

**JUNGA KIM**

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**EDUCATION**

**STANFORD UNIVERSITY, USA**

**Candidate for Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)**

Dissertation: 'Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: Does Regime Type Matter? Democratization and Farm Supports in South Korea'  
Committee: Judith Goldstein, David Brady, James Fearon  
Fields: International Political Economy, Public Policy, Methods  
Field Paper: Domestic Institutions and Sovereign Default: Empirical Study on Debt Rescheduling Negotiations, 1980-1999  
Honors: Department Fellowship

**GRADUATE SCHOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (GSIS), YONSEI, SOUTH KOREA**

**Master of Art (M.A), June 1999**

Thesis: 'Media and Trade Policy in Korea: A Case Study of Newspaper Coverage of the Uruguay Round Negotiations, 1986-1994'  
Fields: International Trade Policy  
Adviser: Jongryn Mo  
References: Jongryn Mo, Jung-in Moon, Sung-bong Lee  
Honors: Trade Specialist Fellowship

**YONSEI UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA**

**Bachelor of Art (BA), February 1995**

Major: Russian Literature and Language  
Minor: Political Science and Diplomacy  
Honors: Excellency Scholarship (top 2%)

**MOSCOW UNIVERSITY, RUSSIA**

**Exchange Student Program, 1993**

**CONFERENCE PAPERS**

Political Economy of Agricultural Protection Revisited: Does Regime Type Matter? *International Studies Association Annual Convention, February 15-18, 2009, New York, NY*

Political Economy of Agricultural Protection Revisited: Does Regime Type Matter? *American Political Science Association Conference, August 28-31, 2008, Boston, MA*

WTO, Political Institutions and Farm Supports: Legislative Structure and Agricultural Protection in Korea, 1945-2004 (Research Proposal). *APARC workshop on Korea-Japan Legislative Studies. 2005, Stanford, CA.*

Domestic Institutions and Sovereign Default: Empirical Study on Debt Rescheduling Negotiations, 1980-1999. *American Political Science Association Conference, September (poster session), 2005, Washington D.C.*

Domestic Institutions and Sovereign Default: Empirical Study on Debt Rescheduling Negotiations, 1980-1999. *Midwest Political Science Association Conference, April 7-10, 2005, Chicago, IL.*

## EXPERIENCE

### Stanford University

Research Assistant	Political Science, Judith Goldstein	Fall 2005
Research Assistant	APARC, Giwook Shin	Summer 2005
Explored electorate as well as the electoral systems in Korea since 1945. Developed tools to codify socio-economic backgrounds of congressmen		
Research Assistant	Political Science, Judith Goldstein	Fall 2004
Investigated time-serial NTR and non-NTR tariff rates of the key U.S. trading partners		
Research Assistant	Center for International Development, Nicholas Hope	Summer 2004
Assessed Chinese banking reform		
Research Assistant	Political Science, James Fearon	Spring 2004
Explored the internal and external challenges of the United Nations and its solutions		
Research Assistant	Political Science, Mike Tomz	Summer 2003
[FDI project] Analyzed multi-national corporations' responses to the expropriation in Africa, and studied the fluctuations of the world public bond prices, 1820 -1990		
Research Assistant	Political Science, Jean Oi	Summer 2002
Evaluated corporate and bank reforms in Asia after the 1997 financial crisis		
Research Assistant	Political Science, Terry Mo	Summer 2001
[School Project] Investigated the teachers' contracts with California school board		
Teaching Assistant	PS 100A/200A Statistical Analysis for Political Sciences I James Fearon	Fall 2001
	PS 100B/200B Statistical Analysis for Political Science II Simon Jackman	Winter 2002
	PS 148T Political Economy of Democratization and Economic Development in Korea Hyug-baeg, Lim	Fall 2002
	PS 110B Strategy, War, and Politics Ben Valentino	Spring 2003
	PS 114T Major Issues in International Conflict Management Kelly M. Greenhill	Spring 2004
	PS 141L China in World Politics Lyman H. Miller	Spring 2005
	PS 115R International Relations of Korea	

David Kang  
ECON 141 Public Finance and Fiscal Policy  
Michael J. Boskin

Winter 2006

Fall 2008

**Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University**

Research Assistant      Center for International Studies, Jongryn Mo      1999-2000  
Administered "Case Studies of Economic Reforms in Korea," and "Democracy and Market Economy," joint projects with the CIS, Korea Development Institution, Korea Economic Research Institute, and *Chosun Ilbo*

Research Assistant      Jongryn Mo      1998-1999  
Studied domestic agricultural market liberalization and foreign policymaking process.

**Korea Institute for International Economic Policy**

Research Assistant      Foreign Investment Division, Sung-bong Lee      1998  
Surveyed on the FDI policy, corporate governance and restructuring, and EU monetary integration

**PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP**

American Political Science Association

**REFERENCES**

Prof. Judith Goldstein  
Stanford, Political Science.  
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Prof. David Brady  
Stanford, GSB  
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Prof. James Fearon  
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**TEACHING INTERESTS**

International Relations

Introduction to Statistical Analysis

International Political Economy

Introduction to Public Policy

Comparative Politics

Political Economy of East Asia

## ABSTRACTS

### **Political Economy of Agricultural Protection Revisited: Does Regime Type Matter?**

The mechanisms that produce inefficient farm subsidy programs have been rigorously studied by political economists using new institutional economic analyses. These rent-seeking approaches predict that a democratic system will invariably render inefficient policies (Tullock 1988, 1990). It is thought this is because in democracies, special interests package the measures in accordance with the ideology of the general public to increase the chance of being accepted as policy. Such prediction was echoed by Findlay who showed that authoritarian states become embedded with increased rent-seeking consequences once they begin to democratize (Findlay 1991). However, not only democracies but also authoritarian regimes face the need to convince the public of proposed policy changes. In this paper, I extend the traditional rent-seeking proposition to show that authoritarian regimes are as much prone to have inefficient policies, since they have to deal with a public having stronger and less diversified ideologies. Results show that democratic countries are more likely to have lower agricultural tariffs when controlled for the key variables, such as the number of veto players and the overall trade openness. Democracies tend to have multiple veto players, but the impact of each on the level of agricultural protection is opposite. This study suggests that by ensuring civil society to freely form and exchange diverse ideas and ideologies, one can expect to reduce the prevalence of inefficient public choice outcomes.

### **Domestic Institutions and Sovereign Default: Empirical Study on Debt Rescheduling Negotiations, 1980-1999**

The history of sovereign default dates back to the 1820s, continuing to grow in a form of debt renegotiation. Researches have focused on correcting macroeconomic policies or international institutions to mitigate periodic global insolvency. However, sovereign default rarely is a solely economic matter, and fixing international institutions does not address why countries under a common external shock react differently. In this study, I explore how domestic political institutional framework influences a country's willingness to honor its obligation. Based on previous literature, I present a series of arguments that lead to several testable hypotheses associating the number of veto players and the likelihood to default. These hypotheses are tested against fourteen Latin American and Asian countries from 1980 to 1999. The logistic multivariate regression shows that although multiple veto players make it hard to repay the debt in fledgling democracies, the relationship reverses when the debtor becomes a mature democracy. Since Tsebelis (1995; 2002), there have been rigorous efforts to theoretically and empirically demonstrate how the domestic political institutional design determines macroeconomic policy outcomes in developing countries. This study builds on these findings, providing evidence that the impact of multiple veto players on sovereign default is negative only when a country is democratically consolidated. Otherwise, the relationship reverses, and we observe less responsible government to its foreign lenders.

### **Media and Trade Policy in Korea: A Case Study of Newspaper Coverage of the Uruguay Round Negotiations, 1986-1994**

In this study, I constructed a dynamic theory of media based upon the Baron's model to explain news coverage and treatment of international trade issues in Korea. To support the theory, news reports and editorials on Uruguay Round from nine national dailies were analyzed, and changes in dependent variables – coverage, forms of treatment, and ways of treatment-- were used to demonstrate the existence and effects of external influences and media's different levels of vulnerability to them. Independent variables were in three levels: characteristics and nature of the

issue, collective action, and institution levels. At the initial stage, the relative newsworthiness of the issue mostly determined whether and how the issue should be treated. However, once the issue was identified and covered by the media, its coverage alerted the public, activists, interest groups, and public officeholders to the issue, which then tried to seize the opportunity created by media coverage of an issue to further their cause or interests. They directly or indirectly influenced the news media, distorting coverage and treatment decisions, with their own strategies and networks. Although the media guarded its independence, it might at times find components of those strategies to be newsworthy. Meanwhile, structure of media organization and newsgathering system made the difference in vulnerability to each source of influences, leading further difference of the coverage and treatment across time and organization. News media is a source of information for those in the trade policy making and it plays an important role in setting a certain issue on the policy agenda, developing the issue, and shaping the win-sets for policymakers. Therefore, they must decide which issues the media is likely to cover and the treatment these issues are likely to receive. In addition, knowledge on the determinants of media coverage may provide the policy makers with strategic focal points to enter and tackle or rationalize the media environment. Mechanism constructed in this thesis will provide a starting bloc to establish more accurate and systemic model of the media behavior in Korea.