

# Indian Logic - A bird's eye view

Chandra Mohan B G

26 November 2001

## Abstract

Reasoning is an important gift of nature to the sentient beings. The highest evolution of this is seen in human beings. When reasoning is made mathematical, and therefore universally acceptable, it is termed as *Nyaya* or *Logic*<sup>1</sup>. The logic which is used to strengthen the reality of experiences. Nyaya system and philosophy projects the application of reasoning at various levels of experience. In Indian philosophical context, logical analysis is developed to a very systematic technical discipline, having history of more than 2500 years. The Nyaya philosophy has its own vision of philosophy but it is also providing a set of tools and technicalities to other disciplines of philosophy by way of common ground of argument platform. So I have made an attempt to give you a Nyaya system of philosophy in an introductory context.

---

<sup>1</sup>Logic is neither a science nor an art, but a dodge - By Benjamin Jowett

## Contents

<b>1 Basic features of Indian Philosophy</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2 Schools of Indian Philosophy</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>3 The Nyaya Philosophy</b>	<b>4</b>
3.1 History of Nyaya Philosophy . . . . .	6
3.2 Divisions of Nyaya Philosophy . . . . .	6
<b>4 Nyaya Theory of Knowledge</b>	<b>7</b>
4.1 Definition and classification of knowledge . . . . .	7
4.2 Perception . . . . .	8
4.3 Inference . . . . .	9
4.4 Upamana . . . . .	11
4.5 Sabda . . . . .	11
4.6 Doubt . . . . .	11
4.7 Error . . . . .	12
4.8 Tarka and Vada . . . . .	12
4.9 Memory . . . . .	13
<b>5 The Nyaya Theory of the Physical World</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>6 Individual Self and its Liberation</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>7 The Nyaya Theology</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>8 Conclusion</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>A Basic Approach to philosophy</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>B Classification of Knowledge</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>C Classification of perception</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>D Classification of Inference</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>E Classification of Sabda</b>	<b>17</b>

## 1 Basic features of Indian Philosophy

Like all other living beings man struggles for existence. Unlike the other lower beings struggle blindly without any conscious plan and purpose, and work by instinct, man uses the superior gift of his intellect to understand the conditions and meaning of the struggles to devise plans to ensure success. He wishes to lead his life in the light of knowledge of himself and world of his actions, but even their far-reaching consequences. Desire for knowledge therefore springs from the rational nature of man. Philosophy is an attempt to satisfy this very reasonable desire. It is therefore not a mere luxury, but a necessity.

Philosophy, derived from Greek words "Philos" and "Sophos" means *love of knowledge*. It tries to know the things immediately and remotely concerns the man. What is the real nature of man? What is the end of life? What is the nature of this world in which we live? Is there any creator of the world? How should man live in the light of his knowledge of himself, the world and god? These are some of many problems, taken at random, which we find agitating in the human mind in every land. From the dawn of civilization, philosophy deals with problems of this nature.

As philosophy<sup>2</sup> aims at knowledge of truth it is termed in its own way, that there can be a direct realization of truth (tattva darshana). A man of this kind of realization becomes free but the one who lacks in gets entangled in the world. A view regarding the basic approaches to philosophy by east and west is given in Appendix A.


## 2 Schools of Indian Philosophy

According to a traditional principle of classification, most likely adopted by orthodox Hindu thinkers, the schools or systems of Indian philosophy are divided into two broad classes, namely:-

1. Orthodox (astika) :- not because they believe in God but they accept the authority of the Vedas.
2. Heterodox (nastika) :- not believe in the authority of the Vedas

---

<sup>2</sup>The discovery of what is true and the practice of that which is good are the two most important objects of philosophy. By - Voltair



The *Mimamsa* and the *Sankhya* do not believe in God as the creator of the world, yet they are called orthodox (astika), because they believe in the authoritativeness of the Vedas. The six systems mentioned here are not the only orthodox systems; they are the chief ones. The other two less important orthodox systems of philosophy are *Medical* and *Grammer*. The table below tell you about the different systems of philosophy and its founder. The different systems of philosophy and its founder are given in the following table.

Systems of Philosophy	Founder
Carvaka Philosophy	Sage Carvaka
Jaina Philosophy	24 tirtankaras
Bauddha	Sage Gautama Buddha
Mimamsa Philosophy	Sage Jaimini
Yoga Philosophy	Sage Patanjali
Sankhya Philosophy	Sage Kapila
Nyaya Philosophy	Sage Gautama
Vaisheshika Philosophy	Sage Kanada

Table 1: Different systems of philosophy

### 3 The Nyaya Philosophy

Nyaya system of Philosophy is a way of acquiring the true knowledge of reality through by upholding logical thinking, logical reasoning, common sense and science

<sup>2</sup>In philosophy it is not the attainment of goal that matters, it is the things that are met with by the way. By - Havelock Ellis

without discarding them as "*Moon beams from largest lunacy*".

Nyaya system of philosophy has been held in great reverence from a very long time, *Yagnavalkya* regards it as one of the four limbs of veda, Manu includes it under Sruthi. It may be well thought that logic arose out of necessity of sacrificial religion, especially out of the need that existed for interpreting correctly the vedic texts regarding sacrificial rites, rules and results.

Vachaspati defines the purpose of Nyaya as a critical examination of objects of knowledge by means of canons of logical proof. This philosophy is mainly concerned with the correct thinking and means of acquiring true knowledge of reality. It is very useful in developing powers of logical thinking and rigorous criticism in its students. This philosophy serves as an introduction to all systems of Indian Philosophy. Every student of Philosophy irrespective of any system of philosophy has to undergo a preliminary course of Nyaya or logic, which establishes true logical thinking and rigorous criticism as a means of acquiring true knowledge of reality.

In this system of philosophy, they try to explore the true knowledge of reality not on the mere basis of authority, or just by restoring to faith. What is supplied by scriptures or the evidence of senses must be subjected to critical enquiry and criticism, Naiyayikas admit the truth whatever established by logical reasoning and logical thinking.

Nyaya is one of the subject of study in the classical studies of Hindu which comprises of five subjects as follows: -

- Kavya (literature)
- Nataka (drama)
- Alankara (rhetoric)
- Tarka (logic)
- Vyakarana (grammar)

Nyaya is sometimes called as Tarka Vidya or science of debate, Vadavidya or science of discussions. Discussions or Vada is the breath of intellectual life. We are obliged to use it in search of truth, which is complex in nature.

Every subject of Nyaya which means literally going into a subject or analytical investigation. The system of Nyaya which studies the general plan and methods of critical enquiry may be called as science of sciences. Such pure logical studies were encouraged by Mimamsakas who were not merely exegetes but also logicians.

But the logical problem as to the methods and conditions of true knowledge or the canons of logical criticism is not the sole or the ultimate end of the Nyaya system of philosophy. Its ultimate end like that of the other systems of Indian philosophy, is liberation, which means the absolute cessation of all pain and suffering.

It is only in order to attain this ultimate end of life that we require a philosophy for the knowledge of reality, and a logic for determining the conditions and methods of true knowledge. So we may say that the Nyaya like other systems of Indian philosophy is a way of life, although it is mainly interested in problems of logic and epistemology.

This Nyaya philosophy was found by the **Sage Gotama** who was also called as *Gautama* or *Akshapada*. Accordingly, the Nyaya is also known as Akshapada system. Nyaya philosophy is also called by the name *Nyayavidya*, *Tarkasastra* (*science of reasoning*), and *Anviksiki* (*science of critical study*).

### 3.1 History of Nyaya Philosophy

The beginning of Nyaya belongs to prebuddhistic period, though a scientific treatment of it was undertaken some time about the period of early Buddhism, main principles were established just before Third century B.C. The first work of the Nyaya philosophy is the **Nyayasutra of Gotama**. It is divided into five adhyayas or books, each containing two ahnikas or sections. The subsequent works of the Nyaya system, such as

- Vatsyayana's Nyaya-bhasya
- Uddyotakara's Nyaya-varttika
- Vachaspati's Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika
- Udayana's Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-parisuddhi
- Kusumanjali
- Jayanta's Nyayamanjari

explain and develop the ideas contained in the Nyaya-sutra.

The modern school of Nyaya (Navya-Nyaya) begins with the epoch-making work of Gangesa, viz. the *Tattvacintamani*. This school flourished at first in Mithila, but subsequently became the glory of Bengal with Navadvipa as the main center of this learning and teaching. The modern school lays almost exclusive emphasis on the logical aspects of the Nyaya, and develops its theory of knowledge into a formal logic of relations between concepts, terms and propositions. With the advent of modern Nyaya, the ancient school lost some of its popularity. The syncretistic school of the Nyaya is a later development of the Nyaya philosophy into the form of a synthesis or an amalgamation between the Nyaya and the Vaisesika system.

### 3.2 Divisions of Nyaya Philosophy

The whole of the Nyaya philosophy may be conveniently divided into four parts, namely,

---

<sup>2</sup>A little philosophy inclineh man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth man's mind about to religion. By - Bacon

1. The Theory of Knowledge
2. The Theory of the Physical world
3. The Theory of Individual self and its liberation
4. Theory of God

It should, however be observed here that the Nyaya system is in itself an elaboration of SIXTEEN philosophical topics (padartha). These are ***Pramana, Prameya, Samasya, Prayojana, Drstanta, Siddhanta, Avayava, Tarka, Nirnaya, Vada, Jalpa, Vitanda, Hetubhasa, Chala, Jati and Nigrahashtana.***

## 4 Nyaya Theory of Knowledge


Nyaya theory of reality is based on the Nyaya theory of knowledge. According to this, there are four distinct sources of true knowledge.

- Pratyaksa (perception)
- Anumana (inference)
- Upamana (comparison)
- Sabda (testimony)

### 4.1 Definition and classification of knowledge

Knowledge or cognition (jnana or buddhi) is the manifestation of objects. Just as the light of a lamp reveals or shows physical things, so knowledge manifests all its objects.

This section deals with the how true knowledge is distinguished from false knowledge. How do we know that the first knowledge is true and second false? That is how do we test the truth or falsity of knowledge? True knowledge leads to successful practical activity, while false knowledge ends in failure and disappointment. Valid presentative knowledge (prama) is a definite or certain (asandighdha), faithful or unerring (yathartha) and non - reproductive experience (anubhava) of the object. The following figure shows the classification of the knowledge. Refer to the explanation of this figure in Appendix B.



## 4.2 Perception

Of different sources of knowledge, Pratyaksa or intuition or perception is the most important source of knowledge. Gautama defines sense-perception as **“that knowledge which arises from the ‘contact’ of a sense-organ with its object, inexpressible by words, unerring and well defined”** This definition mentions the different factors involved in the act of perception: the senses (indriya), their objects (artha), the contact of the senses with their objects (sannikarsha), and cognition produced by this contact (jnanam). It is a matter of inference that there are sense-organs.

The senses are said to be five, corresponding to the five characters of knowledge (buddhilaksana) visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual. They occupy different sites (adhithana), the eyeball, the ear hole, the nose, the tongue and the skin. From the varied nature of processes (gati), forms (akrti) and constituents (jati), of which they are made, it is evident that the senses are five in number. The five sense-organs eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin, are said to be of the same nature as the five elements, light, ether, earth, water and air, whose special qualities of color, sound, smell, taste, and tangibility are manifested by them.

The definition of perception as a cognition due to the stimulation of our sense organs by the perceived object is generally accepted by us, the perception of the table before me is due to the contact of my eyes with the table, and I am definite that the object is a table. The perception of a distant figure as either a man or a post is a doubtful and indefinite cognition, and therefore, not a true perception. What however is really common to, and distinctive of, all perception is a feeling of directness or immediacy of the knowledge given by them. We are said to perceive

an object if and when we know it directly i.e. without taking the help of previous knowledge or any reasoning process. So some Indian logicians propose to define perception as immediate cognition (saksat pratiti), although they admit that perception is in almost all cases conditioned by sense object contact.

Manas (or mind) is a condition or perception. When we are deeply absorbed in some study we do not hear the sound of the wind, though the sound affects the organ or hearing and the self is in connection with it, being all-pervading. Vatsyayana holds that manas is as good a sense-organ as the eye and the like, though there are certain marked differences. The outer senses are composed of material or elemental substances, are effective on only a few specific objects, and are capable of acting as organs. Gautama's definition of perception includes the characteristic of freedom from error. Not all perception are valid. In normal perception we have

1. The object of perception
2. The external medium such as light in the case of the visual perception
3. The sense-organ through which the object is perceived
4. The manas or the central organ, without the help of which the sense-organs cannot operate on their objects.
5. The self

If any of these fail to function properly, erroneous perception arises. If the manas is otherwise engaged, or if the self is emotionally excited, illusions arise. The causes of illusions are generally classified under three heads

1. Dosa or defect in the sense-organ, such as jaundiced eye
2. Samprayoga, or presentation of a part or an aspect instead of the whole object
3. Samskara, or the disturbing influence of mental prejudice or habit producing irrelevant recollections.

The illusion of snake arises on the occasion of seeing the rope, since the recollection of the snake is aroused. The different classifications of perception according to different Naiyayakaras are given in Appendix C.

### 4.3 Inference

After perception comes *anumana or inference*. Anumana (Anu - after, mana - knowledge). literally means a cognition or knowledge which follows some other knowledge. Inference is a process of reasoning in which we pass from the apprehension of some mark (linga) to that of something else, by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance (vyapti) between the two, including both Deduction and Induction. Anumana is sometimes defined as knowledge which is preceded by perception. Vatsyayana holds that "*no inference can follow in the absence of perception.*"

Vyapti (Universal connection) relates the two elements of a vyapaka or the pervader and the vyapya or the pervaded. Anumana or inference derives a conclusion from the ascertained fact of the subject possessing a property, which is pervaded or constantly attended by another property. We ascertain that the mountain is on fire from the fact that the mountain has smoke, and smoke is universally attended by fire. The different factors of inferential reasoning are brought out in the form of syllogism.

According to Indian logicians inference must have its constituents three terms and at least three propositions. In inference we arrive at the knowledge of some character of a thing through the knowledge of some mark and that of its universal relation to the inferred character.

Inference contains three terms paksha, is the subject, which we are concerned in any inference. Sadhya is the object, which we want to know in relation to the paksha or the inferable character of the paksha. Hetu is the reason for our relating the sadhya to the paksha. It is the ground of our knowledge of the sadhya as related to paksha.

In inference we must have three propositions all of which are categorical and one must be affirmative or negative. First proposition corresponds to the conclusion syllogism, second minor premise, and third major premise. But order of propositions is different as compared to the western theory. The structure is conclusion of syllogism first, and its usual major premise last, in the formal statement of the inference.

According to Naiyayikas inference as a conclusion of proof must be stated in the form of five propositions called its avayavas or members. These are prathijna, hetu, udaharana, nigamana, and upanaya. The prathijna is the first proposition, which asserts something. The hetu is the second proposition, which states the reason for this assertion. The udaharana is the universal proposition showing the connection between the reason and the asserted fact, as supported by the known instances. Upanaya is the application of the universal proposition to the present case. Nigamana is the conclusion, which follows from the preceding propositions.

As we have seen before, inference is, in Indian logic a combined deductive-inductive reasoning consisting of at least three categorical propositions. All inferences are thus pure syllogisms of the categorical type, which are at once formally valid and materially true. For classification of Inference refer Appendix D.

Fallacies occur when the normal working of the cognitive powers is interfered. The fallacies of inference (hetvabhasa) in Indian logic are all material fallacies. So far as the logical form of inference is concerned, it is the same for all inferences. There is strictly speaking, no fallacies form of inference in logic since all inferences must be put in one or other of the valid forms. Hence if there is any fallacy<sup>3</sup> of inference, that must be due to the material conditions on which the truth of the constituent premises depend. Naiyayikas define three kinds of fallacies; they are

*Savyabhicara, Viruddha, Satpratipaksa, Asiddha, Badhita.*

#### 4.4 Upamana

Upamana, or comparison, is the means by which we gain the knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing previously well known. Upamana is the third source of our knowledge accepted by Nyaya. Hearing that a wild ox (gavaya) is like a cow, we infer that the animal, which we find to be like the cow, is the gavaya. Two arguments are involved in an argument by comparison which are

1. The knowledge of the object to be know.
2. The perception of similarity.

It is the source of our knowledge of the relation between a name and things so named or between a word and its denotation (sanjnasanjnisambandha). We have such knowledge when we are told by some authoritative person that a word denotes a class of objects of a certain description, apply the word to some object or objects which fit in with that description, although we might not have seen them before.

#### 4.5 Sabda

Sabda (testimony) is the last pramana accepted by the Nyaya. Literally sabda means verbal knowledge it is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge however is not valid. Hence sabda, as a pramana, is defined in the Nyaya as valid verbal testimony. We accept many things, which we have not observed or thought about on the authority of others. We learn a good deal from popular testimony, historical tradition and scriptural revelation. The logical issues involved in this mode of acquiring knowledge are discussed under sabda, or verbal testimony. For classification of Sabda refer Appendix E.

#### 4.6 Doubt

The state of *doubt*<sup>4</sup> is said to arise from

1. The recognition of properties common to many objects, as when we see a tall object in the twilight and are not sure whether it is a man or a post, since tallness is found in both.
2. The recognition of properties not common to any of the objects, as when we find it difficult to decide whether sound is eternal or not, since it is not found in man or beast, which are non-eternal, or in atoms, which are eternal.
3. Conflicting testimony, as when two competent authorities differ about the nature of the soul

---

<sup>3</sup>The folly of one man is the fortune of other. By - Bacon

<sup>4</sup>Galileo called doubt the father of invention it is certainly the pioneer. By - Bovee

4. Irregularity of perception, as when we see water and are not sure whether it is real, as in a tank, or unreal, as in a mirage, since it is perceived in both
5. Irregularity of non-perception, which is the converse of the preceding.

If one of the alternative is suppressed, and the mind <sup>5</sup>is inclined towards another, we have a case of uha, or conjecture, where we tentatively accept an alternative. The suppression of one alternative is due to the strength of the other. If in a rice field we see a tall object, we conjecture that it is a tall man and not a tall post, since posts are not often met with in rice fields. While in the state of doubt, the two alternatives are probable; in that of uha, one becomes more probable than the other.

Another kind of doubtful state is mentioned, called anadhyavasaya, due to lapse of memory. Doubt is the impetus to investigation, for it creates a desire for what is not cognized. It precedes inference, though not perception or verbal knowledge. Doubt ends when our knowledge become precise. Doubt is not to be confused with error so long as we know that we do not know the nature of the object for certain, we have true knowledge or pratyaya. Doubt is incomplete knowledge, while error is false knowledge.

#### 4.7 Error

Prama , or valid knowledge, is distinguished from doubt (samsaya) and erroneous knowledge (viparyaya), where the ideas do not lead to successful action. Illusions and hallucinations fail to realize their ends, i.e. do not fulfil the expectations roused by them. We become conscious of error<sup>6</sup>when the demands or our ideal past are not met by the present. We see a white object and take it to a silver pick it up and find it to be piece of shell. The new experience of the shell contradicts the expectation of silver. According to Vatsysyana "*what is set aside by true knowledge is the wrong apprehension, not the object*". But all erroneous cognition has some basis in reality. Vatsyayana says "*No wrong apprehension is entirely baseless*".

#### 4.8 Tarka and Vada

In Tarka, or indirect proof, we start with a wrong assumption and show how it leads to absurdities. If the soul were not eternal, it would not be able to experience the fruits of its actions, undergo rebirth or attain release. It is therefore eternal. Tarka is a type of inference distinct from other types, since it is not based on any perception. It leads indirectly to right knowledge. Vatsyayana thinks that it does not give us determinate knowledge, though it tells us that the opposite of a suggested premise is impossible. Tarka is not by itself a source of valid knowledge<sup>7</sup>, though it is valuable as suggesting hypothesis.

Vada or discussion, proceeds by means of the free use of syllogisms and aims at the

<sup>5</sup>The true, strong and sound mind is the mind that can embrace equally great things and small. By - Samuel Johnson

<sup>6</sup>The man who makes no mistakes does not usually make anything. By - Edward J. Phelps

<sup>7</sup>He who knows other is learned. He who knows himself is wise. By - Lao Tsze

ascertainment of truth. But it often degenerates into mere wrangling (jalpa), which aims at effect or victory and cavil (vitanda), which delights in criticism for its own sake. Such a futile discussion can be put an end to by convicting the opponent of his error and forcing him to accept defeat.

#### 4.9 Memory

All knowledge is divided into presentative cognitions (anubhava), which are not reproductions of former states of consciousness, and representative cognition (smṛti), which recall previous experiences into consciousness. If we exclude memory knowledge, the entire past will drop out of the field of **certitude**. Memory knowledge is based on residual traces (samskarajanya). Memory is defined as "*due to a peculiar contact of the soul with the manas and the trace left by the previous experience*".

It is sometimes said to be caused solely by the impression (samskaramatrajanya), and thus distinguished from recognition (pratyabhijna). While the impression is the immediate cause of the recollection, the perception of the identity of the present object with something else is the cause of recognition. The Nyaya does not admit memory as a separate source of knowledge, since we have in it not any cognitive knowledge of objects, but only a reproduction of a past experience in the same form and order in which it once existed in the past and has now ceased to exist. The validity of remembered knowledge depends on that of the previous experience, which is reproduced. Some logicians include remembered knowledge under valid cognition when the latter is defined as knowledge which is not contradicted, perception of the sign and the rest (lingadijnana) are not present at one and the same time.

### 5 The Nyaya Theory of the Physical World

The Nyaya theory of physical world, in respect of these and other commented subjects, is the same as that of the Vaisesika. The Vaisesika theory, which is a more detailed account of the subject, is accepted by the Nyaya as samanatantra or an allied theory common to the Nyaya and the Vaisesika system.

### 6 Individual Self and its Liberation

Nyaya philosophy here deals with the real nature of the self and the way in which he has to attain the ultimate reality of life.

### 7 The Nyaya Theology

In the Nyaya-Sutra we find short but explicit reference to God. Though in the Vaisesika-Sutra there is no explicit mention of God by name, yet the commentators interpret some of the sutras as referring to God. But the later Nyaya-Vaisesika school gives us an elaborate theory of God and connects it with the doctrine of

liberation. According to these thinkers, the individual self can attain true knowledge of realities and, through it, the state of liberation only be the Grace of God. Without God's grace neither the true knowledge of the categories of philosophy nor the highest end of liberation is attainable by any individual being of the world. So questions that are :What is God? How do we know that God exist? Are answered in detail.

Now more important question which naturally arises here is this : What are the proofs for the existence of God?. The Nyaya-Vaisesika have to their credit an array of proofs which include almost all the arguments given in the Western philosophy for God's existence. There are as many as ten proofs, of more important are mentioned here:

The Causal Argument, The argument from Adrsta, The argument from the Authoritativeness of the Scriptures, The testimony of Sruti, Anti-theistic Arguments are also included here.

## 8 Conclusion

The value of the Nyaya System lies especially in its methodology or theory of knowledge on which it builds its philosophy. One of the charges against Indian philosophy is that it is based on religious authority and is therefore dogmatic and not critical. The Nyaya philosophy is a standing repudiation of this charge. The Nyaya applies the method of logical criticism to solve the problems of life and reality. It is by means of a sound logic that it tries to find out the truth and defend it against hostile criticism. The philosophical positions of Nyaya is said to be lower than that of the Sankhya or the Vedanta. This becomes manifest when take the theory of individual self and god.

Finally Vatsyayana says Highest good is attained only when one has rightly understood

- That which is fit to be discarded ( suffering along with it's causes in the shape of avidya and its effects
- That which puts an end to suffering, in other words jyana (knowledge)
- The means by which distruction of suffering is accomplished, (philosophical treatise)
- Goal to be attained or highest good

## Appendix

### A Basic Approach to philosophy

In the history of Western philosophy we find that human knowledge about each of the different problems mentioned above began to grow, it became impossible for the same man to study everything about every problem. Division of labour or specialization became necessary and a group of men devoted themselves to a particular problem or a few connected problems. There came into existence of different special sciences like Physics, Chemistry, Botany, Astronomy, Geology and similar sciences took up each aspect of the world of nature. Physiology, Anatomy and the other medical sciences devoted themselves to the different problems of the human body. Psychology began to study the problems of the human mind. The detailed study of many of the particular problems with which philosophical speculation originally started became thus the subject-matter of the special sciences. Philosophy then began to depend on the reports of the investigation made by the different sciences, tried to understand their meanings and implication critically, and ultimately these results in understanding the general nature of universe-man, nature and god.

Though basic problem of philosophy have been the same in the East as in the West and the chief solutions have striking similarities, yet the methods of philosophical enquiry differ in certain respects and the processes of the development of philosophical thought<sup>8</sup> also vary. Indian philosophy discusses the different problems of Metaphysics, Ethics, Logic<sup>9</sup>, Psychology and Epistemology, but generally it does not discuss them separately. Every problem is discussed by the Indian philosopher from all possible approaches, metaphysical, ethical, logical, psychological and epistemological. This is the main distinction between Indian Philosophy and Western Philosophy in their respective approaches to the problem.

We find that many of the problems of contemporary Western philosophy are discussed in Indian systems of philosophy. Besides, we find that indigenous scholars with a thorough training, exclusively in Indian philosophy, are able to deal even with abstruse problems of Western philosophy with surprising skill.

If the openness of mind, the willingness to listen to what others have to say, has been one of the chief causes of the wealth and greatness of Indian philosophy in the past, it has a definite moral for the future.

---

<sup>8</sup>Great thought reduced to practice become great acts. By - Hazlitt

<sup>9</sup>The fact that logic cannot satisfy us awakens an almost insatiable hunger for the irrational. By - A. N. Wilson

## B Classification of Knowledge

Knowledge is broadly classified into Anubhava or presentative cognition and smṛti or Memory<sup>10</sup>i.e. representative cognition. Each of the two can be valid (yathārtha) or non-valid (ayathārtha). Valid presentative knowledge is called prama. It is divided into four divisions perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Non-valid presentative knowledge (aprama) is divided into three parts called doubt (samasya), error (bhrama or viparyaya) and hypothetical argument (tarka). <sup>11</sup>The true art of memory is the art of attention. By - Samuel Johnson Thus valid presentative knowledge (prama) is the definite or certain (asandigdha), faithful or unerring (yathārtha), and non-reproductive experience (anubhava) or the object. My visual perception of the table before me is such knowledge (prama) because in it the table is presented to me directly just as it really is, and I am certain about the truth of my cognition. Though memory is not prama, as it is non-presentative or a mere reproduction of past knowledge, it may also be valid or non-valid, according as it is a reproduction of some previous valid or non-valid presentative knowledge. Doubtful cognition cannot be called prama, because it is not certain knowledge. Error is undoubted knowledge indeed, and may also be presentative, but it is not true to the nature of its objects.

## C Classification of perception

There are different ways of classifying perception. First, we have distinction between *Luakika* or ordinary and *Alaukika* or extraordinary perceptions. This distinction depends on the way in which the senses come in contact with their objects. We have laukika perception when there is the usual sense-contact with objects present to sense. In alaukika perception, however, the object is such as is not ordinarily present to sense, but is conveyed to sense through an unusual medium. Perception again is of two kinds, namely, external (bahya) and internal (manasa). The former is due to the external senses of sight hearing, touch, taste and smell. The latter is brought about by the mind's contact with psychical states and processes. Thus we have six kinds of laukika or ordinary perception viz., the visual (caksusa), auditory (srautra), tactual (sparsana), gustatory (rasana), olfactory (gharanaja), and the internal or mental (manasa) perception. Alaukika or extraordinary perception is of three kinds viz., Samanyalaksana, Jnanalaksana and yogaja.

According to Nyaya (also the Vaisesika, Mimamsa and Jaina), there are six organs of knowledge. Of these five are external and one is internal. The five external senses are the organs of smell (ghrana), taste (rasana), sight (caksuh), touch (tvak), and hearing (srotra). These perceive respectively the physical qualities of smell, taste, color, touch and sound. They are physical in nature and each of them is constituted by that very same physical element whose qualities are sensed by it.

According to another classification, ordinary perception is of two kinds, namely nirvikalpaka or the indeterminate and savikalpaka or the determinate. To these two we may add pratyabhijna or recognition.

Keeping in view of nature of perception, Naiyayikas distinguish thus between three modes of ordinary perception. Extraordinary perception is always determinate, since it is definite and explicit knowledge.

## D Classification of Inference

Naiyayikas give us three different classifications of inferences, according to first classification, inference is of two kinds namely, svathanumana (inference for oneself) and parathanumana (inference for others) this is a psychological classification. According to Gautama we have three kinds of inferences namely puravat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta. Third classification is kevalanvayi, kevelavyatireki and anvayavyatireki.

## E Classification of Sabda

There are two ways of classifying sabda or verbal knowledge. According to the one there are two kinds of sabda namely that relating to perceptible objects (drstartha), and that relating to imperceptible objects (adrstartha). According to other classification there are two kinds of testimony the scriptural (vaidika) and the secular (laukika).

## References

- [1] S. Radhakrishnan. *Indian Philosophy (Vol 2)*.
- [2] S.N. Dasguptha. *History of Indian Philosophy*
- [3] Satish Chandra Bhattacharya. *Introduction to Indian Philosophy*
- [4] M. Hiriyanna *Essentials of Indian Philosophy*