Economics 258 Ali Yurukoglu Matthew Gentzkow Neale Mahoney Winter 2024 <u>ayurukog@stanford.edu</u> <u>gentzkow@stanford.edu</u> <u>nmahoney@stanford.edu</u>

#### **Industrial Organization II: Syllabus**

#### **Class Description**

This course is the second of three courses in the Ph.D. sequence in Industrial Organization in the economics department (257, 258, and 260). The goal of the sequence, and especially the first two quarters, is to provide broad general training in the field, introducing you to the central questions around imperfect competition, market structure, innovation and regulation, as well as the models and empirical methods commonly used to tackle these questions. The third quarter provides an opportunity for students to write a supervised research paper, and gain experience presenting their work.

Students in the Economics PhD program who intend to take IO as a field must take 257 and 258, and students who further intend to write theses in IO are strongly recommended to continue through 260. All three classes are also open to students in other fields and Stanford departments, and traditionally many students in 257 fall into this category. All students taking 257, however, should have taken the first-year graduate sequence in Economics, or have equivalent preparation in microeconomics and econometrics.

## **Course Requirements**

The specific requirements are:

- a) 2 Problem Sets. These will entail substantial empirical and computational exercises.
- b) 2 Written Assignments. This will focus on critically reading and evaluating the literature.
- c) Class Preparation. Before most classes, we will assign one or two papers, and students will be expected to familiarize themselves with this material.

Class grades will be based on problem sets (60%), written assignments (20%), and class participation (20%). All three are essential parts of the course and we expect students to take them seriously.

#### **Tentative Class Schedule**

#### Part 1: Antitrust and regulatory issues

Mon, Jan 8: Antitrust and Regulation: Overview and Basic Theory (AY)

Wed, Jan 10: Antitrust and Regulation: Empirical Horizontal Mergers and Collusion (AY)

Wed, Jan 17: Vertical Relations and Bargaining (AY) Mon, Jan 22: Vertical Relations and Bargaining (AY) Wed, Jan 24: Markups and Concentration (AY)

Mon, Jan 29: Markups and Concentration (MG)

#### Problem set 1 due Jan 29

## **Part 2: Applications**

Wed, Jan 31: Platforms (MG) Mon, Feb 5: Platforms (MG)

Wed, Feb 7: Selection markets (NM) Mon, Feb 12: Selection markets (NM) Wed, Feb 14: Selection markets (NM)

#### Written assignment 1 due Feb 14

Wed, Feb 21: Selection markets (NM) Mon, Feb 26: Behavioral IO (MG) Wed, Feb 28: Behavioral IO (MG)

#### Part 3: Dynamics

Mon, Mar 4: Single Agent Dynamics (AY)

## Written assignment 2 due Mar 4

Wed, Mar 6: Dynamics (Industry Dynamics) (AY)

Mon, Mar 11: Dynamics (Applications to Regulation) (AY) Wed, Mar 13: Dynamics (Applications to Innovation) (AY)

#### Problem set 2 due Mar 13

#### **Tentative Reading List**

#### Jan 8: Antitrust and Regulation: Overview and Basic Theory (AY)

Read: Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers by Nocke and

Whinston

DoJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Does Merger Simulation Work? By Bjornstedt and Verboven

#### Jan 10: Antitrust and Regulation: Empirical Horizontal Mergers and Collusion (AY)

Read: Killer Acquisitions by Cunningham, Ederer, and Ma

Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market by Assad, Clark, Ershov, and

Xu

#### Jan 17: Vertical Relations and Bargaining (AY)

Read: Handbook of IO chapter by Lee, Whinston, and Yurukoglu

Will also cover: Lectures on Antitrust Economics, Chapter 3, by Whinston

#### Jan 22: Vertical Relations and Bargaining (AY)

Read: The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel

Television by Crawford, Lee, Whinston, Yurukoglu

Will also cover: The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television by

Crawford and Yurukoglu

Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in

Health Care Markets by Ho and Lee

# Jan 24: Markups and Concentration (AY) Read: The Rise of Market Power by de Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger Will also cover: The Evolution of Market Power in the US Automobile Industry by Grieco, Murry, and Yurukoglu Jan 29: Markups and Concentration (MG) Read: Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions by Syverson The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms by Autor et al. Jan 31: Platforms (MG) Read: TBD Feb 5: Platforms (MG) Read: **TBD** Feb 7: Selection Markets (NM) TBD Read: Feb 12: Selection Markets (NM) Read: **TBD** Feb 14: Selection Markets (NM) Read: TBD

TBD

Feb 21: Selection Markets (NM)

Read:

#### Feb 26: Behavioral IO (MG)

Read: Contract Design & Self Control by DellaVigna & Malmendier

Fungibility & Consumer Choice by Hastings & Shapiro

Feb 28: Behavioral IO (MG)

Read: Uniform Pricing in US Retail Chains by DellaVigna & Gentzkow

Strategic Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions by Hortaçsu and Puller

#### Mar 4: Single Agent Dynamics (AY)

Read: Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model

of Harold Zurcher by Rust

Measuring the Dynamic Efficiency Costs of Regulators'
Preferences: Municipal Water Utilities in the Arid West by

**Timmins** 

Will also cover: Patents as Options by Pakes

## Mar 6: Dynamics (Industry Dynamics) (AY)

Read: Markov-perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical

Work by Ericson and Pakes

Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition by Bajari,

Benkard, and Levin

Will also cover: Selection and the Evolution of Industry by Jovanovic

Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium by

Hopenhayn

A Dynamic Analysis of the Market for Wide-bodied Commercial

Aircraft by Benkard

Dynamics of Consumer Demand for New Durable Goods by

Gowrisankaran and Rysman

Measuring the Implications of Sales and Consumer Inventory

Behavior by Hendel and Nevo

## Mar 11: Dynamics (Applications to Regulation) (AY)

Read: Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics by

Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan

Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation: Time Inconsistency, Moral Hazard, and Political Environments by Lim and Yurukoglu

# Mar 13: Dynamics (Applications to Innovation) (AY)

Read: Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate More? By Goettler and

Gordon

Estimating the Innovator's Dilemma: Structural Analysis of Creative Destruction in the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1981–1998

by Igami