ILYA R SEGAL, ECONOMICS, STANFORD

Ilya R. Segal

Department of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel. (650) 724-4905
Ilya.Segal@stanford.edu
http://www.stanford.edu/~isegal/

Academic Positions

· 2002 – present: Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University (Courtesy appointment, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2004-present)

· 1999 – 2002: Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University

· 1995 – 1998: Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley

Visiting Positions

· Visiting Researcher, Microsoft Research Silicon Valley, Summer 2008

· Member, The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, 2002-2003

· John Stauffer National Fellow in Public Policy, Hoover Institution, 1998 – 1999

· Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fall 1995

Education

· Harvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1995. Advisors: Eric Maskin, Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer

· Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, M.S., Applied Mathematics, 1991

Research and Teaching Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory, Industrial Organization, Theory of the Firm

Honors, Awards, Grants

· 2008 Compass Lexecon Prize for “the most significant contribution to the understanding and implementation of competition policy” (joint with Michael Whinston)

· Toulouse Network on Information Technology, Member, 2005-present

· Econometric Society Fellow, elected in 2003

· John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2002-2003

· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship, 1999-2001

· National Science Foundation Research Grants 1998-2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2005, 2004-2006, 2010-2012

· Review of Economic Studies European Meetings, 1995

· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Dissertation Fellow, 1994-95

· Pew Foundation Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, 1991-92

Publications (in PDF)

Refereed Journal Articles

“A Simple Status Quo that Ensures Participation (with Application to Efficient Bargaining),” with Michael Whinston, Theoretical Economics 6(1), 2011, pp. 109-125
“Optimal Information Disclosure,” with Luis Rayo, Journal of Political Economy 118(5), 2010, pp. 949-987
“Nash Implementation with Little Communication,” Theoretical Economics 5(1), 2010, pp.51-71
“The Communication Cost of Selfishness,” with Ronald Fadel, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 2009, pp. 1895-920
“Antitrust in Innovative Industries,” with Michael Whinston, American Economic Review 97(5), 2007, pp. 1703-1730
“The Communication Requirements of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets,” Journal of Economic Theory 136, September 2007, pp. 341-378
“Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication,” with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 28, March 2007, pp. 233-266

· “The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices,” with Noam Nisan, Journal of Economic Theory 129(1), July 2006, pp. 192-224

· “Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities,” with Michael Whinston, Econometrica, 71(3) 2003, pp. 757-791

· “Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand,” American Economic Review 93(3), 2003, pp. 509-529

· “Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining,” Review of Economic Studies 70(2), 2003, pp. 439-460

· “Coordination and Discrimination in Contracting with Externalities: Divide and Conquer?” Journal of Economic Theory 113(2), 2003, pp. 147-181

· “Communication Complexity and Coordination by Authority,” Advances in Theoretical Economics, forthcoming

· “Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets,” with Paul Milgrom, Econometrica 70(2), 2002, pp. 583-601

· “The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing),” with Michael Whinston, Econometrica 70(1), 2002, pp. 1-45

· “Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments,” with Michael Whinston, RAND Journal of Economics 31(4), 2000, pp. 603-633

· “Naked Exclusion: Comment,” with Michael Whinston, American Economic Review 90(1), 2000, pp. 296-309

· “Contracting with Externalities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), 1999, pp. 337-388

· “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 1999, pp. 57-82

· “Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint,” RAND Journal of Economics 29(3), Autumn 1998, pp. 596-609

Refereed Conference Proceedings

· “Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries," with Noam Nisan, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 158-164

· “The Communication Cost of Selfishness: Ex Post Implementation,” with Ronald Fadel, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 165-76

· “Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication," with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan, European Symposium on Algorithms, September 2003, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2832 Springer 2003, ISBN 3-540-20064-9

Invited Contributions

“Property Rights,” with Michael Whinston, Handbook of Organizational Economics, ed. by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, Princeton University Press, 2012

· Designing Dynamic Mechanisms, with Susan Athey, in American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 97(2), May 2007, pp. 131-6

· Communication in Economic Mechanisms, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs), ed. by Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey, and Torsten Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006

· Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems, in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006

Other Publications

· “Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey,” European Competition Law Review, 2007, 323-32

· Solutions Manual for “Microeconomic Theory” by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green , 1996, with Chiaki Hara and Steve Tadelis, Oxford University Press

Working Papers

“Property Rights and the Efficiency of Bargaining,” with Michael Whinston, August 2012
“What Makes them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Internet Search Advertising,” with Przemyslaw Jeziorski, February 2009
“Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization, and Information Disclosure,” with Alessandro Pavan and Juuso Toikka, revised August 2011
“An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism,” with Susan Athey, 2006, revised August 2012

Selected Invited Lectures

· Keynote Speaker, Southern California Symposium on Network and Game Theory, 2012

· Semi-Plenary Speaker, 4^th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Istanbul, 2012

· Lecturer, Summer Schools in Economic Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007 and 2012

· Invited Speaker, North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, Evanston, 2012

· Invited Speaker, Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Rio de Janeiro, 2008

· Invited Speaker, 9^th World Congress of the Econometric Society, London, 2005

Professional Service

· Review of Economic Studies, Foreign Editor, 2010-present

· National Science Foundation Economics Panel, 2008-2010

· Program Committee, Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposia, BAGT1-BAGT4, 2006-2009

· B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics, Editor, 1999-2005

· American Economic Review Editorial Board, 2002-2005

· RAND Journal of Economics, Associate Editor, 1998-2006

· Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2003-2005

· Program Committee, North American Meetings of the Econometric Society, 2002 (Winter), 2004 (Winter), 2004 (Summer)

· Program Committee, 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society, August 2000

· Program Committee, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, 2008, 2012

· Program Committee, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge IX, 2003

· Segment Organizer, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004

· Organizer, Workshop on Multiparty Contracting, European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee, July 2000

· Director of Graduate Studies, Economics Department, 2005-2011

· Stanford University Committee on Libraries, 2004-2007

· Chair of Graduate Admissions, Economics Department, Stanford University, 2004-2005

Languages: Bilingual Russian - English, fluent in Ukrainian, basic knowledge of French

Last Modified: January 3, 2013