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ITSS Security Alerts > Microsoft RPC Vulnerability Actively Exploited Throughout Stanford - 5 August 2003

Original Bulletin 16 July 2003: Windows RPC Buffer Overflow Permits Remote Code Execution

Update 7 August 2003: Detection, Recovery and Prevention of the Auto-Propagating Windows RPC Exploit

On this page:
Summary
Technical Details
Countermeasures


Summary

A significant number of Windows machines throughout the Stanford campus have been exploited via the recently announced critical vulnerability in the Microsoft RPC service, described in http://securecomputing.stanford.edu/alerts/windows-rpc-16jul2003.html. At least two exploits are known to be circulating on the Internet, which leave different malicious software installed on victim machines. Information Security Services has not yet been able to isolate the infection vectors for the machines that have been compromised, but we continue to work with campus system administrators, other university incident response teams, Microsoft, and others to reduce the impact of these attacks on campus.

If you run any Windows desktop or server machine, or are responsible for machines belonging to other people, install the patches included in the advisory above immediately.

Technical Details

On July 16, 2003, Microsoft and the security research organization Last Stage of Delirium announced a critical vulnerability in the Windows RPC/DCOM interface. This vulnerability affects Windows NT Workstation and Server, Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows 2003 Server. Although the LSD report included no proof of concept code, exploits began hitting the Internet within a couple of days.

Microsoft, CERT and others have documented the existence of at least two exploits, which create different signatures on compromised machines. These exploits may attack a system through any port that the RPC endpoint mapper uses -- these include

Protocol sequence used by endpoint mapper
TCP or UDP port
ncacn_ip_tcp
TCP/135
ncadg_ip_udp
UDP/135

ncacn_np \pipe\emapper (uses SMB null sessions)

TCP/139 and TCP/445
ncacn_http
TCP/593
ncacn_http with COM Internet services enabled
TCP/80

Here is a list of the public exploits known to take advantage of the RPC vulnerability described in MS03-026:

RPC Win32 AutoRooter, described by F-Secure, Network Associates, Symantec and others

  • creates files rpc.exe, rpctest.exe, tftpd.exe, dcomx.exe, lolx.exe, worm.exe on local hard drive
  • spawns rootshell that accepts connections on TCP/57005
  • rpc.exe contains text "rpc autorooter by ERIC"

dcom.c exploit

  • spawns rootshell that accepts connections on TCP/4444 or an arbitrary port selected by the attacker

xfocus DCOM exploit

As yet unidentified rootkit -- installs backdoor and then patches vulnerability

  • disables Norton Anti-Virus or other PC security applications
  • copy of the legitimate, correctly signed update.exe file from Microsoft is installed in the local C: root drive.
  • the patch for MS03-026 is installed and the machine has been rebooted

    Auto-propagating RPC exploit (a primitive worm)

Countermeasures

We do not yet know what ports the exploit software is using. All of the ports listed in the Technical Details section except TCP/80 are blocked at the perimeter of Stanford's network.

The most important thing that all personal computer users and administrators can do is to be sure that the patch for MS03-026 is installed on their machines. Although there have been some reports that the patch has not prevented some computers from being compromised, those reports have not been confirmed, and are now believed to be a result of confusion between this RPC buffer overflow and another (as yet unconfirmed) denial of service vulnerability in the Windows 2000 RPC implementation.

Details on patches are available at http://securecomputing.stanford.edu/alerts/windows-rpc-16jul2003.html.

ITSS Information Security Services expects an update from Microsoft on these issues tomorrow, and will provide more information as it becomes available.

 

Last modified Wednesday, 08-Feb-2006 11:46:35 PST

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