Media and Intraparty Ideological Movements: How Fox News Built the Tea Party

Online Appendix

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Contents

A. Data Construction Details

We use a variety of data sources in our empirical analysis. First, we draw on several data sets to construct variables related to media exposure or media programming. Through the Lexis-Nexis database, we obtain broadcast transcripts for the three major cable news outlets during our period of study–namely, CNN, FNC, and MSNBC–by downloading all transcripts for each identifiable cable news program for each of these channels in 2009 and 2010. Also, following Martin and Yurukoglu (2017), we rely on the Nielsen FOCUS database to measure channel lineups by zip code-year. For each cable system and year, the database records the availability and channel positions of CNN, FNC, and MSNBC as well as the zip codes served by said system. In addition, to acquire data on viewership by channel, we rely on Nielsen Local TV (NLTV) database for daily ratings for CNN, FNC, and MSNBC by county, which are constructed based on Nielsen's survey of a rotating panel of households.

To shed light on how channel positions influence individual FNC viewership, we analyze MediaMark Research's Survey of the American Consumer from 2001 and 2009, which provides rolling cross-sectional questionnaires on media consumption, demographics, and political activities. Specifically, we examine two sets of variables: 1) self-reported viewership (both binary and in binned hours) of FNC, CNN, and MSNBC within a week prior to a respondent's interview date; and 2) self-reported race and ethnicity, gender, age group, household income category, educational attainment, and left-right ideology.

To identify Republican candidates with affiliation to the Tea Party movement, we follow Skocpol and Williamson (2012) and focus on House Republican candidates in 2010. Among these candidates, we identify 173 of them as Tea Party candidates based on their membership in the House Tea Party Caucus (48), or endorsements from Tea Party-affiliated activist organizations such as FreedomWorks, Tea Party Express, Tea Party Nation, and the Independence Caucus during the 2010 midterm elections (138).[1]

[1]Endorsement data originate from Zernike et al. (2010).

Among these Tea Party candidates, 40 of them were founding members of the House Tea Party Caucus in 2010. We can thus construct a measure of the extent to which cable news content resembled the congressional speeches given by these Tea Party-affiliated members of Congress during the same election cycle. To this end, we downloaded the 2009-2010 Congressional Record from the US Government Publishing Office's website (`http://gpo.gov`).

For our analysis of the impact of Fox News on attendance at Tea Party rallies, we thank Madestam et al. (2013) for generously sharing their replication data set, which includes county-level attendance estimates for Tea Party rallies on Tax Day of 2009. In addition, Madestam et al. (2013) show that rainfall on Tax Day was a strong predictor of smaller turnout at Tea Party rallies, which served as an instrument for rally size to the study the effect of these rallies on subsequent electoral support for the Republican party. Based on Madestam et al. (2013)'s findings, we include data on whether it rained in a given county on Tax Day in 2009 as well as the prior probabilities of rain by county as control variables in our analysis of Tea Party rallies. In this analysis, besides county-aggregated cable system controls (i.e., MSNBC channel position, channel configuration, the total number of channels on the cable system, and the number of broadcast channels on the system by zip code), we also incorporate other control variables used in Madestam et al. (2013), specifically county population deciles, region fixed effects, county demographics (i.e., income distribution, unemployment levels and changes, population density, urbanity, racial and ethnic composition, foreign population), and voting outcomes from the 2006 House of Representatives elections and the 2008 presidential elections by county.

We collect campaign contribution records from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Bonica 2019). Importantly, DIME reports not only all itemized contributions (including the self-disclosed addresses of contributors), but also time-invariant identifiers of unique contributors. DIME thus allows us to calculate both the total dollar amount of itemized contributions and the number of unique itemized contributors, by zip code, to Tea Party-affiliated Republican candidates versus Republican candidates without such affiliations in the 2010 election cycle.

We gather precinct-level voting data for House primary elections in 2010 that featured Tea Party candidates, which is feasible for Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. We are able to retain 74 Tea Party candidates in our analysis of primary elections. In addition, in order to spatially link precincts to the nearest zip codes (since Nielsen data are recorded by zip codes), we use shape files provided by the Harvard Election Data Archive (Ansolabehere et al. 2014) to aggregate precinct-level vote shares up to the zip code level. Specifically, we compute the spatial coordinates of each precinct's centroid and overlay these coordinates onto the U.S. Census' zip code shape files to identify the best matched zip code for a given precinct.

Finally, unless noted otherwise, we collect demographic data at the zip code, county, and congressional district level from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Censuses. These include population size, gender composition, age distribution, racial and ethnic makeup, household income by deciles, education attainment levels, and urbanity status.

B. Additional Figure for Content Analysis

Figure B.1 visualizes the relative weight of issues focused by all Republican candidates in both their appearances (top panel) and in cable news coverage (bottom panel).



(a) Candidate Appearances



(b) All Other Content

Figure B.1: Estimated topic weights of key Republican-party emphasized topics, in candidate appearances (top) and all other cable content (bottom).

C. FNC Channel Positions and Viewership

How malleable were views on the Tea Party movement among people whose consumption of FNC was sensitive to its channel position on cable systems? While we cannot definitely answer this question given our lack of individual-level data that include both validated FNC viewership and attitudes regarding the Tea Party movement, we can indirectly address this question by examining how responsiveness to FNC's channel positions varied by individual attributes, and the extent to which salient individual attributes correspond to known demographics that predict support for the movement. To that end, we examine data from MediaMark Research's Survey of the American Consumer, subsetting to respondents from 2001 to 2009 (all responses were collected prior to the Tax Day rallies on 2009) who subscribed to a wired cable TV provider.[2] Importantly for our analysis, MediaMark asks respondents to report both whether they watch CNN, MSNBC, and FNC at all within the past week as well as how may hours they spent on each channel within the past week. By merging in channel positions of FNC and MSNBC by zip code to respondent information, we can examine the sensitivity of their FNC viewership to FNC channel positions. Additionally, some of the self-reported respondent attributes in MediaMark–age, left-right ideology, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, gender, and household income–are salient predictors of support for the Tea Party Parker and Barreto (2013). We also examine whether respondents' sensitivity to FNC channel positions depends on these demographic attributes.

Tables C.1 and C.2 demonstrate that at both the extensive margin (i.e., watching any FNC) and the intensive margin (i.e., positive hours spent on FNC), respondents consumed less FNC the higher its channel position is in respondents' cable systems. This is true even after accounting for the following control variables and state-year fixed effects:

- Cable system characteristics: whether a respondent's zip code had cable access to both FNC and MSNBC or only FNC, number of channels, and number of broadcast channels;

[2]And not viewers who watched FNC through a satellite service such as DirecTV; these viewers see a common, nationwide order that does not vary from location to location.

- Respondent attributes: household income, ideology, age, race and ethnicity, gender, and educational attainment; and
- Demographics: racial, gender, age, income, educational, and urban/rural makeup and population size in the 2000 Census in the respondent's zip code

Note that Table C.2 (and any subsequent regression tables in this section that focus on the intensive margin) has a smaller sample size due to excluding respondents who self-reported watching no FNC. Standard errors are clustered at the cable system level.

Table C.1: FNC Channel Positions on Cable Viewership (Extensive Margin)

	Any FNC			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FNC Channel Pos.	-0.0007**	-0.0007**	-0.0007**	-0.0008***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	0.0003	0.0002	0.0002	0.0001
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
HH Income (in Thousands)		0.0003***	0.0002***	0.0002***
		(2.97×10^{-5})	(2.9×10^{-5})	(2.83×10^{-5})
Conservativism		0.035***	0.034***	0.032***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age (Quintile)		0.037***	0.036***	0.035***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
White		0.0006	-0.007	0.003
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Black		0.062***	0.061***	0.070***
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Hispanic		-0.014*	-0.007	-0.006
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
College Degree		-0.016***	-0.010***	-0.009***
		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Man		0.043***	0.041***	0.044***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Cable System Characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Zip Code Demographics			✓	✓
State-Year FEs				✓
Observations	158,059	126,715	125,649	125,649
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.08
F-test	736.0	491.4	178.3	10.7

Table C.2: FNC Channel Positions on Cable Viewership (Intensive Margin)

	FNC Hours			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FNC Channel Pos.	-0.003	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	0.001	0.0006	0.0007	-0.0005
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
HH Income (in Thousands)		-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.003***
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Conservativism		0.402***	0.395***	0.388***
		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Age (Quintile)		0.464***	0.452***	0.445***
		(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
White		0.141*	0.140*	0.191**
		(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.080)
Black		0.252**	0.195*	0.237**
		(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.108)
Hispanic		0.006	-0.036	-0.057
		(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.083)
College Degree		-0.244***	-0.192***	-0.196***
		(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Man		0.043	0.042	0.060
		(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Cable System Characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Zip Code Demographics			✓	✓
State-Year FEs				✓
Observations	56,879	46,297	45,837	45,837
R^2	0.005	0.05	0.05	0.08
F-test	49.4	161.2	58.8	3.7

Tables C.3 and C.4 examine whether FNC channel positions' impact on viewership (at the extensive versus intensive margins) depends on respondent attributes, including the same control variables as the previous two tables. Coefficient estimates for individual attributes and their interactions with MSNBC's channel positions are suppressed for brevity. Standard errors are clustered by cable system. Both tables reveal that many individual attributes that strongly predict both support for the Tea Party moment Parker and Barreto (2013) and FNC viewership–specifically race/ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, and household income-appear to have no bearing on respondents' responsiveness to FNC channel positions. One exception is age (in quintiles), which moderates FNC channel positions' impact on FNC viewership primarily at the extensive margin (see Table C.3). This may be due to the fact that older respondents are much more likely to watch FNC at baseline (see Tables C.1 and C.2), and hence the marginal impact of channel positions may be larger for relatively younger audiences. Also, at the extensive margin, conservative-leaning respondents are somewhat less responsive to FNC channel positions, although this heterogeneous effect is only one-tail significant after accounting for state-year fixed effects (see Table C.3). These exceptions aside, Tables C.3 and C.4 suggest that FNC channel positions' influence on FNC viewership is not limited to demographics that are unlikely to sympathize with Tea Party causes (e.g., women, minorities, college graduates, higher earners, and youths). Those who may have higher latent propensity to support the Tea Party movement might still be influenced by FNC channel positions in their consumption of the channel.

Table C.3: FNC Channel Positions on Cable Viewership (Extensive Margin)

	Any FNC			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FNC Channel Pos.	-0.0007**	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.0003)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	0.0003	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002
	(0.0003)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
FNC Channel Pos. × HH Income		1.32×10^{-6}	1.88×10^{-6}	1.03×10^{-6}
		(1.77×10^{-6})	(1.74×10^{-6})	(1.62×10^{-6})
FNC Channel Pos. × Conservatism		0.0002**	0.0002**	0.0002*
		(8.57×10^{-5})	(8.64×10^{-5})	(8.91×10^{-5})
FNC Channel Pos. × Age		0.0002***	0.0002***	0.0002***
		(6.21×10^{-5})	(6.18×10^{-5})	(6.16×10^{-5})
FNC Channel Pos. × White		0.0002	0.0002	7.33×10^{-5}
		(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
FNC Channel Pos. × Black		0.0006	0.0006	0.0004
		(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
FNC Channel Pos. × Hispanic		0.0005	0.0005	0.0006
		(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
FNC Channel Pos. × College Degree		-0.0001	-0.0001	-4.71×10^{-5}
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
FNC Channel Pos. × Man		2.07×10^{-5}	-2.02×10^{-5}	-3.92×10^{-5}
		(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Cable System Characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Respondent Demographics		✓	✓	✓
Zip Code Demographics			✓	✓
State-Year FEs				✓
Observations	158,059	126,715	125,649	125,649
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.08
F-test	736.0	230.5	127.9	10.6

Table C.4: FNC Channel Positions on Cable Viewership (Intensive Margin)

	FNC Hours			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FNC Channel Pos.	-0.003	-0.016**	-0.017**	-0.015**
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
FNC Channel Pos. × HH Income		1.78×10^{-5}	1.45×10^{-5}	1.38×10^{-5}
		(2.16×10^{-5})	(2.17×10^{-5})	(2.21×10^{-5})
FNC Channel Pos. × Conservatism		-0.0005	-0.0007	-0.001
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
FNC Channel Pos. × Age		0.002	0.002*	0.002*
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
FNC Channel Pos. × White		0.004	0.004	0.002
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
FNC Channel Pos. × Black		0.002	0.002	-4.88×10^{-6}
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
FNC Channel Pos. × Hispanic		0.002	0.003	0.005
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
FNC Channel Pos. × College Degree		0.001	0.001	0.0007
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
FNC Channel Pos. × Man		0.002	0.002	0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Cable System Characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓
Respondent Demographics		✓	✓	✓
Zip Code Demographics			✓	✓
State-Year FEs				✓
Observations	56,879	46,297	45,837	45,837
R^2	0.005	0.05	0.05	0.08
F-test	49.4	75.6	42.1	3.6

D. Additional Table and Figures for Tea Party Rallies

Figure D.1 replicates Skocpol and Williamson (2012)'s analysis of weekly frequencies of on-air references to the Tea Party movement by FNC, CNN, and MSNBC both leading up to Tax Day and afterwards, displays a modest lead in FNC's coverage of the movement ahead of the rallies.



Figure D.1: Weekly Frequencies of Tea Party Mentions by Cable Outlet

Figure D.2 shows a (weak) positive association between the average primetime FNC rating (aggregated to the county level) during the six months prior to Tax Day of 2009 and rally attendance as a percentage of county population. The size of points indicates the number of Nielsen households in the county average.

Table D.1 reports 2SLS estimates for Tea Party rally sizes on subsequent FNC ratings, instrumenting for rally size using rainfall on 4/15/2009 as in Madestam et al. (2013).



Figure D.2: Positive Association between Tea Party Rally Sizes and Pre-Rallies Average FNC Primetime Rating Across Counties

Table D.1: Effects of Tea Party Rally Size on Subsequent FNC Ratings (2SLS)

	Fox News Rating, Summer 2010				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	0.857***	0.600***	0.311**	-0.302	0.828
	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.149)	(0.923)	(1.05)
% Tea Party Rally Attendance	0.087	0.122	0.065	0.191	0.237
	(0.376)	(0.286)	(0.294)	(0.250)	(0.240)
Pre-April 2009 Rating		0.086***	0.088***	0.071***	0.062***
		(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Cable System Controls			✓	✓	✓
Cable Positions			✓	✓	✓
County Demographics				✓	✓
2008 and 2006 Voting					✓
Rain Prob. Decile FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population Decile FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2,687	2,687	2,616	2,616	2,616
R^2	0.11	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.21

E. Strategic Entry of Tea Party Candidates

As the Tea Party movement attracted greater national attention following the Tax Day rallies, a wave of Tea Party-backed Republican candidates entered the 2010 midterm elections in order to attain nominations by the Republican party (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Blum 2020). Did FNC influence prospective Tea Party candidates' choices to enter congressional races in specific congressional districts? To this end, we estimate regressions of the following form:

$$TeaPartyEntry_d = \alpha Accessibility_d^{FNC} + \mathbf{X}_d\Gamma + \epsilon_d \tag{A.1}$$

The outcome variable $TeaPartyEntry_d$ is an indicator of whether any Tea Party-affiliated Republican candidate ran in the 2010 House election in congressional district d.[3] The explanatory

[3]All results remain qualitatively identical if we subset to non-incumbent Tea Party candidates.

variable of interest, $Accessibility_d^{FNC}$, represents one of two measures of the accessibility of FNC via cable TV in congressional district d in the 2010 election cycle. One such measure is the density of FNC across a congressional district, which equals the share of zip codes overlapping with a congressional district (weighted by population size) that had access to FNC via cable TV (Arceneaux et al. 2020). However, the expansion of FNC across the United States was nearly complete by 2010 (Martin and Yurukoglu 2017), so there is only modest variation in this variable. As a result, we also use an alternative measure of FNC's accessibility, which is the additive inverse (i.e., multiplying by -1) of average cable channel position of FNC in zip codes that overlap with a congressional district (weighted by zip code population size). Insofar as Tea Party candidates were more likely to enter the 2010 House of Representatives elections in congressional districts with greater exposure to FNC, we should expect the estimated coefficient of $\alpha > 0$.

$\mathbf{X}_d$ consists of congressional districts' cable system characteristics (whether the average cable subscriber had access to both FNC and MSNBC or only FNC), demographics (racial, gender, age, income, educational, and urban/rural makeup in the 2010 Census), and state fixed effects.

Table E.1 reports estimation results using FNC density by congressional district in 2010 as the independent variable of interest, and Table E.2 displays analogous estimation results using the additive inverse of the weighted average FNC channel position in each congressional district in 2010 as the alternative measure of FNC accessibility. We cluster standard errors at the state level in both tables. Even though the estimated coefficient of interest always positive, as expected, it is never statistically distinguishable from zero. In short, we find no evidence that Tea Party candidates strategically entered the 2010 midterm elections in congressional districts that had systematically higher degrees of FNC accessibility. Our conclusion echos Arceneaux et al. (2020)'s findings that while FNC market penetration across congressional districts does not predict the challenger emergence in primary elections during 1997-2009, even though it does predict quality Republican challengers running against Democratic incumbents in general elections in that time frame.

Table E.1: No Evidence of Strategic Entry of Tea Party Candidates Based on Congressional District-Level Fox News Density

	Tea Party Entry		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
FNC Channel Density	0.049	0.221	0.657
	(0.303)	(0.396)	(0.980)
Cable system controls	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls		✓	✓
State FEs			✓
Observations	436	435	435
R^2	0.002	0.06	0.17

Table E.2: No Evidence of Strategic Entry of Tea Party Candidates Based on Congressional District-Level Weighted Average Fox News Channel Position

	Tea Party Entry		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Weighted Ave. FNC Channel Pos.	0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Cable system controls	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls		✓	✓
State FEs			✓
Observations	436	435	435
R^2	0.004	0.06	0.17

F. Additional Tables for Campaign Contributions

Table F.1 reports estimation results for zip-code total itemized contributions to Tea Party candidates (by counts of unique donors) in columns (1)-(3), and those to other Congressional Republican candidates in columns (4)-(6).

Table F.1: FNC Effect on Zip Code-Level Total Number of Itemized Contributors

	Tea Party Candidates			Other Rep. Candidates		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FNC Channel Pos.	-0.036***	-0.028**	-0.027***	-0.016	-0.003	-0.0008
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	0.013	0.022*	0.016	-0.017	-0.005	-0.014
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Cable system controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
State FEs			✓			✓
Observations	20,871	20,352	20,334	20,871	20,352	20,334
R^2	0.03	0.22	0.28	0.04	0.30	0.33

Table F.2 compares the main treatment effect of FNC channel positions on total zip code contributions to Tea Party candidates versus other Republican candidates in a stacked regression, with the same set of control variables and their interactions with an indicator of campaign contribution recipients being Tea Party candidates.

Table F.2: Comparing Zip Code-Level Total Itemized Contribution to Tea Party vs. Non-Tea Party Republican Candidates

	Dollar Amounts			Number of Itemized Donors		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Tea Party Candidates	4,431.0**	-39,875.1**		3.16***	-23.1***	
	(1,910.1)	(16,872.9)		(1.15)	(8.13)	
FNC Channel Pos.	-15.7	-8.75	-6.87	-0.016	-0.003	-0.0008
	(33.1)	(33.5)	(29.1)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.014)
FNC Channel Pos. × Tea Party Candidates	-21.7	-22.6	-27.9	-0.021	-0.025	-0.026*
	(32.9)	(33.4)	(30.1)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.016)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	-44.6	-26.5	-26.4	-0.017	-0.005	-0.014
	(27.7)	(24.8)	(18.4)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)
MSNBC Channel Pos. × Tea Party Candidates	53.3*	43.4*	34.3	0.030*	0.026*	0.030*
	(27.4)	(26.1)	(21.2)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Cable system-by-Tea Party controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic-by-Tea Party controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
State-by-Tea Party FEs			✓			✓
Observations	41,742	40,704	40,704	41,742	40,704	40,704
R^2	0.02	0.10	0.12	0.05	0.28	0.33

Tables F.3 and F.4 show that there are no detectable effect of FNC cable channel positions on campaign contributions to Democratic candidates (measured in terms of total dollar amounts versus number of unique itemized contributors by zip code), including the same set of control variables as shown in other tables in this section.

Table F.3: FNC Effect on Zip Code-Level Total Itemized Contributions to Democratic Candidates

	Donations to Democratic Candidates ($)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
FNC Channel Pos.	21.7	12.6	1.21
	(72.1)	(59.8)	(48.0)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	-126.3	-85.2	-90.4
	(100.1)	(81.1)	(59.8)
Cable system controls	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls		✓	✓
State FEs			✓
Observations	20,871	20,352	20,334
R^2	0.05	0.27	0.29

Table F.4: FNC Effect on Zip Code-Level Total Number of Itemized Contributors to Democratic Candidates

	No. Donors to Democratic Candidates		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
FNC Channel Pos.	0.022	0.060	0.041
	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.035)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	-0.080	-0.041	-0.061*
	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.034)
Cable system controls	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls		✓	✓
State FEs			✓
Observations	20,871	20,352	20,334
R^2	0.08	0.45	0.49

Table F.5 reports estimated effects of FNC's cable channel positions on itemized contributions to Tea Party candidates (aggregated as counts of unique donors) separately for existing versus new donors.

Table F.5: Zip-Code Itemized Contributions (By Total Number of Donors) to Tea Party Candidates Among Existing vs. New Donors

	Existing Donors			New Donors		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
FNC Channel Pos.	-0.019**	-0.015*	-0.015**	-0.016***	-0.015***	-0.015***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	0.007	0.013*	0.009	0.004	0.008*	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Cable system controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
State FEs			✓			✓
Observations	21,200	20,641	20,621	21,200	20,641	20,621
R^2	0.03	0.17	0.23	0.03	0.12	0.20

Tables F.6 separately estimates treatment effects by donor ideology based on terciles derived from *all* existing donors, aggregating contributions by counts of unique donors. Table F.7 estimates differential treatment effects by ideology tercile among existing donors who *previously gave to Republican candidates*, again aggregating contributions by counts of unique donor.

Table F.6: Zip-Code Itemized Contributions (By Total Number of Donors) to Tea Party Candidates Across Existing Donors

	Donor Ideology $(-1, -0.342)$			Donor Ideology $(-0.342, 0.289)$			Donor Ideology $(0.289, 1)$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
FNC Channel Pos.	-0.0005	-0.0005*	-0.0005***	-0.004*	-0.003*	-0.003**	-0.011**	-0.009	-0.008*
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	-0.0003*	-0.0002	-0.0001	0.0003	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.010*	0.006
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Cable system controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
State FEs			✓			✓			✓
Observations	21,200	20,641	20,621	21,200	20,641	20,621	21,200	20,641	20,621
R^2	0.01	0.07	0.10	0.01	0.10	0.14	0.02	0.15	0.22

Table F.7: Zip-Code Itemized Contributions (By Total Number of Donors) to Tea Party Candidates Across Existing Republican Donors

	Donor Ideology $(-0.691, 0.367)$			Donor Ideology $(0.367, 0.456)$			Donor Ideology $(0.456, 0.965)$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
FNC Channel Pos.	-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.006**	-0.004*	-0.003	-0.003*	-0.005*	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003*	0.0006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Cable system controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographic controls		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
State FEs			✓			✓			✓
Observations	21,200	20,641	20,621	21,200	20,641	20,621	21,200	20,641	20,621
R^2	0.01	0.11	0.16	0.02	0.14	0.20	0.02	0.10	0.18

G. Additional Table for Primary Voting

Table G.1 shows that there are no detectable turnout effects in primary elections that we can attribute to FNC cable channel positions.

Table G.1: FNC Effects on Turnout (% Age-Eligible Population) in Republican Primaries

	Primary Turnout Rate Proxy (# Votes Cast / # Age-Eligible Residents)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
FNC Channel Pos.	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
MSNBC Channel Pos.	-1.37×10^{-5}	1.65×10^{-5}	-7.91×10^{-5}
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Cable system controls		✓	✓
Demographic controls	✓	✓	✓
District FEs	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3,265	3,265	3,255
R^2	0.54	0.54	0.60

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