Into the Breach
An Analysis of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
In the past two decades the United Nations has found itself in a new era of peacekeeping. Its missions increasingly involve complex intrastate conflicts that challenge long-held ideas about neutrality, force, and the role of negotiation. The great number of actors and the many contingencies in these conflicts are difficult to control, and it should therefore be of no surprise that the UN has had varied levels of success in carrying out its mandates. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), during which a UN hostage crisis erupted in May of 2000, is among the latest peacekeeping operations to experience serious setbacks in the field. UNAMSIL follows on the heels of missions in Somalia (UNOSOM) and Rwanda (UNAMIR), whose own respective difficulties spawned a flurry of literature pinpointing lessons for future operations. Many lessons indeed have been identified from these and other missions, and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) keeps records of these, making them available to officials and the public. The collection of lessons is useless, however, unless they are applied to future missions so that the mistakes that occurred once do not occur again. The UN must take careful account of its successes and failures if it is to acclimate itself to the challenges of the post-Cold War international system.
This article takes a three-part look at the performance of the UN in Sierra Leone. Using published compilations of lessons gathered by the DPKO from UNOSOM and UNAMIR, the first section of the article analyzes the extent to which these lessons were applied to UNAMSIL. It argues that three main factors contributing to UNAMSIL’s May 2000 deterioration could have been mitigated by the application of relevant lessons. These factors were the failure to use mandated force; the lack of progress in the Disarmament, Demobiliza-tion and Reintegration Program (DDR); and the ineffective dissemination of information to the people of Sierra Leone, particularly the ex-combatants.
The second section of the article attempts to place UNAMSIL’s procedural flaws into perspective with a discussion of the deeper problems that hampered both the mission and Sierra Leone’s hopes for peace. It posits that despite the hostage crisis, UNAMSIL’s action in Sierra Leone should not be considered a "failure" of UN peacekeeping. The final section revisits UNAMSIL now one year after the hostage crisis of May/June 2000. It assesses the extent to which the three factors originally contributing to the crisis have been since addressed, and looks at the prospects for peace in Sierra Leone. The article ultimately concludes that while current negotiations coupled with UNAMSIL’s improvement over the past year have increased the chances of peace, the changing character of the war in Sierra Leone presents new obstacles.
LESSONS UNAPPLIED
The Civil War in Sierra Leone
Despite the inevitability of oversimplification, a brief history is due of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Civil war broke out in the country in 1991, when a militia of rebels calling itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) mobilized to overthrow the government of elected president Joseph Momoh.1 The government army initially defended against the RUF, but then eventually itself deposed Momoh in 1992, and imposed military rule under Captain Valentine Strasser.2 Although the RUF was also led by a former member of the Sierra Leone Army—Foday Sankoh—the change in the country’s leadership did not quiet the rebels for very long, and fighting continued.3
Interestingly enough, elements of the international community were involved in the civil war from almost its very beginning. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional organization of which Sierra Leone was a member, sent its Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to help defend the Momoh Government in 1991.4 After the army coup, ECOWAS, working with the Organization for African Unity and a Special Representative of UN Secretary General Annan, managed to negotiate a deal with the military leadership which resulted in elections and a return to civilian rule in 1996—now under President Ahmed Kabbah.5
Kabbah’s rule, however, was recognized neither by the RUF, nor by all members of the Sierra Leone Army. This time under the leadership of Major Johnny Paul Koroma, army elements calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) joined together with RUF forces to execute another coup against the government in 1997, deposing Kabbah, who fled to Guinea.6 The AFRC and the RUF formed a ruling junta which refused to step down despite international sanctions.7
This junta was overthrown by ECOMOG troops in early 1998, and the Kabbah Government reinstalled. In mid-1998 the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established to monitor and advise attempts to demobilize rebels and restructure the country’s security forces.8 The rebels continued to fight against the Kabbah Government, however, and gained control over large parts of Sierra Leone.9 In January of 1999, they advanced upon the capital of Freetown, and once again deposed Kabbah, but were driven out by ECOMOG troops within a few weeks.10 In the interim, the rebels proceeded to inflict atrocious violence on the civilian population of Freetown—their signature strategy of intimidation—including slaughter, rape, and amputation.11
In light of the growing threat to civilians and the difficulty of subduing the rebels, a series of diplomatic efforts were launched by the UN Special Representative to open up dialogue with the RUF. These efforts led to a negotiation between the Kabbah Government and the RUF in May of 1999, and to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement in July 1999.12 The Lome Agreement, which called for a permanent end to hostilities, the transformation of the RUF into a political party, the formation of a government of national unity, and the monitoring and aid of the UN and ECOMOG, was not without controversy.13 Its provisions also included the pardon of Foday Sankoh and RUF rebels for any crimes committed during the war, and the guarantee of four RUF-filled cabinet posts in the new government. Sankoh himself was put in charge of the country’s diamond mines—a perhaps questionable move, given the RUF’s history of financing their exploits with smuggled diamonds14—but one apparently necessary for peace. In light of several broken cease-fire agreements that had been made and obliterated throughout the eight year conflict, the commitment of the RUF to the peace accord was difficult to gauge.15 Yet despite Lome’s flaws, its alternative was continued violence. This was the tenuous environment that greeted UNAMSIL upon its deployment in December of 1999.
The Failure to Use Mandated Force
The Lome Agreement called for the creation of a neutral peacekeeping force, comprised of UNOMSIL and ECOMOG, which would disarm all ex-combatants.16 To this end, in September of 1999, Secretary General Annan outlined his ideas for the formation of UNAMSIL, a United Nations peacekeeping force which was to include a substantial amount of troops from countries participating in ECOMOG at that time. UNAMSIL was not to have an enforcement mandate (which meant that it could not coercively implement the Lome Agreement, but did not exclude the use of force in the execution of UNAMSIL’s mandated duties). Instead, enforcement of the peace agreement and maintenance of peace and security were to remain the responsibility of ECOMOG, as provided for by its mandate. In UNOSOM and UNAMIR, the UN learned that it was not capable of undertaking major enforcement action, and that a coalition of states was better suited for such measures.17 Unfortunately, as Annan was formulating the concept of UNAMSIL in August of 1999, he received word from Nigerian president Obasanjo that Nigeria would soon begin a gradual withdrawal of its substantial force from ECOMOG.18 Despite this fact, plans for UNAMSIL went forward, as a neutral force was needed to facilitate the DDR program.19
It is interesting to note, therefore, that in his September 23, 1999 report to the security council Annan stated,
The concept of operations for [UNAMSIL] is predicated upon ECOMOG remaining in Sierra Leone. Conversely, in the eventuality of the withdrawal of Nigerian troops, as announced by President Obasanjo, a reassessment will be required. . . addressing the additional tasks for and possible strengthening of [UNAMSIL] to assume the functions now fulfilled by ECOMOG.20
In light of past missions, it was unlikely that Annan in 1999 would have proposed, or the Security Council authorized, an enforcement mandate for UNAMSIL. UN officials most probably hoped that by the time ECOMOG withdrew, the situation in Sierra Leone would be stable enough not to require enforcement action on the part of the UN. If such was their assumption, it was a dangerous one to make. As ECOMOG’s withdrawal drew near, the DDR process was not up to speed, and the restructured army and police force—meant to fill the security gap left by the withdrawing ECOMOG—were not ready. The UN was in a quandary. It could neither take over ECOMOG’s mandate, nor withdraw its forces and leave Sierra Leone to spiral back into civil war. The best the UN could do at that stage was to enlarge the size of its force, take on some of ECOMOG’s more important responsibilities, and continue working with the Kabbah government to improve Sierra Leone’s police force and restructure its army enough to ensure some measure of security for the country. Unfortunately, the situation did not remain stable long enough for this to transpire, and one key reason for the May 2000 hostage crisis was UNAMSIL’s early and continuous failure to use justifiable force.
One of the lessons learned from UNOSOM was the importance of the use of necessary mandated force with determination, and early on in a mission.21 Such action establishes the idea that the UN is serious about its operations. UNAMSIL’s use of its mandated force in self defense would have sent the message that encroachment on the rights and safety of its troops was not advisable. Annan emphasized the importance of a UN force, "large and capable," that "should operate on the basis of robust rules of engagement," when presenting his concept of UNAMSIL to the Security Council.22 The Council, in turn, granted UNAMSIL authority to, "take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel" in the discharge of its mandate.23 Although they were authorized to use force in the execution of their mandate, reported incidents of UNAMSIL troops being passively disarmed by rebels go back to January 2000.24
A good case can be made for the argument that the UN troops sent by member countries to Sierra Leone were poorly trained and ill-equipped. Ample evidence of this can be found throughout Annan’s reports, and in statements made by UN officials in Sierra Leone and New York. Countries with well trained armies, such as Great Britain and the United States, did not contribute peacekeepers to UNAMSIL.25 Many troops came instead from Kenya, Jordan, Guinea, and Zambia—poor countries whose militaries had limited training and experience. Also important in the evaluation of UNAMSIL is the idea that UN forces are at a disadvantage because they come from countries with different procedures, equipment, rates of deployment, and degrees of preparedness. One UNAMSIL spokesman characterized these problems as "the inherent weakness of UN peacekeeping as it is presently structured."26
Beyond this, however, UNAMSIL’s non-engagement problems may be partly attributable to the attitudes of core leadership. While Force Commander Jetley began to emphasize to his troops the need for more assertive behavior upon the urging of Annan, in interviews he continued to maintain that UNAMSIL’s actions were predicated upon restraint and caution.27 This seems at odds with Annan’s "robust rules of engagement."28 Commenting on a January disarmament of a Kenyan battalion, Mission Chief Adeniji said, "Should they turn this into a fight they knew they were going to lose . . . or do they let [the RUF] have [the equipment], knowing we will get the weapons back?"29 Such a statement seems to suggest a lack of consideration for the crucial long-run role of justifiable force in building rebel respect for UNAMSIL troops.
It should be noted that military strategy in a complex security environment such as that of Sierra Leone is difficult to assess out of context. Moreover, the commitment of UNAMSIL leadership to the immediate safety of their contingents is commendable. UNAMSIL’s early inaction, however, clearly emboldened rebels to step up their attacks on troops and loot equipment. By the time the RUF decided to launch a hostage campaign, it had learned to expect little resistance.
The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
RUF leader Foday Sankoh’s apparent lack of commitment to the disarmament of RUF forces strongly contributed to the slow progress of the DDR program in the months before the hostage crisis. UNAMSIL, whose involvement with DDR hinged on the cooperation of the faction leaders, had no mandate to compel Sankoh to positive action. It did, however, have a measure of control and involvement with other aspects of the DDR process that had a direct impact on DDR’s level of success.
UNAMSIL, along with other major stakeholders (ECOMOG, RUF, AFRC, donor representatives, and the Kabbah Government) constituted the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), the main policy body guiding the DDR program. In the beginning days of the UNAMSIL mission, the committee met weekly to discuss ways of accelerating DDR.30 In its capacity as an advisor, and to the extent possible in a forum whose actors may not all have been listening, UNAMSIL should have more actively emphasized the DDR lessons learned from the UN’s own past campaigns. The UN had significant self-interest to protect, and thousands of ex-combatants to affect, by taking a strong lead in guiding DDR policy. As UNAMSIL was the dominant international body working with the DDR program, the international community would consider it accountable for DDR failures regardless of how many other actors were involved. Furthermore, DDR was an extremely important component of the peace process for two logical reasons: as long as ex-combatants remained armed and unemployed, not only did incentives for a return to conflict remain high, but so too did the chance that small confrontations would turn into large scale warfare.
There is no doubt that Secretary General Annan was aware of the relevant DDR lessons weeded out from UNOSOM and other missions—he cited the important elements of the DDR process in his March 7, 2000 report when calling for action.31 Rather, it is the extent to which UNAMSIL leadership facilitated the application of those lessons, and more importantly, their timely application, that is questionable. The DDR program suffered from key logistical weaknesses clearly warned against in DPKO literature. The first of these weaknesses was the lack of coordination between demobilization and reintegration. The success of demobilization efforts depends upon effective reintegration activities, which are needed to prevent the pooling of ex-combatants at demobilization camps, and to raise incentives for DDR by quickly re-involving ex-combatants in desirable and productive activities. Unbalanced development of the two elements in Sierra Leone led to the build up of large numbers of ex-combatants at demobilization centers. The result was unrest and even violence at centers in Port Loko and Lungi.32 In each of his regular reports to the Security Council, beginning with December of 1999, Annan urged the speedy development and implementation of a comprehensive plan for reintegration. Yet not until April 7, 2000 were significant steps forward taken by the NCDDR.33 As a result, hundreds of ex-combatants who had not yet reintegrated reportedly left the camps and rearmed when the May 2000 crisis erupted.
DPKO literature also notes the tie between successful reintegration and the restructuring of the national army, which should be able to absorb a large number of ex-combatants.34 Despite this fact, significant progress was not made in the restructuring of the Sierra Leone army, and in his March 2000 report Annan was still calling for such a restructuring. Although the lead on restructuring belonged to the Sierra Leone government, its importance to DDR should have propelled UNAMSIL’s NCDDR advisors to lobby more actively for action.
The Ineffective Dissemination of Information
Another factor limiting the success of DDR was the lack of information dissemination to ex-combatants about the provisions of the DDR program. Because ex-combatants are often reluctant to register for DDR unless they know what they will receive in return, a DDR information strategy is highly important.35 Many Sierra Leonean ex-combatants were unaware of the provisions of the program, and also worried about whether or not they would be able to join the new army after DDR. Such worries led to reluctance to demobilize. Annan noted the lack of DDR understanding among ex-combatants in his December 6, 1999 report, and urged mitigation efforts.36 Unfortunately, continued lack of information was cited well into April 2000.37
Information problems contributed to more than just the slow progress of DDR, however. On a wider scale, the ineffective dissemination of information lessened the extent of UNAMSIL’s influence and the size of its potential support base in the country. Evaluations of both UNOSOM and UNOMIR had emphasized the importance of establishing effective public information mechanisms from the outset of a mission. Assessments of UNOSOM’s problems noted the lack of an integrated information strategy, and an "inadequate emphasis on information related to the long-term aspects of UN involvement in Somalia."38 The same inability to effectively inform the public was noted in UNAMIR, and was particularly tragic in Rwanda in the face of negative broadcasts from Radio Mille Collins.39 In Sierra Leone, limited information from UNAMSIL allowed for a virtual information monopoly by rebel leaders, whose influence over the views and actions of their combatants was thus increased. A telling quote was given by one man, who explained, "[The RUF] are uneducated boys who don’t know what the United Nations is. [A lot of them] think it’s just some other country, like Sierra Leone."40 This statement sheds some light on RUF behavior towards UNAMSIL and the manipulative power available to Sankoh.
Annan’s reports do not emphasize calls for the set up of a country wide public information campaign in Sierra Leone until March of 2000.41 By that time, however, Sankoh had already issued several hostile public statements about UNAMSIL.42 In a subsequent statement on May 1, he falsely accused UNAMSIL of seriously injuring rebels in a shootout, and the increased tension that resulted between the RUF and UNAMSIL exploded into the hostage crisis.43
BROADER CONSIDERATIONS
On May 1, 2000, after months of successfully disarming UN contingents, RUF forces detained a group on UNAMSIL personnel after a skirmish at a DDR camp in Makeni (CRS 5). The hostage crisis began, ironically, almost one year after the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement. The last ECOMOG troops withdrew from Sierra Leone on May 2, as previously scheduled, 44 and within six days, approximately 500 members of UNAMSIL had been taken hostage. 45 The majority of these were released between mid-May and late June as a result of negotiations, but fresh abductions continued into July, amidst an atmosphere of increasing violence.
Troops from the United Kingdom (UK) arrived in early May to evacuate their nationals, and maintained a military presence in Sierra Leone until mid-June, when they pulled out, leaving behind a contingent of military personnel for the purpose of training the Sierra Leone army.46 Also in early May, Sankoh went into hiding, but was subsequently captured and taken into government custody. 47
As the crisis unfolded, several immediate problems faced UNAMSIL. The imminent pullout of UK troops, whose presence had bolstered the confidence of both the UNAMSIL contingents and the civilian population, threatened to further undermine stability. Meanwhile, the future structure of UNAMSIL—which would play a decisive role in the aftermath of UK withdrawal—was shrouded in uncertainty. Events had shown that a stronger international presence was unarguably needed in Sierra Leone. Who could best provide that presence, however, remained a question. The United States initially backed, and then withdrew support for a separate West African Force under Nigerian leadership. 48 If more troops were simply to be incorporated into the existing UNAMSIL force, however, would anything really be accomplished? The enlargement of UNAMSIL in preparation for ECOMOG’s departure had done little to help mitigate the pre-crisis situation. Similarly, an even larger force, serving under the same type of mandate, with the same ill-trained troops—even if fortified by some well-trained troops—seemed to hold little promise. In addition, the now heightened mistrust between the rebel groups, the fear of retribution, and the lack of confidence in the ability of UNAMSIL to maintain order threatened to seriously challenge the foundering DDR program and propel more ex-combatants back into the field. These problems together with the deteriorating security environment fueled questions of UNAMSIL’s validity.
Judging UNAMSIL
In light of the questions surrounding its efficacy, the performance of UNAMSIL preceding the hostage crisis and the subsequent deterioration of the Lome Peace Agreement is particularly interesting to analyze. UNAMSIL added a new element to the conflict in Sierra Leone—a requested UN peacekeeping force—but seemingly produced little variation from the pattern of strife, becoming, instead, itself a victim of the violence. Does the performance of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone thus constitute a failure of UN peacekeeping?
More than from its procedural flaws, UNAMSIL’s problems stemmed ultimately from conditions outside the mission’s control. The Lome Agreement paved the way for UNAMSIL into Sierra Leone, but did so without laying a strong enough foundation. Although it helped to advance the agenda of peace and provide a path towards conflict resolution, Lome- like so many other treaties crafted out of the need for a break from violence—was a shot in the dark. As long as both sides to the conflict found it expedient to support Lome, the treaty—with UN help—had a chance at establishing lasting peace. Once the RUF no longer found the treaty’s provisions in line with its goals, however, Lome had little chance of succeeding without a treaty-enforcement effort—and this was not something that UNAMSIL was intended to undertake.
Clearly, vital lessons recognized at the highest levels were not applied in the field in Sierra Leone—this is the failure of the UN in Sierra Leone, and it is a failure that the Department of Peacekeep-ing Operations should have been able to avoid. Had the UN paid more careful attention to its own lessons from past missions, the exploits of the rebel factions would likely have been checked with greater success, and the hostage crisis likely would have been averted, leaving more resources available for bolstering the peace process. Most importantly, UNAMSIL would have figured more prominently in RUF cost-benefit assessments of their commitment to Lome, possibly decreasing incentives to violate the peace process. It would be naive to think, however, that Sierra Leone would have been on the fragile road to success a year and a half ago if only the UN had applied its peacekeeping lessons in the field—by exhibiting a strong and early will to defend itself, successfully completing the DDR of ex-combatants, better providing for the security of the country, or showing stronger leadership in other areas. The situation in countries needing UN help is never so clear cut.
As Annan’s reports show, UNAMSIL’s entire structure was designed with the Lome Agreement’s guarantees of security, support, and free access in mind. As these guarantees were not backed up by all parties, UNAMSIL was legitimately crippled. If any lesson stands out from fifty years of UN peacekeeping, it is that without the commitment of all paries involved, there can be no peace.
LOOKING BACK, THINKING AHEAD
One Year After the Hostage Crisis
Despite the odds against peace, UNAMSIL did not withdraw from Sierra Leone as a result of the hostage crisis. Instead, in mid-July 2000 the UN launched a successful armed rescue operation to free the remaining 233 hostages (CRS 5). A relative quiet descended over Sierra Leone in August 2000 as both sides held their positions, although sporadic attacks by rebel groups persisted, and both the government and RUF forces continued to stand poised for further military action.49 The RUF designated an interim leader?Issa Sesay?to replace Sankoh, and this designation allowed UNAMSIL to open channels of communication with the RUF.50 In October 2000 RUF leaders used these channels to express their interest in a cease-fire and a return to the Lome Peace Agreement.
After a meeting in November between RUF, UNAMSIL, ECOWAS, and the Sierra Leone Government, the Abuja Cease-fire Agreement was signed between the Government and the RUF on November 10, 2000.51 The Abuja Agreement established a thirty-day cease-fire, and required the RUF to allow UNAMSIL’s deployment throughout the country, provide for unimpeded movement of people and goods, return the weapons seized from UNAMSIL during the hostage crisis, and resume disarming by the DDR program.52 Fighting subsided as a result of the cease-fire, but by March 2001 the RUF had not yet returned all weapons, facilitated free movement of people and goods, or allowed UNAMSIL full access to RUF-controlled areas.53 As this article was nearing completion in early May 2001, however, a new set of peace talks opened in Abuja, Nigeria, between the RUF and government of Sierra Leone.54
The pending round of Abuja Peace talks brings Sierra Leone once again to a beginning. As the conflict enters its eleventh year, the country is winding down another cycle of violence with yet another attempt at peace. Both the government and RUF leadership have emphasized their interest in the current peace process,55 but past experience casts a shadow of doubt over true rebel commitment to a lasting peace, and the question remains of whether Sierra Leone is destined to once again repeat its cyclical pattern of violence.
One year after the hostage crisis, however, UNAMSIL stands better prepared to aid with a peace process if one should be negotiated The hostage crisis provided a dramatic example of the consequences caused by the failure to use mandated force. Although the DPKO had already documented the importance of early and determined use of mandated force in the establishment of rebel respect for UN peacekeepers,56 nothing brought that point to light more clearly than the 500 UN hostages. The July 2000 hostage-rescue operation effectively compelled UNAMSIL to use its mandated force to the full extent,57 and UNAMSIL took the opportunity to reassert its credibility and willingness to carry out its original robust rules of engagement (CRS 5). In August 2000, at the same time that the force on the ground was becoming more effective, the UN Security Council authorized a broader mandate for UNAMSIL and added to its numbers. More importantly, it supplemented this action with efforts to increase training of troops and provide a troop-information program to explain the provisions of the mandate to all UNAMSIL members.58
With the gradual stabilization of the security environment within Sierra Leone, prospects for the future of the DDR program have become much more positive than had been expected in the immediate aftermath of the hostage crisis. With the DDR inadequacies and their consequences fresh in the minds of the NCDDR in mid-2000, members stepped up their efforts to rehaul the DDR program and address its flaws to the extent possible.59 An independent commission, sponsored by the UK Department for International Development and the World Bank, subsequently conducted its own comprehensive review of the DDR program.60
These review groups concluded?as had the UN in evaluations of UNOSOM and UNAMIR?that greater emphasis needed to be placed on reintegration programs to absorb demobilized ex-combatants.61 Now bolstered by increased monetary support from the international community in light of the publicity generated by the hostage crisis?this well recognized lesson began to be applied with greater success. By March of 2001, 6,853 ex-combatants were involved in reintegration projects, and capacity existed for another 4,300.62 In addition, 1,800 combatants demobilized and entered reintegration programs between May 2000 and March 2001 despite the concurrent conflict.63
The positive developments on the DDR front in the year after the hostage crisis have been complemented by significant improvements in the information dissemination program. Radio UNAMSIL was established in July of 2000, and began broadcasting important information about political and military developments in Sierra Leone, the activities of the UN and its partner agencies, and UNAMSIL’s role and function in the country.64 This key expansion of the UN’s information dissemination capacity will likely play an important role in the success of UNAMSIL’s future efforts.
UNAMSIL and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone
Rarely, if ever, does an operation get what essentially amounts to a second chance at making a first impression. UNAMSIL may have that chance if the Abuja Peace talks can create conditions for a peace maintainable by careful monitoring and demobilization efforts. Several important considerations remain, however. Just as the character of UNAMSIL has changed over the past year, so too has that of Sierra Leone’s war.
One new factor is the increased disunity that has emerged within the RUF.65 Not all elements of the RUF recognize Sesay as their new leader, and splintering groups may launch attacks on UNAMSIL regardless of any RUF-negotiated agreements. A second development is the growing regionalization of the conflict. Since August of 2000, border attacks by RUF and Liberian forces in Guinea, and by Guinean forces on RUF positions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, have increased in intensity.66 Even if UNAMSIL can secure the territory of Sierra Leone, rebel elements may be able to take advantage of the decreased security environment in the border areas of Guinea and Liberia to continue attacks from abroad. Liberia’s growing turmoil may also dampen prospects for controlling the diamonds-for-arms trade channeled through its territory?a practice that has sustained the RUF war effort, and one which the UN had hoped to bring under control.
UNAMSIL’s own concept of operations also faces obstacles. UNAMSIL plans to deploy its troops into RUF-controlled areas in successive phases, restore law and stability, and create the environment necessary to enable the Sierra Leone Army to step in and take over security measures, and the Government to extend its authority.67 Forward deployment into RUF-controlled areas, however, requires significantly more troops than are currently at the UN’s disposal, and it seems unlikely that UNAMSIL will receive the full amount of troops recommended as necessary by Annan, given the lack of response from potential troop donor countries.68
With the numerous potential problems posed by these contingencies and others that may arise, it is utterly important that additional setbacks not also arise from UNAMSIL’s inability to prevent well-identified procedural flaws from occurring in the future. UNAMSIL must continue to act with extreme care, both for its own benefit and for that of Sierra Leone. The window of opportunity for peace in Sierra Leone is shrinking with time as the number of children raised in an environment of conflict increases, the country’s limited capital and infrastructure deteriorate, and the rich mineral resources that may hold the key to an eventual economic recovery are siphoned away to pay for weapons. Although the international community may criticize the UN for its mistakes in the field, the general refusal to address conflict in Africa on a bi- and multilateral basis puts such criticism on precarious ground. As the UN is called upon to deal with complex conflicts more frequently in the years to come, its successes, as well as its failures, will be subject to increased scrutiny. Into which of these two categories Sierra Leone will ultimately be placed remains to be seen, and the stakes are incredibly high.
Endnotes
1 http://www.rnw.nl/humanrights/html/historysl.html
2 http://www.rnw.nl/humanrights/html/historysl.html
3 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm
4 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm
5 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm
6 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm, http://www.rnw.nl/humanrights/ html/historysl.html
7 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm
8 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm
9 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm
10 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm
11 http://www.rnw.nl/humanrights/html/historysl.html
12 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsil/ UnamsilB.htm
13 http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/
1c963eb504904cde41256782007493b8/
846044f5f1f66f2dc1256827004c28f4?OpenDocument,
http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/sierra/flash/0,6189,218993,00.html
14 http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/sierra/ flash/0,6189,218993,00.html
15 http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/sierra/ flash/0,6189,218993,00.html
16 (Peace Agreement, XIII-XX)
17 (General Framework, 85)
18 Annan, Kofi A.. Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, para. 36. UN page www.un.org/docs/sc/reports/1999/1003e.pdf. Document dated: 1999. Document accessed: April 2001.
19 ECOMOG was not considered a neutral force by many of the rebel elements, and its phased withdrawal was called for in the Lome peace agreement (Peace Agreement, XII-XX).
20 Annan, Kofi A.. Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, para. 50. UN page www.un.org/docs/sc/reports/1999/1003e.pdf. Document dated: 1999. Document accessed: April 2001.
21 Ottunnu, Olara A., and Doyle, Michael W.. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. Lanham, MD. 1998, p. 280.
22 Annan, Kofi A.. Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, para. 43. UN page www.un.org/docs/sc/reports/1999/1003e.pdf. Document dated: 1999. Document accessed: April 2001.
23 (S/RES/1270 [1999], para. 14)
24 Lynch, Colum. "UN Troops Disarmed in Sierra Leone," The Washington Post. Monday, February 7, 2000. A1.
25 Annan, Kofi A.. Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, annex. UN page www.un.org/ docs/sc/reports/2000/455e.pdf. Document dated: May 2000. Document accessed: April 2001.
26 Rupert, James. "Imminent British Departure Worries Sierra Leoneans," The Washington Post. Sunday, May 28, 2000. A24.
27 Farah, Douglas. "Diamonds are a Rebel’s Best Friend," The Washington Post. Monday, April 17, 2000. A12.
28 Annan, Kofi A.. Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, para. 43. UN page www.un.org/ docs/sc/reports/1999/1003e.pdf. Document dated: 1999. Document accessed: April 2001.
29 Lynch, Colum. "UN Troops Disarmed in Sierra Leone," The Washington Post. Monday, February 7, 2000. A1.
30 Annan, Kofi A.. First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, para. 17. UN page www.un.org/ docs/sc/reports/1999/1223e.pdf. Document dated: 1999. Document accessed: April 2001.
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34 (Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping, P 1)
35 (Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping, 7)
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38 (Lessons Learned from Somalia, 59)
39 Belgian Radio Mille Collins broadcast anti Tutsi hate messages in the weeks preceding the Rwandan genocide of 1994. (Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping, 86)
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44 (S/2000/445, para. 59)
45 (CRS 5).
46 (S/2000/455 para. 69, and S/2000/751, para. 20).
47 (S/2000/455 para. 74).
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54 (cnn.com SL reconsiders).
55 (CNN May 4 and CNN May 2 truce talks launched)
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65 CRS, 6.
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