Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
The MNLF uses nationalist rhetoric to call for an independent state in the Southern Philippines. Its 1974 manifesto discusses the Moro people as a nation based more on a shared homeland in the southern Philippines and oppressed by the central government, rather than a group characterized by a common religion. While the group has not emphasized an Islamic agenda, the MNLF claims to represent Filipino Muslims. It made a few references in its manifesto to defending Islam and has historically sought Islamic supporters like the OIC. It enjoys the OIC’s official recognition.[80]
The MNLF initially sought a fully independent state for the Moros, but its leadership accepted an autonomy arrangement in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.[81] Currently, the MNLF is divided in its aims. Some factions – led by Sema and Alonto – have supported the MILF-Philippine agreement and the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), while other factions – led by Misuari and Hashim – have voiced opposition and insisted upon full implementation of the 1996 agreement.[82]
Beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing on and off for two decades, the MNLF engaged in peace talks with the Philippine government, then led by President Ferdinand Marcos. The OIC and Libya facilitated these talks, with the former urging the Philippine government to negotiate and the latter hosting the negotiations that culminated in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.[83]
The next significant round of talks began in 1992, when Philippine President Fidel Ramos restarted peace negotiations with the MNLF. As before, various international actors mediated the talks, including the OIC, the Libyan government of Muammar el-Qaddafi, and the Indonesian government of Suharto. The Philippine government and the MNLF signed Statements of Understanding and Interim Agreements between 1992 and 1996. These negotiation efforts culminated in the Final Peace Agreement – also called the Jakarta Peace Agreement – that was signed by the Philippine government, the MNLF, and the OIC on September 2, 1996. The 1996 agreement officially ended the MNLF’s fight against the government. It designated a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in the southern Philippines, which would be the focus of special development and investment efforts for three years. The agreement also expanded the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and outlined its new governance structures. In addition to these territorial provisions, the agreement called for the integration of MNLF members into the Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. These stipulations were to be implemented across two phases.[84]
The 1996 agreement drove the MNLF to become more integrated with the Philippine political system. The MNLF officially allied itself with Lakas (Strength), the political party of then-President Ramos. Drawing on these political connections, MNLF leader Misuari easily won election as the ARMM’s regional governor about a week after the 1996 agreement’s signing. The political alliance also enabled other MNLF members to run for elected office.[85] Some MNLF members entered the ARMM government or the council overseeing the SZOPAD’s administration.[86] MNLF members held the ARMM governorship from 1996 to 2005.[87] In March of 2019, MNLF leader Hatimil Hassan was elected as the deputy speaker of the Bangsamoro Parliament.[88]
The MILF-Philippine government peace talks, culminating with the signing of the BOL in July 2018, largely excluded the MNLF. Many MNLF members have opposed the ongoing MILF-Philippine government peace talks, insisting that the 1996 Final Peace Agreement already resolved the question of the status of Muslims in the Philippines. MNLF leaders, including Habib Mujahab Hashim and Muslimin Sema, have spoken in front of the Philippine Congress to express their support for or opposition to the proposed Bangsamoro region.[89]
The MNLF has historically depended on armed struggle and government negotiations to achieve its aim of an independent state or autonomous region for Filipino Muslims. Throughout the 1970s, the MNLF fought the Philippine government and armed Christian groups. The MNLF’s militant activity began with attacks against government targets in Marawi City after then-President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in September 1972. Although the MNLF had some capacity to engage in conventional warfare, a massive military operation launched by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973 forced the group to turn to guerrilla tactics with support from Libya and Malaysia.[90] MNLF negotiations with the government began in the mid-1970s and continued for two decades, interspersed with violence. The MNLF often renewed its attacks against the government when it was dissatisfied with the results or implementation of peace agreements. For example, such violence occurred after the 1977 referendum on autonomy in the southern Philippines. The MNLF’s attacks have mostly involved firefights with government troops. The MNLF conducted scattered kidnappings, boat and airplane hijackings, and attacks on civilians in the 1970s.[91] However, the group has generally focused on targeting government troops rather than civilians. The MNLF has used both guerrilla tactics and conventional warfare effectively.[92]
The 1996 Final Peace Agreement formally ended the MNLF’s armed struggle but did not completely cease the MNLF’s use of violence. Most notably, Misuari led his faction in two significant violent campaigns in 2001 and 2013. In 2001, Misuari’s followers launched a major attack against government troops. In the 2013 attack, MNLF members entered Zamboanga City, took hostages, and fought government forces. Violent activity by other MNLF factions (i.e., those factions not led by Misuari) has been less prominent.[93]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization’s history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
The MNLF’s militant activity is not always well-documented. In particular, there is little information on specific attacks and battles between 1977 and 2001. Although the MNLF and the Philippine government were engaged in sporadic peace talks, the group continued to mount attacks and use violence to achieve its goals.
October 21, 1972: MNLF operatives launched an attack on various targets in Marawi City, including the Philippine Constabulary, a government radio station, and a state university. This attack was conducted in response to then-President Ferdinand Marcos’ declaration of martial law. It is generally considered the beginning of the MNLF’s armed uprising against the Philippine state (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[94]
February 7, 1974: The MNLF entered Jolo, the capital of Sulu, and reportedly tried to declare Mindanao’s independence for the first time. The group allegedly attacked Jolo and held it for days before the Philippine military retook the city. The Battle of Jolo devastated the city, although reports differ over whether the MNLF or government forces were mostly responsible for the destruction (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[95]
October 10, 1977: A MNLF commander invited a Philippine military general to a market in Patikul under the pretense of a ceasefire meeting. MNLF forces then ambushed the general and his men (34 killed, unknown wounded).[96]
November 19, 2001: Misuari’s followers attacked multiple Philippine military camps on the island of Jolo, allegedly to undermine ARMM elections in which Misuari was expected to lose. (111+ killed, unknown wounded).[97]
September 9, 2013: Forces from Nur Misuari’s MNLF faction entered Zamboanga City, attacking government forces and ultimately taking about 300 civilian hostages. Fighting lasted until September 28 (6+ killed, 24 wounded).[98]
The MNLF is not designated as a terrorist organization by the United States or the European Union.[99]
In the 1970s, the MNLF emerged as the leading player in the Moro separatist movement. In 1975, the Philippine government began negotiating with the MNLF for the first time. However, the MNLF grew less popular due to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement and the growing perception that Nur Misuari was committed more to his own political gain rather than to championing Moro welfare. With the MNLF’s decline, the MILF became the leading organization seeking Moro independence or autonomy. The almost decade-long MILF-Philippine government negotiations have further marginalized the MNLF.[100]
Historically, the MNLF’s strongest support has come from Muslim tribes based in western Mindanao, namely the Tausug, Sama, and Yakan. The MNLF has also enjoyed substantial support from the Maguindanao and Maranao tribes based in central Mindanao.[101] The fracturing of the MNLF along tribal lines, however, has eroded its support base.[102]
The MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – the most significant splinter group to break away from the MNLF – have historically competed for resources, support, and political legitimacy since the MILF splintered in 1977. The MILF’s rise within the Moro separatist movement coincided with the MNLF’s decline, following the MNLF’s 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the Philippine government, which the MILF strongly opposed.[103] In recent years, the MNLF’s factions have adopted different attitudes toward the MILF. Sema’s Executive Council of 15 (EC-15) supported the MILF-Philippine government peace talks and maintained friendly relations with the MILF. In contrast, Misuari and his faction have resented the MILF and sought to undermine the negotiation process.[104]
The MNLF has formally condemned the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which is listed by the United States and the United Nations as a terrorist organization. The MNLF has cooperated with the Philippine military to oppose the ASG. However, at the local level, relationships between MNLF and ASG commanders have sometimes resulted in alliances against the Philippine military.[105]
Even before its formal establishment, the MNLF benefited from the influence of foreign actors, especially Malaysia. Beginning in 1969, the Malaysian government supplied training and weapons to Filipino Muslims, some of whom would later become MNLF members. MNLF leader Nur Misuari was one of those Malaysian-trained members. The group’s connections to Malaysia are also apparent in the fact that the MNLF was officially formed on the Malaysian island of Pulau Pangkor in 1972.[106]
After its establishment, the MNLF also secured financial support and military training from Libya, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and other foreign sources.[107] From 1972 to 1975, Libya and the OIC provided approximately $35 million to the MNLF, including arms and equipment that were funneled to the group through Malaysia. In the mid-1970s, Libya became the major training site for MNLF members. Syria, Pakistan, and the Palestine Liberation Organization also trained MNLF members beginning in the 1980s.[108] In 1975, The OIC officially recognized the MNLF as the representative of Filipino Muslims, and the MNLF has continued to trumpet its status as an OIC non-state observer to emphasize its legitimacy.[109] Until the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, the OIC annually supplied $1 million to the MNLF.[110]
The OIC also played a pivotal role in the MNLF-Philippine government negotiations leading up to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, and it was a signatory to the official document.[111] More recently, the OIC has also supported the MILF in its negotiations with the Philippine government. The MILF-Philippine government talks, and eventual signing of the BOL, marginalized the MNLF. The OIC has advocated a peace process open to all stakeholders including the MNLF, which it still formally recognizes.[112]
[1] Leifer, Michael. Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2001. Print.; Unson, John. “17 years to a peace deal.” Philstar, 28 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.
[2] Medina, Andrei. “Timeline: Crisis in Zamboanga City.” GMA News, 10 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; “Zamboanga clash kills 6, shuts down city.” Sunstar, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Fonbuena, Carmela. “6 killed, 24 hurt in Zamboanga clashes.” Rappler, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[3] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[4] Cheng, Willard. “Gov’t acknowledges Jabidah massacre for the first time”. ABS-CBN News, 18 March 2013. Web. 6 August 2018. <http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/03/18/13/govt-acknowledges-jabidah-massac...
[5] McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Print.; “Philippines: Muslims.” World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Minority Rights Group International. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.; Cabigao, Jr., Fernando. “PH south’s separatist, armed groups.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 7 Mar. 2015. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.
[6] McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Print.
[7] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Noble, Lela Garner. “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 49.3 (Autumn 1976): 405-424. Web. 27 July 2015.; Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; Cabigao, Jr., Fernando. “PH south’s separatist, armed groups.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 7 Mar. 2015. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.
[8] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[9] Philippines. Office of the President. Proclamation No. 1081: Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines.; McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Print.
[10] McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Print.; Noble, Lela Garner. “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 49.3 (Autumn 1976): 405-424. Web. 27 July 2015.; Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[11] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[12] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[13] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[14] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[15] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[16] Angeles, Vivienne SM. “Philippine Muslim Women: Tradition and Change.” Islam, Gender, and Social Change. Ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 209-229. Print.; Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[17] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[18] Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Resolution No. 10/6-P: Negotiations between the Moro Liberation Front and the Government of the Philippines. Jeddah: 12-15 July 1975.
[19] The Tripoli Agreement. Tripoli: 23 Dec. 1976.
[20] “ARMM History.” Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Office of the Regional Governor’s Information and Communication Technology Office.; Mercado, Eliseo R. “The Mindanao Peace Process: Mediating Peace between the Philippine Government and the Moro Fronts.” Conference on “The Impact of Islam and Peace-making in the Southern Philippines,” 8 Nov. 2003. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.
[21] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[22] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[23] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; Diaz, Jess. “2 MNLF factions support draft Bangsamoro law.” Philstar, 21 Jan. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; Noble, Lela Garner. “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 49.3 (Autumn 1976): 405-424. Web. 27 July 2015.; Madjilon, Mahendra Alih. “Attempts to Unseat Misuari.” Moro National Liberation Front.
[24] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[25] “ARMM History.” Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Office of the Regional Governor’s Information and Communication Technology Office.; Hannum, Hurst. Basic Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights. 1st ed. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993. Print.
[26] “Abu Sayyaf Group.” National Counterterrorism Center, n.d. Web. 27 July 2015.
[27] “OIC urges PH gov’t to preserve gains of Bangsamoro peace agreements.” Office of the President of the Philippines: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 3 June 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; “1996 Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front.” Manila: 2 Sept. 1996.
[28] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[29] Caculitan, Ariel R. “Negotiating Peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines.” Diss. Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. Web. 10 July 2015.; Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[30] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[31] May, R.J. “Muslim Mindanao: Four Years After the Peace Agreement.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2001): 263-275. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.
[32] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[33] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Jacinto, Al. “Nur Misuari ousted as MNLF chairman anew.” GMA News, 2 Apr. 2008. Web. 27 July 2015.; Vigilar, Rufi. “Philippine separatists may merge.” CNN, 20 Nov. 2001. Web. 6 Aug. 2001.
[34] Fonbuena, Carmela. “How to arrest a rebel like Nur Misuari.” Rappler, 12 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[35] Fonbuena, Carmela. “How to arrest a rebel like Nur Misuari.” Rappler, 12 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Chalk, Peter, et al. The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009. Print.; Fonbuena, Carmela. “How to arrest a rebel like Nur Misuari.” Rappler, 12 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[36] “ARMM History.” Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Office of the Regional Governor’s Information and Communication Technology Office. ; “Candidates for ARMM regional governor.” GMA News, 11 Aug. 2008. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.
[37] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[38] Tupaz, Voltaire. “MNLF to MILF: Good luck but beware.” Rappler, 16 Oct. 2012. Web. 27 July 2015.; Regalado, Edith. “Peace, development roadmap for Sulu pushed.” Philstar, 18 July 2006. Web. 27 July 2015.
[39] “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” United States Department of State. Web. 27 July 2015.; “Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities.” United Nations, 26 Aug. 2009. Web. 27 July 2015.
[40] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[41] Wilson, Jr., Thomas G. “Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front a Catalyst for Peace.” Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009. Web. 27 July 2015.
[42] Regencia, Ted. “Philippines prepares for historic peace deal.” Al Jazeera, 25 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.; “What is the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro?” Inquirer, 26 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.
[43] Pareño, Roel. “Nur declares independence of ‘Bangsamoro Republik.” Philstar, 15 Aug. 2013.
[44] Medina, Andrei. “Timeline: Crisis in Zamboanga City.” GMA News, 10 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[45] Legaspi, Amita. “Arrest warrants out vs Misuari, Malik and two others over Zambo attack.” GMA News, 9 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Cayabyab, Marc Jayson. “Despite arrest warrant, Misuari left country—MNLF spokesman.” GMA News, 10 Dec. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; “MNLF’s Nur Misuar ‘very much alive and happy with his 6th wife.” Inquirer, 22 June 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.
[46] “MNLF faction led by Sema not joining Misuari-led attack on Zamboanga City.” Inquirer, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[47] “MNLF reorganized with Alonto as new chair; Misuari out.” Inquirer, 17 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.
[48] Romero Alexis. “Government may need more time to pass BBJ, Duterte says”. Philstar, 17 June, 2018. Web. 9 July, 2018. <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/06/17/1825448/government-may-nee...
[49] Navarro, Louie U. “House panel approves Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.” CNN Philippines, 21 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; Usman, Edd K. “Four MNLF groups divided on BBL.” Manila Bulletin, 20 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; “Leaders of 2 MNLF factions attend Senate hearing on BBL.” Inquirer, 18 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.
[50] Diaz, Jess. “House ratifies Bangsamoro Organic Law”. Philstar, 25 July, 2018. Web. 24 July, 2018 (Manila time is +1 day). <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/25/1836632/house-ratifies-ban....
[51] Associated Press, “Philippine rebel chief: 30,000 rebels to be disarmed in deal”. Philstar, 25 July, 2018. Web. 24 July, 2018 (Manila time is +1 day). <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/25/1836474/philippine-rebel-c....
[52] Placido, Dharel. “Duterte offers peace to Misuari”. ABS-CBN News, 26 July, 2018. Web. 29 July, 2018. < http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/07/26/18/duterte-offers-peace-to-misuari>.
[53] Elemia, Camille. "Duterte: Misuari Threatened War If Federalism Doesn't Happen." Rappler. March 20, 2019. Accessed May 05, 2019. https://www.rappler.com/nation/226261-duterte-says-misuari-threatened-wa....
[54] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; Usman, Edd K. “Four MNLF groups divided on BBL.” Manila Bulletin, 20 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.
[55] Usman, Edd K. “Four MNLF groups divided on BBL.” Manila Bulletin, 20 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.
[56] Unson, John. “Nur Misuari as leader of the ARMM and MNLF.” Philstar, 11 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[57] Usman, Edd K. “Misuari convenes 2-day meeting.” Tempo, 17 Feb. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; “3 MNLF factions agree to re-unite with Misuari as leader.” Inquirer, 26 June 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.; Legaspi, Amita. “Arrest warrants out vs Misuari, Malik and two others over Zambo attack.” GMA News, 9 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Cayabyab, Marc Jayson. “Despite arrest warrant, Misuari left country—MNLF spokesman.” GMA News, 10 Dec. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; “MNLF’s Nur Misuar ‘very much alive and happy with his 6th wife.” Inquirer, 22 June 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; Tupaz, Voltaire. “MNLF to MILF: Good luck but beware.” Rappler, 16 Oct. 2012. Web. 27 July 2015.
[58] Placido, Dharel. “Duterte offers peace to Misuari”. ABS-CBN News, 26 July, 2018. Web. 29 July, 2018. < http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/07/26/18/duterte-offers-peace-to-misuari>.
[59] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; Tan, Andrew. “The Indigenous Roots of Conflict in Southeast Asia: The Case of Mindanao.” After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia. Ed. Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan. Singapore: World Scientific Pub Co Inc, 2004. 97-116. Print.
[60] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[61] Arguillas, Carolyn O. "Sema Steps down as MNLF Chair; Jikiri Takes over." MindaNews. February 20, 2017. Accessed May 07, 2019. https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2017/02/sema-steps-down-as-mnlf-ch....
[62] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[63] Ranada, Pia. "Ex-House Deputy Speaker Balindong Named Bangsamoro Parliament Speaker." Rappler. March 29, 2019. Accessed May 07, 2019. https://www.rappler.com/nation/226931-pangalian-balindong-named-bangsamo....
[64] “MNLF reorganized with Alonto as new chair; Misuari out.” Inquirer, 17 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.; Legaspi, Amita O. “‘New MNLF leader’ supports Bangsamoro pact between govt, MILF.” GMA News, 24 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.
[65] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[66] Nawal, Allan. "MinDA Chair Denies Proposing a Consulate in Kota Kinabalu." Inquirer Mindanao. September 9, 2016. Accessed May 07, 2019. https://news.mb.com.ph/2019/04/28/minda-chair-denies-proposing-a-consulate-in-kota-kinabalu/.; "The Secretary." Mindanao Development Authority. Accessed May 07, 2019. http://minda.gov.ph/about-minda/the-secretary.
[67] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Vanzi, Sol Jose. “4 MNLF Misuari Factions Reunite.” Philippine Headline News Online, 23 Jan. 2003. Web. 27 July 2015.
[68] Tupaz, Voltaire. “MNLF to MILF: Good luck but beware.” Rappler, 16 Oct. 2012. Web. 27 July 2015.
[69] Sarmiento, Bong S. "Misuari Loyalists in Region 12 Back Proposed Bangsamoro Region." MindaNews. January 14, 2019. Accessed June 12, 2019. https://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2018/11/misuari-loyalists-in-regio....
[70] “Bainon G. Karon—Cotabato City.” Ramon Aboitiz Foundation Inc. Triennial Awards. Web. 3 Aug. 2015.; “MNLF official appeals for support for peace deal.” Philstar, 14 Oct. 2012. Web. 3 Aug. 2015.
[71] Arguillas, Carolyn O. "Women in the Bangsamoro Transition Authority: Only 16 of 98 but a Powerhouse Cast." MindaNews. April 07, 2019. Accessed May 07, 2019. https://www.mindanews.com/peace-process/2019/04/women-in-the-bangsamoro-....
[72] Vanzi, Sol Jose. “4 MNLF Misuari Factions Reunite.” Philippine Headline News Online, 23 Jan. 2003. Web. 27 July 2015.; Ubac, Michael Lim and Arlyn dela Cruz. “Arrested mayor is ‘fearless,’ key MNLF leader.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 June 2008. Web. 27 July 2015.
[73] Wright-Neville, David P. Dictionary of Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010. Print.
[74] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[75] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[76] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; DeRouen, Karl, and Uk Heo, eds. The Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II, Volume 1. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2007. Print.
[77] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[78] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[79] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[80] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[81] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; “1996 Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front.” Manila: 2 Sept. 1996.
[82] Usman, Edd K. “Four MNLF groups divided on BBL.” Manila Bulletin, 20 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.
[83] Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Resolution No. 10/6-P: Negotiations between the Moro Liberation Front and the Government of the Philippines. Jeddah: 12-15 July 1975.}} {{The Tripoli Agreement. Tripoli: 23 Dec. 1976.
[84] “OIC urges PH gov’t to preserve gains of Bangsamoro peace agreements.” Office of the President of the Philippines: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 3 June 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; “1996 Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front.” Manila: 2 Sept. 1996.
[85] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; May, R.J. “Muslim Mindanao: Four Years After the Peace Agreement.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2001): 263-275. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.
[86] Caculitan, Ariel R. “Negotiating Peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines.” Diss. Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. Web. 10 July 2015.
[87] Unson, John. “Nur Misuari as leader of the ARMM and MNLF.” Philstar, 11 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[88] Ranada, Pia. "Ex-House Deputy Speaker Balindong Named Bangsamoro Parliament Speaker." Rappler. March 29, 2019. Accessed May 07, 2019. https://www.rappler.com/nation/226931-pangalian-balindong-named-bangsamo....
[89] “Should the ARMM be replaced by another entity? MNLF factions’ views differ.” Inquirer, 20 Jan. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; De Santos, Jonathan. “BBL might not bring peace if MNLF excluded, rep warns.” GMA News, 13 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.
[90] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; Philippines. Office of the President. Proclamation No. 1081: Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines.
[91] Newton, Michael. The Encyclopedia of Kidnappings. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2002.; “Last Pirating Incident Thought to be in 1975 with Am-Ship Hijack.” Associated Press, 8 Oct. 1985. Web. 27 July 2015.
[92] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[93] Santos, Jr., Reynaldo, and Mica Romulo. “LIST: MNLF’s 5 major attacks.” Rappler, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Medina, Andrei. “Timeline: Crisis in Zamboanga City.” GMA News, 10 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[94] Leifer, Michael. Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2001. Print.; Unson, John. “17 years to a peace deal.” Philstar, 28 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.
[95] “Revisiting the February 7-8, 1974 Burning of Jolo.” Moro National Liberation Front. Web. 27 July 2015.; Philippine News Agency. “War in Mindanao cost P2.013 trillion.” Manila Bulletin, 2 Apr. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; Moya, George P. “Muslim migrants in Manila: BBL best option for peace.” Rappler, 22 Feb. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; Abubakar, Carmen A. “MNLF Hijrah: 1974-1996.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 8.1-2 (March 1999): 209-221.
[96] “Most violent encounters between gov’t forces and rebels.” Inquirer, 27 Jan. 2015. Web. 3 Aug. 2015.
[97] “The Jolo conundrum.” The Economist, 22 Nov. 2001. Web. 3 Aug. 2015.; Santos, Jr., Reynaldo, and Mica Romulo. “LIST: MNLF’s 5 major attacks.” Rappler, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[98] Medina, Andrei. “Timeline: Crisis in Zamboanga City.” GMA News, 10 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; “Zamboanga clash kills 6, shuts down city.” Sunstar, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Fonbuena, Carmela. “6 killed, 24 hurt in Zamboanga clashes.” Rappler, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.
[99] “Terrorist Organization Profile: Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.
[100] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[101] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[102] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[103] Wilson, Jr., Thomas G. “Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front a Catalyst for Peace.” Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009. Web. 27 July 2015.; Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[104] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[105] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[106] Noble, Lela Garner. “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 49.3 (Autumn 1976): 405-424. Web. 27 July 2015.
[107] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
[108] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[109] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; “Support of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).” Moro National Liberation Front. Web. 27 July 2015.
[110] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.
[111] “1996 Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front.” Manila: 2 Sept. 1996.
[112] “OIC wants MNLF included in BBL discussions—Bongbong Marcos.” GMA News, 21 Apr. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.