

Curriculum Vitae, December 2005

PETER J. HAMMOND

A. CONTACT INFORMATION

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B. DEGREE STUDIES

- 1964-67 Undergraduate study at the University of Cambridge.
Mathematics Tripos:
Part IA (1965) Class I;
Part IB (1966) Class I;
Part II (1967) Class II.
- 1967-69 Research Student, Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge.
1968 Economics Tripos, Part II;
papers in Economic Theory, Mathematical Economics, and Theory of Statistics.
- 1974 Ph.D., University of Cambridge — Dissertation title:
Consistent Planning and Intertemporal Welfare Economics.

C. HONOURS AND AWARDS

- 1964-67 Open Scholarship in Mathematics at Trinity Hall,
University of Cambridge.
- 1967-69 Social Science Research Council (U.K.),
Postgraduate Research Scholarship.
- 1977 Elected to a Fellowship of the Econometric Society.
- 1980-88 National Science Foundation grants (U.S.A.).
- 1985, 1999 Included in *Who's Who in Economics* (2nd. and 3rd. editions).
- 1986-87 John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship.
- 1993-94 Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Research Award.
- 2002 Honorary Doctorate in Economic and Social Sciences,
University of Kiel, Germany.
- 2005 Honorary Doctorate of Philosophy, University of Oslo, Norway.

D. UNIVERSITY APPOINTMENTS AND VISITING POSITIONS

1. 1969–71 Junior Research Fellow of Nuffield College,
University of Oxford.
2. 1971–76 Lecturer in Economics, University of Essex
(with tenure from 1974).

1974–75 Research Fellow in the Department of Economics,
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
3. 1976–79 Professor of Economics, University of Essex.

1976–79 Visiting teacher, London School of Economics.

1977 (summer) Visiting Professor, Department of Economics,
Stanford University.
4. 1979–date Professor of Economics, Stanford University

Jan. –Aug. 1983 Fellow, Institute of Advanced Studies,
Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

1983 (May, June) Joseph A. Schumpeter Visiting Professor,
University of Graz, Austria.

1986 (May, June) Professeur invité, Université de Toulouse I, France.

Sept. 1986 –Jan. 1987 Professeur invité,
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics,
Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium.

1987 (Feb.–May) Visiting Fellow, Department of Economics,
Princeton University, U.S.A.

1988 (April) and 1994 (April–May) Visitor to Sonderforschungsbereich 303,
University of Bonn, Germany.

Sept. 1989 –Aug. 1991 Professor of Economics,
European University Institute, Florence, Italy
(and External Professor, 1991–4).

June 1993 Benjamin Meaker Visiting Professor,
University of Bristol, England.

Sept. 1993 Visitor to the Center for Economic Studies,
University of Munich, Germany.

Oct. 1993 –Aug. 1994 and June 2002 Gastprofessor, Institut für Finanzwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik [Public Finance and Social Policy],
University of Kiel, Germany.

Spring 1994 Visiting Professor, Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica,
Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”, Italy.

Sept. 1995 Leif Johansen Visitor, Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo

- 1996 (May, June) Visiting Professor, University of Graz, Austria.
- 1998 (Autumn) Visiting Professor, Institute of Economic Research,
Hitotsubashi University, Japan.
- 2004 (March) Visiting Professor, Department of Economics
National University of Singapore.

E. OTHER ACTIVITIES

1. *Review of Economic Studies*
Member of Editorial Board (1971–75).
Joint Managing Editor (1975–79).
2. Econometric Society
Member of the Program Committees for the European Meetings at Grenoble (1974), Vienna (1977), Athens (1979), and Maastricht (1994), as well as for the North American Meeting at San Diego (1981).
Invited discussant (with K.J. Arrow) of the survey paper: E.S. Phelps “Recent Advances in Welfare Theory: Justice and Equity,” at the 3rd World Congress of the Econometric Society, Toronto, 1975.
Fellow (elected 1977).
Discussant of the invited lecture by Ariel Rubinstein, “Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall,” at the Econometric Society European Meeting, Maastricht, 1994.
Co-Editor, Econometric Society Research Monograph Series, 1995–2000.
Member, Fellows Nomination Committee, 1996.
3. Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) — formerly the Economics Division of the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences (IMSSS) at Stanford:
Summer seminars 1975, 1977–1982, 1984–date.
Director, September 1995–August 1997 and September 2005 to date.
4. Social Science Research Council (U.K.)
Consultant to the Economics Committee for the Triennial Review (1977).
5. University of Cambridge
External Examiner for the M. Phil. degree in Economics (1979).
6. The Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Vatican
Invited participant at the meetings of economists (November 5th, 1990 and November 27th, 1991) in connection with the Papal Encyclical *Centesimus Annus*, published in May 1991 to mark the centenary of *Rerum Novarum*.
7. International Conference on Game Theory, Florence, June 1991
Member of the Scientific Committee.

8. *Ricerche Economiche: An International Review of Economics*
Member of the Editorial Board, 1991–6.
9. Centro Interuniversitario per la Teoria dei Giochi e le Applicazioni [Inter-university Centre for Game Theory and Applications, in Italy]
Member of the Scientific Committee (1992–95).
10. Osservatorio “Giordano dell’Amore” on the Relationship between Law and Economics, Milan — Member of the Scientific Committee (1992–date).
11. FUR VII (The 7th International Conference on the Foundations and Applications of Utility, Risk, and Decision Theory), Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, June 30–July 3, 1994 — Invited speaker for the special session on “Consequentialism” and for the plenary session on “Recent History and Expectations in Decision Theory.”
12. Invited symposiast for T.M. Scanlon’s Tanner Lecture on Human Values, “The Status of Well-Being”, University of Michigan, October 1996.
13. Society for Social Choice and Welfare
Member of the Editorial Board of *Social Choice and Welfare* (1997–2004).
Council Member (1999–date).
14. *Journal of Public Economic Theory*
Member of the Editorial Board (1997–2001).
15. Game Theory Society: invited Charter Member (from 1999).
16. National University of Singapore
External Examiner for the M. Soc. Sci. (Economics) degree (1998–2000).
17. Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”, Italy
Federico Caffè Lectures, Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica (2005).

F. BOOKS PUBLISHED AND IN PREPARATION

1. (with Knut Sydsæter) *Mathematics for Economic Analysis* (Prentice-Hall, 1995)
 revised and condensed version *Essential Mathematics for Economic Analysis*
 (Pearson Education, 2002); 2nd edition (Pearson Education, 2005)
 Spanish translation, *Matemáticas para el análisis económico* (Prentice-Hall, 1996)
 Hungarian translation, *Matematika közgazdászoknak*
 (Aula Publisher, Budapest, 1998)
 German translation, *Mathematik für Wirtschaftswissenschaftler: Einführung*
 (Pearson Studium, Munich, 2003)
 Turkish translation, *Ekonomik Analizi için Temel Matematik*
 (Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara, 2004)
 Italian translation, *Manuale di matematica per l'analisi economica*
 (Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2004).
2. (with Knut Sydsæter, Atle Seierstad and Arne Strøm) *Further Mathematics for Economic Analysis* (Pearson Education, 2005).
3. (edited with Salvador Barberà and Christian Seidl) *Handbook of Utility Theory*
 (Kluwer Academic Publishers):
Vol. 1: Principles (1998);
Vol. 2: Extensions (2004);
Vol. 3: Empirical Work and History (in preparation).
4. (edited with Gareth D. Myles, including an “Introduction”, ch. 1, pp. 3–14)
Incentives, Organization, and Public Economics: Papers in Honour of Sir James Mirrlees (Oxford University Press, 2000).
5. (edited with Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Kenneth J. Arrow, Felix Kubler, Ho-Mou Wu and Nicholas C. Yannelis) *Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics: Essays in Honor of Mordecai Kurz* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2003).
 - *The Elusive Theoretical Gains from Trade and Migration* (2005 Federico Caffè Lectures, for publication by Cambridge University Press).
 - *Social Choice for Welfare Economics and Ethics* (a collection of papers for publication by Oxford University Press).

G. PUBLISHED AND FORTHCOMING JOURNAL ARTICLES

1. “Agreeable Plans with Many Capital Goods,” *Review of Economic Studies*, **42** (1975), 1–14.
2. “A Note on Extreme Inequality Aversion,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **11** (1975), 465–467.
3. “Equity, Arrow’s Conditions, and Rawls’ Difference Principle,” *Econometrica*, **44** (1976), 793–804; reprinted in K.J. Arrow and G. Debreu (eds.), *Landmark Papers in General Equilibrium Theory, Social Choice and Welfare* (Edward Elgar, 2002), ch. 35, pp. 679–690; and (without appendix) in F.H. Hahn and M. Hollis (eds.), *Philosophy and Economic Theory* (Oxford University Press, 1979), ch. X, pp. 155–163.
4. “Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice,” *Review of Economic Studies*, **43** (1976), 159–173; reprinted in K.J. Lancaster (ed.) *Consumer Theory* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999) ch. 23, pp. 367–381.
5. “Endogenous Tastes and Stable Long-Run Choice,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **13** (1976), 329–340.
6. “Total Discounted Demands and Long-Period Preferences,” *Economic Record*, **52** (1976), 26–35.
7. “Why Ethical Measures of Inequality Need Interpersonal Comparisons,” *Theory and Decision*, **7** (1976), 263–274.
8. “Dual Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility and the Welfare Economics of Income Distribution,” *Journal of Public Economics*, **7** (1977), 51–71; “———: A Corrigendum,” *Journal of Public Economics*, **14** (1980), 105–6.
9. “Dynamic Restrictions on Metastatic Choice,” *Economica*, **44** (1977), 337–350.
10. (with Edwin Burmeister) “Maximin Paths of Heterogeneous Capital Accumulation and the Instability of Paradoxical Steady States,” *Econometrica*, **45** (1977), 853–870.
11. “Economic Welfare with Rank Order Price Weighting,” *Review of Economic Studies*, **45** (1978), 381–384.
12. “The Core and Equilibrium through the Looking-Glass,” *Australian Economic Papers*, **16** (1977), 211–218; “Voluntary Contracts and Jam in the Far Future,” *Australian Economic Papers*, **17** (1978), 363–364.
13. (with Partha S. Dasgupta and Eric S. Maskin) “The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility,” *Review of Economic Studies* (Symposium on Incentive Compatibility), **46** (1979), 185–216.
14. “Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies,” *Review of Economic Studies* (Symposium on Incentive Compatibility), **46** (1979), 263–282.
15. “Equity in Two-Person Situations: Some Consequences,” *Econometrica*, **47** (1979), 1127–1135.
16. (with John F. Kennan) “Uniformly Optimal Infinite Horizon Plans,” *International Economic Review*, **20** (1979), 283–296.

17. (with Avinash K. Dixit and Michael Hoel) “On Hartwick’s Rule for Constant Utility and Regular Maximin Paths of Capital Accumulation and Resource Depletion,” *Review of Economic Studies*, **47** (1980), 551–6.
18. (with Partha S. Dasgupta) “Fully Progressive Taxation,” *Journal of Public Economics*, **13** (1980), 141–154.
19. (with Partha S. Dasgupta and Eric S. Maskin) “On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control,” *Review of Economic Studies*, **47** (1980), 857–860.
20. “Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty,” *Economica*, **48** (1981), 235–250.
21. “The Economics of Justice and the Criterion of Wealth Maximization,” *Yale Law Journal*, **91** (1982), 1493–1507.
22. “Overlapping Expectations and Hart’s Conditions for Equilibrium in a Securities Model,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **31** (1983), 170–175; reprinted in J.-M. Grandmont (ed.), *Temporary Equilibrium: Selected Readings* (New York: Academic Press, 1988), pp. 156–161.
23. “Project Evaluation by Potential Tax Reform,” *Journal of Public Economics*, **30** (1986), 1–36.
24. “Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies,” *Review of Economic Studies*, **54** (1987), 399–412; extended abstract in P. Kleinschmidt and F.J. Radermacher (eds.), *Proceedings of the SOR Conference, Passau, 1987*, pp. 57–8.
25. “Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility,” *Theory and Decision*, **25** (1988), 25–78; reprinted in J.D. Hey (ed.) *The Economics of Uncertainty, Vol. 2: Uncertainty and Dynamics* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1997), pp. 358–411.
26. “Consequentialist Demographic Norms and Parenting Rights,” *Social Choice and Welfare*, **5** (1988), 127–145; also in W. Gaertner and P.K. Pattanaik (eds.) *Distributive Justice and Inequality* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1988), pp. 39–57.
27. “Orderly Decision Theory: A Comment on Professor Seidenfeld,” *Economics and Philosophy*, **4** (1988), 292–297.
28. (with Mamoru Kaneko and Myrna Holtz Wooders) “Continuum Economies with Finite Coalitions: Core, Equilibrium and Widespread Externalities,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **49** (1989), 113–134.
29. “Consistent Plans, Consequentialism, and Expected Utility,” *Econometrica*, **57** (1989), 1445–1449.
30. “Theoretical Progress in Public Economics: A Provocative Assessment,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, **42** (1990), 6–33; also in P.J.N. Sinclair and M.D.E. Slater (eds.) *Taxation, Private Information and Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
31. “Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal Comparisons,” *Social Choice and Welfare*, **8** (1991), 1–19.
32. (with Andrés Rodríguez-Clare) “On Endogenizing Long-Run Growth,” *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, **95** (1993), 391–425; also in T.M. Andersen and K.O. Moene (eds.) *Endogenous Growth* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 1–35.

33. (with Jaume Sempere) “Limits to the Potential Gains from Economic Integration and Other Supply Side Policies,” *Economic Journal* **105** (1995), 1180–1204.
34. “Four Characterizations of Constrained Pareto Efficiency in Continuum Economies with Widespread Externalities,” *Japanese Economic Review*, **46** (1995), 103–124.
35. (with Antonio Villar) “Efficiency with Non-Convexities: Extending the ‘Scandinavian Consensus’ Approaches,” *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* **100** (1998), 11–32; also in T.M. Andersen and K.O. Moene (eds.) *Public Policy and Economic Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 11–32.
36. (with José Córdoba) “Asymptotically Walrasian Strategy-Proof Exchange,” *Mathematical Social Sciences*, **36** (1998), 185–212.
37. “Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in Decision Theory and Games,” Stanford University Department of Economics Working Paper No. 97-038; abbreviated version published in *Mathematical Social Sciences*, **38** (1999), 139–156.
38. “On f -Core Equivalence in a Continuum Economy with General Widespread Externalities,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, **32** (1999), 177–184.
39. (with Giovanni Facchini and Hiroyuki Nakata) “Spurious Deadweight Gains,” *Economics Letters*, **72** (2001), 33–37.
40. (with Yeneng Sun) “Monte Carlo Simulation of Macroeconomic Risk with a Continuum of Agents: The Symmetric Case,” *Economic Theory*, **21** (2003), 743–766; also in C.D. Aliprantis *et al.* (eds.) *Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics: Essays in Honor of Mordecai Kurz* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2003), pp. 709–732.
41. “Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate,” *Social Choice and Welfare* (Special issue on “The axiomatic theory of resource allocation — In honour of Louis Gevers” edited by C. d’Aspremont and F. Maniquet) **21** (2003), 181–193.
42. (with Georges Bordes and Michel Le Breton) “Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments,” *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, **7** (2005), 1–25.
43. (with Yeneng Sun) “Joint Measurability and the One-way Fubini Property for a Continuum of Independent Random Variables,” *Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society* **134** (2006), 737–747.
44. (with Yeneng Sun) “The Essential Equivalence of Pairwise and Mutual Conditional Independence,” *Probability Theory and Related Fields* (to appear).
45. (with Jaume Sempere) “Gains from Trade versus Gains from Migration: What Makes Them So Different?” Stanford University Department of Economics Working Paper No. 98-012; *Journal of Public Economic Theory* (to appear).

H. PUBLISHED AND FORTHCOMING PAPERS IN VOLUMES

1. (with James A. Mirrlees) “Agreeable Plans,” in J.A. Mirrlees and N.H. Stern (eds.) *Models of Economic Growth* (Proceedings of a Conference of the International Economic Association, Jerusalem, 1970) (London: Macmillan, 1973), ch. 13, pp. 283–299; to be reprinted in J.A. Mirrlees *Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 19.
2. “Charity: Altruism or Cooperative Egoism?” in E.S. Phelps (ed.), *Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975), pp. 115–131.
3. “Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Planning Procedure,” in D.A. Currie and W. Peters (eds.), *Contemporary Economic Analysis, Vol. 2* (Proceedings of the Conference of the Association of University Teachers of Economics, 1978) (London: Croom-Helm, 1980), ch. 8, pp. 221–250.
4. “Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Information,” in A.K. Sen and B. Williams (eds.) *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge University Press, 1982), ch. 4, pp. 85–102.
5. “Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle,” in L.J. Cohen, J. Łoś, H. Pfeiffer and K.-P. Podewski (eds.), *Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science*, VI, (North-Holland, 1982), pp. 607–620.
6. “Ex-Post Optimality as a Dynamically Consistent Objective for Collective Choice Under Uncertainty,” in P.K. Pattanaik and M. Salles (eds.) *Social Choice and Welfare* (North-Holland, 1983), ch. 10, pp. 175–205.
7. “Approximate Measures of Social Welfare and the Size of Tax Reform,” in D. Bös, M. Rose, and C. Seidl (eds.), *Beiträge zur neueren Steuertheorie* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1984), pp. 95–115.
8. “Welfare Economics,” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.) *Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare* (London: Macmillan, 1985), ch. 13, pp. 405–434.
9. “Consequentialist Social Norms for Public Decisions,” in W.P. Heller, R.M. Starr and D.A. Starrett (eds.), *Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, Vol. I* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 1, pp. 3–27; Italian translation published in L. Sacconi (ed.) *La decisione: Razionalità collettiva e strategie nell’amministrazione e nelle organizzazioni* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1986), ch. 2, pp. 60–88.
10. “Progress in the Theory of Social Choice and Distributive Justice,” in S. Zandvakili (ed.) *Research in Economic Inequality, Vol. 7: Inequality and Taxation*, pp. 87–106 (1998); revised version of English original published in Italian translation in L. Sacconi (ed.) *La decisione: Razionalità collettiva e strategie nell’amministrazione e nelle organizzazioni* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1986), ch. 3, pp. 89–106.
11. “On Reconciling Arrow’s Theory of Social Choice with Harsanyi’s Fundamental Utilitarianism,” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.) *Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy* (Macmillan and New York University Press, 1987), ch. 4, pp. 179–221.

12. “Social Choice: The Science of the Impossible?” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.), *Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy* (Macmillan and New York University Press, 1987), ch. 1B, pp. 116–131.

Three entries for *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics* (London: Macmillan, 1987) on:

13. “Uncertainty”; reprinted in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.) *The New Palgrave: Utility and Probability* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 280–294; slightly revised for *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance* (London: Macmillan, 1992).
14. “Altruism”; reprinted in S. Zamagni (ed.) *The Economics of Altruism* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 165–167.
15. “Envy”; reprinted in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.) *The New Palgrave: Social Economics* (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 45–48.
16. “Consequentialism and the Independence Axiom,” in B.R. Munier (ed.) *Risk, Decision and Rationality* (Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on the Foundations and Applications of Utility, Risk and Decision Theories) (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1988), pp. 503–516.
17. “Principles for Evaluating Public Sector Projects,” in P. Hare (ed.) *Surveys in Public Sector Economics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), ch. 2, pp. 15–44.
18. “Some Assumptions of Contemporary Neoclassical Economic Theology,” in G.R. Feiwel (ed.) *Joan Robinson and Modern Economic Theory* (Macmillan, and New York University Press, 1989), ch. 4, pp. 186–257; Spanish translation “Algunos supuestos de la teología de la teoría económica neoclásica contemporánea,” *Estudios Económicos de el Colegio de México*, **5** (1990), 3–81.
19. “Incentives and Allocation Mechanisms,” in R. van der Ploeg (ed.), *Advanced Lectures in Quantitative Economics* (New York: Academic Press, 1990), ch. 6, pp. 213–248.
20. “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and how they are and should be made,” in J. Elster and J.E. Roemer (eds.), *Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 7, pp. 200–254; reprinted in A.P. Hamlin (ed.) *Ethics and Economics, Vol. I* (Edward Elgar, 1996), ch. 22, pp. 410–464.
21. “Approximate Measures of the Social Welfare Benefits of Large Projects,” Stanford University, Institute of Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Economics Technical Report No. 410 (1983); in S. Dahiya (ed.) *Theoretical Foundations of Development Planning, Vol. V: Project Evaluation* (New Delhi: Concept Pub. Co., 1991).
22. “Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations,” in R. Selten (ed.) *Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John Harsanyi* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1992), pp. 305–319.

23. “On the Impossibility of Perfect Capital Markets,” in P. Dasgupta, D. Gale, O. Hart, and E. Maskin (eds.), *Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1992), pp. 527–560.
24. “Irreducibility, Resource Relatedness, and Survival in Equilibrium with Individual Non-Convexities,” in R. Becker, M. Boldrin, R. Jones, and W. Thomson (eds.) *General Equilibrium, Growth, and Trade II: The Legacy of Lionel W. McKenzie*, (San Diego: Academic Press, 1993), ch. 4, pp. 73–115.
25. “Aspects of Rationalizable Behavior,” in K. Binmore, A.P. Kirman, and P. Tani (eds.) *Frontiers of Game Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T Press, 1993), ch. 14, pp. 277–305.
26. “Credible Liberalization: Beyond the three theorems of neoclassical welfare economics,” in D. Bös (ed.), *Economics in a Changing World, Vol. 3: Public Policy and Economic Organization* (IEA Conference Volume No. 109) (London: Macmillan, 1993), ch. 3, pp. 21–39.
27. “Elementary Non-Archimedean Representations of Probability for Decision Theory and Games,” in P. Humphreys (ed.) *Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, Vol. I: Probability and Probabilistic Causality* (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), ch. 2, pp. 25–59.
28. “Money Metric Measures of Individual and Social Welfare Allowing for Environmental Externalities,” in W. Eichhorn (ed.) *Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994), pp. 694–724.
29. “A Revelation Principle for (Boundedly) Bayesian Rationalizable Strategies,” in R.P. Gilles and P.H.M. Ruys (eds.), *Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994) ch. 3, pp. 39–70.
30. (with Jeffrey L. Coles) “Walrasian Equilibrium without Survival: Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Remedial Policy,” in K. Basu, P.K. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura (eds.) *Choice, Welfare and Development: A Festschrift in Honour of Amartya K. Sen* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 3, pp. 32–64; reprinted in J.P. Drèze (ed.) *The Economics of Famine* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999), ch. 7, pp. 167–199.
31. “Social Choice of Individual and Group Rights,” in W.A. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, and N. Schofield (eds.), *Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 3, pp. 55–77.
32. “The Moral Status of Profits and Other Rewards: A Perspective from Modern Welfare Economics,” in R. Cowan and M.J. Rizzo (eds.) *Profits and Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), ch. 4, pp. 88–123.
33. “Consequentialism, Structural Rationality and Game Theory,” in K.J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, and C. Schmidt (eds.) *The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour* (IEA Conference Volume No. 114) (London: Macmillan, 1996) ch. 2, pp. 25–42.
34. “Consequentialist Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics,” in F. Farina, F. Hahn, and S. Vannucci (eds.) *Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 92–118.

35. “Game Forms versus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights,” in K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura (eds.) *Social Choice Re-examined, Vol. II* (IEA Conference Volume No. 117) (London: Macmillan, 1997) ch. 11, pp. 82–95.
36. “Rights, Free Exchange, and Widespread Externalities,” in J.-F. Laslier, M. Fleurbaey, N. Gravel and A. Trannoy (eds.) *Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), ch. 11, pp. 139–157.
37. “The Efficiency Theorems and Market Failure,” in A.P. Kirman (ed.) *Elements of General Equilibrium Analysis* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998) ch. 6, pp. 211–260.
38. “Consequentialism and Bayesian Rationality in Normal Form Games,” in W. Leinfellner and E. Köhler (eds.) *Game Theory, Experience, Rationality. Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics and Ethics. In honor of John C. Harsanyi. (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5)* (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 187–196.

Two chapters for the *Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 1: Principles* (edited with Salvador Barberà and Christian Seidl; Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998) on:

39. “Objective Expected Utility: A Consequentialist Perspective,” ch. 5, pp. 145–211;
40. “Subjective Expected Utility,” ch. 6, pp. 213–271.
41. “History as a Widespread Externality in Some Arrow–Debreu Market Games,” in G. Chichilnisky (ed.), *Markets, Information and Uncertainty: Essays in Economic Theory in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) ch. 16, pp. 328–361.
42. “Multilaterally Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann–Hildenbrand Macroeconomies,” in M. Wooders (ed.) *Topics in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics: Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann* (Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society, 1999), pp. 171–187.
43. “Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities, and Lexicographic Expected Utility,” in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey and B. Skyrms (eds.) *The Logic of Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) ch. 2, pp. 39–66; also in A. Bachem, U. Derigs, M. Jünger and R. Schrader (eds.) *Operations Research '93* (Extended Abstracts of the 18th Symposium on Operations Research held at the University of Cologne, September 1–3, 1993) (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 1994), pp. 219–250.
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