

Warwick acknowledges that he has little to say about the sources of policy horizons and it is in this area that his work raises many more questions than it answers. He speculates that party supporters limit the party's ability to diverge from its stated policy commitments. The Swedish Centre Party, for example, had campaigned explicitly against the use of nuclear reactors in the previous election, limiting the party's ability to compromise with its pro-nuclear coalition partners. But "party supporters" is a generic term that may apply to voters, party activists or (most likely) both. Warwick later appears to lean toward the vote-based explanation, speculating about how parties may impose horizons on themselves in order to maintain an ideological "brand name" identity with the electorate.

If party activists are partially responsible for the existence of policy horizons, then scholars of party organization have a significant role to play in exploring the sources of policy horizons. Warwick helpfully cites Gregory Luebbert's claim that party leaders will not enter a governing coalition if they are convinced that doing so will provoke party members to revolt against the leadership. If true, a party's internal distribution of power, particularly the ability of members and activists to effectively hold the leader to account, should play an important role in determining the range of a party's policy horizons and, all other things being equal, the ability of a party to join a governing coalition.

Policy Horizons and Parliamentary Government has many strengths. It is organized and written in a methodical and thoughtful manner and will be accessible to readers not well versed in the methods of spatial modelling. Warwick is rigorous in outlining his tests of the policy horizons hypothesis, acknowledging shortcomings and describing his attempts to remedy them. But the book's most important contribution is in refining how political scientists interpret coalition negotiations and the people that participate in these negotiations. Warwick's politicians are not number crunchers calculating with furrowed brows the policy utility they can sacrifice for office before inviting retaliation from party supporters. Rather, such politicians depend on their knowledge of the party (undoubtedly aided by their experience and contacts in the different components of the party organization) and their experience from previous coalition negotiations to approximate the limit of their supporters' tolerance for policy compromise and then act within those limits.

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Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence

Jeremy M. Weinstein

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Inside Rebellion combines clear and sharp theoretical insights with multiple and well-designed methods to address an important issue and moves the debate substantially forward. How can we explain variations in violence in civil wars, particularly the targeting of civilians? Weinstein argues that the structure of opportunities at the outset of rebel mobilization dominate the movement's destiny.

Those movements that develop in the presence of significant resources, due to natural endowments or external assistance, are less rigorous in recruitment, training and discipline. Movements that lack resources must rely more on true believers and develop a variety of tactics to gain followers that lead to stronger, more coherent organizations. These different forms of organizations, respectively termed opportunist and activist, lead to very different strategies vis-à-vis the populations surrounding the movements. The origins of organizations are crucial, Weinstein argues, because they set forth processes that are path dependent. Activist organizations have to develop

good relations with the local populace upon whom they depend. Not only do opportunist organizations not need the locals as much, they cannot discipline their troops anyway, so indiscriminate violence is far more likely. While activist organizations can deteriorate in the face of government repression, the influx of resources and the like, it is much less likely that opportunist organizations can develop discipline, alter their reputation and strategies of engaging the civilians and the like. Indeed, one contribution here is to show how some starting points create tighter path dependencies than others.

Theoretically, Weinstein builds on and contributes to several literatures, including work in contentious politics on social mobilization, principal-agent theory and particularly the work on greed and grievance. This book moves beyond the argument about whether greed or grievances are more important for driving civil war to show how different kinds of funding opportunities lead to not only distinct organizational forms but varying tendencies towards civilian victimization. He shows that an abundance of funding is likely to lead to more rapacious organizations, very much akin to the resource curse in the study of state formation. He is reluctant to conclude that activist organizations are more likely to be successful; as he keenly points out, some opportunistic ones have been able to reach their stated goals. However, the logic of his approach—that opportunistic groups are likely to antagonize the locals, leading to resistance—suggests that, holding all else constant, activist organizations should be more successful. This is clearly a key implication of his work, and it would have been especially valuable had he addressed it more directly.

Weinstein focuses at first on four cases: National Resistance Army of Uganda, RENAMO of Mozambique, Sendero Luminoso Nacional and Sendero Luminoso-Huallaga of Peru. The first two represent extreme ends of the organizational spectrum as the NRA was quite poor and disciplined while RENAMO was funded by Rhodesia and later South Africa. The two variants of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) are contrasted as the main organization developed rigorous schemes of recruitment and control, while the regional organization located in the coca-growing zones became an opportunistic organization due to the development of the cocaine trade. He gets much mileage out of these cases, as he engaged in interviews with participants in each former war zone. Despite this wealth of information from these cross-continental comparisons, Weinstein goes beyond these cases, bringing in mini-comparisons from Angola (UNITA), Colombia (FARC), Nepal, and Sierra Leone. He also engages in some relatively simple but useful quantitative analyses to determine whether his findings travel beyond the first three cases. The regressions reveal outliers that Weinstein then examines a bit further, including Algeria and Lebanon.

The book ends with a series of implications for research and policy, but I would like to point to the international side of things. Weinstein considers all sources of abundant funding as essentially having the same impact, whether it is drug money, diamonds or external assistance. This would be true, perhaps, if the external supporter did not care about the behaviour of the organization. The case of RENAMO may be driving this assumption, but in other cases outsiders may actually care how their preferred combatant fights. Clifford Bob, in his book, *Marketing Rebellion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), finds that non-governmental organizations are less supportive of violent groups. Thus, the identity of the external supporter and its preferences may determine whether a rebellious organization has abundant resources or restricted ones.

Weinstein moves the debates significantly forward. There is still room to ask whether particular kinds of resources have different impacts, but now we know where to go theoretically and empirically to figure these kinds of questions out—to the organizations and their structures. This book will be required reading for any core

graduate comparative politics class as well as all classes on civil war and most on contentious politics.

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Party Movements in the United States and Canada: Strategies of Persistence

Mildred A. Schwartz

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This is an unusual book. Its subject is neither parties nor social movements, but party movements—organizations which combine the moral indignation of social movements with parties' goals of influencing elections. Students of American and Canadian parties know them as third or minor parties, given short shrift in the American literature and greater attention in Canada. Schwartz argues that party movements are underestimated. Successful or not, most persist, if not in the same organizational form, then through symbols or ideas they have generated, or in successor organizations

It is this persistence which Schwartz wants to explain. Drawing on the new social movement literature, Schwartz argues that their success and survival depends not only embedded features of the socio-political environment but on agency—the choices which party movements make. Schwartz uses organization theory to examine the persistence of party movements in four American states and four Canadian provinces which have been fertile ground for party movements. Party movements confront ongoing problems. They must maintain legitimacy, manage relations with other organizations, maintain or modify their structures, recruit and train activists, set goals and offer inducements to followers. Each one of these throws up dilemmas. Party movements cope in different ways. Schwartz argues that their responses can be grouped into six broad strategies: the formation of factions, takeovers of other organizations, purges of dissident members, mergers with parties or party movements, and abeyance—allowing the organization to lapse while waiting for better times.

Schwartz' book is based on painstaking research into party movements, some better known, others more obscure. Her book has ten chapters. The first three set the stage by introducing the problem, sketching the political histories of the eight states and provinces and the party movements they have harboured and explaining the analytical framework. Next are chapters on each of the six strategies, showing how some of party movements treated have used variants of the strategy in question in response to each of the six problems. The capstone is a concluding chapter showing how responses bear positively or negatively on outcomes.

What, then, accounts for the persistence of party movements? Schwartz has no single answer. Ultimately, the reader is left with the assertion that party movements are important and that most persist, but not in the same way. Some, like the CCF/NDP in Saskatchewan have ended up as parties in their own right; others like the Non-Partisan League in North Dakota or the Farm Labor in Minnesota merged with state Democratic parties; but still others—Social Credit in Alberta—ended up bequeathing themes which other parties later adopted. However, there is no single pattern or set of patterns which explain different levels or degrees of persistence. Instead, party movements choose between inward and outward-looking strategies, some more successful than others.

This book is not as successful as it might have been. Schwartz's preface suggests that it was a difficult book to write. Sadly, it is a difficult book to read. There is too much material crammed into too few pages. Anxious to demonstrate the utility of organization theory, Schwartz does not lay out the histories of the party movements she treats in a way that allows readers to easily understand the dilemmas faced or the