Top > Publications

Japanese

- Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis - Information, Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity - Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy - The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm - Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity - Communities and Markets in Economic Development - The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development - The Japanese Main Bank System - The Japanese Firm	The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm Masahiko Aoki by Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984 Table of Contents Part I RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ORTHODOX THEORIES OF THE FIRM   1. INTRODUCTION   2. THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF THR FIRM The Walrasian Entrepreneur as a Co-ordinator The Entrepreneur as a Maximizer The Coase Problem The Asymmetry of Risk Attitudes and the Modern Corporation The Firm as a Risk-sharing Contrivance The Invisible Hand v. the Visible Hand Collective Nature of the Human Assets To Shirk or To Be Monitored Organizational Rent and Intra-firm Bargaining Conclusions   3. THE MANAGERIAL THEORY OF THE FIRM The Organizational Nature of the Managerial Utility Why Growth? A Digression - Shareholders' Non-unanimity The Shareholders' Counter-revolution? A Digression - Relevancy of the Agency Theory to the Corporation   4. THE THEORY OF THE WORKER-CONTROLLED FIRM Creeping Worker Control Dilemma of Industrial Democracy Summary of Part I     Part II THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME MODEL OF THE FIRM   5. THE ORGANIZATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM Introduction - The Manager as a Referee The Bargain Possibility Frontier The Bargaining Process and its Equilibrium The Weighting Rule The Equilibrating Behaviour of the Firm Appendix: Fixity of Durable Equipment Financing of Investment A Normative Aspect of the Organizational Equilibrium Mathematical Appendix   6. EQUILIBRIUM BARGAIN AND INEFFICIENT BARGAIN I: THE CASE OF LAY-OFFS The McDonald-Solow Model The Leadership-Membership Relation in the Union   7. EQUILIBRIUM BARGAIN AND INEFFICIENT BARGAIN II: THE CASE OF EMPLOYEES' HIERARCHY The Model of Employees' Hierarchy Growth Criteria in the Hierarchical Firm Mathematical Appendix     Part III EFFICENCY OF THREE LEGAL MODELS OF THE FIRM   8. INSTITUTIONAL EFFICIENCY Summary of Parts I and II The Classicist v. Managerialist Debate Institutional Efficiency Models of the Decision-making Structure of Firms   9. THE SHAREHOLDERS' SOVEREIGNTY-CUM-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING MODEL Zero-sum Game? The Level of Bargaining The Scope of Collective Agreements The Duration of Collective Agreements Summary   10. THE PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT MODEL Politics and Ideologies of Participation Monitoring Management: The German Model Extending Collective Bargaining? The Bullock Model Summary   11. THE CORPORATIVE MANAGERIALISM MODEL Statutory Tendency Towards Corporatism Mechanisms for Controlling Management Professional Ethics and Training Summary