

Civic Communities and Predatory Societies

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Good morning, and thank you for coming. This meeting, and the entire work of the Intercultural Management Institute, are vivid reflections of the accelerating pace of globalization. Increasingly, Americans are living in and doing business with a wide range of other countries. In ever-increasing numbers, students, business people, professionals, the highly skilled, and the unskilled are coming to the United States to visit, to exchange cultures and ideas, to be educated, to promote trade, to seek or make investments, or to look for jobs, hope, and a better life.

All over the globe people are pouring across borders for every kind of purpose imaginable—noble and mundane, legal and illicit—at an unprecedented pace. The United States, always a nation of immigrants, is becoming ever more diverse. Today, well over half the population of our 100 largest cities is made up of what used to be called “minorities”—people of color. Within two decades, racial and ethnic “minorities” in America will be a majority. Europe is witnessing the same explosion of diversity, driven not only by free movement within the European Union but the rapid acceleration of legal and illegal immigration from Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Within Africa, most of whose countries are already among the most ethnically diverse in the world, millions of people have crossed national borders to flee ethnic violence, oppression, war, poverty, and famine. Large numbers of Chinese are moving into the Russian Far East, and by some estimates they will constitute the largest demographic group, perhaps 10 million people, within less than a generation.

The point is well understood by anyone in this room who has traveled or worked internationally, or even gone to the corner market. More and more, we are living with cultural diversity. And we will have to operate sensitively and respectfully within it and manage it effectively if we are going to be successful. This applies at all levels: to individuals, to organizations, and to countries.

I am not going to talk much about the specific challenges of adapting to, embracing, and harnessing cultural diversity for shared success. I gather that is what other panels at this conference. Instead, I want to address a larger question that confronts us as we work in and deal with a wide diversity of countries abroad.

The plain and even brutal fact is that some countries are extraordinarily successful and others are miserable failures. Politically, some countries are free, open, stable, and democratic. Some are struggling to institutionalize democracy. A few are stable but highly repressive. But many lack any kind of stable political order. They are mired in corruption, repression, and violent conflict, and no one can be sure how long the government of the day will last or how it might be replaced. When countries witness the total implosion of social and political order we now call them “failed states.”

Economically, of course there are the rich, advanced industrial countries (which are all stable democracies except for Singapore) and several dozen extremely poor countries where the average person survives on less than a dollar a day. But the rich countries

were not always rich, and even outside the West, a number of countries are growing rich and becoming stable democracies as well.

Why are some countries outside the West succeeding and others failing?

Several types of explanations have been offered. Some point to culture. They argue that economic development and democracy in the West were fostered by such values as individual dignity, responsibility, and initiative, social pluralism, economic and political freedom, the rule of law, limited government, and the separation of spiritual and temporal authority.¹ From a culturalist perspective, some non-Western countries may employ technology and mobilize resources in a way that modernizes the society, but their values preclude democracy and may also condemn them to underdevelopment. Other theories emphasize economic policies and institutions. Any country that follows the policies and institutional rules of an open, market economy ought to be able to attract capital and induce it to invest to create new wealth. If economic development goes on long enough, by this logic (or one form of it), democracy will eventually follow, as almost all rich countries sooner or later become democracies. More recently, there has been a growing focus on institutions of governance, and their importance not just for democracy but for development. By this logic, even market-oriented policies will not work unless there are effective governmental institutions and practices to create an “enabling environment” that secures property rights, guarantees contracts, and

attracts investment. This includes first and foremost a rule of law and an overall climate of order and predictability in political life.

There was a time when it was fashionable to think that some countries were condemned by fate, culture, and geography to be poor and oppressed. Even today, one cannot ignore the evidence of Jeffrey Sachs and others that landlocked countries start with a disadvantage in their prospects for development. Then there is the “paradox of plenty.” We might imagine that countries with mineral wealth would be greatly advantaged in the quest for economic development, and ultimately, for political order and freedom as well. That turns out to be dramatically untrue. Oil has been much more of a curse than a blessing.² The most successful countries generally are the ones that make it on the basis of human rather than mineral resources.

If it is human resources that matter, then the way that people relate to one another should hold the key to development. This brings us back to the nexus between two key factors—culture and institutions—and to a term that increasingly resonates within every corner of thinking about development: social capital. I will return to this in a moment. But first, let’s think about the different forms of capital that foster economic growth and development.

There is a growing recognition that countries need several types of capital in order to develop. They need financial capital to make possible the creation of new private enterprises that will expand production, creating jobs and wealth. Historically, some

states have mobilized capital from above and force-marched the country to development repressively for some period of time, but ultimately development is only sustainable and only reaches advanced levels of wealth when private capital in search of profit invests in new production and exchange. Second, development requires physical capital, and not just for companies but for communities and countries. Here, states must play a crucial role in building the infrastructure, the roads, bridges, ports, power grids, and even schools, that enable production and exchange to take place efficiently. Rising levels of production and services require labor and management with more knowledge and higher skills. This is the third dimension, human capital, and while it can emerge in part from experience and practical training, it generally requires education, and ever more advanced education. This cannot emerge adequately from the private, uncoordinated efforts of individuals, families, and communities. Human capital can only be accumulated in the levels necessary for success in increasingly competitive world markets if states provide effective public education at the mass level.

States must also help to provide other, less tangible public goods that induce private investors to risk their financial capital in search of profits, and that coordinate and restrain the market. These are the institutions that generate a rule of law and a climate of peace, predictability, and order:

- an independent and professional judicial system;

- a transparent and efficient banking system (including an independent central bank);
- effective rules, regulations, and oversight agencies governing banking, capital markets, and commerce (including contract and bankruptcy laws and business codes of conduct);
- rules and institutions to restrain corruption by monitoring and when necessary punishing the conduct of public officials;
- a system of domestic policing that enables people to invest, produce, and exchange free of extortion from the state or criminals;
- and a tax system that collects sufficient revenue to finance all of these public goods.

In his seminal book on globalization, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas Friedman calls these institutions the “software” that accompanies a country’s basic “hardware” of an economic model, such as capitalism, and its “operating system” (macroeconomic policies).³ In the context of this discussion, we can call this software “institutional capital,” in that it facilitates the creation and efficient application of all other forms of capital.

We come, then, to the fifth and least tangible form of capital: social capital. Social capital is visible in the variety of nongovernmental organizations, associations, clubs, and activities in which individuals freely combine to help one another. But social capital is more than visible forms of organization. It is, to quote Robert Putnam, the “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”⁴ Social capital encompasses the relations of social trust, the networks of mutual assistance and civic engagement, and the norms of reciprocity, mutual respect, political equality, and concern for the collective good that enable people to combine to produce more and accomplish more than they could individually. Thus, social capital can help to provide financial capital, as individuals and groups invest in one another’s activities. Putnam offers the example of the rotating credit association as a pure model of social capital, but relations of trust and cooperation facilitate much larger-scale investments as well. Social capital also helps to generate physical capital, human capital, and institutional capital. When people in a society trust one another, cooperate, and view one another as political equals (even if they are of different classes), they will also pay their taxes, obey the law, and construct the kinds of public institutions that produce political freedom and order, and economic freedom and growth. A paucity of social capital yields a very different kind of society, founded on distrust, deceit, domination, and exploitation.

Two Models of Society

For twenty years as a social scientist, I have been trying to understand why some countries develop stable democracy and others do not. Like many other social scientists, I have found it necessary to identify numerous factors that explain the differences between countries in democratic development. But in recent years, I have increasingly been struck by one broad factor that unites or integrates most of the important causes. I do not pretend to any particular originality here. I think most of the insights can be gleaned from the literature on social capital, and particularly from Robert Putnam's book, *Making Democracy Work*, one of the most important contributions to the study of comparative politics and comparative development in the last several decades.

All countries or societies in the world—indeed all forms of collective life—can be located on a continuum of variation in terms of their strength of social capital and the quality of public institutions and public life that follow from that. At opposite ends of this continuum, we can identify two models of society. One Putnam calls the “civic community.” The other I call the “predatory society.” To be sure, these are “ideal types.” No country or organization is purely civic or purely predatory. Any large collectivity encompasses a mix of people. Even if most people in a civic community are law-abiding, trusting, and committed to the public good, there are always at least a few who are not, and perhaps many whose commitment is firm only because there are strong

institutions to restrain less civic-minded impulses. Otherwise, there would be no need for policing. And even in the most predatory society, there are at least some people who believe in political equality, justice, fairness, and accountability. Otherwise, there would be no hope, and I do not think any society is completely beyond hope.

In the model civic community, there is an abundance of social capital. People generally trust one another, combine in all forms of association, and cooperate for larger, collective ends. Where they differ in beliefs and opinions, they mutually respect and tolerate their differences, and they feel some sense of solidarity with the collectivity (the organization, the community, or the nation) that transcends their differences. Citizens see one another as political equals, and believe in equality of opportunity, even though they recognize that perfect equality of outcomes can never be obtained. Relations among people in the civic community are primarily horizontal, in that people come together as individuals with equal dignity, rights, and obligations, and this equality is mutually understood, respected, and embedded in the laws. People are truly citizens; they have an interest in public issues and care about the welfare and progress of the community. In this sense they are motivated at least to some degree by public-spiritedness, or what Putnam terms, quoting Michael Walzer, “civic virtue.” This model of the “good society” is not utterly fanciful, but (like capitalism at its best) potentially quite consistent with the self-regarding impulses in human nature. Putnam writes:

Citizens in the civic community are not required to be altruists. In the civic community, however, citizens pursue what Tocqueville termed “self-interest properly understood,” that is, self-interest defined in the context of broader public needs, self-interest that is “enlightened” rather than “myopic,” self-interest that is alive to the interests of others.⁵

It is important to emphasize now that one reason why citizens in the civic community view civiness as “self-interest properly understood” is that they feel confident that most *other* citizens will behave in a similar way. And this confidence is not just rooted in a civic, trusting, egalitarian culture. They have such confidence because there are strong, effective institutions of governance to enforce and reproduce civic behavior. A culture of trust, cooperation, reciprocity, respect, restraint, tolerance, and compromise—in a word, civiness—cannot be sustained on a scale as large as the nation without supportive political institutions. People obey the law, pay their taxes, observe ethical standards, answer the call to jury duty, and otherwise serve the public good not *simply* because they are public-spirited, but because they believe others will be, and because they know there is some penalty for failing to be. It is very hard to know where culture ends and institutions begin, but they clearly form a dense and eventually almost seamless web. If it is somewhat discouraging to ponder that people would be less pleasant and helpful toward one another without these supporting institutions, there is also a very hopeful corollary to this insight. Just as the civic culture requires institutional support and nurturing, so a predatory culture thrives in the absence of

effective institutions and can be changed through the introduction of them. That is the conclusion I am coming to here today. Culture is not necessarily destiny.

The predatory society is the inverse of the civic community. First, there is no real community, no shared commitment to any common vision of the public good, and no respect for law. Behavior in the predatory society is cynical and opportunistic. People ally with one another in the quest for power and privilege, but not in a horizontal fashion. Rather, relations are steeply hierarchical, as patrons mobilize clients who in turn may serve as patrons to citizens at even lower levels of power and status. This is why we speak of “chains” of patron-client relations in such societies. Blatant inequalities in power and status cumulate into “vertical bonds of dependency and exploitation,” which constitute the way society is organized. In a predatory society, the powerful prey on the weak. The rich extract wealth from the poor, exploit their labor, and deprive them of public goods. In rural societies, landlords may trap the poor in forms of debt peonage that border on slavery. In fact, slavery—which, tragically, is persistent and even resurging in parts of the world—is the purest form of a predatory human relationship.

The masses of ordinary people at the bottom of a predatory society cannot cooperate with one another because they are trapped in hierarchical networks, fragmented from one another, and generally distrustful. Very often, this social fragmentation is reinforced by ethnic, linguistic, or other forms of identity cleavage that keep the

oppressed from collaborating and enable the privileged to rally ready political support from their ethnic compatriots. All too often, predatory elites mobilize ethnic tension or nationalism in order to redirect the frustration and resentment of their clientelist followings away from their own exploitative behavior. Yet ethnic tensions and nationalist resentments have a basis in social reality, and this is why predatory elites often succeed in inflaming them. It is, then, no coincidence that from Nigeria to the Congo, from Colombia to Kosovo, from Serbia to Sudan, ethnic violence, nationalist bloodletting, and civil war are heavily mixed up with the corruption of cynical elites.

The predatory society cannot sustain democracy, for sustainable democracy requires constitutionalism and respect for law. Neither can it generate sustainable economic growth, for that requires actors with financial capital to invest it in productive activity.

In the predatory society, people do not get rich through productive activity and honest risk-taking. They get rich by manipulating power and privilege, by stealing from the state, exploiting the weak, and shirking the law. Political actors in the predatory society will use any means and break any rules in the quest for power and wealth.

Politicians in the predatory society bribe electoral officials, beat up opposition campaigners, and assassinate opposing candidates. Presidents silence criticism and eliminate their opponents by legal manipulation, arrest, or murder. Ministers worry first about the rents they can collect and only second about whether the equipment they are purchasing or the contract they are signing has any value for the public. Legislators collect bribes to vote for bills. Military officers order weapons on the basis of how

large the kickback will be. Ordinary soldiers and policemen extort rather than defend the public. In the predatory society, the line between the police and the criminals is a thin one, and may not exist at all. In fact, in the predatory society, institutions are a façade. The police do not enforce the law. Judges do not decide the law. Customs officials do not inspect the goods. Manufacturers do not produce, bankers do not invest, borrowers do not repay, and contracts do not get enforced. Any actor with discretionary power is a rent-seeker. Every transaction is twisted to immediate advantage. Time horizons are extremely short because no one has any confidence in the collectivity and its future. This is pure opportunism: get what you can now. Government is not a public enterprise but a criminal conspiracy, and organized crime heavily penetrates politics and government.

I think I have some understanding of the way predatory societies work. I lived in one for a year, and I have studied that one for 25 years. I do not say it is a purely predatory society, but it is one of the most predatory in the world. I am talking about Nigeria, which is rated every year by Transparency International as the most corrupt or one of the most corrupt countries in the world. But I could also be talking about Pakistan, or Sudan, or the Congo, or perhaps most purely of all, Iraq. We could talk of Russia, or Ukraine, or in fact most of the former Soviet Union, which is rapidly slipping back from civic and democratic possibilities to a political and economic system based on power, exploitation, corruption, and crime.

Institutions to Control Predation

I have painted an extreme portrait of the predatory society. Countries in trouble in the world fit this portrait to different degrees. But those countries where order is decaying and the economy is stagnating are invariably much more predatory than civic. And the more predatory they are, the more trouble they are in. Two years ago, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright identified four countries that would be priorities for U.S.

democracy-promotion attention: Nigeria, Indonesia, Colombia, and Ukraine. These four countries are vitally important to the security of the United States. They are big, influential countries that will affect political stability and democratic possibilities in their regions. But all four have sunk deeply into a predatory state. In these countries today, endemic corruption and crime, widespread abuse of power, social fragmentation and cynicism, and the general lack of public-spiritedness and ineffectiveness of government institutions are precluding investor confidence, obstructing economic development, draining democracy of meaning, and paving the way for its collapse. The same deepening predatory dynamics produced the breakdown of democracy in Pakistan in October 1999 and are strangling democracy in Russia.

In Africa, the predatory nature of politics and economic and social life is the principal obstacle to democracy, development, and peace. On the continent, only Botswana has built a civic community—and not coincidentally, it has a stable democracy with the highest economic growth rate in the continent over the last two decades. Only a small

number of African countries—Ghana, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, perhaps a few others—appear to be moving clearly toward (or are preserving some semblance of) the good governance and public spiritedness of the civic community. But in every one of these countries, progress is quite tentative and uncertain.

Since the collapse of global communism a decade ago, we have been in a somewhat celebratory mood about the direction of political development in the world. That collapse gave rise to the most dramatic expansion of democracy in history. By 1995, over 60 percent of the world's regimes were democracies, and that proportion has more or less held since then. But by the logic of the dichotomy I have drawn here, the figures are deceiving. Democracy can be stable—that is consolidated—only where norms, behavior, and institutions are predominantly civic rather than predatory. That is not the case in most of the new democracies that have emerged during the “third wave” of democratization. Certainly it characterizes the thirty countries in the world that are stable, liberal, advanced industrial democracies. (These are the 24 countries of Western Europe plus the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and Japan). Even in Italy, where social trust is relatively low and political cynicism high, the country overall is much closer to the civic model than to the predatory one. And Italy is closer now, after the “clean hands” reform campaign cracked down on political corruption and Mafia penetration of politics, than it was a decade or two ago. Some other countries (Taiwan and Korea, for example, and several states in Central Europe) are moving at least haltingly toward the consolidation of a liberal democracy with the culture and

institutions of a civic community. And many of the very small developing countries may already have achieved that (possibly because civicness may be easier to construct on a smaller scale, where face-to-face relations are more prominent). In most of the developing and postcommunist countries (with populations over one million), the norms, social structures, and institutional vacuums and deformities of the predatory society are proving tenacious, and very dangerous.

It is difficult to resist the temptation to think that the problem is rooted in the cultures of these countries, and that there is not much we can do about it. It is true that these countries will not develop and will not consolidate democracy until their cultures change, but it is wrong to presume that cultural change must lead the way out of the predatory trap. Cultures change only slowly, but institutions can be changed fairly rapidly. And cultures will adapt to new institutional incentives, *if* the institutions work effectively to generate new expectations and norms. We must work, through civic education and organizational efforts, to generate new, more civic norms. But these will only be sustainable if the institutions of a civic community come into place.

Predatory states need to be completely overhauled. A crucial place to begin is with the institutions of “horizontal accountability.” This is the process by which some state actors hold other state actors accountable to the law, the constitution, and norms of good governance. Some of the key institutions in this regard are the judiciary, the central bank and related oversight institutions, and the electoral commission. These institutions

must be resourceful, professionally led and staffed, and independent of political manipulation and control if they are to function effectively.

The most urgently important institutions of horizontal accountability are the ones directly charged with controlling political and bureaucratic corruption. Corruption is the core phenomenon of the predatory state. It is the principal means by which state officials extract wealth from the society, deter productive activity, and thereby reproduce poverty and dependency. Outside of the central state, landed elites, corporate oligarchs, political barons, and organized crime bosses use corruption to purchase access to resources and immunity from taxes and the law. Politicians use corruption to barricade themselves in power. Patrons distribute the crumbs of corruption to maintain their clientelist support groups. Corruption is to the predatory state what the blood supply is to a malignant tumor. Cut it off and the tumor will shrink and die.

Cutting it off will be a long, contested process. But powerful, well-designed institutions can make a difference. What is needed most of all is an Independent Counter-Corruption Commission, which receives declarations of assets by all significant public officials on a regular basis and has the staffing, technology, and political will to monitor those declarations and prosecute before an independent tribunal corrupt accumulation and concealment of wealth. Such a commission must vigorously monitor the conduct of public officials in every respect, backed up by a National Audit Commission to audit all public accounts and an Ombudsman's Commission to receive and investigate public

complaints. It must have the authority and resources to prosecute all types of bribery, embezzlement, and violation of the public trust. If corruption is really to be deterred and controlled, convictions must bring serious penalties, including forfeiture of corrupt assets and of the right to hold public office, and for the most serious offenses, jail. This requires again independent and resourceful courts and prosecutors as well.

The institutions of horizontal accountability form a self-reinforcing web. A counter-corruption commission must rely in part on the audit agency to uncover theft and misuse of public resources, and on the Ombudsman to invite and investigate public complaints. Reduction and deterrence of corruption will be reinforced if an electoral commission can produce sufficiently clean elections to enable citizens to turn out of office the most corrupt public officials.

It is a mistake to think that the impoverished masses at the bottom of the predatory system are so fragmented and hoodwinked that they will happily settle for whatever crumbs of corrupt patronage are dropped their way. People do learn over time that the system is exploiting them, and information about corruption and injustice moves around much more readily than it once did. Or at least it can move around if there is some freedom of information, in terms of a pluralistic press, and crucially in poor countries, free access to the radio airwaves.

The importance of free and fair elections and free mass media underscore a fundamental point about controlling corruption and predation. In a predatory society, accountability

cannot succeed if the initiative for it comes only from within the state sector.

Horizontal accountability must be reinforced by vertical accountability. In addition to competitive elections and the mass media, NGOs play a crucial role in monitoring the conduct of public officials and holding them accountable for their performance in office.

A third type of accountability is external. International actors and donor governments must do much more to monitor the conduct of public officials in states that receive concessional lending and other forms of aid. And they must move vigorously to strengthen norms and institutions of accountability in international banking, so that we can do more to trace and cut off corrupt flows of money across countries. Predatory elites do not keep much of their wealth in their own countries, precisely because they have so little confidence in their societies. They park their money and assets abroad. We need to identify those illegally acquired assets and go after them with new international rules and institutions.

Coalitions for Institutional Reform

Predatory societies are caught in vicious cycles of corruption, exploitation, lawlessness, cynicism, and duplicity. Why would elites who benefit from these conditions put in place institutions with the autonomy and resources to change these conditions? Truly predatory elites will fight serious change. But in most of these societies, particularly the ones that are at least formally democratic, there are at least some elites in the party

system and the state sector who favor better governance. And there is growing sentiment for serious governance reforms in the independent mass media and civil society. In fact, the vibrancy of these civil society actors in countries such as Nigeria and Indonesia shows that these societies are far from purely predatory, and that constituencies for good governance do exist.

The problem is that these constituencies are weak in relation to those who control the state and the political and social system. And the only way that this power imbalance can be altered is by more decisive action from the international community. Financial and technical assistance to civil society advocates for good governance is important, and is helping in some cases to refine and strengthen social demands for reform. But the most urgent initiative is to alter the incentives confronting leaders of predatory states. For too long, they have had a free ride. They and their cronies plunder their societies, and the international community facilitates this plunder with aid and lending. Now many well-intentioned voices are calling for a “jubilee” initiative to write off unconditionally the debts of the poorest countries. Most of these countries are poor not because they are indebted or incapable of developing, but because they have more or less predatory societies with chronically bad governance. Unless governance is changed, and with it social structures and norms, these countries will remain poor, no matter how much aid and debt relief the West bestows on them.

One potentially powerful lever of change for these predatory societies would be radically changed expectations on the part of the international donor community. We need a new international bargain: debt relief for democracy, and development assistance in exchange for good governance. No country should be relieved of its official international debts if it does not have in place a credible, serious plan to control political corruption. This must include not only appropriate institutions, but also institutional leaders that independent civil society actors regard as serious. Each country can and should design its own institutions. But some kind of independent body to control corruption is needed, as is an independent judiciary, a free press, and regular free and fair elections. No country that does not meet these conditions should be relieved of its debts to the United States, to the other donor democracies, or to international institutions like the World Bank. And no state that refuses to institute these conditions of public accountability and good governance should receive official development assistance. Those countries might receive emergency humanitarian aid, and their civil society organizations should be generously supported where they demonstrate serious purpose and capacity. But wherever possible, predatory states should be cut off from the international flows of finance that keep them going.

In pursuit of these principles, Congressman Frank Wolf has introduced into the House of Representatives the “Responsible Debt Relief and Democracy Reform Act.” It makes cancellation or reduction of debts owed by foreign countries to the United States conditional on freedom of the press and of association, an independent and non-

discriminatory judiciary, the establishment of serious institutions and laws to control corruption, free and fair elections, and respect for human rights. The bill also urges the President to instruct the U.S. Executive Directors of multilateral lending institutions to vote and lobby for applying the same requirements to countries seeking relief from debts owed to these institutions.

Such political conditions for debt relief may sound like a tough approach. But international compassion absent clear analysis and principled standards has done little if anything to advance development and human well being in predatory societies.

Africans themselves are increasingly hoping that the international community will apply tough conditions on their own governments. They are weary of the poverty, oppression, and violence brought on by the irresponsible, plundering leadership of their own elites.

Change in endemically corrupt and predatory societies comes about as a result of coalitions for reform. A successful coalition must include three elements: pressure from within, from reform-minded elites in the party system and state who at least perceive an enlightened self-interest in institutional change; pressure from below, from civil society; and pressure from outside, the international community.

In the international community, the United States remains the indispensable country in the quest for democracy and good governance. People still look to the American example for leadership and inspiration. In many impoverished, conflict-ridden, predatory societies, ordinary people increasingly understand that real change requires

better governance, and an end to wanton corruption, exploitation, and abuse of power. In our policies on debt relief and aid, we have an opportunity to help battered societies begin to construct the institutions and norms of a civic community. As a nation, we are the first and still the leading civic community. Where will we stand?

¹ See for example Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996): 68-72.

² Terry Lynn Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty : Oil Booms and Petro-States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

³ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000, paperback edition): 151-152.

⁴ Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993): 167.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 88. This discussion of the “civic community” draws primarily from pages 87-90 of Putnam.