Ilya R. Segal

Department of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel. (650) 724-4905
Ilya.Segal@stanford.edu
  http://www.stanford.edu/~isegal/

Academic Positions

· 2002 – present:     Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University (Courtesy appointment, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2004-present)

· 1999 – 2002:        Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University

· 1995 – 1998:        Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley

· Fall 1995:             Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Education

· Harvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1995. Advisors: Eric Maskin, Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer

· Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, M.S., Applied Mathematics, 1991

Research and Teaching Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory, Industrial Organization, Theory of the Firm

Honors, Awards, Grants

· Toulouse Network on Information Technology, Member, 2005-present

· Econometric Society Fellow, elected in 2003

· John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellow, 2002-2003

· The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton Member, 2002-2003

· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Research Fellow, 1999-2001

· John Stauffer National Fellow in Public Policy, Hoover Institution, 1998 – 1999

· National Science Foundation Research Grants 1998-2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2005, 2004-2006

· Review of Economic Studies European Meetings, 1995

· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Dissertation Fellow, 1994-95

· Pew Foundation Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, 1991-92

· Second Prize, the U.S.S.R. National Physics Competition, June 1985

Publications (available in PDF)

Refereed Journal Articles    

·   “The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices,” with Noam Nisan, Journal of Economic Theory 129(1), July 2006, pp. 192-224

·        “Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities,” with Michael Whinston, Econometrica, 71(3) May 2003, pp. 757-791

·   “Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand,” American Economic Review 93(3) June 2003, pp. 509-529

·    “Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining,” Review of Economic Studies 70(2) April 2003, pp. 439-460

·    “Coordination and Discrimination in Contracting with Externalities: Divide and Conquer?” Journal of Economic Theory 113(2) December 2003, pp. 147-181

·    “Communication Complexity and Coordination by Authority,” Advances in Theoretical Economics, forthcoming

·    “Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets,” with Paul Milgrom, Econometrica 70(2), March 2002, pp. 583-601

·    “The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing),” with Michael Whinston, Econometrica 70(1), January 2002, pp. 1-45

·    “Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments,” with Michael Whinston, RAND Journal of Economics 31(4), Winter 2000, pp. 603-633

·    “Naked Exclusion: Comment,” with Michael Whinston, American Economic Review 90(1), 2000, pp. 296-309

·    “Contracting with Externalities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), May 1999, pp. 337-388

·    “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies 66(1), January 1999, pp. 57-82

·    “Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint,” RAND Journal of Economics 29(3), Autumn 1998, pp. 596-609

Refereed Conference Proceedings

·        “Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries," with Noam Nisan, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005

·    “The Communication Cost of Selfishness: Ex Post Implementation,” with Ronald Fadel, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005

·        “Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication," with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan, European Symposium on Algorithms, September 2003, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2832 Springer 2003, ISBN 3-540-20064-9

Invited Contributions

·    Designing Dynamic Mechanisms, with Susan Athey, in American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 97(2), May 2007

·    Communication in Economic Mechanisms, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs), ed. by Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey, and Torsten Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006

·    Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems, in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006

Other Publications

·    Solutions Manual for “Microeconomic Theory” by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green , 1996, with Chiaki Hara and Steve Tadelis, Oxford University Press

Recent Working Papers

Editorial Service

· B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics, Editor, 1999-2005

· American Economic Review Editorial Board, 2002-2005

· RAND Journal of Economics, Associate Editor, 1998-present

Conference Organization

· Program Committee, Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposia, BAGT1-BAGT4, 2006-present

· Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2003-2005

· Program Committee, North American Meetings of the Econometric Society, 2002 (Winter), 2004 (Winter), 2004 (Summer)

· Program Committee, 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society, August 2000

· Program Committee, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003

· Program Committee, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge IX, 2003

· Segment Organizer, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004

· Organizer, Workshop on Multiparty Contracting, European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee, July 2000

Committee Service

· Director of Graduate Studies, Economics Department, 2005-present

· Stanford University Committee on Libraries, 2004-present

· Chair of Graduate Admissions, Economics Department, Stanford University, 2004-2005

Languages: Bilingual Russian - English, fluent in Ukrainian, basic knowledge of French 

Last Modified: December 5, 2007