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Monographs
New Thoughts about Old Things: Cognitive Policies as
the Ground of Singular Concepts
(Garland Publishing, New York 2001)
My dissertation--all about our warrant for trading on coreference...Kent
Bach's review of it for the Notre
Dame Philosophical Review.
Papers
...about Self-Knowledge:
"Elusive reasons: a problem for first-person authority"
An examination of recent social psychology's bearing on
"authorship" accounts of authority. (Philosophical Psychology vol.16, no.4, 2003) (pdf
ingenta)
"Reason and the past: the role of rationality in diachronic
self-knowledge"
Inference as the source of
self-knowledge of one's past thoughts and attitudes. (Synthese
vol.145, no.3, 467-495, 2005) (pdf springerlink)
"Knowing what
one wants"
Inference as the source of self-knowledge of desire. (Forthcoming in Philosophy&Phenomenological
Research)
"Self-knowledge of belief: seeking causes"
On the liberating effects of
self-knowledge of belief. (Forthcoming in American Imago)
...about Confusion:
"Confused thought and modes of presentation"
Defending neo-fregeanism against Ruth
Millikan's challenges (The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 55, no.218,
21-37, 2005.) (pdf
blackwell synergy)
"A notional worlds approach to confusion"
How to be an optimist when interpreting the confused subject (Mind&Language,
vol.22 no.2 April 2007 150-172.)
"Varieties of Coreference"
Invited paper for PPR symposium on Kit Fine’s Semantic Relationism (PPR,
forthcoming 2009)
...about Knowledge & Knowledge Attribution:
"Living without closure"
How we might get along even if closure
principles do not govern our epistemic lives. (Grazer Philosophische Studien,
69: 93-117, 2005) (pdf
ingenta)
"Enough is enough: pretense and invariance in the
semantics of 'knows that'"
(Philosophical Perspectives, v. 19 Epistemology
ed. John Hawthorne, 2005) (pdf blackwell synergy)
...about Memory:
"Memory, anaphora and content preservation"
Anaphoric relations among thoughts
underwrite the preservation of content when making inferences. (Philosophical
Studies vol.109: 97-119, 2002) (pdf
ingenta)
"Memory"
Invited chapter in The Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford Handbook Series (forthcoming 2009)
...about various matters
"Moore's paradox"
(With John Perry) A new take on what
makes Moorean assertion Unsatz.
This (Moore'sParadox.pdf) is a preprint of an
article whose final and definitive form will be in The Australasian
Journal of Philosophy (2008); The Australasian Journal of Philosophy
is available online at http://journalsonline.tandf.co.uk/
Work in Progress
"Knowledge as assurance"
expanding the semantic account of “Enough
is enough…”
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