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U.S. Government (USG) response to post-conflict and disaster situations in the past
four years has been largely reactive. In the case of Iraq, early technical reconstruction
strategies were inflexible to the evolving security and political environments, and the USG
proved itself unable to adapt. For example, in the reconstruction of Iraq's electricity sector,
the USG provided combustion turbines, but did not implement any programs to ensure the consistent supply
of associated fuels. As a result, Iraq must now import costly diesel or burn crude, worth an
equivalent of up to $2B per year in potential lost income.
I am interested in strengthening the role of design thinking and technological know-how to improve
reconstruction policy and decision-making. Similar to the design of a consumer product, but more
so, errors early in reconstruction planning result in costly financial and social outcomes. Design
thinking, expanded to address political and bureaucratic constraints, has the potential to change
how governments and societies approach and work in post-conflict and disaster situations. By examining
the U.S.'s and other government's implementation of reconstruction policies, lessons can be learned to
integrate design thinking for improved responses.

K.M. Donaldson (2006), "The Challenge of Keeping Iraq's
Lights On: A Critical Look at Electricity Reconstruction" Invited paper for Stabilizing Iraq: Options
for Democracy, Security and Development Conference at the Freeman-Spogli for International Studies,
Stanford University, March 17-18, Stanford
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