

STUDENT SOLDIERS

THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S
“PERIOD OF EXTREME LEFTIST ADVENTURISM”

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Kenji Hasegawa revisits the Japanese Communist Party of the early 1950s during a militant phase in which students headed to rural villages to prepare for a Maoist revolution. This strategy was rejected outright in 1955 and, since then, the experiences of these student-soldiers have largely been forgotten in histories of the JCP, student movements and post-war Japan. Hasegawa attempts to reevaluate and reconstruct the historical narrative from the perspective of the students and activists of the time, using their memoirs as primary sources.

In the early 1950s, as war raged on the neighboring Korean peninsula, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) ended its postwar pursuit of peaceful revolution in favor of a more militant line. Molotov cocktails exploded on city streets and JCP members of the mountain village mobilization troops (*sanson kosakutai*) headed for rural villages in preparation for a Maoist revolution. These tactics, in which student JCP members participated as rank and file soldiers, produced meager results and further alienated the beleaguered party from the Japanese public. In the summer of 1955, the JCP repudiated its military line in the Sixth Party Congress (*rokuzenkyo*).

In the history of the postwar student movement, these five years of military tactics are nearly universally denounced or disowned. Yamanaka Akira's prominent history of the postwar student movement, for example, sees in this period a “rupture of the revolutionary tradition in the student movement” wherein the JCP leadership imposed its control over the student movement and misled it

into pursuing meaningless and destructive terrorist tactics.¹ The JCP's official history similarly dismisses the period as the unfortunate interlude of “extreme leftist adventurism,” placing the blame for the imposition of unrealistic formulas onto Japan on the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform.² Yamanaka's revolutionary tradition refers to the anti-imperial struggle led by the newly formed National Federation of Student Self-governing Associations, or *Zengakuren*, which peaked with the 1950 protests against the Red Purge.³ Whereas student activist recollections of the 1950 protests abound, much of what has been written on the ensuing military interlude has taken the form of literature, the most famous being Shibata Sho's best-selling novel of 1964, *Saredo wareraga hibi*, which vividly portrays the despair and agony of a student *sanson kosakutai* member.

Some former activists, however, who unlike Shibata actually participated in the student movement of the period, have reacted negatively to such literary portrayals by outsiders. Muto Kazuyo, for example, writes that none of the *rokuzenkyo* novels he read impressed him favorably. For him, “the more

skillfully it is written, the cheaper it seems.”⁴ Muto was frustrated by the collective silence of the student activists of this period. Yamada Takao, a former student activist, shared Muto’s dissatisfaction. While he was not officially a member of the JCP’s underground military organization referred to by party members as “Y,” he participated in the testing of Molotov cocktails and the military operations led by it. However, he held only a limited and fragmented view. He writes, “I would like my friends who went into...’Y’ to speak directly about the life they led there. I want to know now how the party members and activists of that period fought, and how they lived their lives afterward.”⁵ Tsuchimoto Noriaki, another student activist, writes that he and his fellow activists could not see the overarching objectives of their movement at the time, as they had been forced to act within the hierarchical structure of the JCP. Recently breaking his silence about his experiences in the student movement of the early 1950s, Tsuchimoto writes how the period remained the “darkest part” of him that he had “forcefully frozen without ever resolving.”⁶

In what ways was this dark and neglected period of “extreme leftist adventurism” experienced by student soldiers who participated in them? Excised from histories of the JCP and student movements, their experiences have naturally been neglected in more general histories of postwar Japan. The tendency has been to characterize the early 1950s as a period when the Korean War came, in the words of the prime minister at the time, Yoshida Shigeru, as a “gift from the gods,” rescuing the Japanese economy from postwar stagnation. While it may have been so for leaders like Yoshida, students in the JCP, many of whom had been resigned to death in battle just five years prior, certainly did not experience this period in the same way.

The New Platform of 1951

In mid-September of 1951, Waseda University JCP cell members assembled for an important meeting. The head of the cell held up a document, announcing that with this, they could “completely crush the factionalists” of the International faction and accomplish the unification of the party. This was the draft of the new platform of 1951 and the party leadership called for party-wide debate on it. But as students became intoxicated by the message, little debate ensued. One month later the new policy was officially adopted in the Fifth Party Congress.⁷

In January 1950, the Cominform had criticized the JCP for its postwar policy of peaceful revolution and urged that they struggle more intensely against the American occupation forces. As a result, the JCP split over how to respond to the criticism: the Mainstream faction refused to unequivocally accept the criticism, while the dissenting International faction attacked the party leadership for this refusal. The influential Tokyo University JCP cell joined the International faction with alacrity, taking *Zengakuren* and most student groups with it. As a general tendency, the International faction had a more intellectual orientation, prone to value the student movement as an important part of Japan’s revolution. The Mainstream faction, on the other hand, was often referred to as “reeking of dirt” (*dorokusai*), tending to dismiss the “petit-bourgeois” nature of the student movement and emphasize the need to go “into the masses.”

The new platform of 1951 hammered home its message in the simple and didactic style characteristic of the Mainstream faction. Unlike International faction documents, the language was clearly intended for farmers and workers with little education, for those people were to be the main force

behind the coming revolution. First, it denounced the American imperialist occupiers for exploiting the Japanese people and dragging them into a new war. In order to rule over Asia, the Americans were in need of a “base with developed industries and a population large enough to recruit soldiers.” In its view, the US was using Japan for this purpose, and while American imperialists were spreading propaganda for a separate peace fully aware that it would lead to war with China and the Soviet Union, Japan should, it stated, choose “the road to peace and cooperation with China, the Soviet Union, and other peace loving nations.”

The new platform further stated that the Americans were misleading the farmers of Japan into believing that they could escape poverty only through war and imperial expansion. Land reform, not war, was the answer. It furthermore denounced the Yoshida government for acting as a front for the occupation forces. Just like the occupation forces themselves, the reactionaries of the Yoshida government wished to prolong the occupation for as long as possible in order to keep the Japanese people under their subjection: “Therefore the Yoshida government is the government for the enslavement of the Japanese nation under the American imperialists.” Like the occupation forces, they also wished for a new war, as it would lead to profits for the big landlords, monopoly capitalists, and the privileged bureaucrats: “Therefore the Yoshida government is the government of war, and the government that will ruin Japan.”

In order to liberate the country from the occupation, it was necessary to topple the Yoshida government and establish a people’s government (*kokumin seifu*) for national independence. Third, it proclaimed that a democratic revolution for national liberation was necessary. Land reform was especially

important in this revolution. The land reform carried out under the occupation forces did not give land to poor farmers free of charge and thus did not help “the majority of farmers who had no money to buy land.” It added that land reform needed to be carried out not only in agricultural areas but other lands like forested areas in the mountains, as well, which the American land reform had left untouched. Finally and most importantly, regarding the tactics of revolution, it stated curtly that “it is a mistake to think that the liberation and democratic reform of Japan can be accomplished through peaceful means.”⁸

Yui Chikai had been among the factionalists that the party was seeking to root out. Why did he and other former International faction students become intoxicated by this new platform? In late November of 1950, International faction students had rejoined the party after being expelled by the Mainstream faction, acting in accordance with the call for party unity in the September 3 issue of the Chinese Communist Party newspaper. They did so unapologetically, maintaining that their actions during the Red Purge struggles had been correct, convinced that they would eventually be able to change the party from within. Optimism proved short-lived, however, as they found themselves gradually succumbing to party discipline.

Tsuchimoto Noriaki was another student from Waseda University in a similar situation. He recalls that until early 1951, the International faction had held a firm grip on *Zengakuren*. But as the student movement experienced the cyclical stagnation that accompanied summer vacation, the tables were turned after the Cominform publicized its second criticism in August supporting the Mainstream faction. The Mainstream faction had already taken over the Kansai and Hokkaido student

organizations, but armed with Cominform support, they attacked the Tokyo organization (*Togakuren*), the most important pillar of *Zengakuren*. Former International faction activists of the *Togakuren* gave in, effectively surrendering the intact organization to the Mainstream faction. Tsuchimoto writes, “I knew what to expect from the student bureaucrats of the Mainstream faction, but my heart was broken by my [International faction] comrades with whom I had shared my faith for two years... I experienced the pain of losing sight of what it meant to be a truly good party member.”

Tsuchimoto returned to the Waseda campus in April 1952 after being expelled from the *Zengakuren* headquarters at Tokyo University. Feeling empty, he found himself “muttering ‘Bolshevik’ and ‘party member’ like Buddhist chants.” Ever since entering the party in 1946, Tsuchimoto had ceaselessly devoted himself to its causes. Being a factionalist was unbearable; he felt that he needed to prove himself.⁹ The new party platform, publicized as Tsuchimoto and Yui were agonizing over their place in the party, seemed to provide them with a simple solution: through the radical action it prescribed, they would be able to prove their devotion to the party.¹⁰

Ogouchi

Waseda University’s Social Sciences Study Group (*Shaken*) was one of the first groups to put the new platform into action. In late 1951, it organized a “village survey” in Ogouchi, a village in the mountains of western Tokyo. Ostensibly, the survey was a voluntary activity, but in reality, it was ordered by the party as a punitive measure because of *Shaken’s* factionalist tendencies. In effect, the party ordered *Shaken* members to go into Ogouchi village and mold themselves into disciplined party members.¹¹

Why Ogouchi? In 1931, the Tokyo city

government had initiated plans to build a dam that would sink the village. The plan was delayed temporarily when the Kanagawa prefectural government objected, and then due to the escalating war effort. In 1948, the decision was made to resume construction. For the JCP, Ogouchi, an “unliberated” mountain village that the Tokyo government was planning to erase from the map, was a fitting site for the struggle called for in the new platform of 1951.

In early 1952, Waseda students started preparing for village mobilization and the establishment of Y, the military organization. Yui was charged with organizing the military organization for the simple reason that he had brawled with university employees during the university festival the previous year. As preliminary training for Y, Yui’s troops surreptitiously sprayed graffiti and posted posters late at night, denouncing the “traitors” working for the police and the university employees—actions that left Yui with a “bad aftertaste in [his] mouth.” Then, after the February examinations, Yui entered Ogouchi with about twenty others to “learn the spirit of the new platform.” Before going, he was handed a party document titled “We Must Start Preparations and Actions for Armed Struggle.”¹²

In the form of questions and answers, this document elaborated on the tactics of armed struggle called for in the new platform. Why did they need a military organization? Because they needed to rid the country of the occupation, a powerfully armed entity. Was it possible to form a military organization? It was difficult but possible, since they had the support of the Japanese people. How could they create a military organization of the workers and farmers? They could do so by gathering people willing to devote themselves to the armed struggle for national independence. The first step was to organize a Core Self Defense Force in the villages

and factories, which eventually would develop into guerilla forces and finally into a “people’s army.” Was it possible to organize rural bases for guerilla forces in Japan? Although Japan did not have large-scale hinterlands that could serve as Chinese-style rural bases, they could develop rural bases especially in the mountain areas where feudal repression was harshest. What kind of activities was the military organization to lead? They would engage in hit-and-run attacks where the enemy was weak, retreating in disadvantageous situations.¹³

Once in Ogouchi, the members went around their assigned hamlets in groups of two and tried to mobilize the villagers into supporting the coming revolution. At night they assembled for the reporting and summation of the day’s activities. As the village mobilization sought the obliteration of students’ petit-bourgeois nature, the summations tended to be moralistic. One group, for example, found an old cigarette on the ground and after debating what to do, saw that nobody was looking and smoked it. At night, one of the members gravely confessed his crime and conducted a “self-criticism.” The other member who had failed to confess was subjected to harsh criticism at the meeting. Having learned his lesson, this member conducted his own “self-criticism” the following night. He confessed that he had muttered an obscenity to an old lady in the village who had torn up the hand bill he handed her. He offered that this was evidence of his lack of devotion to the masses. The others approvingly evaluated the progress he had made toward becoming a good party member. Such didactic thinking had not been completely absent in the student movement of 1950, Yui writes, but it became amplified to an extreme in the reconstruction cell led by the Mainstream faction.

Yui’s first stint in Ogouchi lasted about a month until late March, when he headed back onto

campus to prepare for the organization of the self-defense force. Several days later came the first police crackdown, in which 23 members were arrested. When the *Shaken* members first entered the village, they had been provided a bunkhouse for shelter thanks to the name card provided by their faculty adviser. Yui recalls that the initial welcome wore off, however, after police intervention and a newspaper article reporting that the professor had been deceived by the JCP.¹⁴ Covering the arrests, the *Asahi Shinbun* reported that a group of men claiming to be Waseda University students arrived in Ogouchi village to conduct an opinion survey the previous December. They later occupied without permission a privately owned hut and started their campaign to mobilize against the planned construction. They published a newsletter, gave puppet shows, and handed out candy to children, while simultaneously recruiting villagers to join the Core Self Defense Force. On March 29, they were arrested on charges of trespassing, contravening Ordinance 325 (acts prejudicial to the occupation), illegally cutting down trees from a privately owned forest, and assaulting a police officer.¹⁵

Five days after the arrests, an article appeared in the *Yomiuri Shinbun* that gave readers a rare glimpse of the mysterious *sanson kosakutai*. The young reporter responsible for the article was Watanabe Tsuneo, the former leader of Tokyo University’s JCP cell. After hearing news of the arrests, he had headed to Ogouchi and hiked up to where some troops remained. After being interrogated by hostile troops, Watanabe reported, he succeeded in getting some answers:

Q: What do you eat up here?

A: The same food as the poor farmers of this village. 7 parts wheat, 3 parts rice, miso, leeks, and salt.

What do you do up here?

Stupid question. Mobilization for the revolution, of course.

Do the *sanson kosakutai* still exist?

There are *kosakutai* in all the mountains. You are lucky you came to this base. If it had been the next mountain over you would be dead. We are tame.

Don't you think of life in Tokyo?

You folks think that way but we are most happy living together with the people.

Will you stay after April when school starts?

We are learning here. We do not do your kind of learning, disconnected from practice. It's none of your business what we do after April.

Do you have weapons?

You people have written about it so you should know. We have all the weapons we need [*He points to a log*]. This, too, is a weapon. For us everything is a weapon.

How long will you barricade yourselves in?

That is not even worth answering. From here we can defeat one hundred, no, one thousand men with ten of us. Bazookas and tanks are useless up here....

Will the armed revolution succeed?

Of course it will succeed. When it happens, you should really be hung...but there is no use in killing you now. Beat it.¹⁶

Y

As the new school year started, Yui got to work constructing Y. Yui became captain of the Waseda organization, dubbed the National Liberation Waseda Storm Troops. Y organizations were built up in Tokyo University and Ochanomizu Women's University, alongside a number of non-student cells.

The troops occasionally cooperated in manufacturing explosives and went into the mountains to practice throwing them. The new military organization was to be organizationally independent of the party, composed of those willing to "risk death fighting for national independence and democracy against American imperialists and the traitors." Members were to be physically strong, without "personal problems" like amorous relationships. For Yui, building Y provided an enjoyable reprieve from JCP culture. Y was free of what Yui viewed as a moralistic "let us solve our problems together" style of operation that was increasingly prevalent in the party at large. It was also free of the ideological hairsplitting among the student factions. Students in the Waseda Y distanced themselves from campus-based activities, setting up their own headquarters, manufacturing explosives, working hard to keep pace with the Tokyo University troops. Since Y was supposedly free from problems of ideology and factionalism, participation boomed with outside activists joining in meetings and training missions.¹⁷

Yui and fellow Y members were ready for what they expected to be their first military operation by the first post-occupation May Day of 1952. The day before May Day, however, Y members were called into party headquarters, where Yui was disappointed to hear that their mission would merely be selling the soon-to-be-reissued JCP newspaper *Akahata*. If they had brought any weapons or explosives, the party leader said to them, they should dispose of them. Y members took up the rear during the clash with the police. While the student demonstrators charged into the forbidden area in front of the Imperial Palace, Y members led straggling demonstrators to the other gate and fought with law enforcement by throwing stones, jousting with placards, and throwing back the tear gas canisters.¹⁸

As a result of the harsh repression that followed the May Day clash, Yui was forced to abandon his room and live without fixed lodgings. In order to fight back and break out of the fearful calm prevailing on the campus, Waseda's Y distributed a handbill that publicized their existence for the first time, calling upon students to join the military organization. It stated that harsh police repression during the May Day incident had proven the necessity of armed struggle. "Let us take arms and struggle together for national liberation," it urged. "To devote one's life to the liberation of the nation" was what it meant "to live our precious lives correctly and beautifully."¹⁹ While preparing the handbills, Yui and the cell captain decided to start a campus patrol, predicting that they could find police officers intruding on campus. If they could expose the intrusion, they could incite students and thus change the atmosphere of the campus.²⁰ Not surprisingly, they were able to catch an officer who had come onto campus to gain information on a May Day participant. Their actions led to a violent clash between students and police on May 8.²¹ Y members participated in the demonstrations against the Anti-Subversive Acts Law and stayed aloof from the campus-based student movement with its factional antagonisms. Instead, they devoted their energies toward keeping up with the Tokyo University troops.²²

Yui threw his first Molotov cocktail on May 30. It was a rainy day and people had gathered in the district of Shinjuku for a demonstration against the Anti-Subversive Acts Law. Y troops dispersed themselves in the crowd, lobbing explosives toward the police. Troops from Ochanomizu Women's University dressed as prostitutes stood on guard while others stood by the ready to defend the throwers from undercover police. As Yui threw his explosive, a man grabbed his arm from behind. At

first thinking he had been caught by an officer, he found to his relief an onlooker congratulating him. At the party meeting the following day, this was cited as proof of mass support for military action, but Yui was unconvinced and embarrassed. "I was relieved that everybody was safe following our first action, but I also thought that throwing Molotov cocktails was mere child's play. There was a natural desire for the development of more powerful weapons."²³

Guerilla Warfare

In June, Y members assembled on the roof of an Engineering Department building for an emergency meeting. The head of the district bureau announced that the time had come for them to organize Independence Guerilla Forces (*dokuritsu yugekitai*). "Self defense" was now insufficient; they needed to organize offensive guerilla troops. Party members had been debating whether or not guerilla warfare in Japan was possible, but now the party leadership decided that this was both possible and necessary. Though each Y group was ordered to volunteer one member to join the Guerilla Forces, at first, no one willingly stood up for service. The head of the district bureau finally broke the silence by appointing a student known as K, who was already in his fifth year. Unable to bear watching K alone "volunteer," Yui decided to go with him.

Alone with Yui after the meeting adjourned, K wondered sarcastically if Ogouchi was to become the graveyard for the student movement. Jokingly, Yui responded that since K had been a student in a military preparatory school, though he had missed out on becoming an imperial soldier, he now had the opportunity to become "a *real* military man." Yui knew that his joining the guerilla force meant that he would leave the university permanently. "I did not feel any lingering attachment toward the

university,” he recalls, “but I was painfully aware of the gap between myself and friends who, amidst a reviving economy, were beginning to talk of summer vacation travel plans.” He collected donations from friends, packed essential items for guerilla life, and set off to lead the Ogouchi Guerilla Force. Among the books he packed were works by Marx, Mao, and the former Japanese army’s infantry manual.²⁴

The regular *kosakutai* had moved their shelter to a small cave that could fit about fifteen people after being evicted from their hut in the first police crackdown. The members washed themselves in the nearby river and ate gruel of nine parts barley and one part rice. They were provided three cigarettes a day.²⁵ Yui’s troops set up camp in a hut over a mountain from the 西 While the regular *kosakutai* continued their mobilization campaign in the village, the troops surveyed the surrounding landscape and trained. They emulated Korean guerilla forces, running up and down the mountain wearing pants filled with sand. At night they would sleep with their training clothes on, and soon they found mold growing on their genitals. Living under such conditions, Yui was unenthusiastic when news reached of the Mainstream faction’s complete victory in the 5th *Zengakuren* Congress of June 28, 1952.

Guerilla forces entered three other mountain villages of western Tokyo: Ongata, Kori, and Hikawa. The troops from the three villages periodically met under the leadership of a local party member. The troops set up camp in an abandoned charcoal kiln, in a hut, and under a dilapidated bridge. The party leadership told them that with time a commissariat would be established, weapons and food provided them, and radio communication established between them.²⁶ With continued police crackdowns and the villagers’ continued unresponsiveness to their publicity campaign, however, such promises proved

improbable. Tsuchimoto recalls that wherever he went, the villagers were unreceptive. There was a “mutual instinctive distrust” between the *kosakutai* and the villagers, and their “struggle” was going nowhere.

Rejected by the villagers they were supposed to liberate, the members refocused their campaign on the underpaid construction workers. In early July, they successfully mobilized the workers for a strike to demand time off and a special bonus payment for summer vacation. The workers were receiving 250 yen per day, with overtime payment of 60 yen for two hours. Nearly 200 yen were deducted for food, bedding, and cigarette costs. The workers were going to confront the boss with the demand to raise their daily pay to 300 yen and to provide a special summer payment of 500 yen.

The second police crackdown occurred as the members were preparing for the strike. They were ordered to light fires to flammable material near the dam. The military organization was going to prevent the police from entering the village by dropping a rock onto the road. This was, they were told, their opportunity to establish their rural base, and three thousand workers were headed their way to assist in their struggle. With this, the members were each handed a box of matches and ordered to set fire at their own discretion. Some members protested in vain on the grounds that they had done nothing to mobilize the villagers for military action. The plan to drop the rock failed and the police truck sped into the construction site unimpeded.

The third crackdown followed after about half a month. By this time, the Guerilla Force’s donations had run out and they were forced to join the *kosakutai* in their shelter. Members took turns descending the mountain to collect donations. When Yui returned from his run on July 29, the village

was tense. The previous day, *kosakutai* members had scuffled with the guard at the construction site after having revived the mobilization campaign of the dam construction workers. As a result, the police had entered the village and were on guard against *kosakutai* activities. Though most members argued against going into the construction site under such conditions, their leader overrode them. About ten members went in, including three students from Tokyo University who had come on their summer vacation. The third crackdown ensued and Yui was arrested, but was freed soon thereafter, as he had not taken part in the operation.²⁷

After being freed, Yui headed back to the shelter and found K there alone. The day before the third crackdown, K had been involved in a separate mission to attack American troops. His group tried to stop a US military vehicle with a GI and *panpan* girl inside, but the GI threatened them with a pistol and drove off. K was arrested and held for interrogation for three days, after which he had returned to the shelter alone. He told Yui that JCP members had intermittently visited for about 10 days following the third crackdown to survey the situation. After that, however, the visits ceased and he had been alone.

Soon after Yui rejoined K, the *kosakutai* situation deteriorated even further with a police crackdown in Ongata and the arrest of the party leader in charge of the three troops. Their military tactic was supposed to be guerilla-style hit-and-run from the four rural bases, Yui thought, but their tactics were turning out to be “run-run-run.” Party members were occasionally sent in, but many of them broke down physically or mentally and did not stay long. Eventually Yui and K started working for the farmers in the fields and mountains. The troops were soon informed that the party was easing up on its policy of guerilla warfare, after which the force’s activities

became essentially the same as the other *kosakutai*. Toward the end of 1952, the core members of the Ogouchi *kosakutai* rejoined them after being freed from prison. They were able to borrow a hut at the construction site and celebrated the 1953 New Year indoors with electricity. The Ongata troops, meanwhile, continued to live in the charcoal kiln until their demobilization with *rokuzenkyo* in the summer of 1955.²⁸

Conclusion

Take a look, the shadow is already growing down there. A mere five hours of daylight per day. I have my own name for this village: the shaded village. There is another symbolic meaning to this name. As the great city of Tokyo develops, just as the grass at the foot of towering trees dies, Ogouchi becomes the sacrifice of developing Tokyo and dies. It was better when the village was under the shadow of the mountains. Once a village comes under the urban shadow, it is doomed.²⁹

Soon after losing his girlfriend to a Tokyo youth, Ichinosuke was sent to Manchuria and died in battle. His bones were returned to Ogouchi and buried in an already abandoned village temple. By this time, villagers had grown indifferent to the upkeep of their doomed community. The construction of the Ogouchi dam was temporarily interrupted by the escalating Asia-Pacific War, then resumed in 1948. Ogouchi village disappeared under water in 1957.

Like the story of Ogouchi village, the experiences of the JCP student soldiers whose mission it was to “liberate” the village have been left in the shadows of postwar history. Many have preferred it that way, for they do not fit into heroic narratives of JCP or

student movement history. But student soldiers like Yui Chikai and Tsuchimoto Noriaki could not simply leave their experiences in Ogouchi and in the JCP's "extreme leftist adventurism" to oblivion. Fortunately, they have left behind recollections in writing so that some light can be shed on what it meant to be a JCP student soldier in the early 1950s.



ENDNOTES

- 1 Yamanaka Akira, *Sengo gakusei undoshi* (Tokyo: Gun Shuppan, 1966).
- 2 Nihon Kyosanto, *Nihon kyosanto no 50 nen* (Tokyo: Nihon kyosanto chuo iinkai shuppanyoku, 1972), 38.
- 3 The Red Purge of 1950 resulted in the dismissal of more than twenty thousand workers in the public and private sectors, most of them union activists. Although occupation and government officials announced their intention to extend the Red Purge onto the university campuses, this was for the most part not realized, in part due to widespread student protests. For the Cold War context of the Red Purge, see John Dower, "Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," in John Dower, *Japan in War and Peace* (New York: New Press, 1993), 155-207.
- 4 Muto Kazuyo, "Gakuseiundo no 'chusei' to 'runessansu,'" *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo geppo* 3 (Tokyo: San'ichi shobo, 1969).
- 5 Yamada Takao, "Kaenbin jidai' wo tomoni ikite," *Ikuta fusai tsuito kinen bunshu* (Tokyo: Ikuta fusai tsuito kinen bunshu kankokai, 1967), 90.
- 6 Tsuchimoto Noriaki, "Ogouchi sansonkosakutai' no ki," *Waseda 1950 vol.3* (Tokyo: Waseda 1950 nen kiroku no kai, 1998), 117.
- 7 Yui Chikai, "Paruchizan zenzenshi," *Yui Chikai Iko | Kaiso* (Tokyo: Yui Chikai tsuitoshu kankokai, 1987), 21.
- 8 Nihon kyosanto, *Nihon kyosanto no tomen no yokyu—atarashii koryo*, August 1951 [underground JCP document].
- 9 Tsuchimoto, op.cit., 116-118.
- 10 Yui, "Paruchizan zenzenshi," 21-22. Matsuda Masao, who was a high school JCP member at the time, recalls fellow activists avidly memorizing the party line on military policy. He recalls how a senior comrade came down from the mountains and joined them during one of their study sessions. The man complimented them for studying hard, but then told them that military policy was not just theory. "It is this," he said, thrusting his fist toward the students' faces and stunning them into silence. Matsuda Masao et al., *Left Alone* (Tokyo: Akaishi shoten, 2005), 38.
- 11 Ibid., 23.
- 12 Yui, "51 nen koryo to gokusa bokenshugi' no hitokoma," *Yui Chikai Iko | Kaiso*, 63. Yui, "Paruchizan zenzenshi," 24.
- 13 *Kyūkon saibaiho* 2.22 (1951.11.8), 2-16 [underground JCP document].
- 14 Yui, "51 nen koryo to gokusa bokenshugi' no hitokoma," 63. Yui Chikai, "Paruchizan zenzenshi," 26.
- 15 *Asahi Shinbun*, March 29, 1952, 3.
- 16 *Yomiuri Shinbun*, April 3, 1952, 3.
- 17 Yui, "Paruchizan zenzenshi," 26. Yui, "51 nen koryo to gokusa bokenshugi' no hitokoma," 64-65.
- 18 Yui, "Paruchizan zenzenshi," 27. Yui doubts that the May Day incident was a JCP-led military operation. Illegal JCP publications contained articles of self-criticism by Y members who failed to keep up with the mass uprising. Although the party did call for the "capture of the people's plaza" leading up to the May Day demonstration, there were no concrete plans. Yui thinks that it was the sense of liberation brought on by the end of the occupation that resulted in the rebellious energy among the demonstrators. The party underestimated this energy, re-issuing *Akahata* but otherwise remaining tentative, inexplicably turning Y troops into paper boys and remaining prepared to re-close the *Akahata* printing press. Yui, "51 nen koryo to gokusa bokenshugi' no hitokoma," 65-66. For an account of this "Bloody May Day" incident, see John Dower, *Embracing Defeat* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 554-555.
- 19 *Shiryō sengo gakusei undo* vol. 2 (Tokyo: San'ichi shobo, 1969), 29.
- 20 Specifically, they had in mind the "Poporo incident" on the Tokyo University campus in February 1952. Students discovered an underground police officer attending a leftist theater and took his police notebook, leading to arrests and student protests.
- 21 Yui, "51 nen koryo to gokusa bokenshugi' no hitokoma," 66.
- 22 Yui, "Paruchizan zenzenshi," 28.
- 23 Ibid., 29.
- 24 Ibid., 31. Yui, "51 nen koryo to gokusa bokenshugi' no hitokoma," 68.
- 25 Tsuchimoto, 124.
- 26 Yui, "Paruchizan zenzenshi," 32. Yui, "51 nen koryo to gokusa bokenshugi' no hitokoma," 69.
- 27 Tsuchimoto, 124. Yui, "51 nen koryo to gokusa bokenshugi' no hitokoma," 70-71.
- 28 Yui, "Paruchizan zenzenshi," 32. Yui Chikai, "51 nen koryo to gokusa bokenshugi' no hitokoma," 71-73.
- 29 Ishikawa Tatsuzo, *Hikage no mura* (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1948), 4.