Desha M. Girod
Ph.D.
Candidate
Department
of Political Science
Stanford,
CA 94305-6044
Email: dgirod ‘at’ stanford.edu
Research:
Foreign Aid, Comparative Political Institutions, Civil War
Manuscripts CV (pdf) Teaching
I’m a Ph.D. candidate
in Political Science at
Center on
Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.
My research on civil war, comparative political
institutions, and foreign aid relies on quantitative
methods and on field work in Africa and Latin
America.
Manuscripts (abstracts below; pdfs available upon request)
Foreign Aid and
Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Dissertation) Chapter
summary
“Foreign Aid and Post-Conflict Reconstruction” (Under Review)
Paper
presented:
- Cornell University Symposium on Failed States, Scheduled for April 2008
- The 2008 Meeting of the International Studies Association
- The 2007 Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association
- The Center on Democracy, Development
and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, October 2007
- The 2006 Meeting of the American
Political Science Association
- The 2006 Meeting of the African
Studies Association
- The Yale Center
for the Study of Globalization, Yale University, May 2005
Abstract: Why are some governments better than others at rebuilding their states in the aftermath of civil war? Existing arguments typically propose that post-conflict reconstruction is more likely when governments receive enough aid to offset the devastation from conflict. The analysis reported here shows that multilateral aid helps resource-poor states, but not their resource-rich counterparts, because resource-poor states face incentives to use aid well. Drawing on previously unavailable data on compliance with donor-required reforms collected by the World Bank’s internal auditing group, this paper also demonstrates that reform is a mechanism for post-conflict reconstruction. Moreover, the data are consistent with the expectation that multilateral donors adjust aid according to the extent of reform. None of these results hold for bilateral aid, which has a similar impact to natural-resource rents.
“Do remittances improve
governance? Remittance flows and public goods in Mexico, 1995-2000” (Under Review) (with Claire Adida)
Paper
presented:
- The 2008 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Scheduled for August
- The 2006 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association
Abstract: Scholars increasingly show
that remittances improve development, but how do remittances, or direct money
transfers from migrants, affect government responsiveness? Remittances may
substitute essential governmental functions since they sometimes finance access
to public goods and services. Mexico offers a unique opportunity to assess the
competing impacts of government spending and remittances since Mexican states
receive varying levels of remittance flows originating primarily from a single
source, the United States. Using census data from Mexico’s Municipal Database
System and remittance data from its National Population Council, this paper
offers a sub-national analysis of Mexican states’ access to drainage and tap
water between 1995 and 2000 controlling for political and economic variables.
The data show that, when remittances improve access to public goods, government
spending, at best, has no impact. Additionally, remittances’ impact is
strongest for the most private types of public goods, suggesting that
remittances may indeed substitute government services.
“Do Autocrats Create Democrats?” (Working Paper)
Paper presented:
- The 2007 Meeting of the American Political Science
Association
- The Latin American Studies Center, Stanford
University, Scheduled for May, 2008
- The Global Policy and
Development Conference on State Building, Norfolk, Virginia, 2006
Abstract: Why do some
post-authoritarian rulers respect rights while others become new
authoritarians? This paper argues that
new leaders are deterred from violating citizens' rights when their
authoritarian predecessors employed indiscriminate attacks on potential regime
challengers. The rights violated by the previous ruler generate a consensus on
what institutions the new government should protect. The paper further
demonstrates that certain conditions are more likely to trigger these attacks.
Dictators are more likely to attack a majority of citizens when faced with a
particular sort of crisis: when their sources of patronage decline because
their international legitimacy is suffering. This paper first tests the theory
in Panama, which democratized after the US overthrew its dictator Noriega.
Second, it analyzes 127 coups of authoritarian leaders between 1965 and 1999
and finds support for two observable implications of the theory: (1) the more
repressive the dictatorship, the more democratic the government that follows it
and (2) the greater the decline in a dictatorship’s international legitimacy,
the more democratic the regime that follows it. In conclusion, the paper explores
implications for democracy promotion.
“The Geography
vs. Institutions Debate Revisited” (with Luz Marina Arias) (Working paper)
Abstract: Recent scholarship argues
that the extractive goals of European colonizers determined the colonial institutions
they imposed, which then influenced subsequent postcolonial institution
building. We claim that the literature
overlooks an important variable: settlers’ abilities to use preexisting
regulatory authority in newly discovered lands.
We argue
that pre-colonial institutions influenced institution building both at
colonization and after the colonial period.
“Cut from the Same Cloth? Multilateral vs.
Bilateral Aid” (Manuscript in progress)
Paper presented:
- The 2008 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Scheduled for August
Abstract: Existing scholarship finds that foreign aid has
little, if any, positive impact on political and economic development.
This paper argues that the results in the literature can be attributed to
bilateral aid flows, which have similar effects to natural-resource
rents. Bilateral donors represent individual country governments making
decisions about how to distribute funds. They find it easier, on average,
to support a strategic interest than multilateral donors, who consist of many
countries with divergent strategic interests. As long as aid recipients
believe their government’s survival is of greater value to foreign patrons than
reform implementation, these governments lack incentive to use aid well.
Multilateral donors are less likely to coordinate strategically and, therefore,
more likely to disburse according to the degree of reform in recipient
states. If multilateral donors disburse for development more than
bilateral donors, then across developing countries, multilateral aid should
have more positive effects on political and economic development than bilateral
aid. This paper disaggregates aid flows into multilateral and bilateral
categories and finds that bilateral aid drives the negative effects of total
aid across developing countries since 1960 while multilateral aid positively
impacts political and economic development.
Lecture
entitled “Natural Resources and Post-conflict Reconstruction” in Transitions
from War to Peace, a Master’s course in International Policy Studies, Stanford University, February 2008
Lecture
entitled “State-building” in Introduction to International Relations (300
students) at Stanford University, November 2004
Head
Teaching Assistant for Introduction to International Relations, (300 students)
at Stanford University, Fall Quarter 2004, Faculty Instructor: Michael Tomz
Head
Teaching Assistant for NGOs and Development, Stanford University, Spring
Quarter 2004, Faculty Instructor: David Abernethy
Teaching
Assistant for Introduction to International Relations,
Teaching
Assistant for International Security in a Changing World,
Teaching
Assistant for Introduction to American Politics,