 21 November 2014

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Message

Essential to distinguish between supply stagnation (US) and demand stagnation (Euro area and Japan)

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The US case

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
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Appropriate to use the term stagnation for earnings per household and to examine the sources of that stagnation

Average real earnings per household, 2009 dollars



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Declining labor share

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Depleted capital

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Reduced productivity growth

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Collapse of labor-force participation


DECOMPOSITION OF REAL EARNINGS PER HOUSEHOLD

$$R = (1 - \alpha_t) \frac{Y_t}{F_t}$$


= $(1 - \alpha_t) A_t H_t^{1 - \alpha_t} K_t^{\alpha_t} \frac{1}{F_t}$
= $\underbrace{(1 - \alpha_t)}_{\text{share}} \underbrace{A_t}_{\text{TFP}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{H_t}{F_t}\right)^{1 - \alpha_t}}_{\text{hours/HH}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{K_t}{F_t}\right)^{\alpha_t}}_{\text{capital/HH}}$

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
LABOR SHARE



TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY




CAPITAL PER HOUSEHOLD



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TOTAL HOURS OF WORK PER HOUSEHOLD




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
Decomposition of hours per household, using CPS data

Hours per household = [participants per household] \times [workers per participant] \times [hours per worker]


TOTAL HOURS OF WORK PER HOUSEHOLD, CPS




PARTICIPANTS PER HOUSEHOLD



WORKERS PER PARTICIPANT



HOURS PER WORKER



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Capital likely to return to historical path of the capital/output ratio, as in the standard growth model

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Reasons for collapse of participation not well understood

Changes in weekly hours of time use, 2003 to 2013

American Time Use Survey

	Personal care	Household work	Market work	Education	Leisure	Other
Men	1.3	0.1	-2.5	0.2	1.3	-0.4
Women	1.6	-0.7	-0.8	-0.1	0.8	-0.8

LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE, MONTHLY



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Woodford has argued cogently for continuing monetary expansion to validate earlier statements of the Fed's intention to expand aggressively to escape the ZLB

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Stagnant real compensation in lower-skill labor markets

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Timidity stands in the way of effective monetary policy under secular demand stagnation

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Central banks unwilling to lower IOR despite the absence of currency hoarding

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And tax holdings of currency in excess of $\in 10,000$ at a rate sufficient to discourage accumulation

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How would financial institutions remain viable with negative interest rates?

In ordinary times, banks earn on their portfolios and pay depositors somewhat less, taking the difference as gross profit; with negative rates, banks earn from depositors and pay on portfolio holdings, taking the difference as gross profit.