Ilya R. Segal
Department of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel. (650) 724-4905
Ilya.Segal@stanford.edu
http://www.stanford.edu/~isegal/
Academic Positions
· 2002 present: Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University (Courtesy appointment, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2004-present)
· 1999 2002: Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University
· 1995 1998: Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley
Visiting Positions
· Visiting
Researcher, Microsoft
Research Silicon Valley, Summer 2008
· Member, The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, 2002-2003
· John Stauffer
National Fellow in Public Policy,
· Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fall 1995
Education
· Harvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1995. Advisors: Eric Maskin, Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer
· Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, M.S., Applied Mathematics, 1991
Research and Teaching Interests
Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory, Industrial Organization, Theory of the Firm
Honors, Awards, Grants
· 2008
Compass Lexecon Prize for the most significant contribution to the
understanding and implementation of competition policy (joint with Michael
Whinston)
· Toulouse Network on Information
Technology, Member, 2005-present
· Econometric Society
Fellow, elected in 2003
· John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2002-2003
· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship, 1999-2001
· National Science Foundation Research Grants 1998-2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2005, 2004-2006
· Review of Economic Studies European Meetings, 1995
· Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Dissertation Fellow, 1994-95
· Pew Foundation Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, 1991-92
· Second Prize, the U.S.S.R. National Physics Competition, June 1985
Publications (in PDF)
Refereed Journal Articles
· The Communication
Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices, with
· Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities, with Michael Whinston, Econometrica, 71(3) May 2003, pp. 757-791
· Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand, American Economic Review 93(3) June 2003, pp. 509-529
· Collusion, Exclusion, and
Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining, Review of Economic Studies 70(2) April 2003, pp. 439-460
· Coordination and
Discrimination in Contracting with Externalities: Divide and Conquer?
· Communication Complexity and Coordination by Authority, Advances in Theoretical Economics, forthcoming
· Envelope Theorems for
Arbitrary Choice Sets, with Paul Milgrom,
Econometrica 70(2), March 2002,
pp. 583-601
· The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing), with Michael Whinston, Econometrica 70(1), January 2002, pp. 1-45
· Exclusive Contracts
and Protection of Investments, with
· Naked Exclusion: Comment, with Michael Whinston, American Economic Review 90(1), 2000, pp. 296-309
· Contracting with Externalities, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), May 1999, pp. 337-388
· Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts, Review of Economic Studies 66(1), January 1999, pp. 57-82
· Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint, RAND Journal of Economics 29(3), Autumn 1998, pp. 596-609
Refereed
Conference Proceedings
· Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries," with Noam Nisan, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 158-164
· The Communication Cost of Selfishness: Ex Post
Implementation, with Ronald Fadel, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality
and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 165-76
· Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication," with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan, European Symposium on Algorithms, September 2003, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2832 Springer 2003, ISBN 3-540-20064-9
Invited
Contributions
· Designing Dynamic
Mechanisms, with Susan Athey, in
American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings, 97(2), May 2007, pp. 131-6
· Communication in Economic Mechanisms, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs), ed. by Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey, and Torsten Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006
· Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems, in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006
Other
Publications
· Solutions Manual for
Microeconomic Theory by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green , 1996, with
Chiaki Hara and Steve Tadelis,
Recent Working Papers
Professional Service
· RAND Journal of Economics, Associate Editor, 1998-present
· National Science Foundation Economics Panel, 2008-present
· Program
Committee, Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposia, BAGT1-BAGT4,
2006-present
· B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics, Editor, 1999-2005
· American Economic Review Editorial Board, 2002-2005
· Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2003-2005
· Program Committee, North American Meetings of the Econometric Society, 2002 (Winter), 2004 (Winter), 2004 (Summer)
· Program Committee, 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society, August 2000
· Program Committee, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, 2008
· Program Committee, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge IX, 2003
· Segment Organizer, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004
· Organizer, Workshop on Multiparty Contracting, European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee, July 2000
· Director of Graduate
Studies, Economics Department, 2005-present
·
· Chair
of Graduate Admissions, Economics Department, Stanford University, 2004-2005
Languages: Bilingual Russian - English, fluent in Ukrainian, basic knowledge of French
Last Modified: October 13, 2009