| Jowei Chen |
Assistant Professor,
Department of Political Science,
University of Michigan, 2009-
Department of Political Science,
University of Michigan, 2009-
| Contact: |
Jowei Chen
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
5700 Haven Hall
505 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045
Telephone: (917) 861-7712
Email: jowei@umich.edu
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
5700 Haven Hall
505 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045
Telephone: (917) 861-7712
Email: jowei@umich.edu
Current Research Areas
1. Vote Buying in United States Elections:
When Do Government Benefits Influence Voters' Behavior?
The Effect of FEMA Disaster Awards on US Presidential Votes. (Under Review)
Abstract: In the aftermath of the summer 2004 Florida hurricane season, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) distributed $1.2 billion in disaster aid among 2.6 million individual applications for assistance. This research measures the effect of FEMA aid on voters' election-day behavior in Democratic, moderate, and Republican neighborhoods. First, I compare precinct-level vote counts and individual voter turnout records from the post-hurricane (November 2004) and pre-hurricane (2000 and 2002) elections to measure the effect of FEMA aid on Bush's vote share. Using a two-stage least squares estimator, with hurricane severity measures as instruments for FEMA aid, this analysis reveals that core Republican voters are the most electorally responsive to FEMA aid - $7,000 produces one additional vote for Bush. By contrast, in moderate precincts, each additional Bush vote costs $21,000, while voters in Democratic neighborhoods are unresponsive to receiving FEMA aid. Hence, voters closely aligned with the incumbent party are more responsive to government benefits. Additionally, by tracking the geographic location of each aid recipient, I find that FEMA awarded disproportionately more aid to applicants from Republican neighborhoods than those from Democratic or moderate neighborhoods, even conditioning on hurricane severity, average home values, demographics, and aid applications.
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Are Poor Voters Easier to Buy Off?
A Natural Experiment from the 2004 Florida Hurricane Season. (Under Review)
Abstract:
Are poor voters easier to buy off with monetary awards than middle and upper income voters? This paper exploits detailed records on FEMA disaster aid awards to individual Florida residents in the aftermath of the summer 2004 hurricane season; FEMA distributed over $1.2 billion among 2.6 million applications for aid. By tracking the geographic location of each aid recipient and comparing precinct-level vote counts from the post-hurricane (2004) and pre-hurricane (2002) elections, I calculate the relative costs and benefits of using FEMA aid to buy off voters of varying socioeconomic classes. Using both instrumental variables regression and nearest neighbor matching, I show that poor voters are more electorally responsive to monetary transfers than middle and upper income voters: Among the poor, $11,800 of aid buys one additional vote for President Bush in the 2004 election. Among the wealthy, each new Bush vote costs $37,500.
2. The Geographic Targeting of Pork Barrel Projects:
The Law of k/n:
The Effect of Chamber Size on Government Spending in Bicameral Legislatures. (with Neil Malhotra)
American Political Science Review. Vol. 101, No. 4: p. 657-676. Abstract
Abstract:
Recent work in political economics has examined the positive relationship between legislative size and spending, which Weingast et al. (1981) formalized as the "law of 1/n." However, empirical tests of this theory have produced a pattern of divergent findings. The positive relationship between seats and spending appears to hold consistently for unicameral legislatures and for upper chambers in bicameral legislatures, but not for lower chambers. We bridge this gap between theory and empirics by extending Weingast et al.'s model to account for bicameralism in the context of a Baron-Ferejohn bargaining game. Our comparative statics predict, and empirical data from U.S. state legislatures corroborate, that the size of the upper chamber (n) is a positive predictor of expenditure, whereas the ratio of lower-to-upper chamber seats (k) exhibits a negative effect. We refer to these relationships as the "law of k/n," as the two variables influence spending in opposite directions.
Credit Sharing Among Legislators:
Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 54, No. 2.
Abstract
Abstract:
How does the electoral geography of legislative districts affect pork barreling?
This article's formal model revises and enhances Mayhew's (1974) classic credit-claiming theory to account for voters' uncertainty in assigning credit for pork projects.
Under bicameralism, every town is represented by at least two legislators. Hence, voters may be uncertain of which legislator to credit for each project, giving rise to potential free-riding among legislators.
Having more legislators who can potentially claim credit for each project exacerbates this free-riding problem and dilutes the incentive to pursue pork barreling, a result I refer to as credit sharing among legislators.
Specifically, a Senator whose district overlaps geographically with more lower chamber districts will pursue less pork spending.
To test these predictions, I analyze new data on pork barrel earmarks secured by New York State Senators from 1998 to 2006.
This analysis produces robust empirical support for the credit sharing theory.
Split Delegation Bias:
Abstract:
A substantial body of work in political economics has presumed the veracity of David Mayhew's classic theory of credit-claiming, whereby legislators enjoy electoral rewards for bringing home particularistic spending projects. However, recent empirical work has found that voters are generally unable to credit the correct legislator for each pork project, creating a research puzzle: How do parties benefit from pork spending if voters cannot properly assign credit? I revise Mayhew's classic theory to account for voter ignorance in bicameral legislatures, demonstrating that party leaders cope with voter uncertainty by directing pork away from neighborhoods represented by legislators from differing parties. I refer to this result as Split Delegation Bias, as a party leader strategically gives less pork to members whose districts overlap with the opposing party's districts. I introduce new line-item data on pork earmarks in the New York State Assembly to corroborate the formal model, using matching estimators to show that areas with Split Delegations receive 32% less pork, a difference of $4.03 per capita.