# Ranking, Aggregation, and You

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# A simple question

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On a scale of 1 (very white) to 10 (very black), how black is this box?

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- On a scale of 1 (very white) to 10 (very black), how black is this box?
- Which box is blacker?

## Another question

### On a scale of 1 to 10, how relevant is this result for the query *flowers*?



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# Another question

Google	flowers
Search	About 849,000,000 results (0.31 seconds)
	Flower - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flower A flower, sometimes known as a bloom or blossom, is the reproductive structure found in flowering plants (plants of the division Magnoliophyta, also called
	Church Street Flowers www.churchstreetflowers.com/ Florist specializing in contemporary custom designs for everyday occasions and weddings. Includes image galleries, business hours and location map.
	Flowers   Same Day Flower Delivery, Send Flowers   FromYouFlow www.fromyouflowers.com/ Order flowers for delivery today! Nationwide flower delivery, starting at \$25.49. Send flowers to celebrate every occasion with same day flower delivery.
	Flowers Online, Send Roses, Florist   1-800-FLOWERS.COM Delivery www.1800flowers.com/ Order flowers, roses, and gif baskets online & send same day flower delivery for birthdays and anniversaries from trusted florist 1-800-Flowers.com.

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- 2. We are good at expressing sparse, partial preferences
  - Much worse at expressing complete preferences





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# Ranking

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- ▶ Web search: Return most relevant URLs for user queries
- Recommendation systems:
  - Movies to watch based on user's past ratings
  - News articles to read based on past browsing history
  - Items to buy based on patron's or other patrons' purchases

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### Standard (tractable) procedures for ranking with partial preferences are inconsistent

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- Aggregating partial preferences into more complete preferences can restore consistency
- ▶ New estimators based on *U*-statistics achieve 1+2+3

# Outline

#### Supervised Ranking

Formal definition Tractable surrogates Pairwise inconsistency

#### Aggregation

Restoring consistency Estimating complete preferences

#### **U-statistics**

Practical procedures Experimental results

# Outline

### Supervised Ranking

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#### **U-statistics**

Practical procedures Experimental results

### **Observe:** Sequence of training examples

▶ Query *Q*: e.g., search term "flowers"

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- Label Y representing some preference structure over items
  - Item 1 preferred to  $\{2,3\}$  and item 3 to 4



Example: Y is a graph on items  $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ 

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• Real-valued score for each item i in item set  $\mathcal{I}_Q$ 

$$\alpha_i := f_i(Q)$$

• Vector of scores f(Q) induces ranking over  $\mathcal{I}_Q$ 

 $i \text{ ranked above } j \iff \alpha_i > \alpha_j$ 

**Example:** Scoring function f with scores

 $f_1(Q) > f_2(Q) > f_3(Q)$ 

induces same ranking as preference graph  $\boldsymbol{Y}$ 



 $f_1(Q) > f_2(Q)$ 

 $f_2(Q) > f_3(Q)$ 

**Observe:**  $(Q_1, Y_1), \dots, (Q_n, Y_n)$ 

Learn: Scoring function f to predict item ranking

Suffer loss: L(f(Q), Y)

- $\blacktriangleright$  Encodes discord between observed label Y and prediction f(Q)
- Depends on specific ranking task and available data

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Example: Pairwise loss

- Let Y = (weighted) adjacency matrix for a preference graph
  - $Y_{ij}$  = the preference weight on edge (i, j)
- $\blacktriangleright$  Let  $\alpha = f(Q)$  be the predicted scores for query Q
- Then,  $L(\alpha, Y) = \sum_{i \neq j} Y_{ij} \mathbb{1}_{(\alpha_i \leq \alpha_j)}$
- Imposes penalty for each misordered edge



 $L(\alpha, Y) = Y_{12} \mathbf{1}_{(\alpha_1 \le \alpha_2)} + Y_{13} \mathbf{1}_{(\alpha_1 \le \alpha_3)} + Y_{34} \mathbf{1}_{(\alpha_3 \le \alpha_4)}$
#### Supervised ranking

**Observe:**  $(Q_1, Y_1), \dots, (Q_n, Y_n)$ **Learn:** Scoring function f to rank items **Suffer loss:** L(f(Q), Y)

**Goal:** Minimize the risk  $R(f) := \mathbb{E}\left[L(f(Q), Y)\right]$ 

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#### Main Question:

Are there tractable ranking procedures that minimize R as  $n \to \infty$ ?

First try: Empirical risk minimization

$$\min_{f} \hat{R}_{n}(f) := \hat{\mathbb{E}}_{n} \left[ L(f(Q), Y) \right] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} L(f(Q_{k}), Y_{k})$$

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Idea: Empirical surrogate risk minimization

$$\min_{f} \hat{R}_{\varphi,n}(f) := \hat{\mathbb{E}}_n \left[ \varphi(f(Q), Y) \right] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^n \varphi(f(Q_k), Y_k)$$

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argmin<sub>f</sub> R̂<sub>φ,n</sub>(f) → argmin<sub>f</sub> R<sub>φ</sub>(f) := E [φ(f(Q), Y)]

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Does  $\operatorname{argmin}_{f} R_{\varphi}(f)$  also minimize the true risk R(f)?

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**Theorem:** If  $\phi$  is convex, procedure based on minimizing  $\phi$  is consistent if and only if  $\phi'(0) < 0$ . [Bartlett, Jordan, and McAuliffe, 2006]



⇒ Tractable consistency for boosting, SVMs, logistic regression

Good news: Can characterize surrogate ranking consistency

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>[Duchi, Mackey, and Jordan, 2013]

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**Theorem:**<sup>1</sup> Procedure based on minimizing  $\varphi$  is consistent  $\iff$ 

$$\min_{\alpha} \left\{ \mathbb{E}[\varphi(\alpha, Y) \mid q] \mid \alpha \notin \operatorname*{argmin}_{\alpha'} \mathbb{E}[L(\alpha', Y) \mid q] \right\} \\ > \min_{\alpha} \mathbb{E}[\varphi(\alpha, Y) \mid q].$$

Translation: φ is consistent if and only if minimizing conditional surrogate risk gives correct ranking for every query

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**Task:** Find  $\operatorname{argmin}_{\alpha} \mathbb{E}[L(\alpha, Y) \mid q]$ 

- Classification (two node) case: Easy
  - Choose  $\alpha_0 > \alpha_1 \iff \mathbb{P}[\mathsf{Class} \ 0 \mid q] > \mathbb{P}[\mathsf{Class} \ 1 \mid q]$

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- Choose  $\alpha_0 > \alpha_1 \iff \mathbb{P}[\mathsf{Class} \ 0 \mid q] > \mathbb{P}[\mathsf{Class} \ 1 \mid q]$
- General case: NP hard
  - Unless P = NP, must restrict problem for tractable consistency

#### Low noise distribution

**Define:** Average preference for item *i* over item *j*:

$$s_{ij} = \mathbb{E}[Y_{ij} \mid q]$$

• We say  $i \succ j$  on average if  $s_{ij} > s_{ji}$ 

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- No cyclic preferences on average
- Find  $\operatorname{argmin}_{\alpha} \mathbb{E}[L(\alpha, Y) \mid q]$ : Very easy
  - Choose  $\alpha_i > \alpha_j \iff s_{ij} > s_{ji}$

Low noise  $\Rightarrow s_{13} > s_{31}$ 

#### Pairwise ranking surrogate:

[Herbrich, Graepel, and Obermayer, 2000, Freund, Iyer, Schapire, and Singer, 2003, Dekel, Manning, and Singer, 2004]

$$\varphi(\alpha, Y) = \sum_{ij} Y_{ij} \phi(\alpha_i - \alpha_j)$$

for  $\phi$  convex with  $\phi'(0) < 0$ . Common in ranking literature.

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⇒ Inconsistency for RankBoost, RankSVM, Logistic Ranking...

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Do tractable consistent losses exist for partial preference data?
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Yes, if we aggregate!

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Practical procedures Experimental results

Can rewrite risk of pairwise loss

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where  $s_{ij} = \mathbb{E}[Y_{ij} \mid q]$ .

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$$\mathbb{E}[L(\alpha, Y) \mid q] = \sum_{i \neq j} s_{ij} \mathbb{1}_{(\alpha_i \le \alpha_j)} = \sum_{i \neq j} \max\{s_{ij} - s_{ji}, 0\} \mathbb{1}_{(\alpha_i \le \alpha_j)}$$

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for  $\phi$  non-increasing and convex, with  $\phi'(0) < 0$ .

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for  $\phi$  non-increasing and convex, with  $\phi'(0) < 0$ .

- Either  $i \rightarrow j$  penalized or  $j \rightarrow i$  but not both
- Consistent whenever average preferences are acyclic

**Old surrogates:**  $\mathbb{E}[\varphi(\alpha, Y) \mid q] = \lim_{k \to \infty} \frac{1}{k} \sum_{k} \varphi(\alpha, Y_k)$ 

 $\blacktriangleright$  Loss  $\varphi(\alpha,Y)$  applied to a single datapoint

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New framework: Ranking with aggregate losses

$$L(\alpha, s_k(Y_1, \dots, Y_k))$$
 and  $\varphi(\alpha, s_k(Y_1, \dots, Y_k))$ 

where  $s_k$  is a structure function that aggregates first k datapoints

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- $s_k$  combines partial preferences into more complete estimates
- Consistency characterization extends to this setting

Aggregation via structure function



 $Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_k$ 

 $s_k(Y_1,\ldots,Y_k)$ 

Aggregation via structure function



**Question:** When does aggregation help?

- Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG)
- Precision, Precision@k
- Expected reciprocal rank (ERR)

Pros: Popular, well-motivated, admit tractable consistent surrogates

• e.g., Penalize mistakes at top of ranked list more heavily

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- Check that aggregation + surrogacy retains consistency

[Craswell, Zoeter, Taylor, and Ramsey, 2008, Chapelle, Metzler, Zhang, and Grinspan, 2009]

• Person *i* clicks on first relevant result, k(i)



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ERR loss assumes p is known Estimate p via maximum likelihood on n clicks:

$$s = \operatorname*{argmax}_{p \in [0,1]^m} \sum_{i=1}^n \log p_{k(i)} + \sum_{j=1}^{k(i)} \log(1-p_j).$$

 $\Rightarrow$  Consistent ERR minimization under our framework



## Benefits of aggregation

Tractable consistency for partial preference losses

$$\operatorname{argmin}_{f} \lim_{k \to \infty} \mathbb{E}[\varphi(f(Q), s_k(Y_1, \dots, Y_k))]$$
  
$$\Rightarrow$$
  
$$\operatorname{argmin}_{f} \lim_{k \to \infty} \mathbb{E}[L(f(Q), s_k(Y_1, \dots, Y_k))]$$

Use complete data losses with realistic partial preference data
 Models process of generating relevance scores from clicks/comparisons

## What remains?

Before aggregation, we had

$$\underset{f}{\operatorname{argmin}} \underbrace{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^{n} \varphi(f(Q_k), Y_k)}_{\text{empirical}} \to \underset{f}{\operatorname{argmin}} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\varphi(f(Q), Y)]}_{f}$$

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When does  

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# Outline

#### Supervised Ranking

Formal definition Tractable surrogates Pairwise inconsistency

#### Aggregation

Restoring consistency Estimating complete preferences

#### **U-statistics**

Practical procedures Experimental results



- Datapoint consists of query q and preference judgment Y
- $n_q$  datapoints for query q
- Structure functions for aggregation:

$$s(Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_k)$$



- ► Simple idea: for query q, aggregate all Y<sub>1</sub>, Y<sub>2</sub>,..., Y<sub>nq</sub>
- Loss  $\varphi$  for query q is

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### Ideal procedure:

- Agnostic to form of aggregation
- Take advantage of independence of  $Y_1, Y_2, \ldots$

## Digression: U-statistics



#### U-statistic: classical tool in statistics

- ▶ Given X<sub>1</sub>,..., X<sub>n</sub>, estimate E[g(X<sub>1</sub>,..., X<sub>k</sub>)] for g symmetric
- Idea: Average all estimates based on k datapoints

$$U_n = \binom{n}{k}^{-1} \sum_{i_1 < \dots < i_k} g(X_{i_1}, X_{i_2}, \dots, X_{i_k})$$

# Data with aggregation: U-statistic in the loss



• Target:  $\mathbb{E}[\varphi(\alpha, s(Y_1, \ldots, Y_k)) \mid q]$
## Data with aggregation: U-statistic in the loss



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Empirical risk for scoring function f:

$$\widehat{R}_{\varphi,n}(f) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{q} n_q {\binom{n_q}{k}}^{-1} \sum_{i_1 < \dots < i_k} \varphi(f(q), s(Y_{i_1}, \dots, Y_{i_k}))$$

#### Convergence of *U*-statistic procedures

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**Theorem:** If we choose  $k_n = o(n)$  but  $k_n \to \infty$ , then *uniformly* in f

$$\widehat{R}_{\varphi,n}(f) \to \underbrace{\lim_{k \to \infty} \mathbb{E}[\varphi(f(Q), s(Y_1, \dots, Y_k))]}_{\text{Limiting aggregated loss}}$$

New procedure for learning to rank

2

3

Use loss function that aggregates *per-query*:

$$\widehat{R}_{\varphi,n}(f) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{q} n_q {\binom{n_q}{k}}^{-1} \sum_{i_1 < \dots < i_k} \varphi(f(q), s(Y_{i_1}, \dots, Y_{i_k}))$$

Learn ranking function by taking

$$\widehat{f} \in \operatorname*{argmin}_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \widehat{R}_{\varphi, n}(f)$$

 Can optimize by stochastic gradient descent over queries q and subsets (i<sub>1</sub>,..., i<sub>k</sub>)



Image ranking

Microsoft Learning to Rank Web10K dataset

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  - 10,000 queries issued
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Aggregate scores by setting

$$s_i = \sum_{j \neq i} \log \frac{\widehat{P}(j \prec i)}{\widehat{P}(i \prec j)}$$

## Benefits of aggregation



# Image ranking

- Setup [Grangier and Bengio 2008]
  - Take most common image search queries on google.com
  - Train an independent ranker based on aggregated preference statistics for each query
  - Compare with standard, disaggregated image-ranking approaches

# Image ranking experiments

Highly ranked items from Corel Image Database for query tree car.



SVM



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- 3. Aggregation can bridge the gap
  - $\blacktriangleright$  Can transform pairwise preferences/click data into scores s
- 4. Practical consistent procedures via  $U\mbox{-statistic}$  aggregation
  - Allows for arbitrary aggregation s
  - High-probability convergence of the learned ranking function

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  - Apply to more ranking problems!
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  - Can we design statistically efficient ranking procedures?
- Other ways of dealing with realistic partial preference data?

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Surrogate loss  $\varphi(\alpha, s) = \sum_{ij} s_{ij} \phi(\alpha_i - \alpha_j)$ 





Aggregate

Surrogate loss  $\varphi(\alpha, s) = \sum_{ij} s_{ij} \phi(\alpha_i - \alpha_j)$ 



$$\sum_{s} p(s)\varphi(\alpha, s) = \frac{1}{2}\varphi(\alpha, s') + \frac{1}{2}\varphi(\alpha, s')$$
  
$$\propto s_{12}\phi(\alpha_1 - \alpha_2) + s_{13}\phi(\alpha_1 - \alpha_3) + s_{23}\phi(\alpha_2 - \alpha_3) + s_{31}\phi(\alpha_3 - \alpha_1)$$

$$s_{12}\phi(\alpha_1 - \alpha_2) + s_{13}\phi(\alpha_1 - \alpha_3) + s_{23}\phi(\alpha_2 - \alpha_3) + s_{31}\phi(\alpha_3 - \alpha_1)$$

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More bang for your \$\$ by increasing to 0 from left:  $\alpha_1 \downarrow$ . Result:

$$\alpha^* = \underset{\alpha}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{ij} s_{ij} \phi(\alpha_i - \alpha_j)$$

can have  $\alpha_2^* > \alpha_1^*$ , even if  $s_{13} - s_{31} > s_{12} + s_{23}$ .