Curriculum Vitae

Contact Information
Graduate School of Business
4th Floor - PhD Office
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305

• "Incentive Compatible Market Design with an Application to Matching with Wages,"
  
  Abstract: This paper studies markets for heterogeneous goods using mechanism-design theory. For each combination of desirable properties, I derive an assignment process with these properties in the form of a corresponding direct-revelation game, or I show that it does not exist. Each participant's preferences are privately known, quasi-linear in money, and depend upon the allocation that he gets - thus, a participant's type is multidimensional. The key properties are individual rationality, incentive compatibility, budget balance, efficiency, and stability against coalitional deviations. The main results characterize mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible in combination with other properties markets.
   

• "A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues," joint with Federico Echenique - published in Games and Economic Behavior Volume 59, Number 1, April 2007, Pages 46-71.

  Abstract: We study many-to-one matchings,  such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

• "Median Stable Matching for Markets with Wages," joint with Michael Schwarz - Second Round at Journal of Economic Theory

  Abstract: We define the median stable matching for two-sided matching markets with side payments and prove constructively that it exists.

• "Dissolving Multi-Partnerships Efficiently," - Working Paper

  Abstract: I study a market where agents with jointly owned heterogeneous goods trade subject to the constraint that each agent ends up with one good. In this market the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in which every agent owns a separate good. An implication of the results is that partnerships should be formed on equal shares ex-ante to make it possible for future dissolution.

• "Pricing in Position Auctions and Online Advertising," - Working Paper

  Abstract: This paper analyzes multi-dimensional position auctions with general pricing rules. The preeminent example of position auctions is the “generalized second-price” (GSP) auction used by major search engines to sell online advertising. Edelman et al. establish that the unique ex-post equilibrium of the GSP auction and the dominant strategy equilibrium of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism have identical ex-post payoffs. However, they only analyze the GSP auction, where the price for an advertiser depends only on the bid of the next highest advertiser, with one dimensional types. This paper shows that the result still holds as long as the price for an advertiser who wins a position depends on any of the bids of advertisers who win lower positions in any “sensible” way, even if the advertisers have multidimensional types.

• "Best Response Strategies in Deferred-Acceptance Procedure for Markets with Wages" - Work in Progress

  Abstract: We study the deferred-acceptance procedure for two-sided markets with wages under incomplete information. It is well known that agents on the proposing side have a dominant strategy to play truthfully for markets with or without wages. On the other hand, Roth and Rothblum (1999) show that truncating preferences are the best response strategies for agents who receive proposals in a symmetric environment. We show that such agents can do better than using a truncation strategy even if agents have symmetric preferences in a market with wages.  This gives a counter example to the common belief that results for matching markets with and without wages are exactly the same.