Posts Tagged ‘proxy voting’

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: “And then a Miracle Happens!: How Do Proxy Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations?

Monday, February 25th, 2013

“And then a Miracle Happens!: How Do Proxy Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations? (PDF)

Authors: David F. Larcker, Allan L.McCall and Brian Tayan, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Date: February 25, 2013
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership No. CGRP- 31

Abstract:

Proxy advisory firms are independent, for-profit consulting companies that provide voting recommendations to individual and institutional investors.  Research shows that these firms have significant influence on voting outcomes.  Given this influence, it is important that investors ensure that the policies of these firms are “accurate”—i.e., that they successfully and reliably differentiate between good and bad future outcomes.

In this Closer Look, we carefully examine the process by which proxy advisory firms formulate their voting policies.  In doing so, we identify serious issues that raise questions about the accuracy of their recommendations.

We ask:

  • How exactly do proxy advisory firms determine that a policy is “correct”?
  • Who participates in the policy development process with these firms?  How do we know that their opinions are representative of shareholder broadly?
  • Why don’t proxy advisory firms disclose the research that supports each of their voting recommendations?

New in Stanford Closer Look series: Shareholder Lawsuits: Where Is the Line Between Legitimate and Frivolous?

Tuesday, November 27th, 2012

Shareholder Lawsuits: Where Is the Line Between Legitimate and Frivolous? [PDF]

Authors: Professor David F. Larcker, Stanford Graduate School of Business, and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Center for Leadership Development and Research, Stanford GSB.
Published: November 27, 2012

Shareholders of public companies are not responsible for designing executive compensation packages. Still, a shareholder vote on compensation is required in two circumstances:  when a company wants to establish an equity-based compensation plan, and annually as part of the Dodd Frank requirement shareholders have an advisory “say on pay.”  In deciding how to vote, shareholders rely on information provided in the annual proxy.

Recently, shareholder groups have sued companies for inadequate disclosure.  They allege that the companies provide insufficient disclosure to determine how they should vote on these matters.

We explore this issue in closer detail and ask:

  • How much disclosure is too much disclosure?
  • If a company follows SEC guidelines, why is this not sufficient?
  • When do lawsuits cross the line from legitimate to frivolous?
  • If disclosure litigation is successful, what other board decisions would be subject to potential lawsuits?

Read the Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To view the entire collection of Stanford Closer Looks please click here. You can also follow more corporate governance and leadership news at @StanfordCorpGov and  @StnfrdLeadrship.

Why Does Corporate Governance Really Matter? New Book from Stanford Showcases Research into How Boards Can Govern Better

Thursday, May 19th, 2011

Corporate Governance Matters by Professor David Larcker and Brian Tayan

STANFORD, Calif.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–“The debate on the role of boards in the wake of the financial crisis has created a lot of hype and rhetoric about corporate governance,” says David Larcker, who is James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting and Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and coauthor with Brian Tayan of the new book Corporate Governance Matters (FT Press). According to Larcker, many so-called experts are heavy on opinions about governance, but light on the facts.

“The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”

“The FDA requires research on drug outcomes before approving a pharmaceutical,” he says. “Shouldn’t experts that prescribe ‘cures for bad governance’ be subject to a similar standard of review?”

In their book, Larcker and Tayan, a researcher at Stanford GSB, challenge the conventional wisdom of the many books, reports, and recommendations of blue-ribbon panels on what constitutes “good” governance. The authors researched hundreds of companies and interviewed many board directors to uncover the real-life consequences of corporate governance practices – from director independence to designing appropriate executive pay packages.

“A lot of people want to measure what’s measurable – we wanted to measure what’s informative,” says Tayan. “For example, certain lightning-rod issues, such as ‘excessive’ risk taking and CEO compensation, get a lot of attention from outside observers, while important issues that are considerably more difficult to assess – such as corporate strategy and succession planning – tend to get the short shrift.”

Trends Getting in the Way of Good Governance

“Our research shows that many emerging developments that were intended to improve governance – purportedly to avert the kind of financial disaster we just experienced – just don’t hold water,” Larcker explains. These include:

  1. Compliance drowning out strategy – “A check-the-box approach is not what we need from directors. We need instead their best thinking and ability to manage risk appropriately for corporate growth.”
  2. “Federalization of corporate governance” – “As corporate governance becomes increasingly, and probably inexorably, ‘federalized’ through regulations such as Dodd-Frank, there is a real question as to whether these laws make boards govern better,” he says. “We’re still debating whether the 10-year-old Sarbanes Oxley was good for the economy.”
  3. “Shareholder democracy” movement – “The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”
  4. Rise of proxy advisory firms – “Proxy advisory firms exhibit substantial influence over the proxy voting process. What is the evidence that their recommendations lead to the kinds of positive outcomes that stakeholders really care about?”

“We wrote our book for thinkers – for practitioners who want to see how important governance issues play out in the real world,” says Tayan.

“By integrating several different approaches to the topic – both business and legal – we have created a practical framework for directors that will help them make decisions that lead to organizational success.”

To speak with the authors, contact Davia Temin or Suzanne Oaks at 212-588-8788 or news@teminandco.com.

For information on Corporate Governance Research Program: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/about/

Contacts

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Helen Chang, 650-723-3358

chang_helen@gsb.stanford.edu

 

 

Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges: The Case of Institutional Shareholder Services

Monday, May 9th, 2011

STANFORD, Calif. — May 09, 2011

Many institutional investors rely on a proxy advisory firm to assist them in voting company proxies and fulfilling the fiduciary responsibility they have to vote in the interest of beneficial shareholders. But according to a new study at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, proxy advisory firm recommendations may actually decrease shareholder value.

The recommendation of proxy advisory firms is not inconsequential. Studies conducted by Stanford GSB faculty member David F. Larcker, who is Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program, and doctoral students Allan L. McCall and Gaizka Ormazabal, show that an unfavorable recommendation from the largest proxy advisory firm (Institutional Shareholder Services, ISS) can reduce shareholder support significantly, depending on the matter of the proposal.

While there are potential benefits and drawbacks to relying on the voting recommendations of proxy advisory firms, little empirical research to date has been performed on whether the voting recommendations of these firms are “correct.” That is, are shareholders really better off if they follow their recommendations?

To answer this question the researchers examined the impact of ISS voting policies on 264 exchange offers during 2004 to 2009. They find that companies that design their exchange offer so that it receives a positive recommendation from proxy advisory firms exhibit a statistically lower market reaction, lower operating performance, and higher executive turnover than those firms that do not design their plans in accordance with the proxy advisory firm guidelines. These results indicate that proxy advisory firm recommendations on stock option exchanges do not increase, and in fact actually decrease, shareholder value.

The research paper, “Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges: The Case of Institutional Shareholder Services,” and companion case study, “Do ISS Voting Recommendations Create Shareholder Value?” are available online from the Stanford Corporate Governance Research Program: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/topics/shareholder/closer_look.html.

Larcker is coauthor, with Brian Tayan, of the book, “Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and their Consequences” (FT Press-Pearson Prentice Hall, 2011).

Contact:

Stanford Graduate School of Business
Helen Chang, 650-723-3358
chang_helen@gsb.stanford.edu