

## The Syntax and Pragmatics of The Naming Relation

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Philosophers of language have lavished attention on names and other singular referring expressions. But they have focused primarily on what might be called lexical-semantic character of names and have largely ignored both what I call the lexical-syntactic character of names and also what I call the pragmatic significance of the naming relation. Partly as a consequence, explanatory burdens have mistakenly been heaped upon semantics that properly belong elsewhere. This essay takes some steps toward correcting these twin lacunae. When we properly distinguish that which belongs to the lexical-syntactic character of names, from that which belongs to the lexical semantic character of names, from that which rests on the pragmatics of the naming relation, we lay to rest many misbegotten claims about names and their presumed semantic behavior. For example, though many believe that Frege's puzzle about the possibility of informative identity statements motivates a move away from a referentialist semantics for names, I argue that the very possibility of Frege cases has its source not in facts about the lexical-semantic character of names but in facts about the lexical-syntax of the naming relation. If I am right, Frege cases as such are insufficient to justify the introduction of the distinction between sense and reference. In a similar vein, I offer a new diagnosis of the widely misdiagnosed felt invalidity of the substitution of co-referring names within propositional attitude contexts. That felt invalidity has been taken

to justify the conclusion that an embedded referring expression *must* be playing some semantic role either different from or additional to its customary semantic role of standing for its reference. I argue, to the contrary, that failures of substitutivity have their source not in the peculiar semantic behavior of embedded expressions but entirely in certain pragmatic principles.

### §1. On the Lexical-Syntax of the Naming Relation

I begin by exploring the lexical-syntactic character of the linguistic category **NAME**. The contrast between the lexical-syntax and lexical-semantics is meant to distinguish lexically governed or constrained word-word relationships, on the one hand, from lexically governed and constrained word-world relationships, on the other. My central claim about the lexical-syntax of **NAME** is that names are a peculiar sort of anaphoric device. In particular, I claim that if  $N$  is a name, then any two tokens of  $N$  are guaranteed, in virtue of the principles of the language, to be co-referential. I will say that co-typical name tokens are *explicitly co-referential*. Explicit co-reference must be sharply distinguished from what I call *coincidental co-reference*. Two name tokens that are not co-typical can refer to the same object, and thus be co-referential, without being explicitly co-referential. For example, tokens of ‘Hesperus’ and tokens of ‘Phosphorus’ co-refer but are not explicitly co-referential. The fact that tokens of ‘Hesperus’ one and all refer to Venus is entirely independent of the fact that tokens of ‘Phosphorus’ one and all refer to Venus. Indeed, I take it to be a correlative truth about names, a truth partly definitive of the lexical-syntactic character of names, that when  $m$  and  $n$  are distinct names, they are *referentially independent*. Referential independence means that no

structural or lexical relation between distinct names  $m$  and  $n$  can *guarantee* that if  $m$  refers to  $o$  then  $n$  refers to  $o$  as well. To say that any distinct names are always interpretationally and referentially independent, is not to say that distinct names must fail to co-refer. Indeed, we can directly show that two names are co-referential via true identity statements. But referential independence does mean that when two distinct names  $m$  and  $n$  do co-refer, their co-reference is a mere coincidence of usage.

The referential independence of distinct names and the explicit co-reference of tokens of the same name type partially defines the lexical-syntactic character of the category **NAME**. Part of what it is to be a name is to be an expression type such that tokens of that type are explicitly co-referential with one another and referentially independent of the tokens of any distinct type. If one knows of  $e$  only that it belongs to the category **NAME**, then one knows that, whatever  $e$  refers to, if it refers to anything at all, then tokens of  $e$  are *guaranteed* to be co-referential one with another and referentially independent of any distinct name  $e'$ , whatever  $e'$  refers to. A name (type) is, in effect, a set of (actual and possible) name tokens such that all tokens in the set are guaranteed, in virtue of the rules of the language, to co-refer one with another. Call such a set a *chain of explicit co-reference*. It is, I suspect, a linguistically universal fact about the lexical category **NAME** that numerically distinct tokens of the same name will share membership in a chain of explicit co-reference and numerically distinct tokens of two type distinct names will be members of disjoint chains of explicit co-reference -- even if the two tokens are coincidentally co-referential.<sup>1</sup>

My claims about lexical-syntactic character of **NAME** is entirely consistent with competing theories of the lexical-semantic character of **NAME**, but once we appreciate

the true lexical-syntactical character of the naming relation, I shall argue, it is easy to see that certain phenomena that have been widely thought to motivate Fregean and neo-Fregean theories of the lexical-semantic character of names do nothing of the sort. Instead, they point to facts about the peculiar lexical-syntactic character of names. Consequently, though my approach does not *entail* referentialism, it does remove certain obstacles that have widely been thought to stand in the way of referentialism.

### **§§1.1 Frege's Puzzle and the lexical-Syntax of the Naming Relation**

Consider Frege's puzzle about the possibility of informative identity statements. Frege wondered how possibly a statement of the form  $\ulcorner a = a \urcorner$  may differ in cognitive value from a true statement of the form  $\ulcorner a = b \urcorner$ . Statements of the former sort are always trivial, while statements of the latter sort may contain new information. Yet, if  $a$  is identical with  $b$ , then a statement asserting the identity of  $a$  with  $b$  merely purports to assert the identity of an object with itself. But that, it seems, is precisely what the trivial statement  $\ulcorner a = a \urcorner$  purports to assert. How can the one statement be trivial and the other informative when the two statements seem to assert the very same thing about the very same object?

Frege introduced the notion of sense partly in order to answer this last question. Names have two distinguishable, though related, semantic roles. Beside the semantic role of denoting its reference, a name also has the semantic role of expressing a sense. A sense was supposed to be or contain a mode of presentation of a reference and to serve as a constituent of the thought or proposition expressed by any sentence in which the relevant name occurred. Because names that share a referent may differ in sense, co-

referring names need not make identical contributions to the thoughts expressed by sentences in which they occur. And it is this fact that is supposed to explain the very possibility of informative statements of identity. Once it is allowed that names that share a reference may differ in sense and allowed that thoughts or propositions are composed out of senses and only senses, it is a short step to conclude that the thought content expressed by a statement of the form  $\Box a = a$  is distinct from the thought content expressed by a statement of the form  $\Box a = b$  even when  $a$  just is  $b$ .

The real explanation of the very possibility of informative statements of identity turns not on the fact that type distinct names are referentially independent, while numerically distinct tokens of the same name are explicitly co-referential. Because the co-reference of type distinct names is not directly guaranteed by the language itself, an identity statement explicitly linking two distinct, and therefore referentially independent names can have an informative feel. By contrast, an identity statement linking numerically distinct tokens of the very same name purports to make manifest only what is already directly guaranteed by the language itself. The difference in felt significance between informative and trivial identity statements is due entirely to the fact that when one repeats a name by issuing another token of that very name, one *explicitly* preserves subject matter.

So, for example, if Jones says “My Hesperus looks lovely this evening!” and Smith wishes to express agreement with Jones, Smith can make her agreement explicit by using again the name that Jones originally used. She can utter a sentence like “Yes, you are right. Hesperus does look lovely this evening!” Suppose, by contrast, that Smith continues the conversation by using a co-referring, but referentially independent

name like 'Phosphorus' to refer to Venus. Perhaps she responds as follows, "Yes you are right, Phosphorus does look lovely this evening!" Though Smith has expressed agreement with Jones – in the sense that she has predicated the very same property of the very same object -- she has not done so in a manifest manner. Indeed, it is *as if* Smith has either shifted the subject matter of the conversation or has somehow implicated that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' co-refer. At a minimum, by shifting to a referentially independent name, the co-reference of which with 'Hesperus' is not explicit, Smith has left open the question whether she has, in fact, preserved the subject matter. She can close that question by stating that Hesperus is Phosphorus. In stating that Hesperus is Phosphorus she puts on display the fact that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are co-referential.

My claim is not that the official propositional content of the assertion that Hesperus is Phosphorus is really the metalinguistic proposition that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' co-refer. Frege was right to deny that *what we say* when we say that Hesperus is Phosphorus is about the signs 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. But it does not follow that the official propositional content of the statement that Hesperus is Phosphorus must be distinct from the official propositional content of the statement that Phosphorus is Phosphorus or the official propositional content of the statement that Hesperus is Hesperus. One will be tempted by this mistaken view only if one commits what John Perry (2001) calls a subject matter fallacy. One commits a subject matter fallacy, roughly, when one supposes that all the information conveyed by an utterance is information about the subject matter of the utterance.

Despite committing a subject matter fallacy, Frege was onto something. We can give due deference to Frege's underlying insight by granting that there are many different ways of putting forth the content shared by these statements, that is, many different sentential vehicles that express that very same content. By putting forth that content in one way rather than another, via one sentential vehicle rather than another, one "puts on display" different facts. When one uses a sentence like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' which contains two referentially independent names to state the identity of Hesperus with itself, one puts on display the coincidental co-reference of two referentially independent expressions. Though this way of looking at matters affords Fregean senses no role in solving Frege's puzzle, it acknowledges and applauds Frege's recognition, however dim, of the very possibility of referentially independent but coincidentally co-referential names. He erred only in the ultimate explanation of the possibility. It is not, as he imagined, that each name is associated with a determinate and independent mode of presentation of its referent as part of its sense. Where Frege sees two names, sharing a reference, but differing in sense in such a way that it cannot be determined a priori that they share a reference, there are really just two names that are referentially independent, but coincidentally co-referential. Where Frege sees a reflection of the lexical-semantic character of names, there is really the influence of the peculiar lexical-syntax of the naming relation. What Frege failed to see is that from a lexical-syntactic perspective names are quite distinctive referring devices. To repeat a name is *ipso facto* to repeat a reference. To refer again to the same object, but using a different name is, in effect, to refer *de novo* to the relevant object, that is, in a way not "anaphorically" linked with the previous act of reference.

I am not claiming that the complete story about Frege's puzzle begins and ends at the lexical-syntax of the naming relation. So far, my arguments are primarily aimed at explaining why informative statements of identity are possible at all and not, primarily, at explaining the nature and significance of the information carried by a true and informative statement of identity. Though I have said that such statements may put on display reflexive or meta-representational information, it is not my claim that such information exhaust what is potentially conveyed by an informative statement of identity. Elsewhere, I have embedded the story I have been telling about the lexical syntax of names in a larger and more complex story about the semantics of names and about the psychological organization of the referring mind.<sup>2</sup> That larger story explains what sort of psychological impact knowledge of informative identities can have on the referring mind. Though I lack the space to detail that story here, an important clue to its outline comes below in my discussion of what I call *in-the-head-co-reference*.

### **§§1.2 How to Type-Individuate Names**

I have argued that tokens of the same name type are explicitly co-referential. And I have claimed that a name type can be identified with a chain of explicit co-reference. But I have not yet said what it takes for two name tokens to be members of the same chain of explicit co-reference and thus to count as tokens of the same name type again. It might be supposed that if *m* and *n* are merely spelled and/or pronounced in the same manner, then *n* is the same name again as *m*. Sameness of spelling and pronunciation are clearly not jointly sufficient to guarantee co-reference, however. So I must deny that names are type-individuated merely by pronunciation and spelling. Some will want to

take issue with that denial. And they will want to insist that tokens of the “same name” need not be co-referential at all, let alone explicitly co-referential. (Perry 2001, Recanati 1993).

In the end, however, there is little at stake between views like mine and views like those of Perry or Recanati. That is because, whatever one’s preferred approach, one needs something rather like my notion of disjoint chains of co-reference, if one is to do full justice to the peculiar lexical-syntax of the naming relation. If one insists on type individuating names by spelling and pronunciation, then my claims about referential independence and explicit co-reference can simply be read as claims about the lexical-syntactic character of fully disambiguated names. Our current worry about how to segregate name tokens into chains of co-reference remains. The claim would then be that it is a linguistically universal fact that when names are *fully disambiguated* tokens of the same name are guaranteed to be co-referential. To disambiguate a name would be precisely to segregate tokens of a certain sound/shape pattern into disjoint chains of explicit co-reference such that it is guaranteed that all the tokens in a given class co-refer with one another and are at most only co-incidentally co-referential with tokens in any distinct class. One way to see this is to see that we might use the same sound pattern twice to refer to the same object, without knowing that we are doing so. Even if there is just one John, we might, for example, mistakenly think that one set of tokenings of ‘John’ co-refer to a different object from that to which a distinct set of tokenings of ‘John’ co-refer. In such a situation, despite the co-incidental co-reference of tokens in the two ‘John’ streams, we would still need to segregate the totality of ‘John’ tokenings into disjoint chains of explicit co-reference. If we succeeded in doing so, we would thereby

have a way of tracking when we are engaged in independent acts of reference to what is coincidentally the same object again and when are engaged in anaphorically linked acts of explicit co-reference. So the distinction I have promoted to center stage is both needed and important, no matter how one cares to type-individuate names.

My central claims and arguments will go through on either way of individuating names. Moreover, a cleaner, more elegant theory results from my own approach. So on theoretical aesthetic grounds alone, I feel entitled to the assumption that the type individuation of names is not simply a matter of pronunciation and spelling. If not, a name token need not wear its type-identity on its morphological and phonological sleeves. So what criteria do determine when a token counts as the re-occurrence of the same name again? To a rough first approximation, two tokenings are co-typical just in case the occurrence of a given (or similar or at least systematically connected) shape/sound pattern again is a further episode in connected history of such tokenings. To turn this rough idea into a systematic theory, we would have to say just when two tokenings of the same or similar shape/sound pattern does and does not count as a further episode in the same continuing history of tokenings. For the present, I will simply say that two tokenings count as tokenings of the same name again when they are linked via what I call a mechanism of co-reference. A mechanism of co-reference links a system of tokenings one with another in such a way that the tokens produced are guaranteed to co-refer. Mechanisms of co-reference bind tokenings together into what I earlier called chains of explicit co-reference.

I have so far told you only what a mechanism of co-reference does, not the means by which it does that. Here it may help to notice that that there are many ways of

marking and displaying co-reference. Explicit anaphora is one way. The identity sign is another. Identity and explicit anaphora are ways of displaying as co-referential expressions which are not directly given, in virtue of their bare type identity, as co-referential. We can, of course, flank the identity sign by tokens which are already given as explicitly co-referential, but it is precisely then that the relevant identity will be trivial and uninformative.

Now the mechanisms of co-reference that link tokenings into a chain of explicit co-reference will be of a rather different character from either explicit anaphora or the identity sign. They do not operate locally, sentence by sentence, or discourse by discourse, to link what are by their type-identity, otherwise linguistically unconnected expressions. Name constituting mechanisms of co-reference have a more global, less formal character. It would not be entirely wrong to think of such mechanisms as being founded on the interlocking and interdependent referential intentions of a community of co-linguals, a community which may be extended in time and spread through space. When I token the sound/shape pattern 'Cicero' I typically do not intend to be tokening something brand new under the sun. Rather, I typically intend to be tokening again what others have tokened before. I intend thereby to refer again to what others have referred to before. And I intend that others recognize that I so intend. It is tempting to think that it is just such a budget of co-referential intentions which makes my tokening of the sound/shape pattern 'Cicero' count as a retokening of the name 'Cicero.' Though there is something to be said for this approach, nothing I say depends on it turning out to be true. I need only the rather more modest claim that absent the intention to either continue or launch a chain of explicit co-reference, a speaker would not even count as using, or

even intending to use, a given sound/shape pattern as a name at all. What it is to intend to use an expression as a name is to use that expression with the intention of either launching or continuing a chain of explicit co-reference, however exactly such chains are ultimately constituted and marked.

Despite the fact that I have offered no positive theory of just what makes a tokening of a given sound/shape pattern count as a further episode in this rather than that continuing history of such tokenings, we should not lose sight of the deeper point that the category **NAME**, together with its defining features of explicit co-referentiality and referential independence, is a linguistic universal, that may be differently realized in different languages. If that category is to be realized in the language of a speech community, then that community must have some practice or other that serves to bind name tokens together in chains of explicit co-reference. In the absence of any such practice, the language of a community would simply contain no instances of the category **NAME**.<sup>3</sup>

Though it is not part of our current burden to say precisely how the practices of a speech community work to bind name tokens together into chains of explicit co-reference, it is not hard to imagine some ways matters might go. It would be a nice result, for example, if name tokens were bound together into chains of explicit co-reference by some tractable property guaranteed to be epistemically manifest to the merely linguistically competent. A manifest syntactic or formal property would serve nicely in that role. Unfortunately, natural languages are not so nicely designed, though one can easily imagine augmenting our language with a system of co-indexing subscripts to serve as a syntactic marker of explicit co-referentiality. Alternatively, one can

imagine a system in which distinct names were never spelled the same.<sup>4</sup> Either system would have the effect of introducing a manifest syntactic marker of explicit co-reference. Some of this already goes on in our language just as it stands. The phenomena of surnames, middle names, the whole system of modifiers like ‘junior’, ‘senior’ ‘the first’ ‘the second’, ‘the elder’ ‘the younger’ are all ways of making it more syntactically explicit and epistemically manifest when we are given the same name again and when, despite the same or similar spelling and pronunciation, we are given distinct names, and thus distinct chains of explicit co-reference. Because our language, as it stands, is not fully explicit in this regard, it is not possible to tell by mere inspection *which* name a given tokening of a certain sound/shape pattern is a tokening of. We typically rely on context to achieve the effect of making explicit co-reference more epistemically manifest. Context provides information that enables the hearer to determine whether the tokening of a given sound/shape pattern is intended as a further episode in this chain of explicit co-reference or that chain of explicit co-reference and thus whether it counts as a further tokening of this or that name.<sup>5</sup>

### **§§1.3. Names Contrasted with Deictics**

In this section, I contrast names with deictic expressions. Within the class of singular terms, deictics are, in certain respects, the dual of names. Just as it is a (partially) defining fact about the linguistic category **NAME** that tokens of the same name are explicitly co-referential, so it is a defining fact about the linguistic category **DEICTIC** that tokens of the same deictic are referentially independent. When tokens of the same deictic do co-refer, the co-reference will be a mere coincidence of usage, rather than a direct consequence of the fundamental linguistic character of deictic referring

expressions. Because token deictics of the same type are referentially independent, they are also interpretationally independent. From the would be interpreter's perspective, an episode of deictic reference involves reference *de novo* to the relevant object -- at least relative to any numerically distinct deictic. Consequently, each token of a given deictic type must be interpreted by a would-be interpreter "from scratch." And this is so even when two token deictics turn out to refer to the very same object.<sup>6</sup>

To say that token deictic reference always involves, relative to any numerically distinct token, reference *de novo* is not to deny the possibility of what we might call discourse deixis. In an episode of discourse deixis, a token deictic refers to an object raised to salience by some earlier chunk of discourse, as in:

Because of that kick *a coconut* dropped. Because *that nut* dropped *a turtle* got bopped. Because *he* got bopped *that turtle* named Jake, fell on his back with a splash in the lake.

Nor am I claiming that co-referring and co-typical deictic tokens can never be interpreted as co-referential. There are in fact sentences in which it seems all but mandatory that two co-typical deictic tokens be interpreted as co-referential. But I want to suggest that the source of any such mandate is neither lexical nor structural but purely pragmatic.

Consider the following:

- (1) Ted saw that man and Bill saw that man too
- (1') Ted saw (that man)<sub>i</sub> and Bill saw him<sub>i</sub> too
- (2) John hates that man because that man is a cad
- (2') John hates (that man)<sub>i</sub> because he<sub>i</sub> is a cad.

On the default reading, an utterance of (1) would seem to be roughly equivalent to an utterance of (1'). Similarly, on the default reading, an utterance of (2) is roughly equivalent to an utterance of (2'). It may be tempting to conclude that there can indeed obtain a relation of anaphoric dependence between subsequent and antecedent deictic tokens of the same type.

But this temptation should be resisted. What we really have here is co-reference through what I call demonstration sharing. Co-reference through demonstration sharing occurs when a speaker intends that the reference fixing demonstration associated with an "antecedent" deictic serve also to fix the reference for a subsequent deictic. When two token deictics share a demonstration, there will obtain a kind of mandatory co-reference between those tokens. But co-reference through demonstration sharing is a purely pragmatic phenomenon that resembles co-incidental co-reference more than it resembles explicit co-reference. Explicit co-reference is lexically or structurally guaranteed co-reference. Coincidental co-reference, by contrast, is neither lexically nor structurally guaranteed, but depends entirely on the coincidences of further usage. Since co-reference through demonstration sharing depends precisely on the speaker's entirely optional intention to, in effect, mount the same demonstration twice, it counts as a species of coincidental co-reference rather than a species of explicit co-reference.

A speaker can convey to the hearer that token deictics are intended to co-refer through demonstration sharing in a number of ways. She can openly fail to mount an independent demonstration for the subsequent deictic. Alternatively, she can select a sentence type that "semantically forces" the relevant deictics to be interpreted as co-referring. (1) above involves such semantic forcing. The presence of the 'too' in (1)

renders incoherent interpretations of (1) on which the deictics do not co-refer. On pain of semantic incoherence, the token deictics *must* be interpreted as co-referring. Notice that the threat of incoherence is absent if the ‘too’ is absent as in:

(1'') Ted saw that man and Bill saw that man.

To be sure, if the first deictic receives greater stress than the second, then even here the preferred interpretation of (1'') involves co-reference through demonstration sharing. On the other hand, if the second deictic receives greater stress than the first then an interpretation on which the deictics do not co-refer through demonstration sharing will be preferred.

Pragmatics also explains the imputation generated by an utterance of (2) that one and the same object is both a cad and is hated by John. In particular, our shared background expectations that, absent special circumstances, people typically do not hate one person because of another person’s character, raises the salience of the interpretation of (2) according to which the deictics co-refer through demonstration sharing. Compare (2) with (3):

(3) John hangs out with that man, because that man is a cad.

In an utterance of (3), the deictics may also co-refer through demonstration sharing, but because it is not unusual for a person to hang out with one person partly in response to a different person’s character, there will be less pressure to interpret the two deictics as co-referring through demonstration sharing. Though it is surely possible for a speaker to convey via an utterance of (3) the proposition that John hangs out with a certain man because that very man is a cad, there is nothing about (3) as a type that renders such an interpretation of any given utterance of (3) more salient or available than an

interpretation according to which the two demonstratives do not co-refer through demonstration sharing.

#### **§§1.4 Names and Principle C**

The interaction of names with other referring expressions in the context of more local anaphoric chains bears brief mention. The entire subject of anaphora is, of course, a large and vexed one, involving many subtle and complex phenomena. I do not pretend even to scratch the surface of that complexity and subtlety here. Still, I want to take brief notice of what I take to be a central and characteristic fact about the role of names in sentence and discourse level anaphoric chains. It is characteristic of names that though they may anchor local anaphoric chains, they may never occupy the role of anaphoric dependent within any such chain. For example, although ‘he’ can (but need not) be interpreted as referentially dependent on ‘John’ in (4), (5) and (6) below, there is no interpretation of (7) or (8) below in which ‘John’ is *bound* to share a referent with ‘he:’

(4) John<sub>i</sub> just arrived at the party and he<sub>i</sub> is already drunk.

(5) Although he<sub>i</sub> just arrived at the party, John<sub>i</sub> is already drunk.

(6) John<sub>i</sub> just arrived at the party. He<sub>i</sub> is already drunk. He<sub>i</sub> had better behave himself<sub>i</sub>.

(7) He<sub>i</sub> kicked John<sub>j</sub>.

(8) A man<sub>i</sub> just arrived at the party. He<sub>i</sub> is already drunk. John<sub>j</sub> had better behave himself<sub>j</sub>.

Of course, ‘he’ and ‘John’ in either (7) or (8) could *turn out* to be co-referential. Imagine, for example, that Smith utters (7) while pointing to John, but without knowing that it is John to whom she is pointing. Similarly, imagine that the drunk man who just arrived at the party is none other than John himself, but that the speaker does not know that John is the drunk man who just arrived at the party. Again the co-reference of ‘he’ with ‘John’ would be at most coincidental. It is simply not permissible for ‘John’ to be explicitly co-referential with any “antecedent” expression except ‘John’ itself.

This last remark will seem to some to need some qualification, since there are well-known cases in which a name is apparently prohibited from taking even itself as an antecedent. Consider, for example:

(9) John<sub>i</sub> kicked John<sub>j</sub>.

On the default reading of (9), the two occurrences of ‘John’ are not explicitly but at most only coincidentally co-referential. Indeed, Principle C of the principles and parameters binding theory predicts that with the two occurrences of ‘John’ co-indexed (9) is straightforwardly syntactically ill-formed and therefore, presumably, not directly interpretable at all. (Chomsky 1981, 1995) Since there are contexts in which an utterance of (9) could convey the relevant proposition, Principle C as more or less standardly stated isn’t quite correct. Still, it is true that a speaker who utters (9) would defeasibly be interpreted as referring to two distinct Johns and not to the same John twice. This fact gives rise to a *prima facie* difficulty for my approach. Since the strong default interpretation has it that the two occurrences of ‘John’ in (9) are referentially independent, it follows, on my approach, that the two occurrences of ‘John’ should count not as the occurrence of the same name twice, but as the occurrence of two distinct,

and therefore referentially independent names. But if to repeat a name is to repeat a reference, why should (9) default to a reading on which the two occurrences of ‘John’ are occurrences of two referentially independent names?

My answer is that the fact that (9) strongly defaults to a reading on which the two occurrences of ‘John’ are referentially independent reflects an *independent fact* about the means by which the grammar permits a single name to claim simultaneous occupancy, as it were, of the multiple argument places of a single verb. It is evident that the strongly preferred way of saying that John is simultaneously the agent and patient of a single kicking is to deploy the reflexive pronoun as in (10):

(10) John<sub>i</sub> kicked himself<sub>i</sub>.

Indeed, though a non-reflexive pronoun can often be explicitly co-referential with an antecedent name, explicit co-reference is not possible here. If we substitute a such a pronoun for ‘himself’ in (10) we get:

(11) John<sub>i</sub> kicked him<sub>j</sub>.

As with (9), on the default reading of (11) ‘John’ and ‘him’ are referentially independent. Indeed, Principle B of the binding theory predicts that (11) is syntactically ill-formed when “John’ and ‘him’ are co-indexed and thus explicitly co-referential. (Chomsky 1981, 1995) Again, this constraint does not rule out the possibility that ‘John’ and ‘him’ can co-refer in an utterance of (11), but they can do so only if the co-reference is coincidental rather than explicit. These data strongly suggest that, to a first approximation, a single name can simultaneously “control” multiple argument places of a single verb only through anaphoric dominance of a reflexive pronoun. It is as if a name is defeasibly forbidden from serving as its own referential doppelganger within single

argument structure. Within a single argument structure a name cannot be anaphorically dominated *even by itself*.

The prohibition against self-domination within a single argument structure is not a general prohibition against explicitly repeating a reference by repeating a name within a single sentence or single discourse. A name may serve as its own referential doppelganger, for example, when it simultaneously occupies argument places in “distinct” verb phrases or when one occurrence of the name is merely a constituent of an argument of a given verb phrase and the other occurrence occupies some other argument place of the very same verb phrase. Consider, for example:

- (12) Mary<sub>j</sub>'s kicking of John<sub>i</sub> upset him<sub>i</sub>
- (13) Mary<sub>j</sub>'s kicking of John<sub>i</sub> upset John<sub>i</sub>
- (14) Mary<sub>j</sub>'s kicking of John<sub>i</sub> upset her<sub>j</sub>.
- (15) Mary<sub>j</sub>'s kicking of John<sub>i</sub> upset Mary<sub>j</sub>
- (16) Mary<sub>j</sub>'s kicking of herself<sub>j</sub> upset her<sub>j</sub>
- (17) Mary<sub>j</sub>'s kicking of herself<sub>j</sub> upset Mary<sub>j</sub>.

Although the relevant names and pronouns in each of (12) - (17) can be interpreted as referentially independent, they need not be. There is nothing like the strong default in favor of interpreting what looks like the same name again in each of (13), (15) and (17) as referentially independent occurrences of two distinct names. Rather, the default interpretation of each of these sentences involves exactly one John and exactly one Mary. Contrast (12) - (17) with:

- (18) Mary's kicking of Mary upset her
- (19) Mary's kicking of Mary upset Mary.

For both (18) and (19), at least two, and possibly three Mary's are involved and each sentence is ambiguous as to whether it is the kicking Mary, the kicked Mary or some third person who is upset by the kicking.

Finally, consider (20) - (22), in which we have explicit co-referentiality across different clauses:

(20) If Bill<sub>i</sub> hopes to finish his<sub>i</sub> dissertation soon, he<sub>i</sub> had better get to work.

(21) If Bill hopes to finish his<sub>i</sub> dissertation soon, Bill had better get to work.

(22) If Bill hopes to finish Bill's dissertation soon, Bill had better get to work.

(21) strongly -- and (22) less strongly -- defaults to a reading in which one and the same Bill is denoted by each occurrence of 'Bill.' On the default reading, (21) and (22) each expresses more or less the same proposition as (20), when it is co-indexed as above.

Moreover, for each of (23) - (29) below, where the reflexive occupies object position, the weakly or strongly preferred interpretation involves one Bill, rather than multiple Bills. Correlatively, where either a name or a non-reflexive pronoun occupies the direct object position, there is a default to a two person reading of the sentence:

(23) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then he had better watch himself.

(24) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then Bill had better watch himself.

(25) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then he had better watch Bill

(26) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then Bill had better watch Bill.

(27) If Bill hopes to earn an A, then Bill had better watch him.

(28) If he hopes to earn an A, then he had better watch Bill.

(29) If he hopes to earn an A, then Bill had better watch himself.

What is the source of the prohibition against a name's self-domination within a single argument structure? Is it just a brute fact? Is there a deeper reason why this should be so? Such questions are better left to linguists. My approach is consistent with any answer your favorite syntactic theory is likely to have on offer. The mere fact that a name is defeasibly prohibited from functioning as its own referential doppelganger within a single argument structure spells no deep trouble for my central claim that tokens of the same name type are explicitly co-referential. My view neither predicts that such a prohibition should obtain nor predicts that no such prohibition should obtain. But given independent grounds for this prohibition on the repeatability of a name within a single argument structure, my approach does offer a way of saying just what the prohibition comes to and what it entails. From our current perspective the prohibition against self-domination within a single argument structure entails that when what looks like the same name occupies multiple argument places within a single argument structure those apparently identical names will be defeasibly interpreted as referentially independent and thus as distinct and therefore at most coincidentally co-referential names.

## **§2. The Pragmatic Significance of the Naming Relation**

In this section, I explore some aspects of what I call the pragmatic significance of the naming relation. I claim that entirely independently of any particular thesis about the lexical-semantic character of names, we can explain certain aspects of the *use* of names. Such explanations turn partly on facts about the lexical syntax of the naming relation

partly on pragmatic facts about the various kinds of language games we play with names. I focus, in particular, on the behavior of empty names in the context of what I call non-veridical language games and on the apparent failure of co-referring names to be intersubstitutable in the context of propositional attitude contexts. I show that a large dose of pragmatics is needed in both cases.

### **§§2.1 Empty Names, Referential Fitness and Non-Veridical Language Games**

I begin by distinguishing what I call merely referentially fit linguistic representations from what I call referentially successful linguistic representations. Referentially fit representations are those that are, as it were, syntactically fit for the job of standing for an object. By and only by playing an appropriate role in a syntactically interlocking system of representations is a linguistic representation made fit to refer. No isolated representation, all on its own and independently of its connection to other representations, can be “fit” for the job of standing for an object. To a first approximation, referentially fit expressions are those that can well-formedly flank the identity sign, well-formedly occupy the argument places of verbs, and well-formedly serve as links of various sorts in anaphoric chains of various sorts. Names, demonstratives, indexicals, variables, and pronouns are the paradigmatic examples. Now I have already argued there are important distinctions among the lexical-syntactic characters of the various kinds of referring expressions. The lexical-syntactic character of the category **NAME**, for example, is partially defined by twin properties of explicit-co-referentiality for co-typical name tokens and referential independence of type distinct names. The lexical syntactic character of the category **DEICTIC**, on the other hand, is

partially defined by the fact that tokens of the same deictic type are referentially independent. Differences in the lexical-syntactic characters of different categories of singular terms amount to so many different ways of being referential fit.

It is important to distinguish mere referential fitness from referential success. A referentially successful expression is one that is both fit for the job of standing for an object and, in addition, *actually* stands for an object. A representation can be referentially fit without *actually* standing for an object, without, that is, being referentially successful. I will sometimes say that representations are referentially fit, but not referentially successful, are merely *objectual* without being fully *objective*. Merely objectual representations have, as it were, the form and function of objectivity despite the fact that they fail to carry out that function. Elsewhere, I argue that referential fitness or objectuality is a precondition for referential success or objectivity, that no object can be *successfully designated* except by an expression that already occupies the fitness-making role in a system of interlocking representations. (Taylor, forthcoming) This fact reflects the small grain of truth in holism about reference. But the holist fails to appreciate that referential success is not itself a matter of occupying the fitness-making role. Only referentially fit representations that stand in some *further* relation to some actual existent are referentially successful. I hold, but will not argue here, that that further relation is a distinguished causal relation.<sup>7</sup> That is to say, a referentially fit expression *e* will refer to an object *o*, and thus be referentially successful, just in case *o*-involving events play a distinguished causal role in the production of instances of *e*. Clearly, an adequate theory must explain just *what* causal role an *o*-involving event must play in the production of instances of *e* if *e* is to count as

referring to *o*. I do not pretend to offer such an explanation here, but if I am right, referential success involves the interaction of two independent factors: the intra-representational factors, whatever exactly they are, that suffice for referential fitness and the extra-representational factors, whatever exactly they are, that suffice, when added to referential fitness, for referential success.

Correlative with the distinction between referential fitness and referential success is a further distinction between what I call veridical language games and what I call non-veridical language games. Veridical language games are dialogic games paradigmatically played with singular representations that are presumptively fully objective or referentially successful. Moves in such games are typically governed by a concern for truth, a concern for getting things right, as things go in the world. Non-veridical language games, on the other hand, are often played with singular representations that are merely objectual. The governing concerns for such games are various -- coherence, consistency, fealty to some truth-like notion that is not yet truth. Pure fiction is one case in point. When we engage in the construction, consumption, and criticism of fiction we play dialogic language games governed by a concern for getting things right, as things go in appropriate stories. But getting things right as things go in a story is not a matter of getting at a peculiar species of truth -- truth in a fiction. Granted, we use such expressions as "It is true in the Holmes stories that..." or "It is true according to the Santa myth that..." But neither truth in a story nor truth in a myth is a species of genuine truth. To be sure, such expressions may play a dialogic role similar to the dialogic role of genuine truth talk. The predicate '...is true' functions in discourse as a device for claiming entitlement to make assertoric moves in dialogic games of inquiry,

argument, and deliberation. One who asserts that  $p$  is true, for example, thereby claims an entitlement to put forth  $p$  as a candidate for mutual acceptance in a dialogic game of inquiry, argument or deliberation. Expressions like “true in the story” may also function as entitlement claiming devices in dialogic games played among producers and consumers of fiction. But entitlements to make moves in non-veridical games arise from sources rather different from the sources from which arise entitlements to make moves in non-veridical games.

By at least two different measures, merely objectual representations and fully objective representations are indistinguishable. First, there are no narrowly syntactic markers of referential success. The merely referentially fit and the fully referentially successful play indistinguishable syntactic roles in the language. Second, we play language games with a common dialogic structure with both the merely referentially fit and the fully referentially successful. In particular, we play entitlement commitment games with both the merely referentially fit and the fully referentially successful. The syntactic and dialogic similarity between the objectual and the objective can lead the inattentive to posit objects where there are none. One is liable to this mistake if one supposes that wherever we make rationally warranted moves with singular representations in some entitlement-commitment game, we are *ipso facto* getting at, or purporting to get at, how things are by some domain of objects. One is liable to think, for example, that in making rationally warranted moves in fictive entitlement-commitment games we are getting at how things are by a domain of *fictional objects* or that in playing mathematical entitlement-commitment games, we are getting at how things are by a domain of *mathematical objects*. Such mistakes are, I think, one source

of a fairly pervasive skepticism about the prospects for a causal theory of reference. For anyone who is prepared to posit a domain of objects wherever there are entitlement-commitment games played with singular representations is liable to think that causal theories cannot explain the nature of our cognitive contact with the plethora of objects she acknowledges. Since we have no causal contact with fictional objects or with mathematical objects, it would seem to follow that the causal theory of reference cannot possibly be a correct general account of how the gap between the merely objectual and fully objective is bridged. The proper response to the line of thought is that there are no such objects, and so no burden on the causal theorist to explain either the peculiar nature of our epistemic “contact” with such objects or our ability to refer to such objects. There are only non-veridical entitlement commitment games played with merely objectual singular representations. And though there is much work to be done in explaining what we are doing when we play such games and the source of such rational warrant as is enjoyed by moves in such games, the existence of such games causes no special problems for the causal theorist.

Once again, close attention to the syntax of the naming relation is the key to philosophical enlightenment. Such attention helps to dispel the illusory feel of objectivity surrounding our use of the merely referentially fit in non-veridical language games. For consider empty names more closely. Like names generally, empty names have the lexical-syntactic property that tokens of the same name again are guaranteed to co-refer. For names that fail to refer, this means that if any token of the name fails to refer, then every token of the name fails to refer. That is, in virtue of their lexical-syntactic property of being explicitly co-referential one with another, tokens of the same

name stand or fall together with respect to referential success and failure in the sense that the referential success of any given token is the success of all and the referential failure of one is the failure of all. Consequently, even tokenings of an empty name can form chains of explicit co-reference. We might call such a chain a *chain of empty explicit co-reference*. The founding link in a chain of empty explicit co-reference will not have been produced in the course of successful reference to an actual existent. Rather, chains of empty explicit co-reference will typically be rooted in the making of fiction or myth or in failed attempts at reference to putatively existent object.

In the case of myth and fiction, for example, chains of empty explicit co-reference will be sustained by interlocking intentions to carry on a mythical or fictive practice. To token again a fictive or mythical name that others have tokened before is not to refer again, but by using the same fictional name again that others have used before, one may make a further move in a “non-veridical” language game that others have played before.<sup>8</sup> By tokening ‘Holmes’ again, for example, I take part in what I call a shared imagining -- the shared imagining that gives content to the Holmes stories. Indeed, the fact that my use of ‘Holmes’ is, and is intended to be, just a further episode in a certain chain of empty explicit co-reference is really all there is to the feeling that in imagining Holmes again, I imagine an *object* that others have imagined before and will imagine again. There is no Holmes to imagine. But by imagining *with* ‘Holmes’ in accordance with the rules that govern a certain non-veridical language game, I take part in a certain shared imagining.

Since empty names one and all refer to the same object, there is a sense in which all empty names might be said to be co-referential. But even for empty names we must

distinguish co-incidental from explicit co-reference. As with names in general, the tokenings of a given empty name will form a chain of explicit co-reference – what we have called a chain of empty explicit co-reference. Moreover, as with names in general, two type distinct empty names will form disjoint chains of empty explicit co-reference. Consider, for example, ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Pegasus’. Tokenings of ‘Santa Claus’ are linked in a single chain of empty co-reference via a mechanism of co-reference that endows them all with a shared referential aim and fate. The explicit co-referentiality of the tokens of ‘Santa Claus’ makes it the case that the failure of ‘Santa Claus’ to refer is a failure shared by all of tokenings of that name, a failure they share in virtue of the fact that they aim to name together. ‘Pegasus’ too is constituted as the very name type that it is by a mechanism of co-reference, a mechanism of co-reference initiated in a founding act of myth-making, sustained for an historical period by intentions to continue the relevant mythical practice, and sustained to this day by intentions to co-refer that are no longer moored to ancient mythical practice. That mechanism of co-reference links tokenings of ‘Pegasus’ together in a chain of empty explicit co-reference such that the tokenings stand or fall together with respect to referential success and failure. But the ‘Pegasus’ chain of empty explicit co-reference is sustained by a mechanism of co-reference entirely independent of the mechanism of co-reference that sustains the ‘Santa’ chain of empty explicit co-reference. Hence the failure of ‘Pegasus’ to refer is a fact entirely independent of the failure of ‘Santa Claus’ to refer. So although ‘Pegasus’ and ‘Santa’ are in a trivial sense coincidentally co-referential, they are not explicitly co-referential.

I said above that the fact the tokens of ‘Holmes’ are explicitly co-referential one with another helps to explain how it is possible for cognizers to engage in certain shared imaginings without there having to be a fictional object Holmes to be the shared object of those shared imaginings. In a similar vein, I claim that the referential independence of ‘Santa’ and ‘Pegasus’ explains all there is to the feeling that the Santa Claus myth and the Pegasus myth have different subject matters. Just as we need not posit a fictional Holmes to be the common subject of all Holmes-imaginings, so we need not posit a mythical Santa and a mythical Pegasus to be the distinguishable subjects of Santa and Pegasus imaginings. The making of myth and fiction may indeed play a role in founding and sustaining chains of empty explicit co-reference, but they do not make mythical or fictional objects to exist.<sup>9</sup>

Sometimes, of course, empty names are tokened not in the making of fiction or myth, but in failed attempts at genuine reference. Here too the relevant name is constituted as the very name that it is by the existence of a chain of explicit co-reference that endows the tokenings of that name with a shared referential aim and fate. Even if there had been no planet causing perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, ‘Neptune’ would still have counted as a name. Contrary to Russell, we should not and would not feel any temptation to conclude on the basis of mere referential failure that ‘Neptune’ was not a name at all, but merely a definite description in disguise. Even referentially failed names have the property of aiming to name. Even tokens of such a name aim to name together. When a name (type) fails to refer, the name defining property of explicit co-referentiality guarantees that that failure will be a failure shared by all tokens of the name. So even empty names form chains of explicit co-reference. It is just that the links

in chains of co-reference formed from the tokens of an empty name share referential failure rather than referential success. Thus in the case imagined, the existence of a mechanism of co-reference, rooted in a failed attempt to fix a reference for ‘Neptune’, would have endowed tokenings of ‘Neptune’ with a shared referential aim and fate.

There is much more to say about empty names and their linguistic behavior. For example, I have argued at length elsewhere that linguistic moves made with empty names are typically not fully propositional. Hence, there is nothing strictly literally said by a sentence containing an empty name. Nonetheless, I have argued, sentences containing empty names may pragmatically convey more or less determinate propositional contents. The pragmatic conveyances of the utterance of a sentence containing an empty name are species of what I call “prepropositional” pragmatic externalities. (Taylor, 2002-b) Such pragmatic externalities are generated via what I call one and a half stage pragmatics. Paradigmatically, one and half stage pragmatics happens where primary pragmatic processes “misfire” or fail to come off. One and a half stage pragmatics presuppose a failed or “misfired” attempt at constituting a strict, literal propositional content. Where primary processes fail, one and half stage processes may step in to fill the breach, by associating a non-literal content with the relevant utterance. Though such contents are not strict, literal contents, neither are they merely conversationally implicated by the relevant utterance -- at least not if we suppose, as many do, that it takes the application of a secondary pragmatic processes to the propositional outputs of primary pragmatic processes to generate conversational implicatures. The proposition associated with an utterance by a one and half stage process is less tightly connected to the utterance than a

strict literal content, but more tightly connected to it than a mere conversational implicature.

## **§§2.2 Acceptance and Substitution**

Earlier in this essay, we examined some evidence that substitution of coincidentally co-referring names is insufficient, on its own, to make the preservation of subject matter manifest. Typically, whenever subject matter is preserved, but not manifestly so, an imputation of distinctness of subject matter is typically generated. This fact suggest that cooperative conversation is governed by a (defeasible) directive constraining discourse participants to make the preservation of subject matter manifest. Such a constraint predicts that despite the coincidental co-reference of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’, they cannot, in general, be substituted one for the other in what we might call a dialectical significance preserving manner, where dialectical significance has to do with significance for the stage-wise evolution of a discourse, argument or conversation. To say that substitution of coincidental co-referents fails to preserve dialectical significance is not to say that such substitution fails to preserve truth value. Preservation of truth value is one thing, manifest preservation of subject matter is something entirely different.

Now in many contexts, substitution of coincidental co-referents can be directly licensed when an identity sign is used to make manifest the co-reference of two referentially independent designators. Propositional attitude contexts constitute, however an apparent exception to this generalization. In such contexts, even when referentially independent and coincidentally co-referential designators are linked via an explicit

identity sign, substitution still may fail to preserve dialectical significance. For example, the inference from (30) and (31) to (32) below is not intuitively compelling, despite the fact that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are linked via an explicit identity sign in (30):

(30) Smith believes that Hesperus is rising

(31) Hesperus is Phosphorus

(32) Smith believes that Phosphorus is rising.

Now philosophers of language have been widely convinced, partly on the basis of the felt invalidity of such inferences, that the semantic contribution of an embedded name to the truth conditions of the containing belief ascription cannot be *just* its referent. Embedding is widely supposed somehow to endow a name with a degree of what I call notional semantic significance in virtue of which an embedded name serves, by some means or other, to either directly or indirectly semantically specify, intimate, or designate the ascriber’s notions, conceptions or modes of presentation of doxastically implicated objects.<sup>10</sup> But on my view the widely shared intuition that -- to put it neutrally -- the acceptability of statements like (30) and (31) need not guarantee the acceptability of a statement like (32) has been widely misdiagnosed. Our intuitions of the badness of such inferences are standardly taken to be intuitions about truth-value dependence and independence.<sup>11</sup> I shall argue that such inferences really involve a kind of pragmatic infelicity, ultimately traceable to the influence of what below I call the default co-reference constraint on propositional attitude ascriptions.

I begin by introducing the notion of *the co-reference set* of a given term for a given agent at a given time. If  $a$  is an agent, and  $n$  is a name in  $a$ ’s lexicon at  $t$ , the co-reference set of  $n$  for  $a$  at  $t$  is the set of expressions in  $a$ ’s lexicon such that either: (a)  $t$

is explicitly co-referential with  $n$  or (b) if  $t$  is referentially independent of  $n$ , then  $t$  is in the co-reference set of  $n$  for  $a$  just in case  $a$  accepts the sentence  $t = n$ . When two referentially independent expressions  $m$  and  $n$  are such that  $a$  accepts  $m = n$  at  $t$ , I will say that  $m$  and  $n$  are in-the-head-co-referential for  $a$  at  $t$ . In the head co-reference is distinct from real world co-reference. Expressions may be real world co-referential, without being in the head co-referential. Moreover, expressions may be in-the-head-co-referential, without being real world co-referential. Finally, it is important to stress that co-reference sets are defined agent by agent and moment by moment. In particular, two referring expressions may be in the head co-referential for a given agent at a given time, but not in the head co-referential for either the same agent or some distinct agent at a distinct time.

In the head co-reference is defined in terms of *acceptance of identity sentences*. Despite the intimate connection between acceptance and belief, acceptance, qua attitude toward a *sentence*, must be sharply distinguished from belief, qua toward the *proposition expressed by that very sentence*. To believe the proposition expressed by a sentence is not *ipso facto* to accept that sentence. One who has no knowledge of English and its sentences can believe the proposition expressed by the English sentence 'The cat is on the mat' even though she fails to accept that very sentence. Conversely, to accept a sentence is not *ipso facto* to believe the proposition expressed by that sentence. One can accept a sentence even if one does not know which proposition the sentence expresses. Now acceptance is itself a kind of belief. To accept a sentence  $S$  is to believe of  $S$  that it expresses some true proposition or other. But one can believe of a sentence that it expresses some true proposition or other, and thereby accept it, without *knowing which*

proposition that sentence expresses. Suppose, for example, that Brown does not *know* *who* Smith and Jones are. Suppose further that Black utters the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’. Assume that Brown takes Black at her word. She thereby comes to believe of the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’ that it expresses a truth, but she does not thereby come to believe that Smith loves Jones.

To be sure, if Brown merely recognizes some further grammatical and lexical facts about the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’ and its constituents, then even if she does not know who Smith and Jones are, there may be further propositions, closely connected to the accepted sentence, that Brown does come to believe in coming to accept the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’. For example, if she recognizes that ‘Smith’ and ‘Jones’ are names and knows the meaning of ‘loves’ then in coming to accept the sentence she thereby comes to believe the further and more articulated proposition that the referent of ‘Smith’ loves the referent of ‘Jones’. But that, again, is still not the proposition expressed by ‘Smith loves Jones’.<sup>12</sup> We might say that Black believes that Smith loves Jones *via* acceptance of the sentence ‘Smith loves Jones’ if she accepts ‘Smith loves Jones’ and knows which proposition it expresses. But we will not attempt to spell out at present just what it takes to know what proposition a sentence expresses. I take it to be a plausible (initial) hypothesis about the connection between belief and acceptance for creatures like us that if  $P$  is a proposition such that  $A$  (explicitly) believes that  $P$ , there is some sentence  $S$  such that  $A$  believes  $P$  *via* acceptance of  $S$ .<sup>13</sup>

Armed with the notion of a co-reference set, we can give an initial statement of the default co-reference constraint on (one-layer) belief ascriptions:

**Default Co-Reference Constraint:** If a sentence of the form:

$A$  believes that ... $n$  ...

is dialectically permissible for a player  $p$  in a dialectical setting  $D$  at  $t$  and

$m$  is in the co-reference set of  $n$  for  $A$  at  $t$ , then a sentence of the form:

$A$  believes that ... $m$ ...

is dialectically permissible for  $p$  in  $D$  at  $t$ .

$S$  is dialectically permissible for a player in the dialectical setting  $D$  at  $t$ , roughly, if given the “common ground” of  $D$  at  $t$ , the production of  $S$  by  $p$  in  $D$  at  $t$  would violate no norms of cooperativeness, perspicuousness, coherence, relevance, or the like which jointly govern the players in  $D$  at  $t$ .<sup>14</sup> The co-reference constraint says, in effect, that (one-layer) belief ascriptions are defeasibly dialectically sensitive to facts about *ascribee* co-reference sets, rather than to facts about either *ascriber* co-reference sets or to facts about *real world* co-reference. The fact that belief ascriptions are defeasibly sensitive to *ascribee* co-reference sets explains why it is not in general dialectically permissible to move from (30) and (31) above to (32) above. When attitude ascriptions are sensitive to facts about *ascribee* co-reference sets, such ascriptions exhibit many of the hallmarks commonly associated with so-called *de dicto* ascriptions.

There are, however, dialectical settings in which the default sensitivity of (one layer) ascriptions to facts about *ascribee* co-reference sets is overridden in favor of sensitivity to facts about the co-reference sets which are elements of the common ground between speaker and hearer. In such dialectical settings, attitude ascriptions will exhibit many of the hallmarks of what are commonly called *de re* ascriptions. In such dialectical settings, whenever:

$$m = n$$

is part of the common ground of  $D$  at  $t$  and

$A$  believes that ... $m$  ....

is dialectically permissible in  $D$  at  $t$ , then:

$A$  believes that ...  $n$  ...

is dialectically permissible in  $D$  at  $t$ . For illustrative purposes, consider the following scenario. Daniel Taylor, formerly a practicing Christian, decides to convert to Islam. In the course of his conversion, he adopts 'Haazim Abdullah' as his legal name. Because he suspects that his devoutly Christian parents, Sam and Seretha, would be distressed by this turn of events, he informs them of neither his change of faith nor his change of name. He does, however, confide in his siblings, Robert and Diane, that he has changed his name, that he has converted to Islam and that Sam and Seretha are unaware of his conversion. It is mutually manifest to Robert and Diane that they, but not Sam and Seretha, accept the following identity:

(33) Haazim Abdullah = Daniel Taylor.

Some time goes by. Diane wishes to inform Robert that Seretha has still not figured out that Daniel, that is, Haazim, is no longer a practicing Christian. It is common ground between Diane and Robert that (a) (33) holds; (b) that Seretha does not accept (33); and (c) that she does not accept (33) because there is no name  $N$  in Seretha's lexicon such that 'Haazim Abdullah' belongs to the co-reference set of  $N$  for Seretha. In the imagined dialectical setting, the inference from (34) below to (35) seems perfectly acceptable:

(34) Seretha believes that Daniel is still a Christian

(35) Seretha believes that Haazim is still a Christian.

Because it is part of the common ground that ‘Haazim Abdullah’ belongs to the co-reference set of no name with which Seretha is competent, in the relevant dialectical setting, the inference from (34) to (35) generates no imputation that Seretha accepts (33). Because of what is common ground between Robert and Diane an imputation that might *otherwise* be generated is simply forestalled. Similarly, because of the common ground of the relevant dialectical setting, the inference from (34) to (35) generates no imputation to the effect that (36) below is true:

(36) Seretha accepts ‘Haazim is still a Christian’.

If I am right about the potential of facts about common ground co-reference relations to forestall imputations of acceptance that might otherwise be generated, then there is a quite natural sense in which an occurrence of (35) in the sort of dialectical setting we have been imagining can be said to be dialectically governed by facts about common ground co-reference sets rather than by facts about ascriber co-reference sets.

Consider a dialectical setting in which the default sensitivity to ascriber co-reference sets is not overridden by any elements of the relevant common ground. Suppose that Seretha learns, by listening to the news on the radio, of the artistic achievements of one Haazim Abdullah, an Islamic poet of some renown. Suppose that she does so without also coming to accept (33). Indeed, suppose that Seretha would explicitly reject (33). And suppose that Robert and Diane mutually know that Seretha has learned of Haazim Abdullah’s poetic achievements and that she has done so in a way that does not lead her to accept (33). Now consider the following ascriptions as they occur in a dialectical setting with a common ground of the sort just described:

(37) Seretha believes that Haazim is a very fine poet

(37') Seretha believes that Haazim is not a very fine poet

(38) Seretha believes that Daniel is not a very fine poet

(38') Seretha believes that Daniel is a very fine poet.

In such a dialectical setting, (37) and (38) can be simultaneously dialectically permissible, while both (37') and (38') are dialectically impermissible, despite the fact that it is common ground between Robert and Diane that Daniel Taylor is Haazim Abdullah. In such a dialectical setting, I claim, an occurrence of (37) would generate an imputation to the effect that Seretha accepts 'Haazim is a very fine poet' and an occurrence of (38) would generate an imputation that Seretha would accept 'Daniel is not a very fine poet'. Since Seretha does accept the relevant sentences, (37) and (38) are unproblematic. On the other hand, an occurrence of (37') would generate the unacceptable imputation that Seretha would accept 'Haazim is not a very fine poet'. And similarly for (38'). Hence neither (37') nor (38') is dialectically permissible. This is so because the relevant ascriptions are naturally interpreted as being dialectically governed by facts about ascriber co-reference sets rather than by facts about common ground co-reference sets

The illustrative dialectical scenarios just considered do not tell the entire story about the pragmatics of attitude ascriptions. I have offered neither a deep explanation of just why the constraint holds nor a systematic account of which factors may serve, in a discourse context, to override the constraint. Nor will I attempt to do so here.<sup>15</sup> It is, however, worth noting that the defeasible co-reference constraint seems *prima facie* limited to singly-embedded belief ascriptions and not to ascriptions involving multiple

embeddings. For example, the inference from (39) and (40) to (41) is not intuitively pragmatically compelling:

(39) John believes that Mary believes that Superman can fly

(40) John accepts 'Superman = Clark Kent'.

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(41) John believes that Mary believes that Clark Kent can fly.

It is worth considering just why this is so.

We begin by considering some further data. Imagine a dialectical setting in which Smith intends by an utterance of (39) to inform Jones of John's beliefs about Mary's beliefs about the abilities of Superman. Suppose that Smith and Jones mutually accept the sentence 'Clark Kent = Superman' and that, moreover, it is common ground between them that John accepts it as well. Even Smith and Jones's mutual acceptance of 'Clark Kent = Superman' together with their mutual knowledge of John's acceptance of (40) seems intuitively insufficient to render (41) an acceptable way for Smith to report to Jones John's belief about Mary's belief about Superman. But notice that (41) feels more acceptable when (42) below is common ground between Smith and Jones:

(42) John believes that Mary accepts 'Clark Kent = Superman.'

This data suggests that the dialectical permissibility of the inner most clause of a doubly embedded ascription is (defeasibly) sensitive neither to facts about common ground co-reference sets nor to facts about the ascriber's co-reference sets, but to facts about the ascriber's *beliefs* about co-reference sets for what we might call the embedded ascriber.

Consider a scenario in which facts about co-reference sets for the embedded ascriber are common ground between the ascriber and the addressee. Suppose, for

example, (43) below is, but (42) above is not part of the common ground between Smith and Jones:

(43) Mary accepts ‘Clark Kent = Superman.’

Where (43) is common ground between Smith and Jones, the default co-reference constraint does seem to license a move from (44) as uttered by Smith to (45) as uttered by either Smith or Jones below:

(44) Mary believes that Superman can fly.

(45) Mary believes that Clark Kent can fly.

However, the standing of (43) as common ground between Smith and Jones still does not, it seems, render (41) permissible in light of (39) (and (40)). This fact lends additional weight to the hypothesis that it is facts about the ascriber’s *beliefs* about the co-reference sets of the embedded ascriber that govern, perhaps defeasibly, the dialectical permissibility of the innermost clauses of an ascription containing a double embedding.

Our hypothetical nested co-reference constraint, as we might call it, entails that where  $n = m$ , discourse participants defeasibly lack entitlement to move from the utterance of an instance of the scheme (46) below to the utterance of an instance of the scheme (47) below merely on the basis of facts about co-reference sets for the embedded ascriber:

(46) *A* believes that *S* believes that **F(*n*)**

(47) *A* believes that *S* believes that **F(*m*)**.

Because the ascriber need have no direct access to whatever governing constraints were operative in the “original” discourse situation, if there was one or in a counterfactual

discourse situation if no actual ascription has occurred, it is not at all surprising that something like the embedded co-reference constraint should hold. In ascribing to another a belief about another's beliefs, it is surely intuitively plausible that we should aim to be responsive, as it were, to the words our ascriber would or did use to make her ascription to the embedded ascriber. If the ascriber is ignorant of facts about co-reference sets for the embedded ascriber, there will be many discourse situations in which the ascriber's ascriptions will be constrained to reflect the state of the ascriber's ignorance. There may also be discourse situations in which a certain indifference to the constraints to which the ascriber was or would have been subject is called for.

Notice that the dialectical permissibility of the outermost that clause of an ascription containing a double embedding is itself (defeasibly) governed by facts about ascriber co-reference sets. Suppose, for example, that Mary is sometimes called by the nickname 'Cookie' and that it is common ground between Smith and Jones that John accepts the sentence 'Mary is Cookie.' Imagine that Smith reports John's beliefs about Mary's beliefs to Jones via (39). In that case, (39) together with the relevant common ground seems sufficient to license:

(46) John believes that Cookie believes that Superman can fly.

If, in addition, (42) is part of the common ground between Jones and Smith, then (47) below will be acceptable as well:

(47) John believes that Cookie believes that Clark Kent can fly.

The provisional take-home lesson is that co-reference constraints, of one sort or another, govern even ascriptions containing multiple embeddings. The evidence we have so far considered suggest the hypothesis that for each level of embedding a new, but

entirely predictable co-reference constraint is defeasibly operative. For a singly embedded ascription, the default co-reference constraint holds. For a doubly embedded ascription, the default co-reference constraint applies to the outermost that clause, while the embedded co-reference constraint applies to the innermost one. Though we lack the space to explore this hypothesis in greater detail at present, it seems evident that far from disconfirming the defeasible co-reference constraint for ascriptions involving a single level of embedding, evidence from cases involving double embeddings lend additional credence to that hypothesis. Indeed, the default co-reference constraint would seem to be the limiting case of an initially plausible, though perhaps unexpected general hypothesis for ascriptions containing  $n$  embeddings, for arbitrary  $n$ .

### **§3. Conclusion**

In this essay, I have addressed many phenomena that have long been hotly disputed among semanticists and philosophers of language. This phenomena include Frege's puzzle about the possibility of informative statements of identity, the behavior of empty names, and the failure of co-referring names to be substitutable within propositional attitude contexts. Though entire semantic programs have risen or fallen or their ability or lack thereof to such phenomena, one take home lesson of this essay is that many of the labors of generations of semanticists may well have been wasted. Semantics simply has fewer explanatory burdens to discharge than we have traditionally imagined. But to say that less of the work of explaining the mysteries and complexities of language in action falls to semantics and more to syntax and pragmatics is not a testament to the weakness of semantics, but of the richness of the resources that we have at our disposal.

It is, I think, high time that philosophers of language exploit those resources to their fullest.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> At the conference at which a version of this paper was originally presented, Diego Marconi objected that the twin properties of explicit co-referentiality of co-typical name tokens and referential independence of type-distinct name tokens does not distinguish names from certain other sorts of expressions. For example, he notes that according to a popular account all tokens of the type 'tiger' refer (rigidly) to the species "tiger." Similarly with the word 'yellow'. So, Marconi worried that my account fails to pick out any *distinctive* property of names. In response, it should be noted that my claim is only that explicit co-referentiality and referential independence *partially* characterize the syntactic category NAME. Names are also expressions that, for example, may well-formedly flank the identity sign and may well-formedly occupy the argument places of verbs. Some totality of such properties jointly constitute a broader, still syntactically characterized class of expressions, the class of SINGULAR TERMS. The category NAME is a distinguished subclass of that class, however exactly the broader class is defined. Included in the class of singular terms are also demonstratives and indexicals—the anaphoric properties of which I discuss below. What I claim, in effect, is that the category NAME consists of the set S of *singular term types* such that: (a) if a term t is a member of S, then tokens of t are explicitly co-referential and (b) if t and t' are members of S such that  $t \neq t'$  then t and t' are referentially independent. So my approach requires an antecedent analysis of singular termhood. I haven't offered such an analysis here, at least not a full-blown one. But see Taylor (forthcoming-a). The account of singular terms offered therein bears a certain affinity to that offered in Brandom (1994). The

twin properties of referential independence of type distinct tokens and explicit co-referentiality of co-typical tokens does, I think, serve to distinguish names from other singular terms. Another distinguishing feature of the anaphoric character of names is that names may dominate anaphoric chains, but are never dominated within any such chain. Contra Marconi, then, it wouldn't bother me at all if there were other expressions in, say, the category PREDICATE or the category COMMON NOUN that had somehow "correlative" syntactic properties. This wouldn't, though, suffice to make predicates be names or obliterate the important syntactic distinction between names and predicates. But I stress again that it is not my goal here to offer a full blown and explicit analysis of the very idea of a singular term.

<sup>2</sup> See the essays collected in (2002-b).

<sup>3</sup> It is sometimes objected to this approach that since I appeal to history and intentions to do the work of segregating tokens into chains of explicit co-reference, my account can no longer be said to be an account of lexical syntax and is really a semantic approach after all. But this criticism is simply confused. UG makes available a certain syntactic category -- NAME -- partially defined by the explicit co-referentiality of co-typical name tokens and the referential independence of type-distinct name tokens. In order to populate that category with expressions the linguistic community has to *do* something -- introduce names into the language. UG doesn't tell you, perhaps, exactly how to do that. At any rate, I'm not offering a story about exactly how that it is done. What UG tells you is, in effect, what you've done once you have succeeded in introducing a name into a language. In particular, you've introduced an expression type such that its tokens are

guaranteed to co-refer, merely in virtue of the fact that it is an expression of the relevant type. Nothing in the story I've told *prevents* a community from "re-using" a certain sound shape pattern to initiate new, disjoint chains of explicit co-reference. But the story implies that when if we do re-use an old pattern for new chain, we've in effect introduced a new name. Nothing in this story has anything so far to with any *disputed* semantic property of names of the sort, for example, that divide referentialist from anti-referentialists.

<sup>4</sup>Something similar in spirit is suggested by Fiengo and May's (1998) in the guise of what they call the singularity principle:

Singularity Principle: If co-spelled expressions are co-valued, they are co-indexed.

Fiengo and May presuppose a distinction between names and expressions which can be reconstructed in terms of my distinction between what I call a sound/shape pattern and what I call a chain of explicit co-reference. I disagree with May and Fiengo, however, in thinking that even if two expressions are "co-valued" and are spelled and/or sounded the same, then they are ipso facto explicitly co-referential. Perhaps this is true for a fully disambiguated language, but it is not true for our language as it stands. May and Fiengo seem aware of this worry and attempt to get around it, I think, by appeal to the notion of an assignment. For they allow that co-spelled and co-referring expressions can have different "assignments." In all frankness, I can't make out what they mean by assignment, however. Clearly, they can't mean that two expressions have the same assignment just in case they share a reference. They seem -- though this is just a guess --

to be looking for something intermediate, sense-like entity to play the role of assignment. It does occur to me that their notion of assignment might well be assimilated to what I call “in-the-head-co-reference.” This is a kind of “co-reference” that need not track actual co-reference. But again, this is just a guess.

<sup>5</sup> Things sometimes go wrong. Sometimes, for example, we mistake numerically distinct tokenings of the same name again for tokenings of two distinct name types. That is, we mistake what are really links in the same chain of explicit co-reference for links in disjoint chains of explicit co-reference. Just such a mistake seems to be one source of a well known and philosophically interesting puzzle about belief due to Saul Kripke (1979). Imagine an agent Smith. Suppose that unbeknownst to Smith opinions are divided among his co-linguals about the beauty of London. Some think that London is a city of outstanding beauty; others think that it is horrendously ugly. Imagine that the name ‘London’ is first introduced into Smith’s referential repertoire via interaction with a collection of apparently knowledgeable people, all of whom think that London is one among the more beautiful cities of the world. He acquires the word ‘London’, intending in his use of it to co-refer with his co-linguals. Since Smith is inclined to believe what knowledgeable people say, he comes to believe that London is a city of outstanding beauty. Subsequently, Smith comes in contact with other apparently knowledgeable people. These apparently knowledgeable people believe that London is one of the more ugly cities in the world. Once again, since Smith is inclined to take knowledgeable people at their words, he comes to believe that London is a horrendously ugly. Because

Smith mistakenly, but not irrationally, believes that knowledgeable people in a single community are unlikely to hold such divergent opinions about one and the same city, he reasons that the apparently knowledgeable people encountered later and the apparently knowledgeable people encountered earlier are not talking about one and the same city.

Kripke's puzzle is a puzzle about beliefs in cases like the above. It seems true to say that Smith believes that London is beautiful and not ugly. Yet it seems equally true to say that Smith believes that London is ugly and not beautiful. Moreover, it would seem a mark of incoherence and irrationality to simultaneously believe and disbelieve the very same proposition, as Smith apparently does. But the story we just told about Smith would seem to support only the conclusion that he is *mistaken*, and not the conclusion that he is either incoherent or irrational in believing as he does. What, in the end, shall we say about Smith, his beliefs, and his rationality or lack thereof?

We are not yet in a position to answer this question fully, but we can say a bit more about just how Smith's confusion comes about and what it consists in. Notice that Smith would surely be surprised to learn "London is London," as he might put it. Of course, he would be no more surprised to learn this fact than the average Babylonian would have been to learn that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Indeed, his surprise would seem to be surprise of the very same character as the surprise of the average Babylonian who learns that Hesperus is Phosphorus. This suggests that part of Smith's problem is that he treats the sound/shape pattern 'London' *as if* it is associated with two distinct and therefore referentially independent names which just happen to be spelled and sounded the same. If that is right, then at the base of Smith's confusion about the city London is a

confusion about the name 'London'. Indeed, Smith's confusion about the *name* 'London' seems deeply implicated in whatever confusion he has about the *city* London.

Let us look more closely at Smith's use of the sound/shape pattern 'London'. It will help to distinguish two (sub)communities of Smith's co-linguals: the A-community and the B-community. The A-community consists of those who think that London is among the most beautiful cities in the world. The B-community consists of those who think that London is horrendously ugly. Suppose further that we distinguish two sequences of Smith's tokenings of the sound/shape pattern 'London' -- an A-sequence and a B-sequence. A tokening is a member of the A-sequence when Smith produces it intending to conform to the usage of the A community. Now Smith intends, by conforming to the usage of the A community, to be conforming to the usage of the community at large. Similarly, a tokening is a member of the B sequence when Smith produces it intending to conform to the usage of the B community. Again, Smith intends, by conforming to the usage of the B community, to be conforming to the usage of the community at large.

Now each tokening in Smith's A-sequence is a link in a chain of explicit co-reference that includes tokenings by members of the A-community. In each such tokening, Smith intends to be co-referring with the members of the A community. If we take Smith's intentions as our guide, it would seem to follow that Smith's A-sequence 'London' is explicitly co-referential with the 'London' of the A-community. Similarly, Smith B-sequence tokenings of the pattern 'London' would seem to be links in a chain of explicit co-reference that connects them with tokenings of the pattern 'London' by the B-

community. Again, taking Smith's immediate intentions as our guide, it would seem to follow that Smith's B-sequence 'London' is explicitly co-referential with the 'London' of the B-community. Are Smith's A-sequence tokens explicitly co-referential with Smith's B-sequence tokens? On the one hand, we want to say that members of the A and B communities are joint masters of the one word 'London.' The members of the A-community and the B-community take themselves to be disagreeing about a common subject and to be engaging in anaphorically linked acts of co-reference, not referentially independent acts of co-reference. And this fact implies that the A-community's tokenings of 'London' and the B-community's tokening of London are links in a single chain of explicit co-reference. Moreover, each time Smith tokens the sound/shape pattern 'London' he intends merely to be continuing a chain of co-reference already initiated by others. He intends merely to be tokening again what others have tokened before. He thereby intends to assure that what others have referred to before, he refers to again.

Unfortunately for Smith, his usage fails to reflect the explicit co-referentiality of the 'London' of the A-community and the 'London' of the B-community. We might say that although the 'London' of the A-community and the 'London' of the B-community are, in fact, explicitly co-referential they are not in-the-head-co-referential *for Smith*. It is the fact that Smith's A-sequence 'London' and his B-sequence 'London' are not in-the-head-co-referential for Smith that makes it plausible to say that Smith does not quite succeed in doing what he originally intended. Though he intends to use 'London' in conformity with the usage of his community, he somehow manages to use one name as if

it were two. That is, he uses the sound/shape pattern ‘London’ as if the set of tokenings of that pattern formed two disjoint chains of explicit co-reference. Consequently, in Smith’s thought and talk tokening ‘London’ is not simply a way of repeating and co-referring with ‘London’.

<sup>6</sup> Elsewhere, I put the lexical-syntactic distinction between names and deictics to help explain the pragmatics of what I call mode of reference selection. See Essay V in Taylor (2002-b)

<sup>7</sup> But see Taylor (forthcoming) wherein I defend at some length a two-factor theory of reference.

<sup>8</sup> For further discussion of the distinction between veridical and non-veridical language games see Taylor (2002-b), especially Essay VI.

<sup>9</sup> I argue for this claim further in Taylor (2002-b).

<sup>10</sup> An exception is Bach (1997a, 1997b.) Bach and I agree in rejecting what he calls the “specification assumption” -- the assumption, roughly, that that clauses specify what I call notional contents. Bach’s specification assumption is broader than my current target. Anyone who accepts that that clauses either semantically specify or pragmatically implicate notional contents accepts Bach’s specification assumption. Hence, Salmon (1986) too counts as endorsing the specification assumption, since he holds that notional contents are pragmatically implicated rather than semantically specified. Despite rejecting the specification assumption, Bach maintains that ascriptions which differ only by the presence of co-referring names can differ in truth value. This is possible, he claims, because belief sentences are “semantically incomplete.” As he puts it:

If substitution (of co-referring terms) makes no semantic difference, how can it affect the content of a belief report? How can substitution turn a true belief report into a false one? Part of the answer is that the sentences used to make the belief reports, though semantically equivalent, are also semantically incomplete (emphasis his). That is, they do not express complete propositions, and to that extent they are like such sentences as:

(a) Fred is ready

(b) Jerry has finished.

Though syntactically well-formed ... these sentences are semantically incomplete because of a missing argument .... However, lacking an argument is not the only way for a sentences to be semantically incomplete.... On the description view, belief sentences are semantically incomplete for different reasons. Like words, such as 'big' and 'short', a belief-predicate does not have a context-independent condition of satisfaction, so that a sentence containing it does not have a context-independent truth condition. A belief-predicate does not express, independently of context, a unique belief-property. (Bach 1997a. 228)

I reject this last claim. In Taylor (2002-b), Essay XI, I argue that so-called semantic incompleteness is possible only where there are either suppressed or explicit parameters which demand, by their very nature, the contextual assignment of a value. I call the view there defended parametric minimalism. Bach and I agree, I think, that simple, unmodified belief sentences have no hidden or explicit argument place waiting to be

filled by a contextually provided value. Here the two of us part company, I take it, with those who endorse the hidden indexical approach to belief sentences. Unlike Bach, however, I think it follows that therefore no pragmatic mechanism can make a belief sentence strictly literally say now one thing, now another, as a function of context. To reject this last inference is to reject the parametric minimalism defended in Taylor (2002-b). To accept this last inference is to accept parametric minimalism. This is not the place to settle the dispute between friend and foe of parametric minimalism. See Bach (1984) and Recanati (1993, 2001) for arguments against parametric minimalism. Recanati rejects minimalism altogether. Bach is a minimalist, but not a parametric minimalist.

<sup>11</sup> Soames (1985, 1987a, 1987b, 2001), Salmon (1986, 1989a, 1989b, 1995) and Braun (1998) are the most dogged exceptions. Soames and Salmon apparently believe that ordinary speakers themselves mistake what are really intuitions about pragmatic infelicity for intuitions about truth and falsity. Braun apparently holds that although speakers do have truth value intuitions those intuitions are mistaken. My aim here is to offer a re-diagnosis of our intuitions as intuitions about dialectical dependence/independence. To that extent, I agree with Soames and Salmon and disagree with Braun. On the other hand, although I do think that philosophers of language have by and large misdiagnosed our intuitions, I do not claim to know how “the folk” understand those intuitions. Nor do I think it matters. I am trying to understand the intuitions themselves, and what drives them. I am not trying to explain the folk theory of

those intuitions and feel no compulsion to respect that folk theory, whatever it is. The bedrock data before us is that the folk find some ascriptions acceptable in certain contexts, while finding others unacceptable. I am after a theory that explains such patterns of acceptance, not a theory which explains the folk explanation of those patterns of acceptance. Explaining the folk explanations might indeed be a very good thing to do. But it's not the same thing as explaining the bedrock data themselves.

<sup>12</sup> It is rather, one form of what Perry (2001) calls reflexive content.

<sup>13</sup> Perry (1980) offers an account of the relationship between belief and acceptance very much in the spirit of the account offered here.

<sup>14</sup> Following Grice, I distinguish violating norms of cooperativeness, perspicuousness, coherence, relevance from the flouting of such norms. Though one who flouts a norm may give the appearance of violating that norm, flouting a norm is not the same as either surreptitiously violating it or openly opting out of it. Flouting is also different from situations in which one must violate one or the other of two conflicting norms. Flouting a norm, according to Grice, is something that one does blatantly, with no intent to mislead, and where there is no apparent clash of conflicting norms. In so doing, one puts one's audience in the position of having to reconcile the open appearance of a violation with the assumption that one is, in fact, respecting the relevant norm. Conversational implicatures are generated, according to Grice, by the attempted reconciliation what is explicitly said, in apparent violation of the norms of cooperativeness, with the assumption that the cooperative principle is in fact being observed. I am not offering an alternative analysis of how conversational implicatures are generated here. My point is merely to

stress that semantically equivalent expressions need not be dialectically equivalent -- perhaps because the utterance of one may, in a given context, generate a conversational implicature that an utterance of the other would not generate.

<sup>15</sup> See Taylor (2002-a), (2002-b) and Taylor (forthcoming-a) for further discussion of attitude reports.

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