

## **Assessing Global Democratization a Decade after the Communist Collapse**

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We are now almost thirty years into the “third wave” of global democratization and a dozen years or so past the collapse of Soviet-bloc communism. How are the new democracies of this generation doing? What have we learned from their experience that can inform and revise our theories of democracy?

At a superficial level, the global state of democracy appears highly encouraging. Over the past quarter-century, democracy has steadily expanded in the world to the point where it is now the predominant form of regime. However, swirling beneath this expansion in the past decade has been a dangerous counter-trend, a proliferating disenchantment among mass publics who increasingly view their political leaders (across various parties and branches of government) as corrupt, self-serving, and unable to address their countries’ serious economic and social problems. Thus, in many developing and postcommunist countries, people are losing confidence not simply in elected officials but in democratic institutions.

Unfortunately, the rising cynicism of disaffected publics is not without considerable justification. Governance in many new democracies is simply inadequate to meet the challenges of both economic and political development. And in the typical authoritarian regime—as in large parts of the former Soviet Union—governance is even much more corrupt, arbitrary, and exploitative. Here is what I consider to be the principal lesson of this new generation of democratic experience. To become stable, effective, and valued, democratic

actors and institutions must govern well. Unless, governance in emerging democracies becomes more open, accountable, lawful, and responsive, economic development is not going to be generated (or at least not sustainable) and new, formally democratic institutions are not going to be consolidated. Improving governance in corrupt, shallow, illiberal democracies—and pseudodemocracies (or what we now call “electoral authoritarian” regimes)—requires a number of very difficult institutional reforms. These reforms are difficult because they challenge vested interests.

Let me first review the state of democratic progress and the sources of democratic malaise. Then I will return to the question of reform.

### **GLOBAL DEMOCRATIC TRENDS**

The last quarter of the twentieth century has witnessed the greatest expansion of democracy in the history of the world. If we define democracy in the minimal sense, as a system of government in which the principal positions of political power are filled through regular, free, and fair elections, then about three of every five independent states in the world are democracies today. In the judgement of Freedom House, there were 121 democracies in the world at the end of 2001—the highest number in history. I think some of these regimes, possibly as many as seventeen, may be better classified as “competitive authoritarian,” in the sense that elections, while competitive, are either not free and fair or do not confer on those elected full power to rule. Even if we count democracies very conservatively in this way, electoral democracy is now the predominant form of government in the world. When the most recent, third “wave” of democratization began in 1974, only about 28 percent of the states in the world were democracies.<sup>1</sup> In total, there were only 39 democracies in 1974. Today, there are about three times as many.

With the growth in the number of democracies has come a parallel, albeit more gradual, expansion of freedom in the world. The proportion of states rated as “free” by Freedom House increased from one-third in 1985 to over 40 percent in 1991, and today it stands at about 45 percent, nearly the highest level ever.<sup>2</sup> The average freedom score (on the Freedom House scale from 7 as least free to 1 as most free) stood at 3.47 at the end of last year, a full point lower than that in 1974, when the third wave began.

Within just a few years of the implosion of the Soviet communist empire, democracies increased, as a proportion of all the world’s states, from about 40 to 60 percent. Since 1995, however, the overall number of democracies in the world has remained more or less constant.

The march of democratic progress has been one of the defining developments of the late twentieth century. By the mid-1990s, democracy was the only broadly legitimate form of government in the world, and many other regimes had liberalized their politics at least superficially. Indeed, today well over half of the remaining non-democracies of the world portray themselves as democratic by holding regular, multiparty elections.<sup>3</sup> Few regimes explicitly eschew and condemn the basic principles of democracy. And most of the non-democracies have significant societal movements or critics seeking democratic political change. Internationally, there has also been a distinct trend toward the affirmation of democratic principles, which are increasingly being codified into international law through various international and regional treaties and resolutions.<sup>4</sup>

However, there have been four other major caveats to the democratizing trend. First, as democracy has spread rapidly in the world, it has become a shallower phenomenon. The quality of governance and the rule of law have actually deteriorated in some existing democracies, and the more recently established democracies have tended to be less liberal and

more corrupt. Second, the spread of democracy has been far from uniform across regions and sub-regions. While some regions of the world are now overwhelmingly democratic, others have been only very partially touched by the democratic trend, while the Arab world remains without a single true democracy. Third, many of the regimes (particularly in Africa and the former Soviet Union) that once appeared to be “in transition” from authoritarian rule have settled into varying shades and forms of authoritarian rule that fall well short of democracy.<sup>5</sup> Finally—and cause for perhaps the greatest concern—many of the democracies that have come into being in the past two decades exhibit growing problems of governance that are eroding their legitimacy among the public and undermining their stability. The global democratic trend is now at greater risk of reversal than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Some signs of this include the ongoing economic and political crisis in Argentina, the political turbulence in Venezuela, the U.S. embrace of authoritarian regimes as allies in the war on terrorism, and especially mounting citizen disgust with corruption worldwide.

The result of shallow democracy and poor governance is that most democracies are failing to achieve the legitimacy and stability that come with consolidation. Democracy is consolidated when all major parties and organizations and the overwhelming majority of the mass public believe that democracy is the best form of government for their society—better than any alternative they can imagine—and when they abide by the rules and constraints of the legal and constitutional system. Two metaphors illustrate this phenomenon. One is that “democracy becomes the only game in town.” The other is that the actors play by the rules of the game, not only in the legal letter but in the normative spirit as well. Most of the new democracies of the third wave are still a considerable distance from achieving consolidation. In the postcommunist world, it is generally believed that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,

Slovenia and the Baltic states all have consolidated their democracies, but not the states of the Balkan region, certainly not Russia and Ukraine, and unfortunately, not Romania.

### The Rise of “Illiberal Democracy”

The “third wave” of democratization has seen a growing divergence between the form of electoral democracy and the deeper structure of liberal democracy. The latter entails not only regular, free, and fair elections but also a strong rule of law, buttressed by an independent judiciary and other institutions of accountability that check the abuse of power, protect civil and political freedoms, and thereby help to foster a pluralistic and vigorous civil society.<sup>6</sup>

With the dramatic expansion in the number of democracies during the third wave, the phenomenon of “illiberal democracy” has markedly increased. In 1974, over 80 percent of the democracies of the world were “liberal” (as indicated by a Freedom House score of 2 or better on the combined 7-point scale of political rights and civil liberties), and all of them were rated “free” by Freedom House. Even in 1987, almost three-quarters of the democracies of the world had average freedom scores (2, 1.5, or 1) indicating liberal democracy. However, as democracy exploded with the demise of communism, liberal democracies declined markedly as a percentage of the overall number of democracies in the world. By 1991, less than 60 percent of the democracies in the world were “liberal,” and that proportion continued to fall with the expansion of democracy through the mid-1990s. The presence of democracy in the world today is broader but also thinner than a decade ago. There has been a striking rise of illiberal democracy. In fact, some of these regimes are only ambiguously democratic, and many of them function very poorly in protecting human rights, controlling corruption, and addressing economic and social problems.

The shallow and illiberal nature of so many existing democracies in the world demands concern for several reasons. First, human rights and the rule of law are ends in themselves, and a number of democracies (as well as all authoritarian regimes) fall seriously short of their obligations to foster and protect the basic rights of their citizens. Second, there is growing evidence of a strong association between the quality and the legitimacy of democracy in the minds of the public. Citizen support for democracy is more robust, and democracy is more stable, when there is greater civil liberty, restraint of power, justice, and accountability.<sup>7</sup> Third, underlying this relationship is the strong connection between the quality of governance and the stability of democracy. Where democracy is less liberal, governance is poorer—more corrupt, wasteful, incompetent, and unresponsive. This alienates citizens, heightens the contentiousness of politics, disposes the country to recurrent crisis, and—there is mounting statistical evidence to suggest—greatly retards the ability to attract international capital flows, obstructing economic growth. Liberal democracy is thus a major foundation of the architecture of good governance that fosters and sustains broad-based development, wins citizen confidence, and thus consolidates democracy.

### The Mounting Problems of Democratic Governance

Since the mid-1990s, two global trends have been colliding, making for a more turbulent and unpredictable world politically. One trend has been the surprisingly robust and resilient third wave of democratization, producing a record number of electoral democracies. The other trend has been a spreading democratic malaise in many parts of the world. In most countries outside Western Europe and the four other Anglophone states, democracy (where it

exists) is not functioning very well. Serious deficiencies of governance are heightening public cynicism about parties and politicians in general, and diminishing public esteem for democracy.

Three generic problems of governance underlie this malaise and obstruct the consolidation of democracy. The most urgent and pervasive problem is the weakness and frequently the decay of the rule of law. No problem more alienates citizens from their political leaders and institutions and undermines political stability and economic development than gross, endemic corruption on the part of government and political party leaders, judges, and officials up and down the bureaucratic hierarchy. The more endemic the problem of corruption, the more likely it is to be accompanied by other serious deficiencies in the rule of law: smuggling, drug trafficking, criminal violence, personalization of power, and human rights abuses. Even in the wealthy, established democracies of North America, Europe, and Japan, scandals involving political party and campaign finance have eroded public confidence in parties and politicians. In the less established democracies, where the legitimacy of democracy is not so deeply rooted, political corruption scandals are much more likely to erode public faith in democracy itself and thereby to destabilize the entire system. This is particularly so where corruption is part of a more general syndrome involving the growing penetration of organized crime into politics and government, the misuse of executive and police powers to intimidate and punish political opposition, and the politicization and inefficacy of key institutions of “horizontal accountability,” such as the judiciary, the audit agency, and even the electoral commission. In many countries today, democracy is weak and insecure because political leaders lack sufficient democratic commitment—“political will”—to build or maintain institutions that constrain their own power. And civil society is too weak, or too divided, to compel them to do so.

The second broad source of malaise is economic. Economic reforms—insofar as they have even been implemented—have not yet generated rapid, sustainable economic growth in most of the developing and post-communist states. A few states have experienced rapid growth, and some others are at least growing modestly. However, in most new and troubled democracies, economic growth is not rapid enough, and is not broadly distributed enough, to lift large segments of the population out of poverty or a very tenuous economic existence. In most of Latin America, in some parts of Africa (such as South Africa), and in some Asian countries (Pakistan, the Philippines), the problem is compounded by extreme levels of inequality in income and wealth (especially, in rural areas, land). Very little progress has been made in these countries in reducing poverty and tempering massive inequalities of income and wealth. It is inconceivable that democracy can be consolidated in these countries unless substantial progress is made toward reduction of poverty and inequality.

The third problem is the inability to manage ethnic, regional, and religious differences in a peaceful and inclusive way. Cultural diversity is not, in itself, an insurmountable obstacle to stable democracy. With all of its problems, India has learned how to manage this diversity through complex institutions of federalism. Spain largely contained its secessionist pressures with the adoption of a system of asymmetrical federalism, and, like the United States, Canada, and Australia, Europe is learning to adapt its democratic institutions to assimilate immigrants from a wide range of other countries and cultures. The problem arises when one ethnic or religious group seeks hegemony over others, or when some minorities perceive that they are being permanently and completely excluded from power, including any meaningful control of their own affairs.

These three problems—indeed, crises—of governance intensify and reinforce one another. Highly visible corruption accentuates the sense of injustice and grievance associated with poverty, unemployment, and economic hardship. Corruption has also been a major obstacle to the successful implementation of economic reforms, especially privatization. Poverty and economic stagnation reinforce the resentment of discrimination and political marginalization of ethnic and cultural minorities like the Roma. The entrenchment of political corruption and clientelism as the principal means of economic advancement aggravates ethnic and nationality conflicts, by raising the premium on control of the state and rendering politics a more intense, zero-sum struggle for control of economic opportunity. The weakness of the rule of law makes it easier for leaders of different nationalities and sectarian groups to mobilize violence at the grassroots as part of their efforts to win power for themselves. It also facilitates electoral fraud and violence. Underlying all of this in many countries is a weak commitment to the public good and the rule of law. Citizens and élites have low levels of trust in one another and in the future. Thus, they strategize on how to take from a stagnant stock of resources, rather than on how to cooperate and produce to enlarge that stock. They focus on ends rather than means—securing power and wealth by any means possible, rather than doing so with respect for the constitution and the law.

These interrelated crises of governance account for the main sources of democratic insecurity in the world today. The accumulation of poor governance and deferred economic reforms led to the implosion of the Argentine economy and the resignation of its president amid public rioting and looting in December 2001. Each of the three crises of governance is visible in the current travails of democratic performance in Nigeria and Indonesia, as well as in the Andean region and many other smaller countries. The weakness of the rule of law and

continued economic stagnation and decay now also threaten the prospects for building democracy in Russia, Ukraine, and other post-Soviet states. In these and other countries, not only are major political leaders ambivalent (at best) in their commitment to democracy, but democratic political parties and civil society groups lack the resources, the organizational strength, and the popular bases to promote successful democratic reforms.

The failure to govern effectively ultimately takes a toll on the legitimacy and stability of democracy. The democratic malaise is particularly visible in the trends in public opinion in Latin America. The 2001 Latinobarometro survey recorded significant drops in support for democracy among most of the countries it surveyed in Latin America. Between early 2000 and April-May 2001, support for democracy as “preferable to any other kind of government,” declined from 60 percent to 48 percent in the entire Latin American region. Support for democracy declined in a number of key countries in the region, from 71 to 58 percent in Argentina, from 50 to 36 percent in Colombia, and from 39 to 30 percent in Brazil. These decreases do not always give rise to parallel increases in support for authoritarian rule, but there is, at a minimum, growing apathy with and alienation from democracy. Even in Uruguay and Costa Rica, the most stable and clearly consolidated democracies in the region, support for democracy declined by five and twelve percentage points respectively.

Latin America’s democratic malaise is driven by the accumulation of governance problems. Three in five Latin Americans overall rated their country’s economic situation as “bad” or “very bad” in 2001. A growing proportion, now four in five, believe that crime and drug addiction have “increased a lot” in recent years, and the same proportion give the same response about corruption. Trust in major democratic institutions is very low and continuing to decline; only around one in five trust the national congress or political parties; trust in the

judiciary has declined to under 30 percent.<sup>8</sup> While support for democracy appears greater in the postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, those democracies also suffer high levels of disaffection, with only 22 percent trusting parliament and only 13 percent political parties in 1998.<sup>9</sup> And in Korea, support for democracy declined sharply after corruption scandals and economic crisis in 1997, from 69 to 54 percent.<sup>10</sup>

At the root of public disillusionment is anger over corruption. Across Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus), surveys find that over 70 percent of the public, on average, believe that their new regime is more corrupt than its predecessor, and in every postcommunist country surveyed a majority of the public believes the national government is corrupt.<sup>11</sup> The Latinobarometer, surveying public opinion in 17 Latin American democracies since 1995, has consistently found similarly high levels of cynicism. When asked whether corruption has increased a little or a lot, remained the same, or decreased a little or a lot in the last 12 months, an astonishing 75 percent of Latin Americans said in 2000 that corruption has increased *a lot*. Another 10 percent said corruption has increased a little and less than five percent perceived any decline.<sup>12</sup> Even in countries with strong support for democracy, such as Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Argentina, most people think corruption has increased a lot. These figures reflect a pervasive perception that parties and politicians of all stripes are corrupt and self-interested, rather than serving the public good, and this perception is alienating many citizens from the democratic process. Tenuous democracies cannot become consolidated and regimes of all kinds cannot improve the quality of their governance and their capacity for sustainable economic development unless corruption is significantly diminished.

The next decade will thus be a time of great danger and opportunity for democracy in the postcommunist states and the broader world. If the crises of democracy are not addressed with

lasting reforms to improve governance by reducing corruption, strengthening judicial, administrative, and political institutions, and professionalizing the state bureaucracy, especially economic management, the stability and viability of democracy will continue to erode, a number of shallow democracies will sink further into the gray zone of pseudodemocracy, and new forms of authoritarianism will emerge. On the other hand, improvements in governance, even incrementally, could buy time for democracy to gradually sink deeper roots in political party life and diverse areas of civil society, as well as in the culture of a country. The path to democratic consolidation thus lies through political reform, and the political civil society mobilization that may help to bring it about.

### **A Strategy for Reform**

If democracy is going to be deepened and consolidated, a number of reforms will be needed. The key priorities, it seems to me, are four:

- controlling corruption and improving the entire apparatus of horizontal accountability;
- strengthening the rule of law and the way it affects the lives of individual citizens, not only through judicial functioning but through more professional, vigorous and democratic policing;
- strengthening and democratizing political parties, and deepening their roots in society;
- developing stronger, more professional and capable states that are better able to respond to rising societal demands for better governance.

The problem is that the need for reform is inversely related to the possibility of it. The same forces in the state and ruling party and allied businesses that generate bad governance through corruption and waste also have the power to block efforts at legal and institutional change. Where the rule of law is weak, government is opaque and unaccountable, and corruption is widespread, political power bestows enormous wealth and privilege, and incumbents do not wish to give it up or have it checked. Corrupt political leaders will not initiate reform, and they will not accept it unless they are forced to.

The crucial missing ingredient for reform to improve and consolidate democracy is political will. “Political will” is the commitment of a country’s rulers to undertake and see through to implementation a particular policy course. At its most resilient, political will here involves a broad consensus among ruling elites, across parties and sectors of government, in favor of democratic and good governance reforms. But consensus is always imperfect, and will is most important at the top levels of government (among major political leaders and senior civil servants). There, political will must be robust and sincere. That is, reform leaders must be committed not only to undertake actions to achieve reform objectives, but also “to sustain the costs of those actions over time.”<sup>13</sup>

Without a robust commitment to fundamental reforms—to control corruption, open up the economy, enhance the rule of law, respect basic civil and political rights, and allow independent centers of power both within and outside the government—capital is not going to flow in, people are not going to invest, economies are not going to grow, and democracy is not going to become consolidated.

How can the will to bring about basic, systemic reform be generated? Such political will is generated from three directions: from *below*, from *within*, and from *outside*. Organized pressure from *below*, in civil society, plays an essential role in persuading ruling elites of the need for institutional reforms to improve the quality of governance. There may also be some reform-minded elements *within* the government and the ruling party or coalition who, whether for pragmatic or normative reasons, have come to see the need for reform (but are reluctant to act in isolation). Finally, *external* actors in the international community often tip the balance through persuasive engagement with the rulers and the society and by extending tangible benefits for improved governance and penalties for recalcitrance.

International assistance can help to develop the first two forms of pressure, and in fact has done so in a number of countries in the past decade. When political will for systemic reform is clearly lacking, the principal thing that foreign assistance can do is to strengthen constituencies for reform in civil society, including NGOs, interest groups, think tanks, and the mass media. Assistance can enhance these actors' understanding of key reform issues, their knowledge of other country experiences, their coordination with one another, their capacity to analyze and advocate specific institutional and policy reforms, and their mobilization of support and understanding in society.

But foreign pressure and assistance can only help on the margins. A key lesson from international efforts to stimulate governance reform is that fundamental reform is only sustainable when there is a "home-grown" initiative for it. If changes in policies and institutions are promised merely in response to international pressures, they will not be seriously and consistently implemented.

The indispensable factor, then, is mobilization from below, from civil society. Civil society actors—NGOs, professional organizations, mass media, and not least, think tanks—must launch a broad campaign for governance reforms. They should generate public awareness and debate of the underlying problems of governance, document through public opinion surveys citizen disenchantment with government performance, identify priorities for reform and potential allies within the state, and form from among their different constituencies and sectors robust coalitions for reform. The tactical goal should be to induce government leaders to sit down with opposition and societal forces to fashion a package of reforms that learns from international experiences but fits the country’s specific problems and history. If this package of reforms is going to overcome vested opposition and win adopting, it must have broad support in society.

#### Fighting Corruption: Promoting Transparency and Accountability

On the demand side, civil society mobilization must raise public awareness of the costs of corruption, change expectations about ethical behavior, and empower the public with information. Citizens must come to see that corruption obstructs development, heightens inequity, and damages the entire country. Public advocacy NGOs, think tanks, the mass media, and explicit anti-corruption organizations—particularly local chapters of Transparency International—have a large role to play in documenting the problem, educating the public, and pressing for specific institutional reforms. Linkages of all kinds are important here: between advocacy NGOs and the

mass media; between NGOs and sectoral interest groups (such as business chambers, trade unions, and professional associations); between local actors and international business; and between national movements and international networks and conventions. Where state actors are themselves pushing reforms, civil society actors should seek to forge public-private partnerships to deepen and accelerate the process. Advocacy NGOs need not be focused on the corruption issue per se in order to have an impact. In many countries, environmental groups have galvanized public action by exposing the links between environmental abuses and political corruption.<sup>14</sup> In many countries, chambers of commerce, business associations, and other advocates for economic reform chip away at the enabling environment for bribery and corruption by seeking to streamline state regulations, eliminate unnecessary controls, and make government more transparent.<sup>15</sup>

The mass media have a crucial role to play in the campaign against corruption. An important element of an anti-corruption assistance program must thus be to enhance the skill—but also the professional responsibility—of the media in investigating and reporting on acts of corruption. National media associations need to strengthen professional skills and norms and to advocate for legislative and administrative reforms to improve transparency and media openness.

On the supply side, civil society organizations and coalitions can do much to generate the reform ideas and proposals:

- Supporting legal and regulatory reform to reduce government's involvement in areas more efficiently handled by the private sector. Here economic reform and anti-corruption efforts converge.

- Streamlining and making more transparent government procedures (including budgeting and procurement) to reduce the opportunities for corruption.
- Elaborating and improving governmental institutions of accountability, and
- Introducing incentives for officials to act in the public interest.

A reform coalition can study and draft ethics and financial disclosure laws for public officials. It can support privatization of state industries. It can help to establish independent government oversight and auditing institutions, streamline regulations, standardize and computerize government financial management, improve contracting procedures, train in fraud investigation, and reform and strengthen judiciaries.

But anti-corruption initiatives do not succeed unless demand proceeds apace to stimulate and sustain political will for reform. Institutional reforms must include some kind of independent, authoritative, and resourceful counter-corruption commission, designed in conjunction with reform advocates in civil society, and clearly empowered to investigate, expose, and prosecute corrupt conduct.<sup>16</sup> The entire structure of horizontal accountability—including the courts, public auditors, ombudsman’s office, and human rights commission—must have similar autonomy, energy, and resources.

Societal pressure, working in alliance with the international community is crucial in generating the will for reform. Indeed, it could be said that in the new democracies of the postcommunist and developing worlds—where corruption is one of the leading threats to the survival and consolidation of democracy—there is no more urgent challenge than for civil society to craft an agenda for institutional reform and to build political coalitions that can, over time, get that agenda adopted.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> The previous two waves of global democratic expansion were the first long wave, ending with the breakdown of many democracies in the period between World Wars I and II, and the post-World War II wave, ending with the “second reverse wave” that began in the early 1960s. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> Adrian Karatnycky, “The 2001 Freedom House Survey,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (January 2002): 99-112. Freedom House rates as “free” those states with an average score between 1 and 2.5 on the combined 7-point scale of political rights and civil liberties.

<sup>3</sup> Of the 71 regimes that are not rated by Freedom House as democracies, 46 have regular multiparty elections and only 25 are politically closed in this respect. See Larry Diamond, “Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): Table 1.

<sup>4</sup> See Thomas Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,” *American Journal of International Law* 86 (January 1992): 46-91; Roland Rich, “Bringing Democracy into International Law,” *Journal of Democracy* 12 (July 2001): 20-34.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (January 2002): 5-21.

<sup>6</sup> Civilian control of the military is also necessary. For a more detailed conceptualization, see Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 10-13.

<sup>7</sup> See Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, Chapter 5, for a summary of some of the evidence from public opinion surveys in developing and postcommunist countries.

<sup>8</sup> “The Latinobarometro Poll: An Alarm Call for Latin America’s Democrats,” *The Economist* July 28<sup>th</sup> 2001: 37-38.

<sup>9</sup> Marta Lagos, “How People View Democracy: Between Stability and Crisis In Latin America,” *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001): Table 3, 143

<sup>10</sup> Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, “How People View Democracy: Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan,” *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001): Table 1, 125.

<sup>11</sup> Richard Rose, “How People View Democracy: A Diverging Europe,” *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001): 101.

<sup>12</sup> Data provided by Marta Lagos from the Latinobarómetro. The percentages saying corruption has “increased a lot” were 75% in 1996, 79% in 1997 and again in 1998, and 75% in 2000.

<sup>13</sup> Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “Identifying and Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts,” Working Papers no. 13, *Implementing Policy Change* project, USAID, January 1999, p. 3. See also Brinkerhoff, “Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An Analytic Framework,” *Public Administration and Development* 20 (2000): 242.

<sup>14</sup> “Promoting Transparency and Accountability: USAID’s Anti-Corruption Experience,” Center for Democracy and Governance, USAID, January 2000, p. 11. Many of the examples that follow are drawn from this document.

<sup>15</sup> Summaries of such programs supported by the Center for International Private Enterprise can be found at [www.cipe.org](http://www.cipe.org).

<sup>16</sup> Larry Diamond, “Fostering Institutions to Contain Corruption,” World Bank PremNotes, 1999/06/30, report no. 21572, [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDServlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946\\_01010505342546](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDServlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_01010505342546), and Michael Johnston, “A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies,” in Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner, *The Self-Restraining State*.