Responding to Regional Challengers in a Unipolar System

An Appraisal of East Asian Balancing and Bandwagoning

China's expanding military capabilities have not gone unnoticed by neighboring countries in East Asia. Seeking to understand why regional states have failed to engage in "balancing" behavior to match China's new capabilities, as classical neorealist theory would suggest, Jason Kelly qualifies the neorealist position by presenting East Asia as a historically and culturally unique case. Yet after taking into consideration the United States' significant presence in the region, Kelly concludes with a reaffirmation of the international applicability of neorealism.

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It is not a recent development or a disputed trend amongst scholars and government analysts that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is dedicating greater national resources to the improvement of its armed forces, the People's Liberation Army (PLA).[1] Yet as Chinese military spending mounts, the East Asian states that appear most threatened by these increases seem blithely unmoved. The Republic of Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore have all failed to reciprocate with comparable and consistent increases in defense spending. Nor have regional states made efforts to balance China's rise through the formation of alliances that exclude the PRC, which has joined all of the existing regional forums devoted to security issues.

The trend toward greater ties between the PRC and its neighbors, in light of China's substantial increases in defense spending, appears to contradict the core precept of neorealism. Neorealists contend that in an anarchic system with no central authority to protect states from one another, weaker states respond to powerful rivals by balancing them.[2] As Stephen Walt has argued in his analysis of balancing behavior in the Middle East within a bipolar international system, regional states are sensitive to threats from other local powers.[3] Similarly, the implicit threat posed by a proximate state's increased capabilities should move East Asian states to heighten security through alliances or improvements in their own capabilities, not forge closer ties with a rising China.[4] Several scholars have sought to explain this anomalous behavior by using analytical frameworks that eschew neorealism and focus instead on the distinctive cultural, historical, and political characteristics of East Asia. The lesson to be learned from these approaches, as David Kang points out, is that the theoretical foundation of neorealism may offer limited utility beyond the boundaries of

Western Europe.[5] If this is true, such a limitation would have significant implications for the study of international relations—namely, that perhaps international relations theoreticians should cede academic ground to area specialists when examining interstate relations outside of Europe.[6] However, this may be a premature conclusion. Equally hasty is the assessment that the absence of a balance of powers in East Asia confirms the inadequacy of neorealism when applied to non-Western states.

This essay will reconcile the disconnect between the fundamental principles that support neorealist approaches to international relations and the absence of balancing behavior in East Asia today. The first section frames the discussion by delineating the core tenets of Kenneth Waltz's theory of international relations and examining the Chinese military's organization of an increasingly modern and minatory military. The second section reviews literature that attempts to explain the lack of East Asian balancing by jettisoning Waltz's conception of the international system. The final section reappraises the applicability of neorealist thought to current security trends in East Asia. Fundamentally, East Asian power dynamics must be viewed from within the context of a unipolar international system. Central to this interpretation is the notion that East Asian states, which should feel threatened by a rise in Chinese capabilities, are assuaged by the presence of the United States in the region because of its commitment to maintain the status quo of power distribution. Neorealism remains an important framework for understanding East Asian international politics, and this becomes clear only after examining the impact of United States military power in East Asia on regional states' decision making.

Neorealism, China's Rise & the Lack of Balancing

As defined by Waltz, an international system is composed of a structure with interacting units.[7] Of central importance to Waltz's interpretation of the international system is the concept that the units constituting the system, in this case East Asian states, operate in an environment of insecurity caused by the absence of an omnipotent international arbiter capable of enforcing peaceable relations and other political agreements. Since any state may use force at any time, all states must be prepared to act or otherwise "live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors."[8] Moreover, uncertainty over the actions and intentions of other states constrains the ability of individual states to cooperate with one another.[9]

These structural characteristics press leaders to formulate and implement foreign policy with one ultimate goal --- to ensure their state's survival. Nevertheless, leaders of these states cannot act with perfect knowledge and wisdom.[10] Structural factors, according to Waltz, do not necessarily predict with perfect or even near-perfect accuracy the behavior of individual states. Waltz argues that behavioral patterns emerge, rather, from the structural constraints of the system. It follows that such changes influence expectations of how system units will behave and what outcomes state actions will produce.[11]

Waltz's theory of international politics has generated much debate, particularly when scholars attempt to cultivate policy prescriptions or predictions, and apply the theory to political developments. Scholars often fail to distinguish

between the broad, systemic nature of Waltz's theory and a more precise theory of foreign policy.[12] As Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder point out, the simplicity of Waltz's model leaves sufficient room for scholars to deduce opposing foreign policy behavior in identical contexts.[13] In an attempt to make the leap from systemic to foreign policy theory, additional variables are often appended to Waltz's framework to account for the predominance of one outcome over another.[14]

Scholars have added many independent variables in order to explain and predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior. Deborah Larson, for example, posits that weak states, as demonstrated through state-society relations, may have incentives to bandwagon in order to retain authority.[15] Steven David also taps domestic influences as a contributing cause for balancing behavior. David argues that leaders face the need to "appease secondary adversaries, as well as to balance against both internal and external threats in order to survive in power."[16] These addenda, however, do not necessarily contravene the fundamental tenets of Waltz's systemic theory, that anarchy is the constant structural element in the international system and that polarity is the variable.

The grist in Waltz's theoretical mill is the dynamic dispersion of power capabilities in the international system. What reactions are expected in response to the increasing relative capabilities of another state? Nations are generally viewed as facing two sets of options when responding to rising threats. Balancing is the act of "allying with others against the prevailing threat," while bandwagoning, by contrast, is the act of "joining the potentially threatening state."[17]

To determine whether a neorealist framework is applicable to the strategic environment in East Asia, we must first demonstrate that China presents a growing threat to other regional states. The observation that Chinese military spending is increasing is not sufficient evidence since relative strength is most important to the neorealist paradigm. Also critical is an understanding of how funding is allocated to military resources. For example, does funding translate directly and efficiently into greater power projection capabilities and increased threat?

China is among the top military spenders in East Asia as indicated by Figure 1 below, and its expenditure has increased substantially in the past two decades. Because the perception of a threat encourages balancing or bandwagoning behavior, Figure 1 plots military expenditures rather than

Figure 1 Military Expenditure as a Percentage of Regional Total



Figure 1 indicates each state's percentage contribution to total military spending among East and Southeast Asia's top 14 military spenders.

Correlates of War (COW) measures. COW figures are a composite index of total population, urban population, energy consumption, steel production, and military personnel, which are all equally weighted. Generally speaking, fluctuations in military expenditures have a more direct impact on the quality and capacity of a national military than on energy consumption and steel production. Demographic indicators, because of their relative stasis, contribute little to intra-generational adjustments as responses to threat perception. As William Wohlforth has noted, pre-1914 decision makers in Europe paid close attention to estimates of military expenditures and personnel, estimates which "clearly influenced the formation of perceptions."[18] Similar approaches to observing military threats, while certainly more sophisticated, doubtlessly still hold sway today.

The remaining question is how increased funding being allocated to the PLA Military imports serve as the apex of Beijing's "Three-Ways" acquisition guidance policy.[19] Indigenous military technology in China is far from cutting-edge. As a result, Beijing has focused its efforts on creating "pockets of excellence" within the PLA through the importation of critical advanced weaponry. Most noteworthy are acquisitions from cash-strapped Russia. Guided-missile destroyers, Sukkhoi Su-30 MKK fighter bombers, as well as Su-30MK2, IL-76 transport planes and IL-78 MIDAS air refueling aircrafts have helped to expand China's power projection frontier and to pull neighboring states into range.[20] Improving missile capabilities, consequently, has had a direct impact on threat perceptions in East Asia.

These improvements in power projection capabilities should be put into context. The power inherent in these advanced weapon systems as well as historical circumstances support the contention that China is swiftly rising to a great power status. For much of the twentieth century, China was an inward-looking military power that emphasized

Figure 2 Annual Military Expenditures in Five of China's Neighboring States



Figure 2 plots changes in annual military expenditures in five of China's neighboring states. The only recent spurt in defense spending in Thailand served to replace depleted ammunition and fuel reserves rather than boost capabilities. In May 2001, Bangkok announced a policy of no new weapons procurement.

the role of ground troops and that promoted a military doctrine privileging a People's War.[21] From this meager starting point, current developments in naval, air, and missile technology appear all the more impressive.

Nevertheless, neighboring East Asian states have failed to engage in traditional balancing behavior in response to improving PLA capabilities; defense spending by other East Asian states remains unperturbed (see Figure 2).[22] Even more surprising from a neorealist point of view is that China became a dialogue partner and later a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a regional political and security multilateral venue, in 2002. With the exception of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Burma (Myanmar), regional states do not seem to be bandwagoning with China either. Each state has maintained or improved relations with the United States, a major military power located in East Asia, while simultaneously increasing commercial, cultural, and popular interactions with China.

Inductive Interpretations

Several scholars have furnished analytical appraisals of the absence of balancing in East Asia, but each has deviated, either implicitly or explicitly, from the anarchic, self-help international structure posited by Waltz. David Kang suggests that international relations theory, originally derived from Western European experience, is not applicable to East Asia. Asian international relations, he argues, differ from European- and US-centric models, a fact that seems to be confirmed by the lack of balancing behavior against China.[23] Asian states do not fear for their survival.[24] Rather, Asia's distinctive historical and cultural mores have fashioned a normative regional environment that shapes the conception, construction, and implementation of foreign policy.[25] Historically, when China was weak, chaos erupted in East Asia; when China was strong, order was preserved. The absence of regional balancing against a rising Chinese threat could be understood as a natural response.[26]

This interpretation is unconvincing for several reasons. To start with, it implicitly assumes other states in East Asia are comfortable with China's position at the apex of an East Asian hierarchy. Foreign policy makers in Hanoi, for example, would disagree with this notion in light of China's repeated invasions during the thirteenth, fifteenth, eighteenth, and twentieth centuries. Another problem is explaining where Japan's aggressive foreign policy throughout the 1930s and early 1940s fits into this interpretation. Indeed, Japan's aggression coincided with and was perhaps triggered by China's military and political weakness at the time. However, Japan's inability to adopt aggressive foreign and military policy in the presence of a powerful China and its presumed comfort with such a hierarchic environment are two different and separate issues. The notion that Japan would acquiesce to a militarily dominant China without the benefit of US protection is a difficult argument to accept. Furthermore, it is doubtful that leadership circles in Taipei would rest easy with Beijing at the helm of East Asia.

Too much emphasis on the distinctiveness of the East Asian regional system may sacrifice practicality for greater accuracy. Waltz cautions us: "One who wishes to explain rather than to describe should resist moving in that direction if

resistance is reasonable."[27] Descriptive analysis, limited in application to East Asian politics and lacking widely applicable theoretical principles, is a slippery slope. In general, the utility of such approaches is inversely related to the level of detail necessary for insightful analysis. This is not to say that such analyses do not provide insight. Steps toward specificity should be limited so as to maximize the general applicability of an approach.

Furthermore, David Shambaugh argues that international relations theorists often graft overly simplistic and inappropriate paradigms onto East Asia. He urges scholars to generate theory inductively from evidence rather than apply theory deductively to political environments.[28] In East Asia, analogies of former rising powers fail to fit contemporary China and have no precedent in the region. Constructing his own inductive theory of East Asian international relations, Shambaugh fuses liberalist tenets to a constructivist view. Shared norms about interstate relations, Shambaugh argues, form the fabric of the East Asian regional community.[29] Not only does East Asia have a history of China-centered hierarchy, Chinese diplomacy over the past decade has worked consistently to undermine perceptions of China as a threat to its neighbors. As a consequence, most Asian states see China as more benign than malign and often accommodate its rise.[30]

Shambaugh furthers his argument by examining how East Asian leaders conduct foreign policy. Trade between China and the rest of Asia topped $495 billion in 2003, up 36.5% from 2002. Nearly 50% of China's total trade volume is intraregional and relatively balanced.[31] The obvious result, he concludes, is that regional actors share economic disincentives to fight and incentives to cooperate. The normative reluctance to view China as a threat encourages growing interdependence and cooperation among states in the region.[32]

However, by attempting to increase descriptive accuracy, Shambaugh's analysis relinquishes the practicality of his model. His analysis loses sight of some of the fundamental conditions and theoretical groundings of the international and focusing instead on trends and recent history. As Robert Jervis points out, no decision maker can bind himself and his successors to a single path in an anarchic international system.[33] New leaders come to power, values shift, and new opportunities and dangers arise. The absence of guarantees fosters the self-help system described by Waltz.

International recognition of China's good will and Beijing's amassment of political capital or soft power through "remarkably adept and nuanced" diplomacy may be only temporary. Dramatic fluctuations in global perceptions of China and its intentions over the past two decades prove this point. Few leaders were comfortable with the prospects of an emerging Chinese giant in the immediate wake of the Tiananmen Square events in 1989. Using models based solely on past behavior and general trends to forecast the future is dangerous in financial markets where vast sums hang in the balance, and more perilous when national security is at stake.

Evelyn Goh, who focuses on the lack of balancing behavior among Southeast Asian states in response to China's rising power, identifies pressures that offer states a continuum of policy options rather than a stark choice between balancing and bandwagoning. The consensus among these states has been a twin strategy of engagement

with China on the one hand and "soft balancing" against potential Chinese aggression or disruption of the status quo on the other.[34] In her case study approach, Goh examines Vietnamese, Singaporean, and Thai foreign policy, and concludes that states are able to construct portfolios of relations, an argument similar to Shambaugh's.[35] Engagement, defined as the development of closer political and economic ties with a country in order to "draw it into international society, thereby changing its leaders' preferences and actions toward more peaceful inclinations," is a key element in Southeast Asian states' relations with China.[36]

Goh's notion of engagement is a departure from the neorealist framework. In an insecure world, trust is not bankable and no clearly defined "international society" exists to shape normative restraints in state relations. Her approach, however, is distinctive from Kang's and Shambaugh's because it argues that a global normative environment, rather than a regional one, leads Southeast Asian states to refrain from balancing behavior. After identifying international society as an important guiding force in regional foreign policy, Goh moves on to a descriptive analysis that focuses on individual Southeast Asian states' bilateral relations with the United States in order to explain individual foreign policies as a product of each state's distinctive political and security context. In doing so, she returns to the paradigm used by Kang and Shambaugh.

The lack of balancing in East Asia, despite the many distinctive cultural and historical attributes of Asian states, raises the question of whether a common element exists that perhaps a unit-level analysis misses. Figure 3 below plots annual defense expenditures of the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. While each of these states has maintained comparable defense spending, the depth of bilateral strategic engagement with the United States varies significantly among them. Korea, in addition to its formal alliance with the US, is home to one of the largest US military presences in the world. Thailand, which President Bush designated a major non-NATO ally (MNNA) in 2003, has reopened the former US airbase in U-

Figure 3 Annual Military Expenditures in Three of China's Neighboring States



Figure 3 plots annual defense expenditures in the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam

Tapao and a naval base in Sattahip to allow for the stationing of US military hardware.[37] Even so, the US military presence in Thailand is nowhere near as large as that in South Korea. US-Vietnam military ties, by contrast, remain minimal. Both nations failed to normalize diplomatic relations until 1995. Tenuous security ties between the two include reciprocal visits by the US Secretary of Defense and the Vietnamese minister of defense during the Clinton administration, as well as a series of US navy frigate port calls to Ho Chi Minh City beginning in 2003.[38] Based on a unit-level analysis, each state should also exhibit distinctive defense postures in response to a rising China threat in relation to geographical proximity. Vietnam shares a border with Yunnan and Guangxi provinces in China, and the Thai border is less than two hundred kilometers from Yunnan, while South Korea is separated from China by the Yellow Sea and North Korea. Despite these idiosyncratic circumstances, all of these states have exhibited similarly low levels of defense spending over the past two decades.

A Systematic Approach

A more generalized interpretation exists, one that is consistent with the neorealist precepts espoused by Waltz, that offers greater applicability. To understand regional cooperation with China and the absence of balancing behavior, it is necessary to frame the power dynamics in East Asia properly. East Asia may not be, as Robert Ross argues, a simple bipolar environment.[39] It is instead a bipolar region within a larger international system characterized by unipolarity. The importance of incorporating the larger global framework lies in the perception that a reserve of extra-regional strength can be brought to bear on local power dynamics. In the formulation of foreign policy by decision makers in East Asia, the overwhelming presence of US military strength, in conjunction with the explicit US commitment to the status quo environment in East Asia, yields a security environment in which leaders have incentive to devote fewer resources to defense capabilities and greater energies toward economic gain through growing commercial ties with China. In this context, rising Chinese military capabilities do not necessarily pose a credible threat to security.

Key to all of this is US commitment to the status quo in East Asia. The US has demonstrated, through official policy pronouncements like the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and other public documentation of US national security policy, a commitment to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats to its "interests." More specifically:

> As a global power with an open society, the United States is affected by trends, events, and influences that originate from beyond its borders. The development of the defense posture should take into account the following enduring national interests . . . Precluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia.[40]

Reliance on policy pronouncements of another state for security, as noted above, should provide little solace to East Asian leaders facing a potential threat. However, this pronouncement coincides with neorealist expectations of US security policy given the current global distribution of power. In a neorealist self-help international system, the United States, in its quest for security, will brook

no challenge to its military prowess in any arena. Thus, the US has structurally induced incentives to preserve the status quo in East Asia. Regional leaders operate in the same anarchic international system, and, consequently, appreciate US strategic incentives. They also understand that US security goals coincide with their own. As a result, the system ceases to induce traditional self-help foreign policy behavior. Regional states are able to trust that structural incentives encourage the US to ensure regional security.

This mitigation of the self-help incentive structure in East Asia permits regional states to allocate smaller portions of national resources for self-protection and dedicate more assets toward other national objectives.[41] East Asia resembles a regional hierarchy in the sense that the strategic environment permits greater differentiation than usual in an international system, but it is not a regional hierarchy that draws stability from historical experience or cultural mores.

In the proper context, the neorealist framework does indeed provide a convincing explanation for the lack of balancing behavior in East Asia. Kang acknowledges that US power in East Asia "confounds the issue" of why Asian states appear not to balance against China.[42] By probing this thought, a clear and consistent explanation for the lack of balancing emerges, one that obviates the need for theories built on the distinctive historical and cultural mores of Asia, and, as a result, maintains broader utility. While anomalies and exceptions may exist, neorealism still provides critical insight into East Asian security.

Endnotes

1 David Shambaugh, "China's Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress," in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, ed., *Strategic Asia 2005-06 Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*, (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 78-82.

2 Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, vol. no. 110 (Spring 1998), 31.

3 Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 158.

4 Ibid., 153. According to Walt, superpowers behave differently. In his discussion of balancing behavior in the Middle East, Walt observes that while most states tend to balance against threats from other regional powers, superpowers tend to balance primarily against aggregate power alone.

5 David Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," *International Security*, vol. no. 27, issue no. 4 (Spring 2003), 3, 5.

6 Ibid., 28. This is precisely Kang's thesis in his argument for "openness" in the international relations discipline and a "healthy tension and dialogue between theory and area studies."

7 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979), 79.

8 Ibid., 79-80, 102. This discussion stems from Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, particularly ch. 6, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power".

9 Ibid., 106. Waltz notes that some small and ill-endowed states may not resist relationships of dependency with other states, which increases the vulnerability of the weaker state, because the costs of resistance are too great.

10 Ibid., 92.

11 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 97.

12 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, vol. no. 44, issue no. 2 (Spring 1990), 138. Christensen and Snyder define a theory of foreign policy as "a theory whose dependent variable is the behavior of individual states rather than properties of the systems of states. It does not refer to a theory that explains all aspects of a state's policy."

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid. For example, Christensen and Snyder add perceptions of offensive and defensive military advantages, stemming from Robert Jervis's work to explain the presence of chain-ganging before 1914 in Europe and buck-passing in pre-1939 Europe.

15 Deborah Larson, "Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?" in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, ed., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimlands* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), ch. 4. Larson suggests that bandwagoning may help a regime retain authority by tamping down external subversion, yielding economic assistance, and undercutting domestic rivals.

16 Steven David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics*, vol. no. 43, issue no. 2 (January), 235.

17 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security*, vol. no. 19, issue no. 1 (Summer 1994), 77, 80. Schweller defines both terms. He applies the term "bandwagoning" to states that freely decide to join a potentially threatening power. This clarification indicates that states may plump for bandwagoning in pursuit of material gain rather than out of coercion.

18 William C. Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance," *World Politics*, vol. no. 39, issue no. 3 (April 1987), 369. In light of the vast technological developments that have occurred in the ninety years since 1914 and the consequent shift of focus away from the numerical size of land armies, Figure 1 omits changes in the military personnel variable.

19 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005 ("Hereafter DOD PLA

Report") (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 2005), 23. Joint development and domestic development comprise the other two elements.

20 James C. Mulvenon, Bernard D. Cole, Richard D. Fisher, Jr., and Richard A. Bitzinger, "Part III—Military Trends," *The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition*, 109-177; see also DOD PLA Report, 23.

21 Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," *International Security*, vol. no. 22, issue no. 3 (Winter 1997-1998), 20.

22 Thailand: EIU Country Profile 2005 (New York, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005), 6. Figure 2 plots changes in annual military expenditures in five of China's neighboring states. The only recent spurt in defense spending in Thailand served to replace depleted ammunition and fuel reserves rather than boost capabilities. In May 2001, Bangkok announced a policy of no new weapons procurement.

23 David Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," 28.

24 Ibid., 7.

25 Ibid., 28.

26 Ibid., 66. Similar views on an East Asian hierarchy have been espoused by John King Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1968); Michael Oksenberg, "The Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *Problematic Sovereignty: Contest Rules and Political Possibilities* (New York: Columbia UP, 2001).

27 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 115.

28 David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," *International Security*, vol. no. 29, issue no. 6 (Winter 2004-2005), 94.

29 Ibid., 96.

30 Ibid., 67.

31 Ibid., 83.

32 Ibid., 67. Shambaugh does note that concerns about a looming "China threat" are still occasionally heard among regional security specialists in Hanoi, New Delhi, Singapore, Tokyo, and Taipei.

33 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, vol. no. 30, issue no. 2 (Jan. 1978), 3.

34 Evelyn Goh, "Meeting the Chinese Challenge: The US in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies," *Policy Studies*, vol. no. 16 (Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2005), 11. Soft balancing entails military acquisitions and modernization in conjunction with attempts to keep the US involved in the region as a counterweight to Chinese power.

35 Ibid., vii, 3.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 26-27.

38 Ibid., 28.

39 Robert Ross, "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century," *International Security*, vol. no. 23, issue no. 4 (Spring 1999), 81-118.

40 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, 2001), 2.

41 Waltz, *Theory of International Relations*, 105. In Waltz's terms, states are able to increase profits without having to suffer the consequences.

42 Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," 2.

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