

1 **Shifts in African crop climates by 2050, and the implications for crop improvement**  
2 **and genetic resources conservation**

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6  
7 **Abstract**  
8

9 Increased understanding of the substantial threat climate change poses to agriculture has  
10 not been met with a similarly improved understanding of how best to respond. Here we  
11 examine likely shifts in crop climates in Sub-Saharan Africa under climate change to  
12 2050, and explore the implications for agricultural adaptation, with particular focus on  
13 identifying priorities in crop breeding and the conservation of crop genetic resources. We  
14 find that for three of Africa’s primary cereal crops – maize, millet, and sorghum –  
15 expected changes in growing season temperature are considerable and dwarf changes  
16 projected for precipitation, with the warmest recent temperatures on average cooler than  
17 almost 9 out of 10 expected observations by 2050. For the “novel” crop climates  
18 currently unrepresented in each country but likely extant there in 2050, we identify  
19 current analogs across the continent. The majority of African countries will have novel  
20 climates over at least half of their current crop area by 2050. Of these countries, 75%  
21 will have novel climates with analogs in the current climate of at least five other  
22 countries, suggesting that international movement of germplasm will be necessary for  
23 adaptation. A more troubling set of countries – largely the hotter Sahelian countries –  
24 will have climates with few analogs for any crop. Finally, we identify countries, such as  
25 Sudan, Cameroon, and Nigeria, whose current crop areas are analogs to many future  
26 climates but that are poorly represented in major genebanks – promising locations in  
27 which to focus future genetic resource conservation efforts.  
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30 **Introduction**

31 Climate is a significant constraint on agriculture throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa  
32 (hereafter “Africa”). With over 40% of the continent’s population living on less than  
33 \$1/day, and 70% of these poor located in rural areas and largely dependent on agriculture  
34 for their livelihoods (Chen and Ravallion 2007), adverse shifts in climate can cause

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\*We thank D. Battisti and C. Tebaldi for suggestions and help with the data, R. Naylor, W. Falcon, J. Chérfas, J. Burney, and M. Mastrandrea for helpful comments on the manuscript, and the Rockefeller Foundation for funding.

35 devastating declines in human welfare. Such shifts have been implicated in everything  
36 from famine to slow economic growth to heightened risk of civil conflict (Bloom and  
37 Sachs 1998; Miguel, Satyanath et al. 2004). As a result, increased attention is being paid  
38 to assessing risks to African agriculture under climate change, with some studies finding  
39 moderate to severe adverse effects on agricultural productivity occurring in as early as  
40 two decades (Easterling, Aggarwal et al. 2007; Lobell, Burke et al. 2008).

41

42 Increased understanding of climate threats to agriculture in Africa, however, has not been  
43 met with a similarly improved understanding of how best to respond. Given the  
44 adaptability displayed by farmers in the face of past climate variability (Adger, Agrawala  
45 et al. 2007), there appears to be some scope for African farmers to adapt on their own to  
46 climate change, for example by switching crops or varieties or by altering the timing of  
47 planting. But if future change is exceedingly rapid, or if it dwarfs the magnitude of past  
48 variability, farmers may be unable to adapt without some help. As a result, there exists a  
49 widely acknowledged need for significant investment in agricultural adaptation, but there  
50 has been little systematic assessment of how to prioritize these so-called “planned”  
51 adaptations – what form they should take, and on what crops and locations they should  
52 focus.

53

54 Here we analyze data on shifting climates to help inform priorities for one major  
55 adaptation strategy: breeding crop varieties to tolerate future climates. Past crop varietal  
56 improvement through breeding has contributed to unprecedented gains in human well-  
57 being throughout much of Asia and Latin America (Evenson and Gollin 2003).

58 Unfortunately, to date this “green revolution” has largely bypassed the African continent,  
59 an absence implicated in Africa’s decades-long track record of poor agricultural  
60 development and economic performance (World Bank 2008). As a result, the  
61 development of improved crop varieties suited to Africa’s diverse agroecologies is seen  
62 as a central priority by the international development community.

63

64 Numerous strategies exist for such crop improvement, and while advances in  
65 biotechnology can offer alternative, more direct pathways to genetic modification of  
66 crops, traditional breeding has a long history of success, is typical for most African  
67 breeding programs, and thus likely will continue to be a critical strategy for crop  
68 improvement. Central to past successes with traditional breeding has been the  
69 availability and use of diverse crop genetic resources that contain the traits being bred for  
70 – for instance, landraces or crop wild relatives with resistance to drought, heat, or a  
71 particular pest or disease.

72

73 Unfortunately, African crop genetic resources conservation is generally poorly supported  
74 at a national level, and material from the region is not fully represented in the major  
75 international genebanks that provide the foundation for sustained public breeding efforts.  
76 Table 1 shows representation of African maize landraces in selected major genebanks,  
77 with African varieties making up roughly 5% of the total holdings. Although the center of  
78 origin of maize is Mesoamerica, maize has been grown in Africa for hundreds of years,  
79 during which farmer selection has produced varieties adapted to the diverse and often  
80 harsh growing conditions on the continent. And while the number of accessions in hand

81 is often an imperfect estimate of diversity conserved, African maize varieties are clearly  
82 under-represented in major genebanks, constraining breeding programs. For sorghum,  
83 another important African cereal crop whose center of origin is in the Sahel, African  
84 varieties represent a higher percentage of total varieties conserved internationally, but key  
85 gaps exist in both the characterization and geographical representation of existing  
86 collections (GCDT 2007).

87

88 National genebanks do conserve additional material that is not always represented in the  
89 international genebanks (Table A1), but the coverage of the diversity present in the  
90 country is usually far from complete (GCDT 2007). Furthermore, national genebanks  
91 often vary widely in their condition, and many are in need of immediate funding simply  
92 to maintain the viability of their existing collections. Finally, countries have sovereignty  
93 over genetic resources, and the accessibility of material in national genebanks to outside  
94 breeders can differ substantially from country to country. As a result, identifying where  
95 to focus efforts to collect and conserve African landraces is seen as a major priority in the  
96 crop genetic resources community.

97

## 98 **Approach and methods**

99

100 Using historical climate data, maps of crop area, and climate model ensembles drawn  
101 from the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report  
102 (AR4), we take two approaches to investigating how crop climates will change across the  
103 continent. The first compares historical climate at a given location to the projected future

104 climate at that location, asking how quickly climate change will push local crop climates  
105 beyond recent experience<sup>3</sup>. Given that many investments in agricultural adaptation, such  
106 as improved crop varieties or expanded irrigation infrastructure, can take decades to  
107 realize returns (Reilly and Schimmelpfennig 2000), understanding the rate and magnitude  
108 of climate change can inform the magnitude and timeliness of needed adaptation  
109 investments.

110

111 Because climates often vary as much across space in a country as they do over time, our  
112 second approach compares present and future crop climates within and across countries,  
113 determining to what extent the spatial range of future climate in a country is represented  
114 in that country today, and whether any un-represented portion has analogs elsewhere on  
115 the continent presently. We use this approach to identify both future problem regions  
116 with no analogs on the continent in today's climate, and countries whose current crop  
117 areas appear likely analogs to many future climates, with the latter case representing  
118 promising areas for genetic resource collection and preservation. For both approaches, we  
119 focus on crop climates for Africa's three primary rainfed cereals – maize, sorghum, and  
120 pearl millet – which together provide on average roughly 30% of calories consumed in  
121 Africa, rising to over 65% in some countries (FAO 2008). Our overall approach is not  
122 intended to map changes in crop suitability under climate change, nor to determine the  
123 effect of climate change on crop yields – both very important topics in their own right –  
124 but rather to characterize the climates under which Africa's cereals will need to be grown

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<sup>3</sup> We thank D. Battisti for this suggestion.

125 in coming decades, and to use this information to prioritize breeding and genetic resource  
126 conservation efforts.

127

### 128 **How fast are crop climates changing?**

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130 To explore the magnitude and speed of climate change over major crop areas in Africa,  
131 we calculate the percentage overlap between historical (1960-2002) growing season  
132 temperature and precipitation and their potential 2025, 2050, and 2075 values over  
133 reported crop area. We combine historical climate data (Mitchell and Jones 2005) with  
134 maps of crop distribution (Leff, Ramankutty et al. 2004) and estimates of the months in  
135 which crops are grown in each country (Lobell, Burke et al. 2008) to derive a 43-year  
136 time series of historical growing season climate at each 0.5 x 0.5 degree grid cell – the  
137 scale at which our historical climate data and crop maps are available. Future  
138 temperatures are determined by adding to historical time series data the simulated  
139 changes in average temperature for the 18 climate models running the A1B emissions  
140 scenario. Similarly, future precipitations are computed by multiplying current values by  
141 simulated percent changes from the range of climate models, which yields the range of  
142 possible future precipitation under the A1B scenario. Climate for the A1B scenario is  
143 roughly similar to other AR4 emissions scenarios through 2050, and intermediate  
144 between the A2 and B1 scenarios by 2075 (Meehl, Stocker et al. 2007).

145

146 Perhaps importantly, our analysis assumes no shifts in the main growing season months  
147 for African cereals. While this might be an unreasonable assumption for irrigated areas

148 where a shift in planting dates could optimize changing growing-season temperatures, it  
149 is a more likely scenario for the vast majority of African cereal area where production is  
150 rainfed and where planting is constrained by the onset of the rainy season – the latter  
151 which is unlikely to shift substantially under future climate (Christensen, Hewitson et al.  
152 2007).

153

154 To determine overlap between past and future climates, we determine the percentage of  
155 possible future climates (as calculated above) that fall within the 5<sup>th</sup> to 95<sup>th</sup> percentile  
156 range of historical climate observations for a given area. An example for a hypothetical  
157 region is shown in Figure 1. We repeat this procedure for every grid cell in the primary  
158 African cereal areas, and for the future climate years of 2025, 2050, and 2075.

159

160 Results show that for temperature, nearly all crop regions move rapidly outside of  
161 historical experience. Figure 2 maps the overlap between historical and projected future  
162 growing season temperatures for maize in Africa. Results indicate that growing season  
163 temperature at any given maize growing region in Africa will overlap on average 58%  
164 with its historical observations by 2025, 14% by 2050, and 3% by 2075. This suggests  
165 that within two decades, growing season average temperature will be hotter than any year  
166 in historical experience for 4 years out of 10 for the majority of African maize area,  
167 growing to nearly 9 out of 10 by 2050 and nearly 10 out of 10 in 2075. Similar results  
168 were obtained for millet (sorghum), with 54% (57%), 12% (15%), and 2% (3%) overlap  
169 between historical and 2025, 2050, and 2075 growing season temperatures, respectively.

170

171 Projections of precipitation change over African crop areas represent considerably  
172 smaller departures from historical experience. For maize, average overlaps between  
173 historical and future growing season precipitation across Africa are 86%, 84%, and 82%  
174 for 2025, 2050, and 2075, respectively, with quantitatively similar results for millet and  
175 sorghum. Larger overlaps of past and future precipitation relative to temperature are a  
176 reflection of high year-to-year variability in historical rainfall relative to projected trends.  
177 The non-overlapping part of the potential rainfall distribution includes both wetter and  
178 drier growing seasons, reflecting the substantial climate model disagreement over the  
179 direction of precipitation change across most of Africa (Christensen, Hewitson et al.  
180 2007).

181

182 Given that growing season average temperatures will quickly and increasingly exceed the  
183 range of historical experience at a given location, and that yields can be quite sensitive to  
184 these temperature shifts (Lobell, Burke et al. 2008), adaptations will undoubtedly be  
185 needed to moderate the impacts of warming. Importantly, one primary adaptation option  
186 for agriculture – the development of crops suited to changed climates – can involve large  
187 time lags, with more than a decade often required to develop and screen new crop  
188 varieties and get them in the hands of farmers. Given this lag, and with a 40% chance by  
189 2025 that growing season climate will be hotter than anything in recent historical  
190 experience, our results suggest a pressing need to develop breeding programs that  
191 anticipate these rapidly warming growing environments.

192

193 **Spatial analogs in crop climates**

194

195 While the importance of both private-sector crop breeding and the use of advanced  
196 genetic techniques has grown rapidly in importance throughout the developed and  
197 developing world, crop improvement in Africa remains a primarily public-sector  
198 endeavor, usually with strong reliance on classical breeding techniques (Pardey and  
199 Beintema 2001). Such techniques rely on *ex-situ* collections of crop genetic diversity –  
200 i.e. genebanks – and thus breeding for a warmer world requires that the necessary crop  
201 diversity be conserved and available within the relevant genebanks. As noted above,  
202 African cereals are often poorly represented in international genebanks, and national  
203 genebanks on the continent are frequently resource-constrained and not always  
204 representative of the crop genetic diversity in the country.

205

206 To help identify priorities with respect to collection and conservation of these genetic  
207 resources, we evaluate the extent and location of places whose current climate serves as  
208 an analog for the future climate in the location of interest. Such climate analogs represent  
209 regions of crop genetic diversity highly relevant to future growing conditions on the  
210 continent, and thus a promising source for germplasm on which needed breeding efforts  
211 could be based. Given the important role that political boundaries play in shaping  
212 agricultural development – i.e, the continued importance of national breeding programs  
213 and the political constraints to cross-border movement of genetic resources – we focus  
214 our analysis on the country level.

215

216 To analyze crop climate analogs across space, we follow a similar procedure as above,  
217 computing the overlap between current crop climates in a given country and future crop  
218 climates in all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 3). Current crop climate for a  
219 given country is defined by the area-weighted distribution of growing season average  
220 temperature and precipitation across all grid cells reporting area for a given crop within  
221 that country, averaged over the last decade for which data are available (1993-2002). We  
222 use the last decade of climate data instead of the full 40-year time series to define current  
223 climate because it is long enough to mask high year-to-year climate variability, but short  
224 enough to realistically capture current growing conditions in the context of a rapidly-  
225 warming continent. Future crop climates are again defined by adding (multiplying)  
226 projected changes by 2050 for each climate model running the A1B scenario to the  
227 current range of growing-season temperatures (precipitation) within the country.  
228 Consistent with other assessments (Fischer, van Velthuis et al. 2002), we assume no  
229 major changes in crop suitability across the continent by mid-century, and thus no large  
230 expansion of crop area.

231

232 To understand how well a country's current range of growing season climate represents  
233 its likely future range, and if and where any un-represented (or "novel") climates in that  
234 country have analogs in current climate elsewhere on the continent (Williams, Jackson et  
235 al. 2007), we estimate two types of overlap between present and future crop climates.  
236 The first calculates the amount of overlap a country's present range of climate will have  
237 with its future range (or "self-overlap"). Self-overlap is defined as the percentage of 5<sup>th</sup>-  
238 95<sup>th</sup> percentile present climate observations that fall within the range of possible future

239 climates projected for a given country (Figure 3). For any novel future climate un-  
240 represented by that country's present climate, we calculate the percentage of that novel  
241 climate falling within the present 5<sup>th</sup>-95<sup>th</sup> percentile of each of all other country crop  
242 climates in Africa.

243

244 Figure 4 shows percentages of self-overlap between a country's current and 2050  
245 growing season temperatures for maize, millet, and sorghum, with countries sorted by  
246 percent overlap of maize temperature. Results provide three insights. First, they confirm  
247 the importance of model-predicted temperature shifts relative to precipitation shifts (not  
248 shown). For 85% of countries, simulated future precipitation regimes overlap with  
249 current climate better than do future temperature regimes – again reiterating the  
250 importance of collecting, evaluating and breeding for heat tolerance.

251

252 Second, results suggest that climate is typically more variable across space than across  
253 time – that is, the range of growing-season climates within a country in a given year is  
254 larger than the range of historical growing season climates at any given point in that  
255 country. Looking across African countries, the average overlap between a country's  
256 current range of maize growing season temperatures and its 2050 range is 40%; the  
257 average overlap is only 10% when comparing historical and likely future temperatures at  
258 any single maize-growing point on the continent. This suggests that even within  
259 countries, substantial variation in the range of growing season climate could indicate  
260 exploitable genetic variation in the suitability of crops to different climates. For a

261 country with large overlap between current and future climate, crop areas in one region of  
262 the country could serve as analogs for crop areas in other regions of the country.

263

264 Finally, for the majority of African countries, current growing season temperatures within  
265 a country will represent less than half of the range of expected 2050 growing season  
266 temperatures over maize, millet, and sorghum areas in that country. Almost uniformly,  
267 the countries with larger climatic ranges currently – such as the topographically diverse  
268 countries of East Africa – overlap better with their future climate. For the 51% of  
269 countries where more than half of maize area in 2050 will experience temperatures  
270 currently unrepresented in present climate, it is likely that they will have to look outside  
271 their borders to find varieties suitable to their new climates.

272

273 To match the need for outside genetic resources with promising locations in which to find  
274 them, we compare novel 2050 climates from each country with current climates in all  
275 African countries. Figure 5 plots the overlap of these novel 2050 climates (y-axis) with  
276 current climates for maize, with countries sorted vertically by average temperature (Mali  
277 hottest, Lesotho coolest), and warmer colors indicating higher overlap. Again, three  
278 stories emerge from the data.

279

280 First, many countries with low self-overlap have novel future climates with many analogs  
281 in present climate elsewhere. Fourteen countries (orange countries, Figure 6) overlap less  
282 than 50% with their future maize area, but have five or more countries that overlap at  
283 least 75% with their novel climates. For these countries, breeding efforts to cope with

284 warming could greatly benefit from accessing genetic resources beyond their own  
285 borders.

286

287 Second, there is a more worrying set of countries with little self-overlap *and* few current  
288 analogs for their novel climates. For maize, there are five countries with <50% overlap  
289 and fewer than five country analogs (red countries in Fig 6), with two others only slightly  
290 above the 50% threshold. These countries are clustered in the Sahel and tend to have  
291 warmer than average current growing season climates. For these countries, there is thus a  
292 much smaller potential pool of foreign genetic resources in which to seek heat tolerance,  
293 at least within Africa. If breeding efforts cannot sustain yield for maize in these countries  
294 in the face of warming temperatures, switches to more heat- and drought-tolerant crops,  
295 such as sorghum and millet, could be necessary.

296

297 Finally, there is a set of countries whose current climate is an analog to many future  
298 novel climates, suggesting promising potential sources of germplasm for future breeding  
299 efforts in anticipation of climate change. Importantly, landraces from many of these  
300 countries – for example Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Mozambique – are particularly  
301 poorly represented in national and international genebanks (Figure 7). The top ten analog  
302 countries for maize – those which overlap most with anticipated novel climates on the  
303 continent – each have fewer than 150 landrace accessions in major genebanks (see Table  
304 A2). These countries appear as particularly high priorities for urgent collection and  
305 conservation of maize genetic resources. An additional criterion for prioritization could

306 also be the total area sown to maize in each country, which varies by a factor of over 100  
307 between Eritrea and Nigeria and is also shown in Figure 7.

308

309 The results for sorghum and millet show qualitatively similar patterns (Figure A3-4 and  
310 Table A2). Roughly 9 out of 10 years by 2050 are warmer at a typical location than any  
311 historical year experienced at that point; the area with climate analogs within the same  
312 country varies from above 80% for a handful of countries to below 50% for a majority of  
313 countries; and analysis of cross-country analogs reveals several countries with numerous  
314 foreign analogs, several countries without analogs, and a handful of countries that serve  
315 as near-universal analogs. Furthermore, many of these near-universal analogs – Tanzania,  
316 Kenya, Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan – are consistent across the three cereals.

317

## 318 **Conclusion**

319

320 For a majority of Africa’s farmers, warming will rapidly take climate not only beyond the  
321 range of their personal experience, but beyond the experience of other farmers within  
322 their own country. Knowledge about the speed and magnitude of these shifts in crop  
323 climates could be useful in at least two ways. First, our results provide specific  
324 information to donor and research institutions that can be used to prioritize where to  
325 focus collecting, evaluation and conservation of genetic resources. While great strides  
326 have been made in the *ex situ* conservation of plant genetic resources over the last half-  
327 century, collections in key areas of likely African diversity are either non-existent,  
328 incomplete, in need of investment to maintain current collections, and/or poorly

329 integrated with larger public breeding efforts (FAO 1997). Importantly, our results  
330 suggest that the diversity currently conserved might not represent that which will be most  
331 useful in adapting crops to climate change in Africa. Investments in the collection and  
332 conservation of crop diversity in key analog countries such as Tanzania, Cameroon,  
333 Nigeria, and Sudan appear to be promising initial priorities.

334

335 Perhaps more importantly, the results demonstrate how international cooperation on  
336 genetic resources conservation and use will be crucial in adapting to the imminent threats  
337 of climate change. With maize, for example, 28% of the population of Africa lives in  
338 countries where less than half of the area will have an analog in the current climate of  
339 locations in their own country. Many of these countries stand to benefit from the genetic  
340 resources of other nations within Africa, if these resources can be effectively managed  
341 and shared. This is further evidence of the interdependence among countries for plant  
342 genetic resources that has led to the development of such collaborative mechanisms as  
343 the Multilateral System for access and benefit sharing of the International Treaty on Plant  
344 Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (<http://www.planttreaty.org/>). It is clear that  
345 such interdependence is set to increase under climate change, and with it the necessity of  
346 international collaboration in the conservation and use of crop genetic diversity.

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