Learning to Love Globalization?
Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade

Supplement II:

What drives the Education Effect: Economic Literacy or Tolerance?

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A. Economic Literacy

As far as we are aware, the only survey that combines measures of both economic knowledge (and economic education) and attitudes toward trade is the one conducted in 1992 by William Walstad and Max Larsen for the National Center for Research on Economics Education and for Gallup (see Walstad 1997; Walstad and Rebeck 2002). Their 1992 survey of 1,500 randomly selected American adults measures trade policy preferences with the following question: "The US currently has a trade deficit. Should we limit imports from other nations to correct this deficit?"[1] To gauge "economic literacy" – the main purpose of the study – the survey asked respondents 19 different substantive economic knowledge questions, 15 of which were multiple-choice. Most of the questions (16) were definitional or conceptual in nature, gauging knowledge of how markets function rather than specific, current-events questions about developments in the economy.[2] Their aggregate measure of specialized economic knowledge (*econknowledge*) just combines the scores of individuals for all these questions, and this is the central variable used in all the analysis in Waldstad (1997) and Walstad and Rebeck (2002). Note that the 1992 survey also asked respondents separate questions about not just their highest levels of educational attainment, but also about their exposure to economics course in high school and to economics, business or accounting courses in college.

We estimated support for trade (answering no to "limits on trade") using a simple, baseline model (including the covariates *age*, *gender*, *race*, and a full set of *income dummies*) and then a specification with a more extensive set of covariates (also adding a full set of *area dummies*, and dummies for *party identification*). In each case we examined the effects of introducing the *econknowledge* variable on the magnitude of the education effect on attitudes about trade. We analyzed the full sample, but also split respondents into different sub-samples depending upon their employment status (matching as closely as possible our analysis of the NES and ISSP data in the paper). Table S1 summarizes the results.

[Table S1]

It is very clear that, once the measure of specialized economic knowledge is included in the estimations, the effects of the standard measures of education on support for trade shrink dramatically in magnitude, and none of these effects remains statistically significant. Economic literacy appears to account for most of the "raw" impact of education on attitudes about trade.

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[1] A second part of the question asks whether, in light of the trade deficit, the US should "ask other nations to reduce their exports to the US to correct the deficit?" See Walstad and Larsen (1992), p.72.
[2] See Walstad (1997) and Walstad and Rebeck (2002) for a full discussion of the particular questions.

The magnitude of the effect of economic knowledge is remarkable, despite the fact that we control for education. For example, based on the full sample estimations in the limited covariate set (model 2, panel A), going from the lowest to the highest level of economic knowledge (i.e. zero to all economic literacy questions answered correctly) is associated with a 0.53 (s.e. 0.09) increase in the expected probability of being pro-trade (that is holding the other covariates at their respective sample means).

Also very interestingly, when we split the sample according to whether people are currently employed or not, we find that the estimated effect of economic knowledge is almost identical across the models. For example, again based on the limited covariate set but this time looking only at the sub-sample of those currently employed (model 3, panel A), going from the lowest to the highest level of economic knowledge is associated with a 0.52 (s.e. 0.10) increase in the expected probability of being pro-trade. The respective increase for those currently not employed (model 4, panel A) is estimated to be 0.46 (s.e. 0.15). None these effects across sub-samples is significantly different from each other – the confidence intervals overlap by wide margins.

B. Tolerance

We conducted a parallel set of tests to see whether measures of relevant cultural values (e.g. tolerance, cosmopolitanism) might also be able account for some large part of the effects of education on views about trade. We first simply re-estimated the models for the 1992 NES data using both the limited and the extensive set of covariates – see Table S2.

[Table S2]

Then to each model we added the core measures of tolerance or cosmopolitanism (or their opposites) one-by-one. These various measures are described in Table S3.

[Table S3]

The results suggest that adding these measures of commitments to tolerance does not affect the impact of education at all (see Tables S4-S7). That is, such measures of values, while themselves often appearing to be significant determinants of views about trade, actually seem to account for none of the a priori impact of education on trade policy preferences. The coefficients and standard errors on both schooling and the education dummies remain virtually identical to the baseline estimates (shown in Table S3), regardless of which tolerance proxy we included.

[Tables S4-S7]

Table S1: Does Economic Literacy Account for the Education Effect?

Survey:	Waldstad America Economic Literacy (AEL) Dataset 1992			
DV	*Trade_Opinion* (1=Don't limit imports from other countries, 0 =Limit imports from other countries)			
Mean	0.32			
SD	0.46			
Sub Sample	*Full Sample*	*Full Sample*	*Currently employed*	*Currently not employed*
Model No.[1]	1	2	3	4
PANEL A: Limited Set of Covars[2]				
HIGH SCHOOL	0.014	-0.034	-0.095	-0.006
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.087)	(0.074)
SOME COLLEGE	0.042	-0.038	-0.094	0.036
	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.085)	(0.087)
COLLEGE GRAD	0.114*	0.004	-0.072	0.162
	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.089)	(0.126)
POST-GRAD	0.239***	0.083	0.016	0.237
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.102)	(0.155)
ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE		0.036***	0.037***	0.033***
		(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Observations	934	934	633	299
Log likelihood	-542.49	-524.77	-365.71	-148.77
Pseudo R-squared	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.12
PANEL B: Extensive Set of Covars[3]				
HIGH SCHOOL	0.011	-0.036	-0.099	-0.007
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.087)	(0.073)
SOME COLLEGE	0.036	-0.042	-0.098	0.022
	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.085)	(0.087)
COLLEGE GRAD	0.102	-0.006	-0.082	0.152
	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.124)
POST-GRAD	0.238***	0.083	0.023	0.189
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.104)	(0.155)
ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE		0.036***	0.037***	0.033***
		(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Observations	934	934	633	299
Log likelihood	-537.29	-520.25	-362.56	-146.47
Pseudo R-squared	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.13

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x_k$), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1), given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (x_k), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.10$ ** $p<0.05$ *** $p<0.01$. Each model includes a full set of controls of the respective covariates set (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by the respective AEL sample weight (wt).
2. Limited Set of Covariates includes age, gender, race, and a full set of income dummies.
3. Extensive Set of Covariates includes age, gender, race, income dummies, a full set of area dummies, and dummies for party identification. For details of variables see Waldstad 1997.

Table S2: Baseline 1992 NES Models

Survey	NES 1992							
DV Mean DV SD DV	*Trade_Opinion (1=Favor Protectionism, 0=Otherwise)* 0.67 0.46							
Sub-sample	*Full Sample*	*Currently in Paid-Work*	*Currently not in Paid-Work*	*Retired*	*Full Sample*	*Currently in Paid-Work*	*Currently not in Paid-Work*	*Retired*
Model No.[1]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
PANEL A: Limited Set of Covariates[2]								
Schooling	-0.048***	-0.056***	-0.031***	-0.028**				
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)				
Junior High					-0.024	0.028	-0.056	-0.029
					(0.087)	(0.154)	(0.100)	(0.131)
High School					0.028	0.051	0.016	0.070
					(0.047)	(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.091)
Higher Education					-0.109**	-0.113	-0.079	-0.072
					(0.051)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.122)
College					-0.317***	-0.289***	-0.355***	-0.398***
					(0.053)	(0.073)	(0.098)	(0.132)
Graduate					-0.315***	-0.305***	-0.259**	-0.134
					(0.061)	(0.081)	(0.113)	(0.149)
Observations	1604	1048	556	227	1563	1021	542	217
Log likelihood	-962.64	-646.24	-308.66	-128.20	-922.08	-621.46	-293.76	-114.85
Pseudo R-squared	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.11
PANEL B: Extensive Set of Covariates[3]								
Schooling	-0.049***	-0.057***	-0.032***	-0.025**				
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)				
Junior High					-0.026	0.010	-0.076	-0.003
					(0.098)	(0.165)	(0.122)	(0.131)
High School					0.041	0.072	0.028	0.099
					(0.050)	(0.078)	(0.062)	(0.092)
Higher Education					-0.097*	-0.098	-0.057	-0.070
					(0.055)	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.124)
College					-0.298***	-0.260***	-0.342***	-0.347**
					(0.058)	(0.083)	(0.103)	(0.142)
Graduate					-0.301***	-0.286***	-0.234**	-0.071
					(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.115)	(0.146)
Observations	1501	989	512	213	1463	964	499	203
Log likelihood	-892.72	-604.92	-277.42	-117.09	-856.56	-581.61	-264.24	-104.87
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.13

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x_k$), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1), given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (x_k), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.10$ ** $p<0.05$ *** $p<0.01$. Each model includes a full set of controls of the respective covariates set (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by the respective NES sample weight (v923008).
2. Limited Set of Covariates includes age, gender, and race.
3. Extensive Set of Covariates includes age, gender, race, union membership, party identification, and ideology. For details of variables see Scheve and Slaughter 2001a/b.

Table S3: NES Tolerance Proxies[1]

Variable Name	Question	Coded
TRUEAMERICAN	"Some people say that there are certain qualities that make a person a true American. Others say that there isn't anything that makes one person more American than another. I'm going to read some of the things that have been mentioned. For each of the following, tell me how important you think it is in making someone a true American -- extremely important, very (important), somewhat (important), or not at all important." Item: "Speaking English?"	1 extremely important; 2 very important; 3 somewhat important; 4 not important at all
TREATEQUAL	Same as above, but item: "Treating people of all races and backgrounds equally?"	Same as above
ETHNO_DISTINCT	"Some people say that it is better for America if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct cultures. Others say that it is better if groups change so that they blend into the larger society as in the idea of a melting pot. Which of these positions comes closer to your own opinion: Racial and ethnic groups should maintain their distinct cultures, or groups should change so that they blend into the larger society?" Note that we recode the answers to this question into a set of dummies ETHNO_DISTINCT and ETHNO_BLEND (the reference category here are those that answered the middle category "neither"	1 "Racial and ethnic groups should maintain their distinct cultures"; 0 Otherwise
ETHNO_BLEND	Same as above	1 "groups should change so that they blend into the larger society"; 0 Otherwise
ADJUSTVALUES	"Here are several more statements. As before, you can just give me the number of your choice from the booklet. The first statement is: The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes."	1 agree strongly; 2 agree somewhat; 3 neither agree or disagree; 4 somewhat disagree; 5 disagree strongly

1 Note that for all tolerance proxies, the missing or refused answers are coded as missing.

Table S4: TRUEAMERICAN

Survey	NES 1992							
DV Mean DV SD DV	Trade_Opinion (1=Favor Protectionism, 0=Otherwise) 0.67 0.46							
Sub-sample	*Full Sample*	*Currently in Paid-Work*	*Currently not in Paid-Work*	*Retired*	*Full Sample*	*Currently in Paid-Work*	*Currently not in Paid-Work*	*Retired*
Model No.[1]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
PANEL A: Limited Set of Covariates[2]								
TRUEAMERICAN	-0.023*	-0.014	-0.034	0.028	-0.017	-0.005	-0.036*	0.054
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.043)
Schooling	-0.048***	-0.055***	-0.033***	-0.028***				
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)				
Junior High					-0.022	0.027	-0.054	-0.039
					(0.088)	(0.154)	(0.103)	(0.131)
High School					-0.117**	-0.114	-0.092	-0.076
					(0.051)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.122)
Higher Education					0.022	0.049	0.008	0.068
					(0.047)	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.090)
College					-0.319***	-0.287***	-0.364***	-0.432***
					(0.054)	(0.074)	(0.099)	(0.126)
Graduate					-0.312***	-0.299***	-0.266**	-0.129
					(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.113)	(0.149)
Observations	1596	1043	553	227	1555	1016	539	217
Log likelihood	-954.12	-643.34	-303.15	-127.93	-915.92	-619.18	-288.99	-114.05
Pseudo R-squared	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.11
PANEL B: Extensive Set of Covariates[3]								
TRUEAMERICAN	-0.029**	-0.023	-0.037*	0.036	-0.024*	-0.012	-0.041*	0.062
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.043)
Schooling	-0.048***	-0.055***	-0.031***	-0.026**				
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)				
Junior High					-0.018	0.008	-0.059	-0.014
					(0.099)	(0.165)	(0.123)	(0.133)
High School					-0.097*	-0.098	-0.053	-0.078
					(0.055)	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.125)
Higher Education					0.042	0.071	0.035	0.097
					(0.050)	(0.078)	(0.062)	(0.092)
College					-0.291***	-0.255***	-0.330***	-0.390***
					(0.058)	(0.083)	(0.104)	(0.139)
Graduate					-0.288***	-0.276***	-0.222*	-0.065
					(0.066)	(0.091)	(0.114)	(0.145)
Observations	1494	984	510	213	1456	959	497	203
Log likelihood	-885.82	-601.43	-274.33	-116.71	-851.22	-579.05	-261.24	-103.94
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.14

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x_k$), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1), given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (x_k), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.10$ ** $p<0.05$ *** $p<0.01$. Each model includes a full set of controls of the respective covariates set (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by the respective NES sample weight (v923008).
2. Limited Set of Covariates includes age, gender, and race.
3. Extensive Set of Covariates includes age, gender, race, union membership, party identification, and ideology. For details of variables see Scheve and Slaughter 2001a/b.

Table S5: TREATEQUAL

Survey	NES 1992							
DV Mean DV SD DV	Trade_Opinion (1=Favor Protectionism, 0=Otherwise) 0.67 0.46							
Sub-sample	Full Sample	Currently in Paid-Work	Currently not in Paid-Work	Retired	Full Sample	Currently in Paid-Work	Currently not in Paid-Work	Retired
Model No.[1]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
PANEL A: Limited Set of Covariates[2]								
TREATEQUAL	0.007	0.039	-0.055*	0.004	0.011	0.047*	-0.061**	-0.014
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.045)
Schooling	-0.047***	-0.057***	-0.031***	-0.028**				
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)				
Junior High					-0.022	0.030	-0.073	-0.032
					(0.086)	(0.153)	(0.104)	(0.133)
High School					-0.111**	-0.116	-0.087	-0.069
					(0.051)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.123)
Higher Education					0.030	0.056	0.014	0.072
					(0.046)	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.090)
College					-0.316***	-0.288***	-0.353***	-0.399***
					(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.098)	(0.132)
Graduate					-0.311***	-0.302***	-0.267**	-0.135
					(0.061)	(0.081)	(0.112)	(0.149)
Observations	1598	1043	555	227	1557	1016	541	217
Log likelihood	-958.74	-641.52	-306.45	-128.19	-918.15	-616.19	-291.25	-114.80
Pseudo R-squared	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.11
PANEL B: Extensive Set of Covariates[3]								
TREATEQUAL	0.012	0.041*	-0.051*	0.004	0.015	0.050*	-0.056*	-0.013
	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.048)
Schooling	-0.049***	-0.057***	-0.031***	-0.025**				
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)				
Junior High					-0.023	0.014	-0.091	-0.006
					(0.097)	(0.163)	(0.126)	(0.133)
High School					-0.100*	-0.102	-0.064	-0.067
					(0.055)	(0.083)	(0.070)	(0.124)
Higher Education					0.041	0.075	0.024	0.101
					(0.050)	(0.077)	(0.063)	(0.091)
College					-0.296***	-0.258***	-0.340***	-0.347**
					(0.058)	(0.083)	(0.102)	(0.142)
Graduate					-0.296***	-0.284***	-0.241**	-0.071
					(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.115)	(0.146)
Observations	1496	985	511	213	1458	960	498	203
Log likelihood	-889.82	-601.29	-275.79	-117.08	-853.82	-577.55	-262.35	-104.83
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.13

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x_k$), i.e. the marginal effect on $\Pr(y=1)$, given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (x_k), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.10$ ** $p<0.05$ *** $p<0.01$. Each model includes a full set of controls of the respective covariates set (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by the respective NES sample weight (v923008).
2. Limited Set of Covariates includes age, gender, and race.
3. Extensive Set of Covariates includes age, gender, race, union membership, party identification, and ideology. For details of variables see Scheve and Slaughter 2001a/b.

Table S6: ETHNO

Survey	NES 1992							
DV Mean DV SD DV	*Trade_Opinion (1=Favor Protectionism, 0=Otherwise)* 0.67 0.46							
Sub-sample	*Full Sample*	*Currently in Paid-Work*	*Currently not in Paid-Work*	*Retired*	*Full Sample*	*Currently in Paid-Work*	*Currently not in Paid-Work*	*Retired*
Model No.[1]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
PANEL A: Limited Set of Covariates[2]								
ETHNO_DISTINCT	0.023	-0.012	0.076	-0.003	0.041	0.002	0.087	0.029
	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.113)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.112)
ETHNO_BLEND	-0.013	-0.069	0.083	0.088	-0.005	-0.060	0.076	0.097
	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.096)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.098)
Schooling	-0.048***	-0.057***	-0.029***	-0.028**				
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)				
Junior High					-0.046	0.029	-0.093	-0.028
					(0.089)	(0.154)	(0.105)	(0.128)
High School					-0.111**	-0.113	-0.087	-0.079
					(0.051)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.122)
Higher Education					0.020	0.051	0.001	0.060
					(0.047)	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.092)
College					-0.323***	-0.293***	-0.327***	-0.394***
					(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.104)	(0.140)
Graduate					-0.322***	-0.314***	-0.253**	-0.123
					(0.062)	(0.081)	(0.114)	(0.151)
Observations	1574	1029	545	223	1535	1004	531	213
Log likelihood	-941.95	-632.94	-298.26	-126.14	-902.67	-609.17	-284.25	-113.02
Pseudo R-squared	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.11
PANEL B: Extensive Set of Covariates[3]								
ETHNO_DISTINCT	0.028	-0.010	0.095*	0.025	0.044	-0.000	0.107*	0.046
	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.121)	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.120)
ETHNO_BLEND	-0.009	-0.055	0.080	0.088	-0.001	-0.050	0.080	0.096
	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.103)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.104)
Schooling	-0.049***	-0.057***	-0.028***	-0.025**				
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)				
Junior High					-0.034	0.016	-0.097	-0.003
					(0.098)	(0.164)	(0.123)	(0.126)
High School					-0.096*	-0.099	-0.054	-0.080
					(0.055)	(0.082)	(0.070)	(0.124)
Higher Education					0.038	0.073	0.021	0.087
					(0.051)	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.092)
College					-0.300***	-0.264***	-0.300***	-0.341**
					(0.058)	(0.082)	(0.108)	(0.153)
Graduate					-0.302***	-0.292***	-0.214*	-0.065
					(0.066)	(0.090)	(0.115)	(0.147)
Observations	1481	974	507	213	1445	951	494	203
Log likelihood	-877.60	-594.40	-270.84	-116.42	-842.71	-572.38	-257.88	-104.27
Pseudo R-squared	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.14

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x_k$), i.e. the marginal effect on $Pr(y=1)$, given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (x_k), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.10$ ** $p<0.05$ *** $p<0.01$. Each model includes a full set of controls of the respective covariates set (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by the respective NES sample weight (v923008).
2. Limited Set of Covariates includes age, gender, and race.
3. Extensive Set of Covariates includes age, gender, race, union membership, party identification, and ideology. For details of variables see Scheve and Slaughter 2001a/b.

Table S7: ADJUSTVALUES

Survey	NES 1992							
DV Mean DV SD DV	Trade_Opinion (1=Favor Protectionism, 0=Otherwise) 0.67 0.46							
Sub-sample	*Full Sample*	*Currently in Paid-Work*	*Currently not in Paid-Work*	*Retired*	*Full Sample*	*Currently in Paid-Work*	*Currently not in Paid-Work*	*Retired*
Model No.[1]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
PANEL A: Limited Set of Covariates[2]								
ADJUSTVALUES	-0.011	-0.008	-0.013	-0.042*	-0.011	-0.010	-0.011	-0.030
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Schooling	-0.051***	-0.059***	-0.033***	-0.027**				
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)				
Junior High					-0.019	0.041	-0.059	-0.015
					(0.093)	(0.175)	(0.104)	(0.140)
High School					-0.117**	-0.110	-0.100	-0.049
					(0.053)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.125)
Higher Education					0.045	0.076	0.026	0.110
					(0.048)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.088)
College					-0.317***	-0.284***	-0.351***	-0.385***
					(0.056)	(0.077)	(0.104)	(0.138)
Graduate					-0.326***	-0.310***	-0.257**	-0.093
					(0.064)	(0.084)	(0.117)	(0.153)
Observations	1463	951	512	207	1427	929	498	197
Log likelihood	-872.92	-586.10	-278.31	-113.53	-836.00	-563.68	-264.50	-100.33
Pseudo R-squared	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.13
PANEL B: Extensive Set of Covariates[3]								
ADJUSTVALUES	-0.004	0.001	-0.009	-0.036	-0.005	-0.002	-0.008	-0.025
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.024)
Schooling	-0.053***	-0.060***	-0.034***	-0.028**				
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)				
Junior High					0.004	0.015	-0.032	0.058
					(0.104)	(0.189)	(0.117)	(0.117)
High School					-0.103*	-0.105	-0.068	-0.040
					(0.057)	(0.087)	(0.070)	(0.123)
Higher Education					0.058	0.088	0.043	0.132
					(0.052)	(0.082)	(0.063)	(0.087)
College					-0.298***	-0.263***	-0.332***	-0.347**
					(0.060)	(0.087)	(0.108)	(0.149)
Graduate					-0.310***	-0.296***	-0.228*	-0.034
					(0.068)	(0.094)	(0.119)	(0.146)
Observations	1372	898	474	197	1338	877	461	187
Log likelihood	-810.19	-548.02	-252.28	-103.21	-776.81	-526.55	-240.08	-90.75
Pseudo R-squared	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.16

1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects ($\partial F/\partial x_k$), i.e. the marginal effect on $Pr(y=1)$, given a unit increase in the value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (x_k), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p<0.10$ ** $p<0.05$ *** $p<0.01$. Each model includes a full set of controls of the respective covariates set (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by the respective NES sample weight (v923008).
2. Limited Set of Covariates includes age, gender, and race.
3. Extensive Set of Covariates includes age, gender, race, union membership, party identification, and ideology. For details of variables see Scheve and Slaughter 2001a/b.