La Violencia

     I asked Tom Marks, who has a deep knowledge of the Colombian problem what he thought of the delegation of Colombian businessmen who propose to talk with the FARC. I asked him also why military force, which failed to suppress la violencia when Rojas Pinilla tried it, would succeed today. Here is his reply:
     "At the heart of the Colombian problem is the lack of a strategy operationalized as a national plan. In the earlier insurgent era, such was prepared, Plan Lazo. Very effective, it was a creation of both Colombia and the U.S., and was multifaceted. The present "Plan Colombia" is to be similar -- indeed, its focus is on non-military aspects. Yet the document has not actually been prepared. Only the US military aid component and accompanying development funds have been spelled out. This creates a considerable void and places the monkey on the military's back.
     It is this which makes the various contacts, talks, and maneuvers so counterproductive. They are not part of an approach, simply undertakings. There seems to be the thought that if the insurgents are "talked to" enough, they'll realize that everyone wants peace, and that will be the end of it. This is so naive as to be embarrassing. There is ample evidence available, in the form of prisoner interrogations, signals intercepts, and captured documents which show that it is FARC which has a plan -- and that it is the government which is blundering along.
     Why precisely this is so gets into analysis which no one has yet undertaken, that of personalities. It is significant that the voluminous material being generated in this country concerning the conflict shows even less understanding of Colombia and the various players than was the case in Vietnam. How this can be possible, given the propinquity of the conflict and the large number of Spanish speakers in the US stems, I would suspect, from the same phenomenon which leads to the lack of understanding in our circles of power vis-a-vis all things military: there are fewer and fewer people who know much about insurgency. Most of what we see is a reflection of our domestic wants and concerns not of Colombian reality. Has there been even a single article, for instance, which deals with a Colombian military personality? A Colombian governor active in defense of the system?
     Long commented upon has been Colombia's propensity for fragmentation and violence. No work exists which convincingly explains these. We are left with a serious consequence, though, the fragmentation of an elite -- to the extent that one sees a class unable or unwilling to recognize even its own self-interests. Yet it expects to be "protected."
     The result is an insurgency which has two faces, only one of which is recognized, that of the insurgents. Yet the paramilitaries are every bit as hostile towards the existing system, as anyone who has taken even a moment to look at their documents knows. They spring from the same absence of the state as the insurgents. Where they part company is that they are committed to democratic, market norms. That they may have "command and control" problems, that their methods may mirror our Phoenix program in Vietnam, is quite a different matter from what they purport to stand for. We're clueless about all of this, but we don't care. If the war won't fit the template of our domestic squabbles, we'll force it into it. It is our unwillingness to gather adequate intelligence upon a conflict three hours flight away which is going to make this mess even worse than it is."

Ronald Hilton - 3/20/00