American Foreign Policy After the End of the Cold War
An Interview with David Holloway
SJIR: Could the political struggle in the Ukraine provoke the possibility of a “new cold war,” and if so, how will it differ from the one that ended just a little over a decade ago? How have the recent string of terrorist attacks in Russia changed its strained relationship with the US?
David Holloway (DH): The events in Ukraine have certainly opened up a political crisis in relations between Russia and the US, and also and very importantly in relations between Russia and the EU. The crisis in Ukraine is an enormous political setback for Russia, which has tried to assert hegemony over the former Soviet republics. For Russian democrats it offers hope that the current style of autocracy in Russia will also give way to democratic change; but it also raises the fear that Russia will be increasingly marginalized and isolated from the West.
An embittered and isolated Russia would not be in the West’s interest or in the Russian interest, for that matter. The expansion of the EU last year means that the EU “neighborhood” overlaps with the Russian “near abroad.” Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) and the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) are likely to be the focus of considerable geopolitical rivalry. Nevertheless, I don’t believe this will lead to a new Cold War, as this new situation lacks the ideological dimension of the Cold War, and, moreover, Russia is still relatively weak vis-à-vis Europe and the US. But the West and Russia will have to be very careful in the way they manage their relations.
The events in Beslan showed how serious the terrorist threat is to Russia and also how incompetent the Russian state is and how poor its security forces are. Russia and the US and Europe have a common agenda in combating terrorism, but there are real tensions among them over the ways each has chosen to combat it. There is considerable anxiety in the US and Europe and in Russia too about Putin’s continuing move towards authoritarianism, to a tightening of centralized state control. After Beslan, for example, Putin abolished the election of regional governors, who will now be appointed by the president.
SJIR: Do you think there are currently evolving qualifications for becoming a world power? To what extent does this relate to nuclear buildup?
DH: The qualifications for world power status appear to be what they have always been, namely, the economic and military power of a country, and generally the extent of a state’s influence in the world. For some states military power is the main qualification, for others it is economic power. Currently we have the unusual situation of one state the US being the dominant economic and military power, with enormous cultural influence as well.
We haven’t seen what many expected, and some hope for an anti-American coalition among the other great powers. No alliance between China, the European Union, Russia, etc… has been formed to counterbalance the US. The EU isn’t really a “world power” because it’s not a coherent actor in foreign affairs, and Europe as a military entity hardly exists separate from NATO. Yet on trade issues, the European Commission is a major force, equal in importance to the US. China is a growing power, along with India, and the rise of these two countries will have a profound influence on world politics in the coming decades. Russia, on the other hand, is a weakened power that still hankers after great power status and sees in nuclear weapons its major claim to that status.
Unfortunately, in spite of the nonproliferation norm, nuclear weapons are, in the eyes of many, a symbol of world power status. The existing nuclear weapons states show no signs of regarding nuclear weapons as unimportant, and India has rather skillfully used its nuclear weapons as a way of enhancing its status as a world power.
SJIR: How do you envision the next 4 years of American foreign policy to unfold? Will there be major shifts or will the administration pursue a similar path to that of the last 4 years?
DH: I don’t foresee radical shifts in policy, but I think there will be adjustments. There will be an effort to repair relations with the European states, which will have some success but will not restore the close ties of the Cold War. The US will continue to seek cooperative relations with China, India, and Russia. The war on terror will continue to be the main focus of policy, but there may be less hubris about what military power can do, given the difficulties in Iraq. The rhetoric may not change too much, but the policy will be more realistic.
SJIR: During his presidency, and particularly since his recent death, Ronald Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy has been viewed in a very positive light. How do you feel the Bush administration compares with that of Reagan?
DH: The rhetoric in the early Reagan administration was forceful partly because he and his advisors felt the US had fallen behind the Soviet Union. Defense policy also reflected the desire to exploit American technological superiority. The policy of rhetorical pressure on the Soviet Union gave way quickly to cooperation with Gorbachev. In retrospect Reagan looks much more skillful than Bush in using rhetoric to achieve US goals.
SJIR: What is your biggest criticism of Bush’s foreign policy? What do you think are its strong points or advantages?
DH: My main criticism is that the Administration has not been creative in thinking about, or shaping, a new world order that would both serve America’s interests and secure the cooperation of others in maintaining international security and achieving global growth and prosperity. The US is, after all, the predominant power in the world and should therefore be expected to play a leading role in doing this, just as it did in the years after World War II. It is hard to imagine any of the current policy-makers being able to entitle their memoirs “Present at the Creation,” as Dean Acheson did twenty years after the formation of the Atlantic Alliance. The Administration has been good at shaking things up but not at using the ensuing disorder to achieve its goals.
In terms of strong points, I think that the administration has been fairly effective in pursuing stable relations with China, India, and Russia, which are all very important powers. These relationships have proved to be less difficult than might have been expected.
SJIR: How has America’s global superpower status changed since the end of the Cold War?
DH: It’s become ever clearer that the US is the sole superpower. In the early 90s one could still talk of a Russo-American partnership, but that has become unrealistic, except in a very limited sense, as Russia continued to decline in the 1990s. The rising powers are not in a position to challenge the United States.
Most importantly, however, 9/11 added a very strong feeling of vulnerability to go along with the sense of overwhelming power. This mix has had profound consequences for US policy.
SJIR: How will a nuclear Iran and its overt support of terrorist groups, with a large US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, affect the Middle East’s political dynamic?
DH: There was great anxiety in the US in the 1960s about the possibility that China might acquire nuclear weapons, and fears that that would lead to a more belligerent Chinese foreign policy. Those fears were not realized. The question is whether similar fears would be realized in the case of Iran. There has been some very belligerent rhetoric from Iran, just as there was from China before it tested the bomb. If Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, other powers will have to try to ensure that Iran adopts policies that do not heighten risk of war, and especially of nuclear war, in the Middle East. That will be a major challenge. As we have seen in South Asia, the introduction of nuclear weapons into a hostile relationship does not necessarily reduce the risk of war.
SJIR: Can the EU and the US restore their relationship with a like-minded policy against Iranian nuclear proliferation?
DH: I hope there will be an effort to seek a more cooperative strategy even if the US and the EU play different roles. If the EU is to be successful in reaching an effective agreement with Iran, in which Iran foregoes nuclear weapons, it will very probably need US support, perhaps in the form of commitments or reassurances on relations with Iran.
SJIR: How did the fall of the Soviet Union affect institutionalized anti-Americanism in Europe and around the world since Europe no longer needed significant U.S. military protection?
DH: The end of the Cold War did change the relationship between Europe and the US because Western Europe and the US no longer faced a common threat. Of course there has always been anti-Americanism in Europe, but also very strong ties to America. Anti-Americanism has grown stronger over the last few years, and it is not clear how reversable that is. A lot has to do with specific issues like the Iraq war, the Kyoto treaty, the International Criminal Court. Some of the hostility will abate, because Europe and the US will still have major political, economic, and cultural ties. But I don’t think the old relationship, which, by the way, had plenty of tensions, is likely to return.