

SUCCESS IN JAPAN -- DESPITE SOME
HUMAN FOIBLES
AND
CULTURAL PROBLEMS

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DEDICATION

RONALD STONE ANDERSON

1908-1985

This paper is dedicated to the memory of a scholar and man of action who devoted his entire professional career to building creative bridges between Japanese and American education. Prior to World War II, and shortly after graduating from Stanford University, Anderson spent six years in Japan, teaching at Aoyama Gakuin and at the higher schools in Kanazawa and Fukuoka. He then returned to Stanford for a master's degree, and taught in California secondary schools. From 1946 to 1950 Anderson served as the first and only regular Chief of the Civil Information and Education Division, Military Government Section, Headquarters, First Corps and Kinki Region, in Kyoto. In this key role, his humanity, his energy, and his deep understanding of Japanese and American education became important factors in the promotion of education for democracy in Western Japan. Ronald Anderson was one of the true unsung heroes of the Occupation.

Thereafter Ron earned his doctorate in history at the University of California, Berkeley, and taught at the Universities of Michigan and Hawaii, where he continued his lifelong involvement with education in Japan and America.

Ron's friends among the Japanese and the Americans were legion. It is an honor to have been one of them {Endnote 1}.

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The last time I was in Tokyo I paid a sentimental visit to the Dai Ichi Building. I took the elevator to the sixth floor, there to find the inevitable uketsuke (receptionist). I asked the old man if I could see Maakaasaa Gensui no jimusho, and promptly -- as though long accustomed to receiving nostalgic gaijin visitors like me -- he slipped on his sandals led me down the hallway.

There it was: a pleasant room with paneled walls. I looked everywhere for some kind of marker or plaque. There was none. Yet, out of respect for its history, the company that owned the building kept the room clean and tidy but unused, except for an occasional company reception. For this room, from 1945 to 1951, had been the office of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur {2}.

Here, I mused, was where a thousand vital decisions had been made -- decisions that would impact upon the entirety of Japanese politics and economics, and indeed upon the very fabric of everyday Japanese life. Here was where policies were developed that freed up liberal Japanese to initiate sociocultural change processes that might not otherwise have taken place as quickly -- or at all.

I stood there alone quietly for several minutes, thinking a thousand thoughts. Then I left the building and strolled across to the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace. Thousands of school children were there on ensoku (school trips). They were smiling, relaxed, spontaneous. I started a conversation with some of them, and was struck by how much easier I found

it to speak with these kids in 1983, than with those I had met back in 1946-48. Back then, as an Occupation official, I had made scores of school inspections, during which I had always tried to include conversations with students -- but had usually found them stiff and almost ritualistic in their responses. But on this bright day 35 years later, I said to myself, "Hey, these look like the kinds of kids we *hoped* Japan would some day have, back in Forties when we were working with Japanese educators." Here in front of me, I ruminated, stood convincing exemplars of the "New Japan" that we in Military Government had talked about with our Japanese colleagues more than a generation earlier. The future had become the present. It was a good feeling.

This article deals with one person's experience in working with Japanese educators and media communicators to help build that New Japan. It deals principally with my "grass roots" work during the first half of 1948 as a civilian official of Military Government (MG) in Wakayama Prefecture. I shall illustrate my experiences by quoting selected excerpts from my monthly reports to higher headquarters {3}.

Ironically, this article reports on events and phenomena of a nature doubtless quite foreign to Douglas MacArthur's own experience in Japan -- for he defined his role from the start as that of a sort of latter-day shoogun, aloof from the masses of ordinary Japanese. He played that role to perfection. In my view, his aloof stance was not only one that came to him naturally, but one that he should have taken even if it had not come naturally. Given the Japanese political culture at the time, his very unreachability gave him maximal charisma, and hence tremendous influence over political,

economic, and sociocultural change processes. It did, though, have the disadvantage that it permitted him no direct opportunity to observe events at the grass roots {4}.

1. ENTER THE OCCUPATIONAIRE

In 1943 I was a 20-year-old student at Antioch College when the Army of the United States finally decided that it wanted me, on the double, and promptly proceeded to transmogrify me into an infantry heavy weapons gunner. Then, in its wisdom, the military personnel system assigned me to the Army Japanese Language School at the University of Michigan. As the fates willed it, I spent the rest of the war either at Ann Arbor or waiting to go there.

Like millions of young Americans at that time, I believed deeply in America's war aims, and had volunteered for service. When V-J Day arrived, I felt an irresistible urge to get to Japan as quickly as possible and do what I could to promote a democratic new order. I reported to my separation center three days early, hurried to Washington, and took the first War Department civilian job offered me.

On a sunny April morning in 1946, I arrived in Yokohama aboard an army troop transport ship. Our group was loaded onto busses for the trip to Tokyo. I was shocked beyond forgetting at the sight of this totally flattened city. Little else besides scattered chimneys, steel safes, and stone kura storehouses had survived the holocaust of American fire bombs. This shock, and others like it which followed, only strengthened my resolve to do what I

could to promote democracy in Japan -- on the assumption, of course, that a democratic Japan would less likely be an aggressive Japan.

I had been assigned as a civilian interpreter to the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (ATIS/SCAP). However, it was immediately clear that if I stayed at ATIS, the odds were strong that my duties would be routine and technical -- precisely what I did not want. What I did want was direct contact with those Japanese who were actively working at the intercultural synapse across which Americans and Japanese were attempting to communicate and cooperate in the process of fashioning a New Japan.

Fortunately for me there was at that time a severe shortage of trained Americans on hand to run the Occupation. Tens of thousands of military personnel chafed impatiently to return home for discharge, and only a relative handful of civilians were available to take their places and staff a rapidly expanding Occupation bureaucracy. Given this fluid situation, and the grace of the Almighty, I managed to get myself released from ATIS, and to convince the Military Government Civil Information and Education (MG CIE) Division at Eighth Army Headquarters that my qualifications as a specialist on Japanese language and culture somehow made up for my very limited experience as a teacher.

Thus, unbelievably, at the age of 23 I found myself Assistant CIE Officer, MG Section, Headquarters First Corps, Kyoto. There, my immediate boss, the late Ronald S. Anderson, and I were responsible for overseeing the implementation of Occupation policy for the democratic reorientation of all schools and public media in three MG regions embracing almost one-third of

the population of Japan. Similarly, we implemented Occupation policy with respect to religion and the preservation of arts and monuments. Given the priceless artistic and historic treasures of unbombed Kyoto and Nara, this last responsibility was considerable. In pursuit of all these duties, I traveled frequently throughout the three regions.

Anderson and I were also directly involved in the hiring of numerous civilian CIE officers to work in the three regions under our charge. This experience gave us a first-hand awareness of the kinds of Americans who were being posted to 20 of Japan's 46 prefectures -- their widely varying competences, cultural sensitivity, values, goals, world view -- and the extent of their knowledge of Japan {5}.

After a year and a half in Kyoto, I was given the opportunity to conduct my own operation, as CIE Officer in Wakayama Prefecture, near Osaka. During the following eight months, I gave guidance, assistance, and encouragement to a hard-working group of local educators who, with stunning speed and skill, succeeded in achieving a comprehensive restructuring of Wakayama's entire public school system, aimed at achieving gender and class equality of access to elementary and secondary education. This was in effect a bloodless revolution, and will serve as the center-piece for much of the analysis that follows. I also worked with a small group of college professors in designing what is today Wakayama University {6}.

During those heady days I was well aware that I enjoyed a level of responsibility far higher than I deserved, especially in terms of my "paper" qualifications. However, as one who helped hire and supervise numerous CIE officers for First Corps' 20 prefectures, I soon saw how ethnocentric and

culturally naive some occupationaires were, who *did* have impressive paper qualifications -- e.g., 15 years as a superintendent in an isolated monolingual rural district in the American heartland -- and I felt less inadequate. "We're *all* unqualified," I told myself, "so why not just do your best, and hope it's good enough?"

Moreover, my enthusiasm for activism rose as I discovered how many key Japanese leaders, officials, and intellectuals were *ready* for change. Japan had suffered cataclysmic losses in a brutal war, had experienced the utter horror of nuclear attack, and, for the first time ever, had been occupied by foreign troops. All this trauma had certainly rendered many Japanese wide open to new ideas about how to conduct social life. And the fact that the Emperor had instructed them to lay down their arms gave a powerful legitimacy to Occupation efforts to effectuate or catalyze change.

I was also struck by what can only be termed a *cultural* characteristic of the Japanese: a tendency to search relentlessly for the *best* way to do something. This tendency had been in manifest operation throughout Japan's modern period since at least the 1870s, when the Japanese government started sending missions to the West to find out what was the best legal system, the best military system, the best education system, etc., for Japan. And now, due to the exigencies of war and surrender, I found myself besieged daily with questions about the best way to run an organization, a school system, a newspaper, or, indeed, a country. It was a unique and humbling historic opportunity.

So, in the two years that followed, I learned to consider eleven-hour days and six- or seven-day weeks to be a reasonable, and deeply satisfying,

work routine. Throughout this entire period, I was in direct daily contact with Japanese educators, writers, journalists, labor leaders, intellectuals, politicians, and reform-minded citizens. I made scores of school inspections, gave countless lectures to teachers' groups, youth clubs, civic associations, PTAs, etc., and held numerous press conferences. Frequently, this contact was through the medium of the Japanese language.

Incidentally, Japan reoriented my entire life. When I returned to the States in 1948 I switched career plans and became a cultural anthropologist. In reflecting today on the grass-roots aspects of the occupation of Japan, therefore, I do so primarily as an anthropologist -- though secondarily through the prisms of history and political science {7}.

2. HUMAN FOIBLES ON THE AMERICAN SIDE

The pace and profundity of daily life in MG at the grass roots readily revealed numerous human foibles on both sides, as well as the patterned ways in which each side defined the other side's foibles. I will not dwell on these human foibles very long, but a quick summary of a few of them (or more precisely, my imperfect perceptions of them) will serve to create the context for the analysis to follow.

2.1. UNPREPARED PERSONNEL

In the early months of the occupation, almost all MG officers were military -- I being, as I recall, the first civilian of officer rank in First Corps Headquarters' MG section {8}. Gradually, more and more civilians were

hired, though the top jobs remained in military hands.

In terms of their fitness for cross-cultural work, MG's officers, military and civilian, varied from excellent to poor. At the positive end of the continuum one found, among others, a number of officers who had been trained for MG duties at various Civil Administration Training Schools (CATS schools) in the U.S. during the war {9}. Many were citizen-soldiers who could draw upon successful administrative or leadership careers in their civilian past. Some of these officers took discharges in Japan and continued their duties as civilians.

As I recall, all of the CATS alumni that I met were male. Indeed, during the first year or so, MG in the First Corps area was almost exclusively staffed by males. It was only gradually that any appreciable number of women MG officers were hired -- a fact that certainly rendered prefectural and regional teams less sensitive to the needs and problems of Japanese women than would otherwise have been the case.

At the negative end of the preparedness continuum were many officers -- especially career military -- who often had exemplary war records, but sometimes were hopelessly unprepared by education or experience, and perhaps temperament, for anything like MG work. They lacked previous cross-cultural experience or knowledge of any foreign language, and were further handicapped by a certain narrowness that hardly fitted them to function effectively in Japan, let alone to supervise or to lead in Occupation affairs {10}. I have described this situation elsewhere (Textor 1951: 186-96), and will not belabor it here.

Looking back on all this, I sometimes find myself marveling that MG didn't do more harm. I believe that what saved the organization, in part, was that, for many domains of responsibility, MG officers were formally expected merely to "observe and report" compliance with Occupation directives. This often made it possible for an officer to satisfy higher headquarters while in fact remaining fairly passive -- after all, one could always ask for some statistics from the kenchoo (prefectural government office), and put them into a plausible monthly report that would probably satisfy higher headquarters. Many, perhaps most, MG officers, especially military ones, (and most especially *career* military ones) were inclined to take this route -- and then relax and enjoy life {11}. This is not to say that many such officers were not conscientious, but it is to say that many were scarcely inclined to go out of their way looking for problems.

By contrast, some military, and more civilian, MG officers did go farther, and became quite ardent activists. I include myself in this category. Instead of simply "observing and reporting," my philosophy -- shared widely in MG CIE -- was that we should assertively try to encourage positive change processes by "guiding and assisting" relevant Japanese in a consistent and persistent manner {12}.

2.2. INEFFICIENT STRUCTURE

The MG structure was a part of the Eighth Army, with headquarters in Yokohama. Under Eighth Army were two corps: the Ninth, headquartered in Sendai, and the First, headquartered in Kyoto. Under the First Corps were three MG regions: Kinki, Tokai-Hokuriku, and Kyushu, headquartered

respectively in Kyoto, Nagoya, and Fukuoka { 13 }. Under each region in the First Corps area were six or seven prefectures, each with its prefectural MG team. At all levels -- army, corps, region, and team -- the commanding and executive officers were invariably military, as were, typically, the holders of many other key posts.

Note that here was a situation of extreme shortage of qualified personnel, yet the military saw fit to maintain *five* levels of administration for military governance purposes, where three would not only have done the job faster, but saved manpower for other purposes { 14 }. The only justification for such redundancy was, I suppose, the unspoken one that it provided niches for military officers who might otherwise have been difficult to place { 15 }!

2.3. VAGUENESS OF MISSION

Especially in the early days of the occupation, prefectural MG teams were plagued by the vagueness of their mission, and the difficulty of securing urgently needed policy decisions, due in part to the three layers of bureaucracy between themselves and SCAP in Tokyo. And it was SCAP *alone* which, in theory, made all policy decisions.

Perhaps this theoretical administrative model could have worked, but only in a situation in which the structure was highly efficient and the mission clearly defined and widely understood. In reality, however, such was not the situation. Only in some cases would a prefectural MG officer refer a problem to higher headquarters -- and be prepared to wait weeks for an authoritative decision. In other cases the officer would simply demur, and assume that the problem at hand would somehow solve itself without MG intervention { 16 }.

In still other and numerous cases, however, referral or demurral were not appropriate. Such cases were those in which Japanese officials and citizens would ask MG for clarification as to whether this or that option was permitted by Occupation policy, where *not* to have given an immediate and clear response would have created more problems, or even danger, than to have referred the matter to higher headquarters. In such cases, MG officers would simply, in effect, *make* interim *ad hoc* policy. Technically, however, such officers might well have been exceeding their authority {17}.

In short, MG CIE officers often found the rigid "observe and report" approach grossly inadequate, and often felt that they had no choice but to invoke the more flexible and positive "guide and assist" approach -- and to stretch it considerably.

2.4. PARANOIA IN THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

Another problem standing in the way of a fully successful Occupation was a certain negativism that pervaded both MG and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), but especially the latter {18}. There was an almost paranoid concern, on the part of numerous military officers, over possible subversion among American civil servants working in Japan. Heading the entire surveillance effort was SCAP's G-2, General Charles A. Willoughby, a man who had been close to General MacArthur for many years, and who was probably the second most powerful American in Japan. It is said that General MacArthur once described Willoughby as "my lovable fascist" {19}. This sobriquet is consistent with my own findings. In 1951 I wrote:

Not long before Mussolini marched into France, Willoughby wrote a book that was generally sympathetic with Generalissimo Franco and with Japanese military activities in China, and said: "historical judgment, freed from the emotional haze of the moment, will credit Mussolini with wiping out a memory of defeat by re-establishing the traditional military supremacy of the white race, for generations to come." Had a Japanese written this sort of opinion about the Japanese "race," he would have been purged by the Occupation. (Textor 1951: 191).

While the Communist threat was certainly real, and assuredly deserved to be taken seriously, General Willoughby and his sprawling national intelligence network sometimes went to absurd extremes that did serious harm to some of the basic positive goals of the Occupation itself (Textor 1951: 120-3). For example, during much of my time in Kyoto, the CIC would send representatives to "monitor" my speeches to teachers' groups, civic organizations, and the like. At one point the CIC even decided, for reasons never explained, that I could not go on a routine field trip into upcountry Kyoto Prefecture -- to speak to teachers' groups, inspect schools and historic monuments, etc. -- unless a CIC officer accompanied me. This decision was especially mysterious because I had been doing just such upcountry work routinely for many months. In any case, my assistant and I obligingly fitted a fourth person into our jeep -- a CIC lieutenant who proceeded to attend every speech I gave, and otherwise to accompany me

night and day throughout a three-day trip through back country villages so remote as to have been virtually unaware of (urban-based) Japanese Communism. Lieutenant P had actually been a class-mate of mine at Ann Arbor, and must have known that I had no reputation for being a Communist or fellow traveler. I knew him as a positive person and nice guy and it did not surprise me that he was visibly embarrassed by his assignment. At the end of the trip he apologized: "Bob, I've felt bad all during this trip, especially since it is so clear that you are contributing a lot more to the aims of the Occupation than people like me are." He later sent me a copy of his report to his superior; it not only cleared me, but was actually laudatory (Textor 1951: 154-5). Surely the Occupation could have found ways of harnessing the talents of this Japan specialist -- and numerous other, similarly well-trained and -motivated officers who found themselves in the CIC -- in a more positive and socially useful way {20}.

3. HUMAN FOIBLES ON THE JAPANESE SIDE

Especially during the first year and a half of the occupation, Americans at the local level held great *de facto* power, and often all that was needed to get something done was to say, directly or otherwise, that "the Shinchiugun (Occupation forces) want this..." -- and it would be done. Such informal edicts were gradually supplanted by more formal ones, such as the formal written "procurement demands" that were used to obtain resources to provide all sorts of facilities for occupationaires and their families -- to build or refurbish office space, to hire musicians to entertain Americans in the billet

dining room, or to make life more efficient, convenient, or pleasant for the Americans in a hundred other ways.

Democratically oriented change, however, cannot be obtained by procurement demand. If the Occupation was to produce positive results in its more complex, substantive goals for the Japanese future, it had to gain a more complex, more *consensual* kind of cooperation from key Japanese officials who were credible to both the Occupation and to the local Japanese power structure. In retrospect, what amazes me is not that there were so few such willing and credible Japanese, but that there were so many.

This is not to say, however, that those on the Japanese side were without their "foibles," at least as I viewed (and oversimplified) them in my American cultural terms. Many educational officials I found myself dealing with were not really educators at all, but general administrators who possessed administrative efficiency, no doubt, but who had no vision of alternative futures for Japanese education -- indeed, in some cases, no apparent vision at all, other than that of a vague maintenance of the *status quo*.

What heartened me, however, was to discover many Japanese educators, often quite junior in status, who actively hungered for change, and were prepared to take risks with their own careers in order to help achieve it {21}. The challenge for the reform-minded occupationaire was to identify these liberal, change-oriented Japanese, and to work with and through them. This is exemplified by an excerpt from one of my monthly CIE reports from Wakayama to higher headquarters.

The new chief of the Education Department, a man in his forties, appears progressive {22}; his new chief of the School Education Section, a man in his thirties, has apparently been the prime mover and planner in educational reorganization throughout the Ken. Top personnel in the Ken Social Education Section and in the education departments of Wakayama, Tanabe and Shingu cities appear hopelessly unimaginative and ill-equipped for their jobs. A new crop of "inspectors" has been appointed, including a few women. A few women have been appointed as principals, including one to a new lower secondary school. The Kencho is believed deliberately but humanely making merit promotions and gradually cleaning out dead wood. (Apr 1948).

4. LIBERALS VERSUS CONSERVATIVES

As a means of bridging from human foibles to the more complex matter of cultural problems, it is first worth taking a brief look at the matter of liberalism versus conservatism among MG occupationaires -- which translates, to some extent, into relative activism versus inactivism in promoting the progressive sociocultural change programs of the Occupation.

The "liberals" in MG, as in SCAP {23}, tended to be people who had matured politically during the Roosevelt period, and who endorsed the broad humanitarian and equity goals of the New Deal. They were comfortable with the general notion that government must intervene when non-governmental institutions leave important problems unresolved. In the MG context, they were *not* comfortable with merely "observing and reporting," and were more

inclined to "guide and assist." The liberals were keenly aware of the need (as they saw it) of actively implementing in peace the very aims for which the war had been fought. Hence, they were more likely to "go the extra mile" to contain various Japanese tendencies to revert toward authoritarianism, racism, and ultranationalism -- and then to follow this with positive programs aimed at democracy and peace.

The more conservative occupationaires were more inclined to regard pro-change Japanese as Communist or pro-Communist, and to try to build up conservative elements in the prefecture, so that (as they saw it) the Japanese government and society would serve as a bulwark against the spread of Communism in Asia. Building up conservative elements often meant simply doing little to actively promote many of the reforms called for by Occupation policies. And unsurprisingly, many officers and enlisted men in the Counter Intelligence Corps epitomized this extreme conservative position.

We come now to an important historical fact, namely that in the early months and years of the Occupation, its overall policy orientation was basically liberal in many respects, and frequently offered considerable latitude for Occupation officials to pursue quite liberal goals. This fact is a striking paradox, in view of the generally conservative outlook of most high-ranking military officers of the time. It is even more of a paradox in the case of General MacArthur himself, whose political views, in the U.S. domestic context, were widely known to have been staunchly conservative {24}.

At the prefectural and regional levels of MG in the First Corps area, my impression was that officers who could broadly be characterized as liberal were more likely to be civilian than military, and more likely temporary

military than regular. Conversely, officers who were civilian were more likely to be liberal than those who were military. These characterizations are, though, very rough and approximate; there were many exceptional and ambiguous cases.

The MG officers I knew varied widely in how hard they worked. In general, civilian officers tended to work harder than military officers {25}, and liberals harder than conservatives. Conservatives were more likely to rely on the local Japanese prefectural officials, and to assume that reports from these officials were true and accurate, or at least satisfactory. Liberals were more likely to follow up on aspects of these reports that seemed unpersuasive or unsatisfactory. Many relatively liberal occupationaires were workaholics, and the majority of workaholics were relatively liberal. I classify myself as having been a liberal workaholic.

Though there was a good deal of genuine camaraderie in MG life at the prefectural level, it was not always easy for workaholic liberal civilian MG officers to work effectively with their non-workaholic conservative military colleagues. To the former, the latter sometimes seemed unconcerned with pursuing many of the announced positive goals of the Occupation. To the latter, the former seemed unreasonably, even suspiciously active.

5. CULTURAL PROBLEMS

It is a truism to say that when we come into contact with people from another culture, the experience makes strikingly clear to us many features of our own culture about which we had previously not been explicitly aware.

The truth of this is all the more compelling when we are officially charged with promoting *change* in the other culture. In occupied Japan, even where American and Japanese foibles were not too great a problem, and even where there was good faith and some degree of consensus between the American and Japanese sides, there still remained many problems of a cultural nature. That is, there were many respects in which the two sides would consistently meet with difficulty in communicating or cooperating, because they viewed the world from different cultural stances {26}. This section will list some of these cultural problems, and illustrate them by quotations, where available, from my monthly reports.

First, however, some background. When I arrived in Wakayama in November 1947, I had an active interest in all the areas within the CIE purview. These areas ranged from fostering democratic education, and education for democracy; to promoting responsible investigative journalism; to encouraging democratic civic associations; to fostering research by faculty in tertiary institutions; to administering SCAP policy concerning religion; to preserving Wakayama's precious arts and monuments -- and on and on. While I dealt actively with all these areas, it was clear to me from the beginning that I had to set priorities in order to maximize my overall effectiveness. I determined to give top priority to *structural* reform, following guidelines from Tokyo calling for a new 6-3-3-4 ladder system -- six years of primary education, three years of lower secondary, three of upper secondary, and four of tertiary -- to take the place of an older system. Therefore, as a matter of priority, I worked with selected Japanese officials and citizens to reform the total *system* of public elementary and secondary

education at one fell swoop, which would take place at the beginning of the 1948-49 academic year in April, 1948. In short, all at once, my Japanese colleagues and I undertook to equalize access to educational opportunity across gender and class lines throughout the prefecture. Doing it all at once, I felt, would cause less net dislocation than doing it piecemeal -- and, equally important, would promote irreversibility.

In the case of gender, I undertook to promote coeducation at every level -- a goal that official Occupation policy broadly and loosely favored, but did not insist upon. In the case of class, also, my efforts were broadly consistent with, but not mandated by, SCAP policy. Specifically, I undertook to:

- ◆ promote districting of public schools, with every child in a particular district attending the school in her or his district.
- ◆ promote "comprehensive" secondary schools, each to contain both a general (academic) and a vocational curriculum -- as a means of democratizing the total learning atmosphere within a school, and moving away from elite bias.

The above two structural innovations were intended to replace an older system of privilege in which the education of girls was less valued and hence less emphasized, and in which certain secondary schools were widely assumed to be more or less reserved for elite children. For example, the prefecture's most prestigious secondary school, the Dai Ichi Chuu Gakkoo (First Middle School), located in Wakayama City, was *the* school to which senior bureaucrats and wealthy people would "of course" send their sons -- to receive academic rather than vocational education. Some of these boys

commuted daily on overcrowded trains from as far away as Tanabe, some seventy miles distant, to attend this elite school.

I realized, of course, that the democratic re-drawing of school district boundaries would not bring about changes in educational *practice* immediately -- but, I reasoned, it would help to do so in the longer run:

- ◆ by causing better-educated and socio-politically more influential parents to give their genuine interest and support to the *local* school -- rather than to a school for the privileged, located in another community; and

- ◆ by necessitating that school administrators and teachers actually *confront* the need to teach all students together: male and female, academically- and vocationally-oriented.

Entire ken has been districted for senior high school purposes. All senior high schools will be coeducational. Out of a total of twenty senior high schools, two will be vocational, all former old system secondary vocational schools will offer general and vocational courses, and former general education old system secondary schools will have a general course with a vocational course or two planned for the near future. . . . Particular attention has been given to securing best possible teachers for junior high schools. Principals of old system secondary schools which became new senior high schools will be transferred. (Mar 1948).

According to the Kencho, structural change in Wakayama's school system is as thorough-going as any in Japan. Advising the Kencho, the city hall and civic groups re these structural changes was CE's biggest job this month. Governor and those whom he appears to represent are patently cool toward re-organization; young teachers, college-graduated citizens and others generally to be categorized as "progressive" are warmly supporting reorganization. (Apr 1948).

This description of the situation Wakayama MG CIE faced will serve to set the context within which we may now examine a number of key cultural problems in which American and Japanese cultural stances were often in opposition {27}.

5.1. OPEN CRITICISM VERSUS HARMONIOUS SILENCE

While most adult Japanese were doubtless shocked by their nation's defeat into feeling that some basic changes in their sociocultural system were needed, many nonetheless manifested a *general* proclivity NOT to offer overt, public criticism of the *status quo*. By contrast, the American proclivity was much more supportive of active public criticism of the *status quo*.

Perhaps the most thoroughly democratic and profitable discussion series ever held in Wakayama Ken occurred this month in the Social Education Study Conference. WMG and the Kencho wrote a provocative list of questions for each program item. Almost all program items were handled by panels. The list of questions provoked the audience into very

wide participation. Some of the attitudes and remarks were caustic and in bad taste, the kind usually associated with enthusiasm mixed with immaturity. For example, one youth group member told a local judge who was serving as panel leader that he thought somebody else should immediately be selected to replace the judge who, he felt, was doing an incompetent job as panel leader. Few youth leaders in the past have ever so addressed a member of the bench. The audience developed the habit of indicating aloud that they could not hear a given speaker, or that a given speaker was long-winded or dilatory in his tactics. One enthusiastic conference participant even attempted to take control of the meeting away from the chairman. This member, who, as far as is known, does not have radical political tendencies {28}, wanted the audience to join him in his enthusiasm to form a new movement aimed at the abolition of the present marriage system and the creation of a free marriage system. WMG at this point suggested that, whatever the merits of the participant's ideas, he should not try to gain acceptance for those ideas through usurpation of the authority of the conference leader. (May 1948).

5.2. ACTION VERSUS INACTION

Japanese officials in the kenchoo were less likely to come up with plans for sweeping action, than were their opposite numbers in MG. In part, the American position reflected a culturally typical value in favor of change-oriented activity *in general*. And in part, too, it reflected the fact that the American knew that his or her presence in Japan was temporary, and that the malleable situation in Japan, favorable to change, would exist for only a few

more short years or even months. Therefore, if action was going to be taken, it had to be taken soon {29}.

5.3. INITIATORY VERSUS MAINTENANCE ACTION

Although MG was officially expected, at most, to offer "guidance and assistance," in some cases MG's inclination to initiate action, and to support Japanese initiators, went further, as the following excerpt indicates.

Continued firm but gentle pressure was exerted on Japanese authorities to get consolidated junior high schools [established] wherever geographical conditions permit. Great resistance has been met from local bosses, who pander to local superstition and prejudices. (Mar 1948).

5.4. INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GROUP EXPRESSIVENESS

Americans are a nation of individuals, or at least our mythology tells us we are. In expressing themselves and their views, occupationaires tended, relative to the Japanese, to do so as autonomous individuals {30}. Our opposite numbers among the Japanese were, in sharp contrast, not likely to express autonomous opinions that diverged from those of their colleagues, and highly likely to consult their *group* first, and to work out a group position with which all members of the group could be comfortable.

5.5. RIGHTNESS VERSUS APPROPRIATENESS

Americans, imbued with the notion of "inalienable rights," were culturally inclined to stress the need for this or that change because it was

seen as the *right* thing to do. Japanese, to the extent that they were inclined to stress the need for change, were somewhat more likely, in my perception, to justify change as tekitoo, or proper. This, as I see it, is consistent with a deep tendency in the Confucian tradition to equate politics with ethics, and to preserve harmony at almost any cost.

One problem with the American cultural emphasis is that rightness can merge into righteousness, which in turn can merge into self-righteousness. I am well aware that I was hardly immune to this problem. In my case, the problem was deftly epitomized in the delightful inscription to a copy of *Fuzambo's Japanese-English Dictionary*, that Wakayama's newspaper reporters gave me as a farewell gift when I completed my service there:

Present to Mr. Textor
From the M.G. Beat Men
Hope you much idealism,
with a little realism.

I still prize this gift, and take to heart its implied constructive advice concerning rigid idealism and self-righteousness. *Mea culpa*.

5.6. PARTICIPATORY VERSUS HIERARCHICAL ACTION

In advocating action to produce change, Americans tended to favor a grass roots approach in which many individuals, of varying wealth and status, would participate. To the extent that Japanese officials and politicians favored action designed to produce sociocultural change of any kind, they

tended to prefer the kind that let the government and the established power structure manage the action. This way, they doubtless felt, that very structure would more likely persist through time.

Principal [Civil Information] activities [for this month] centered on the case of Mr. [KW], a well known local businessman who failed to file an income tax return despite an obviously large income. CI backed up the team's Legal and Government Section with publicity on the progress of the [K] Case. [K's] agents attempted to lure some of the newspapers off the case with bribes. Military Government backed these newspapers up in their refusal to "do business" with [K]. It is felt that the giving of publicity to the [K] Case will help restore the confidence of small tax payers in their government. (June 1948 {31}).

5.7. CIVIC VERSUS GOVERNMENTAL ACTION

Since at least the time of Jefferson, Americans have been suspicious of too much government. During his celebrated visit to the U.S. in the Nineteenth Century, DeToqueville was astounded to note the rich variety of American voluntary civic associations. This cultural tradition was readily evident in MG work; Americans, liberal and conservative alike, were far more inclined to look to civic associations to initiate or carry out change, while Japanese were more inclined to leave the initiation, and much of the execution, to governmental officials.

The principal barrier to desired development of organizations in this Ken is believed to be the officials concerned with women's activities. WMG continued to emphasize the need for separation of government and civil organizations; some of the greatest opposition to this came from the women's organizations themselves, which generally are unaccustomed to shifting for themselves. (Feb 1948) {32}.

5.8. EQUALITY VERSUS SPECIAL PRIVILEGE

Fundamental to the American political culture is the notion that all people have been created equal in their basic rights. On the Japanese side, the degree to which people subscribed to this value varied widely. In general, however, the then-extant polity and economy were far from emphasizing equality.

WMG encouraged the Teachers' Union to contact the Governor in an effort to receive an extra appropriation of approximately six million yen as soon as possible for the realization of the "Equal pay for equal work regardless of sex" principle. The principle already has been achieved, the Union says, in about ten of Japan's prefectures. Since the Governor is generally in opposition to equal treatment for women, some delay and trouble are expected (Feb 1948).

5.9. GENDER EQUALITY VERSUS INEQUALITY

Many activist occupationaires -- female and male -- initiated action to promote gender equality. For example, in Wakayama, I stressed that women

should have an equal opportunity to enter higher levels of training in the normal schools. In our attempts to incorporate this principle into serious policy, my Wakayaman colleagues and I found ourselves producing action of the type that, twenty years later, came to be called "affirmative" action in the U.S. Our efforts were, though, hardly free of problems.

The Governor of Wakayama is opposed to co-education, and has publicly said so. The Governor and "old line" interests throughout the prefecture are these days opposing, by all sorts of spurious arguments: co-education, new senior high schools, and equality of educational opportunity. Progressive citizens throughout the Ken have been encouraged by CIE to oppose these interests. (Feb 1948).

The entrance examination for the current school year at the Wakayama Economics College will give maximum permitted weight to intelligence testing and minimum permitted weight to scholastic achievement testing, in an effort to admit as many female candidates as possible. (Feb 1948).

5.10. CRITICAL VERSUS ROTE APPROACH TO LEARNING

Japanese educators were wedded to pedagogical approaches that emphasized rote learning {33}. By the time of the occupation, American educators had long since been emphasizing independent critical thinking and reasoning.

WMG has encouraged the teachers of one county to enter into an essay contest on the subject: "Workable Methods for Encouraging Spontaneous Participation, and Eliminating Memorized Answers in the Class-room." The winning essay or essays will be submitted to various education magazines for publication. (Feb. 1948).

5.11. INDIVIDUAL HAPPINESS VERSUS SOCIAL DUTY

In my perception, the "ultimate" cultural difference that separated Americans from Japanese was this one. The Americans in the Occupation were culturally committed to the fundamental importance of the "pursuit of happiness," principally on an individual basis, and to the Jeffersonian notion that the duty of government is to permit and foster such pursuit. To the American, duty was also important -- but not, I would argue, *more* important.

My Japanese colleagues, by contrast, seemed to me to emphasize duty, and the precise, persistent, and consistent fulfillment of obligation, vastly more than individual happiness. Individual *fulfillment*, to them, was a goal to be realized through pursuing one's duty in the context of one's group -- and of the higher groups to which one's group owed fealty. The task of government was to require and facilitate the carrying out of social duty.

6. LOOKING BACKWARD: GIVING TO JAPAN

Today, as I re-read the musty pages of my MG CIE reports of 43 years ago, I am reminded that in 1948 I was constantly asking myself whether this

or that specific MG intervention was truly justified -- especially changes of the type that, I suspected, the voters of Wakayama, if given the opportunity of a referendum, would not have supported. (I was quite sure at the time, for example, that Wakayamans would *not* have voted consistently to support the radical, "one fell swoop" re-structuring of their schools that in fact did occur in that year -- and without incident.) Under what conditions, I would ask myself, should an occupationaire go ahead anyway, on the assumption simply that he or she was *right* -- and that, in the future, the Japanese would come to agree, even if they did not agree now? Asking this question immediately places one on tricky moral ground, for rationalizations of this sort have, after all, been used by dictators and brutal rulers since time immemorial.

I countered my suspicions of excessive ego- or ethnocentrism by reminding myself that soon the Japanese would once again be in control of their own country -- and then free, if they chose, to revert to older forms and practices.

I have no systematic data on the extent to which the reforms I helped to catalyze have endured or not. Thirty-five years after I left, however, I was assured by two Japanese educators with whom I had worked closely, that the structural reforms described above have indeed endured and sunk deep roots. I like to believe that this is because, at least to some extent, people have come to value the new institutions and practices, and are now prepared to defend them {34}.

7. LOOKING FORWARD: LEARNING FROM JAPAN

In approaching my closing, I cannot resist a brief commentary on the fact that in recent years thoughtful Americans have become at least as convinced that America must learn from Japan, as they were 45 years ago that Japan must learn from America. I emphatically include myself among them.

Forty-odd years ago Japan *did* indeed learn a lot from America, and much of what it learned was, I believe, useful. Today, surprising though it may seem to some, those very elementary and secondary schools that American occupationaires helped make democratic and modern, are turning out graduates whose mean achievement scores, especially in math and science, are seriously higher than the American. Today, those same schools are turning out workers who, in many instances, are appreciably more adaptable and efficient at manufacturing than American workers. And today, many Japanese industrial workers labor under conditions that are *fairer* than those of their American counterparts -- a reversal of the situation 45 years ago when we in the Occupation fostered democratic unionism -- and indeed a partial explanation for the Japanese industrial miracle.

And a miracle it is. I, for one, am frank to admit that if someone in Wakayama in 1948 had prophesied that within 40 years I would be driving a Japanese-manufactured automobile by choice, I would have doubted his mental stability. Yet today I do drive a Japanese car.

Japanese productive success in the automobile and many other industries has complex implications, and will force Americans to adjust to

many new economic and political realities. Making this total adjustment, and making it quickly and adroitly, will certainly not be easy. But adjust we must.

Adjustment can be facilitated by understanding. In seeking understanding, I would argue that the principal reasons why the Japanese are scoring high in scholastic achievement, and in manufacturing, are rooted in Japanese *culture*. I would further argue that the *freeing up* of various proclivities that in 1945 were already deeply rooted in that culture, for which the American Occupation was in a primary sense responsible, contributed significantly to various processes of change which in turn help to explain Japan's excellence in many fields today.

Be that as it may, I regard the present widespread tendency among thoughtful Americans to try to learn from Japanese culture, as wise indeed. Any such efforts bring one quickly, of course, to the obvious conclusion that many elements of Japanese culture cannot be borrowed into American culture straightaway, because such borrowing would do damage to too many *other* aspects of our sociocultural system. Thus, to take but one of many possible examples, there is no way that several million American married women, even if they wanted to, could suddenly become stay-at-home "Kyooiku mama-s" (education mothers) -- because most of them have jobs that they cannot afford to give up. And so forth.

Nonetheless, even though *direct* cultural borrowing is not possible in a given instance, a thorough *awareness* of how the Japanese have been successful in some particular respect can often inspire creative thinking and innovation: if the American mother cannot perform the monitoring,

stimulating, and nurturing role, then perhaps American society can find someone else who can. And so forth.

Today, then, it is literally true that America cannot afford *not* to learn from Japan. At the same time, it is also arguable that Japan still has much to learn from America. Above all, I consider it a matter of the highest priority that we search vigorously, affirmatively, and creatively for new avenues toward positive Japanese-American cooperation in an increasingly interdependent and borderless world.

8. THE BOTTOM LINE: SUCCESS IN JAPAN

I conclude as follows. The allied occupation of Japan, which was really an American occupation, was, in my view, the most ambitious occupation the world has seen since the emergence of the nation-state. It was an occupation that demonstrated that American leaders had learned several vital lessons from the post-World War I experience. Far from being an occupation of revenge or reciprocated plunder, it was positive in intent and relatively benign and helpful in effect.

A word is here in order concerning my 1951 book about the occupation, which was widely reviewed, often favorably. The *New York Times*, for example, selected the book for its list of "Outstanding Books of 1951." A Japanese language version was published by Bungei Shunju and immediately made the Yomiuri best-seller list.

Forty years later, as I re-read my book, I see many things that I would change -- which is hardly surprising, considering that the book was the first

scholarly publication of any kind that I had ever written.

First off, I would change the ill-chosen title: **Failure in Japan**, which is only somewhat redeemed by the sub-title, **With Keystones for a Positive Policy** {35}.

However, I am still glad I wrote that book. It said some things about the occupation that I still believe needed to be said at that point in history. And Yes, it did criticize General MacArthur, who, I believed and still believe, needed to be criticized on some scores. And it did criticize U.S. foreign policy, which had reversed our policy of deconcentrating the zaibatsu's (moneyed clique's) economic holdings {36}, and vitiated other policies in ways that I still think were not appropriate {37}.

But now that a post-occupation history has accumulated, now that a more tempered judgment can be rendered, let me speak as an anthropologist and say that, in an overall sense, I think the Occupation was -- as occupations go -- *anthropologically* well conducted. Let me speak as a philosophical democrat and say that the occupation was an epochal contribution to world democracy. And let me speak as a member of the human species and say that the occupation was, on the whole, humane. Yes, the occupation *was* a success!

Finally: however much I may have disagreed with him at the time, let me add my conviction that the record of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers serves well to remind us of the social truth that situations do from time to time arise in which a single individual can significantly influence history. General MacArthur showed far greater wisdom and effectiveness than most other

American leaders, civilian or military, of the sort that might have been given his assignment, probably would or could have shown. He achieved clear and definite success in an unprecedented undertaking. He holds a high place in Japanese history -- indeed, a unique one. He deserves that place.

And he deserves honor in our memory.

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1991 "Change and Continuity in Modern Japanese Educational History: Allied Occupational Reforms Forty Years Later," **Comparative Educational Review**, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 447-475. Note: I here use this informative article as an authoritative general summary of the fate, positive or negative, of various Occupation efforts at educational reform. Wray bases his assessments on a wide range of professional literature in both Japanese and English. I find his long "Conclusions" section convincing and valuable, in particular because he relates the relative persistence of various Occupation-sponsored reforms to Japanese culture, institutions, and history.

NOTES

1. I wish to thank Dr. Anderson's widow, Mrs. Lucille Anderson, as well as Prof. David Kornhauser and Ms. Michiko Kornhauser, for reviewing this article in manuscript form. Responsibility for all errors is, of course, mine.
2. Since my visit in 1983, I am told, a Japanese group has begun efforts to restore the office to the way it looked when General MacArthur occupied it, and to preserve it as a memorial.
3. Each month the Wakayama MG Team submitted a report of activities to higher headquarters. I was responsible for the Civil Information (CI) and Civil Education (CE) sections of each such report. I have obtained xerox copies of my reports from the U.S. National Archives for January through June, 1948. These reports were originally classified as "Restricted," but were declassified on April 12, 1974.
4. I have no direct information as to how accurate General MacArthur's knowledge of local grass roots conditions was. If I had to guess, I would speculate that his grasp of such conditions was probably greater than I thought at the time, but still considerably less than I (or he) would have preferred.

5. Perhaps equally important, for the first year or more Anderson and I, and for a while the late Warner I. ("Bud") Weil, were also in de facto in charge of MG CIE activities for Kyoto Prefecture. This gave us a direct window on the rapidly changing scene at the local level, ranging from that at the major universities in Kyoto city to that in isolated village schools in Oku-Tango.

6. The establishment of Wakayama University out of an economics college and two normal colleges was a fascinating experience, but space does not permit its adequate treatment here.

7. I should add that my primary anthropological specialty is Thailand, not Japan. I do not consider myself a Japan expert.

8. My civil service rank was that of Clerical-Administrative-Fiscal (CAF) 9, with the simulated rank of first lieutenant or captain.

9. These officers, many of whom spoke at least some Japanese and understood at least something about Japanese society and culture, included some highly qualified men. However, they constituted only a minority of the total officer personnel in MG, and most of them left Japan within a year or so.

10. For example, one regular army colonel, with authority over many MG teams, made it clear in staff meetings that he would do all in his bureaucratic power to resist the granting of permission for any Caucasian MG man to

marry any Japanese woman, because such a man would thereby be "lowering" himself. However, in the case of a Nisei (Japanese-American) MG man, he would not resist, because such a man would be marrying "above" himself. Racist biases of this general sort were by no means rare, though the harshness of this particular stance was not typical.

11. And life could indeed be enjoyable. Virtually all occupationaires enjoyed a level of physical comfort and convenience far beyond their previous experience. There were Japanese servants to take care of all menial tasks. There were plenty of Japanese women available on one basis or another. There were ample black market opportunities for those who were interested--and many were. In some areas, there was extremely comfortable housing. For virtually all occupationaires, there were ample sports and recreational facilities, luxurious rest hotels, and the like. Usually, occupationaires had fairly ready access to post exchanges or PX trains, where they could buy all sorts of necessities and luxuries, from liquor to wrist watches to Japanese silks or cloisonné. These amenities and luxuries, as well as room and board, were usually available at low prices, and many occupationaires could manage to bank most of their monthly salary.

12. At some point in the occupation -- just when I do not remember -- MG CIE officers were officially authorized to go beyond "observing and reporting," to "guiding and assisting." In fact, many of us had already been doing just that, in response to situations that arose which required some kind of immediate constructive response.

13. At that time the Shikoku and Chugoku MG regions were staffed by Americans for MG purposes, but the tactical occupying troops were those of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force.

14. As soon as it became obvious that there would be no military or physical resistance to the Occupation by the Japanese, there was really no justification for such a complex table of organization for MG activities. A suitable number of tactical troops could have been maintained to insure domestic tranquility and serve whatever other tactical or strategic purposes were considered necessary, but there was no need for MG to be under the command of tactical units.

Of the five levels, the Eighth Army and corps levels were obviously redundant, and often served simply to slow the process of communication between the team level and the SCAP policy level. MG affairs would have run much more efficiently and professionally if team had reported to region, and region directly to SCAP.

15. On January 1, 1950, a change did occur. Military government, re-named "Civil Affairs," was restructured. The total number of personnel was reduced drastically, especially on the military side. Only two levels were retained: the regional teams and the MG Section at Eighth Army Headquarters. The prefectural teams were abolished, thereby depriving MG of true influence at the grass roots. But by this time it hardly mattered, since the Occupation had long since run out of reforming steam (Textor 1951: 192-3).

16. With respect to the First Corps area, it was my impression that in general junior officers would demur more than senior, military more than civilian, and career military more than non-career military.

17. During the middle and later months of 1946 Ronald Anderson and I frequently made interim policy in this manner, with respect to Kyoto Prefecture, and, more provisionally, with respect to the entire First Corps area.

18. The CIC had its own structure, separate from MG, with branches down to prefectural level and below. At least at its lower levels, the CIC was, as far as I know, composed entirely of military personnel.

19. It is difficult for me to understand why General MacArthur, a leader dedicated to fundamental human rights, kept an individual like Willoughby as a key staff officer for many years. Schaller (1989: 121) describes Willoughby thus:

A German-born immigrant with pretensions of noble birth, Willoughby brought a Prussian demeanor and extremely right-wing views to his intelligence post. MacArthur hit the mark when he once called his aide "my lovable fascist." Willoughby saw Communist and Jewish conspiracies at home, abroad, and especially in SCAP's ranks. His Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) spied on Americans and cultivated former members of Japan's secret police and armed forces.

20. Lieutenant P was a well educated man. Many of the personnel assigned to isolated CIC posts, however, were not. Often they were the only American personnel in the city to which they were assigned. They operated in secrecy, a fact that gave them considerable de facto power, and ample opportunity to assume prerogatives well beyond those officially assigned to them.

21. After the occupation, some Japanese officials who had cooperated actively with Occupation officials suffered setbacks in their careers. In other cases, however, such cooperation actually resulted in career advancement to a degree greater than probably would have occurred otherwise -- though they may not have been particularly concerned about, or aware of, this possibility at the time that they offered their cooperation.

22. The official I found in charge of education when I arrived in Wakayama in November 1947 had previously been associated with ultranationalistic activities, even including the administration of "thought control." It was soon clear that there was utterly no way in which he could have been expected to promote democratic education policies. I made it clear to the appropriate officials that he and I could not work together, and before long he was transferred to other duties. I was, in this sense, responsible for his transfer. I was not, however, responsible for the selection of his successor. It was simply my good luck that his successor was so excellent.

23. For a description of a quintessential liberal occupationaire in action, see Chapter 3 of Williams (1979), on Charles L. Kades, of Government Section, SCAP, who played a key role in drafting the present constitution of Japan.

24. For a thorough examination of just how conservative General MacArthur had earlier been, see Schaller (1989).

It remains to explain just why a person so conservative on American domestic issues would turn out to be so liberal when placed in the role of Supreme Commander in Japan. Two reasons seem plausible.

First, MacArthur quickly discovered, if he had not earlier known, that leading conservatives in Japan tended, unlike most of their American counterparts, to be fundamentally anti-democratic. They were what I called, for lack of a better term, the "Old Guard" (Textor 1951: 15-20). MacArthur characterized them thus:

Control was exercised by a feudalistic overlordship of a mere fraction of the population, while the remaining millions, with a few enlightened exceptions, were abject slaves to tradition, legend, mythology, and regimentation. (MacArthur 1964: 310).

Second, MacArthur's liberal policies reflected the influence of liberals in the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, during which considerable planning for the U.S.'s post-surrender Japan policy took place. This planning was embodied in two documents:

- ◆ "Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," SWNCC [State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee] 150/4/A, signed by President Truman on September 6, 1945; and

- ◆ "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper," JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] 1380/5, dated November 3, 1945.

Schaller contends that MacArthur knew the substance of both documents before he landed in Japan on August 30, 1945, and argues that credit for conceptualizing the Occupation's reforms should go primarily to such officials in Washington.

Interestingly, however, in his *Reminiscences*, MacArthur gives the credit to himself. He makes no mention of either Washington document. Instead, he contends:

From the moment of my appointment as supreme commander, I had formulated the policies I intended to follow, implementing them through the Emperor and the machinery of the imperial government. I was thoroughly familiar with Japanese administration, its weaknesses and its strengths, and felt the reforms I contemplated were those which would bring Japan abreast of modern progressive thought and action. First destroy the military power. Punish war criminals. Build the structure of representative government. Modernize the constitution. Hold free elections. Enfranchise the women. Release the political prisoners. Liberate the farmers. Establish a free labor movement. Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppression. Develop a free and responsible press. Liberalize education. Decentralize political power. Separate church from state. (1964: 282-3).

Schaller disputes this. He contends that the two directives from Washington "outlined virtually the entire reform agenda..." Schaller contends, therefore, that MacArthur took personal credit for conceptualizing reforms that in fact were conceptualized by planners in Washington (Schaller 1989: 123).

I find Schaller's argument convincing. In judging General MacArthur on this apparently excessive claim, however, I think one should bear in mind two points:

- ◆ He was a very old man when he wrote his book, and died shortly after finishing his manuscript.

- ◆ Regardless of who conceptualized these reforms (and allowing for the possibility of a considerable amount of independent conceptualization) it was MacArthur whose leadership succeeded in implementing them. This, alone, was an achievement of major historic significance.

25. Informally, the standard developed that the civilian officers should be expected to do the really hard work of MG, since civilian salaries were higher. There was some resentment over these salary differentials.

26. My analysis will be somewhat confounded by the fact that it was not just two cultures that confronted each other, but also two situations, that of prosperous victorious nation and that of prostrate defeated nation.

Consequently, there is, in this section, always the danger that I will attribute to cultural factors phenomena that can better be explained by invoking situational phenomena. On the other hand, it is sometimes true that in situations of extreme stress, the fundamental values of a culture become more evident than would otherwise be the case. Suffice to say here that I am aware of these problems and have tried to deal with them in the presentation.

27. The word "often" is important. The differences in cultural stance here outlined represent what I consider to be *statistical* tendencies only. The listing of these issues in this rough form is intended to indicate general types of situation in which American occupationaires tended to take one broad stance, and Japanese officials and leaders tended to take a different, and more or less opposing, stance. Usually there would be exceptions to these tendencies, and these exceptions sometimes provided useful common ground for negotiation. One of the key tasks of the change-oriented C.I.E. officer was to find and utilize these areas of common ground.

28. In the MG subculture, it was always prudent, especially for a civilian liberal activist officer such as myself, to bend over backwards to make clear to one's superiors that the Japanese with whom one was dealing were not "radical" (in the sense of being Communist or pro-Communist). Otherwise, one risked incurring the suspicion of one's military superiors, and losing their support.

29. Furthermore, the American knew that his or her future career would not be disadvantaged by changes in the Japanese situation, while the Japanese official was keenly aware that he, his group, and his family would have to live with such changes for the indefinite future -- perhaps at a significant disadvantage. This factor was, then, more a situational than a cultural one.

30. Riesman (1950), writing of American characterological types, classified many Americans prior to about World War II as "inner-directed." The implication here was that the American searches his or her soul, and then decides quite autonomously what to do. Clearly, Americans working in Japan in 1946-48 varied as to the extent to their inner-directedness, but I would judge that most civilian liberals were inclined to be inner-directed, and would so categorize myself. I and other civilian liberal activist MG officers sometimes resented the military officers who were our bosses, because they tended more to be, again in Riesman's terms, "other-directed"--the "others" being, of course, other (and higher ranking) Americans--and certainly not Japanese. Riesman broadly classified the Japanese as "tradition-directed" (p. 10).

31. "K," by the way, owned a commodious home in Wakayama City which the local CIC had procured to serve as their residence and office. The chief CIC officer for Wakayama Prefecture once casually informed me that he relied heavily on K for intelligence information -- so much so that he was considering inviting K to move in with The CIC contingent in K's old home, so as to facilitate closer "cooperation."

32. Of course it was true in 1946-48 that due to the dislocation of infrastructure, and the widespread economic hardship, it was often only the government that had the economic or physical resources to carry out a change. My point is, though, that even where such constraints did not exist, this Japanese cultural proclivity was still in evidence. A women's

organization, for example, might see nothing particularly strange about receiving advice from a government official or non-governmental "advisor" -- typically an elderly, culturally conservative *male*.

33. In part, this tradition clearly stems from the simple facts that the Japanese writing system is a character system, and that fully one-third of an elementary school student's time is devoted to memorizing, using, and appreciating characters.

34. Wray (1991: 473) looking at the history of Japanese education over the forty years since the occupation, concludes as follows with respect to the nation as a whole:

The introduction of the 6-3-3-4 educational ladder system achieved...equal educational opportunity and the vested interests of teachers and administrators who bettered their social position has prevented any retreat from the 6-3-3-4 system. [Note that Wray is here explaining permanence by referring to vested interests, rather than to ideological commitment.] Coeducation was strongly resisted by the Monbushoo [Ministry of Education], but it is complete at the elementary level and generally characteristic of urban public junior and senior high schools.

With respect to the comprehensive school, Wray goes on to note:

Before the reforms had a chance to work, the occupation ended. The Americans really never achieved the essence of the 6-3-3-4 system, the comprehensive curriculum, or many other changes because there were not enough teachers, appropriate educational materials and funds, or enough time to ensure adequate follow-through.

35. Other problems with the book, viewed in retrospect, include the following:

- ◆ The book demanded too much, and was too rigid in its standards.
- ◆ Although the Japanese "Old Guard" were hardly a savory group by the standards most Americans would use, the book treated them as considerably more diabolical than they subsequently proved to be.
- ◆ The decision to de-emphasize reform and increasingly emphasize the building up of Japan as a Cold War strategic resource came primarily from Washington. The book did not give MacArthur credit for resisting some of these decisions, simply because at that time I did not have access to adequate information that would have enabled me to do so.
- ◆ Perhaps most important, the book was delayed in publication, due in part to the fact that I was at the time a full-time graduate student. By the time it came out, many of its policy recommendations were out of date.

36. I have not researched this point, but I suspect that it could be argued with some cogency that the current difficulties some American firms are experiencing in competing with Japanese industry are traceable to the failure of the Occupation to carry through most of its originally announced zaibatsu deconcentration policy.

Incidentally, in General MacArthur's *Reminiscences*, he does not mention the fact that the Occupation's original program for zaibatsu deconcentration was drastically reduced, in fact almost totally scuttled (Textor 1951: 50-60 and Appendix Two). He simply states that:

These great trusts were partially dissolved and a truly competitive free enterprise system inaugurated....The main thing was that their influence was broken.

37. I think it can be argued that some aspects of U.S. political policy toward occupied Japan contributed to a situation in which, ever since the end of the Occupation, the nation has essentially been ruled by just one political party. I do not consider this to be a healthy political condition. In my view, Japan will be more convincing as a democracy when it experiences a peaceful, responsible turnover of its ruling party at the national level.