Posts Tagged ‘transparency and disclosure’

Why Does Corporate Governance Really Matter? New Book from Stanford Showcases Research into How Boards Can Govern Better

Thursday, May 19th, 2011

Corporate Governance Matters by Professor David Larcker and Brian Tayan

STANFORD, Calif.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–“The debate on the role of boards in the wake of the financial crisis has created a lot of hype and rhetoric about corporate governance,” says David Larcker, who is James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting and Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and coauthor with Brian Tayan of the new book Corporate Governance Matters (FT Press). According to Larcker, many so-called experts are heavy on opinions about governance, but light on the facts.

“The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”

“The FDA requires research on drug outcomes before approving a pharmaceutical,” he says. “Shouldn’t experts that prescribe ‘cures for bad governance’ be subject to a similar standard of review?”

In their book, Larcker and Tayan, a researcher at Stanford GSB, challenge the conventional wisdom of the many books, reports, and recommendations of blue-ribbon panels on what constitutes “good” governance. The authors researched hundreds of companies and interviewed many board directors to uncover the real-life consequences of corporate governance practices – from director independence to designing appropriate executive pay packages.

“A lot of people want to measure what’s measurable – we wanted to measure what’s informative,” says Tayan. “For example, certain lightning-rod issues, such as ‘excessive’ risk taking and CEO compensation, get a lot of attention from outside observers, while important issues that are considerably more difficult to assess – such as corporate strategy and succession planning – tend to get the short shrift.”

Trends Getting in the Way of Good Governance

“Our research shows that many emerging developments that were intended to improve governance – purportedly to avert the kind of financial disaster we just experienced – just don’t hold water,” Larcker explains. These include:

  1. Compliance drowning out strategy – “A check-the-box approach is not what we need from directors. We need instead their best thinking and ability to manage risk appropriately for corporate growth.”
  2. “Federalization of corporate governance” – “As corporate governance becomes increasingly, and probably inexorably, ‘federalized’ through regulations such as Dodd-Frank, there is a real question as to whether these laws make boards govern better,” he says. “We’re still debating whether the 10-year-old Sarbanes Oxley was good for the economy.”
  3. “Shareholder democracy” movement – “The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”
  4. Rise of proxy advisory firms – “Proxy advisory firms exhibit substantial influence over the proxy voting process. What is the evidence that their recommendations lead to the kinds of positive outcomes that stakeholders really care about?”

“We wrote our book for thinkers – for practitioners who want to see how important governance issues play out in the real world,” says Tayan.

“By integrating several different approaches to the topic – both business and legal – we have created a practical framework for directors that will help them make decisions that lead to organizational success.”

To speak with the authors, contact Davia Temin or Suzanne Oaks at 212-588-8788 or news@teminandco.com.

For information on Corporate Governance Research Program: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/about/

Contacts

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Helen Chang, 650-723-3358

chang_helen@gsb.stanford.edu

 

 

Free Stanford GSB Corporate Governance educational material available on “The Market for Corporate Control”

Wednesday, May 18th, 2011
  • Market for Corporate Control  (Powerpoint Presentation) 
    Authored by Professor David F.  Larcker and BrianTayan, Researcher, GSB Corporate Governance Research Program/MBA ’03.

Overview: A well-functioning governance system consists of more than just the board of directors and the external auditor. It includes all disciplining mechanisms—legal, regulatory, and market driven—that influence management to act in the interest of shareholders.

Examples include:

-Labor market. Failure leads to CEO termination.

-Capital market. Failure leads to higher cost of capital.

-Regulatory environment. Violations lead to litigation.

Similarly, the “market for corporate control” puts pressure on the CEO to perform, or risk sale of company to new owners.

The entire series of presentations, to date, can be found here: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/research/powerpoint_presentations.html

Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges: The Case of Institutional Shareholder Services

Monday, May 9th, 2011

STANFORD, Calif. — May 09, 2011

Many institutional investors rely on a proxy advisory firm to assist them in voting company proxies and fulfilling the fiduciary responsibility they have to vote in the interest of beneficial shareholders. But according to a new study at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, proxy advisory firm recommendations may actually decrease shareholder value.

The recommendation of proxy advisory firms is not inconsequential. Studies conducted by Stanford GSB faculty member David F. Larcker, who is Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program, and doctoral students Allan L. McCall and Gaizka Ormazabal, show that an unfavorable recommendation from the largest proxy advisory firm (Institutional Shareholder Services, ISS) can reduce shareholder support significantly, depending on the matter of the proposal.

While there are potential benefits and drawbacks to relying on the voting recommendations of proxy advisory firms, little empirical research to date has been performed on whether the voting recommendations of these firms are “correct.” That is, are shareholders really better off if they follow their recommendations?

To answer this question the researchers examined the impact of ISS voting policies on 264 exchange offers during 2004 to 2009. They find that companies that design their exchange offer so that it receives a positive recommendation from proxy advisory firms exhibit a statistically lower market reaction, lower operating performance, and higher executive turnover than those firms that do not design their plans in accordance with the proxy advisory firm guidelines. These results indicate that proxy advisory firm recommendations on stock option exchanges do not increase, and in fact actually decrease, shareholder value.

The research paper, “Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges: The Case of Institutional Shareholder Services,” and companion case study, “Do ISS Voting Recommendations Create Shareholder Value?” are available online from the Stanford Corporate Governance Research Program: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/topics/shareholder/closer_look.html.

Larcker is coauthor, with Brian Tayan, of the book, “Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and their Consequences” (FT Press-Pearson Prentice Hall, 2011).

Contact:

Stanford Graduate School of Business
Helen Chang, 650-723-3358
chang_helen@gsb.stanford.edu

Closer Look: The Resignation of David Sokol: Mountain or Molehill for Berkshire Hathaway?

Thursday, April 21st, 2011

The Resignation of David Sokol: Mountain or Molehill for Berkshire Hathaway? (PDF)
by Authors: Professor David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, MBA ’03

Additional related information:
-Berkshire Hathaway Audit Committee Report (Link)
-Questions and Answers From 2011 Annual Shareholders Meeting (Link)

Given its size, Berkshire Hathaway has had a relatively clean record on governance-related matters. This track record speaks to the quality of its governance system and the ability of its “trust-based” model to work.

For these reasons, it came as a shock to many when Warren Buffett announced the sudden resignation of David Sokol in March 2011.  Sokol, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway’s energy subsidiary, was widely considered the front-runner on a short list of potential successors to one day succeed Buffett.  More bizarre were the circumstances surrounding the announcement.  Just days before recommending to Buffett that Berkshire Hathaway purchase specialty chemical company Lubrizol in a $9.7 billion deal, Sokol accumulated common stock in Lubrizol worth $10 million.

The matter raised significant issues for the Berkshire board of directors:

  1. Did Sokol violate the company’s insider trading policy?
  2. Did Sokol’s actions reveal shortcomings in the company’s governance system that need to be addressed?
  3. What will be the long-term impact of these events on company’s reputation?

More broadly, the matter raises questions that are general to all organizations.  How extensive must events be before a company decides that governance changes are required?

Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance:The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important. To see the full series of  Stanford Closer Looks go here.