Posts Tagged ‘corporate governance research’

Linguistic Diversity and Stock Trading Volume

Friday, April 5th, 2013

Linguistic Diversity and Stock Trading Volume (SSRN)

Authors:  Yen-Cheng Chang,  Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance; China Academy of Financial Research (CAFR);  Harrison G. Hong, Princeton University – Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Larissa Tiedens, Stanford Graduate School of Business;
Bin Zhao, Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance; China Academy of Financial Research (CAFR)
Paper Date: March 14, 2013
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 134

Abstract:      

We test the hypothesis that the linguistic diversity of a stock’s investor base leads to more trading. Trading might be due to beliefs differing across languages or investor exposure to multiple languages leading to more trading ideas. Using stock message boards from China, which has ten languages, we measure the linguistic diversity of a stock’s investor base using a Herfindahl index of messages posted from different languages. A firm’s diversity increases in the number of languages spoken in the province where it is headquartered. Using the latter as the instrument, trading volume in a stock rises with its linguistic diversity. We then attempt to discriminate among competing mechanisms. We also show using a sample of forty-one countries that countries with more linguistic diversity have greater stock market turnover.

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: Ten Myths of “Say On Pay”

Thursday, June 28th, 2012

Ten Myths of “Say On Pay”
Authors: Professor David F. Larcker,  Stanford Graduate School of Business; Allan McCall, co-founder of Compensia and currently a PhD candidate at the Stanford GSB; Gaizka Ormazabal, Assistant Professor of Accounting at IESE Business School at the University of Navarra; and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Corporate Governance Research Program, Stanford GSB.
Published: July 28,  2012

Say on pay is the practice of granting shareholders the right to vote on a company’s executive compensation program at the annual shareholder meeting.  Under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, publicly traded companies in the U.S. are required to adopt say on pay.  Advocates of this approach believe that say on pay will increase the accountability of corporate directors and lead to improved compensation practices.

In recent years, several myths have come to be accepted by the media and governance experts.  These myths include the beliefs that:

  1. There is only one approach to “say on pay”
  2. All shareholders want the right to vote on executive compensation
  3. Say on pay reduces executive compensation levels
  4. Pay plans are a failure if they do not receive high shareholder support
  5. Say on pay improves “pay for performance”
  6. Plain-vanilla equity awards are not performance-based
  7. Discretionary bonuses should not be allowed
  8. Shareholders should reject nonstandard benefits
  9. Boards should adjust pay plans to satisfy dissatisfied shareholders
  10. Proxy advisory firm recommendations for say on pay are correct

We examine each of these myths in the context of the research evidence and explain why they are incorrect.

We ask:

* Should the U.S. rescind the requirement for mandatory say on pay and return to a voluntary regime?

Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To receive monthly alerts about the Closer Look series, please email the Stanford Corporate Governance Research Program at corpgovernance@gsb.stanford.edu. You can also follow more corporate governance news on Twitter: @StanfordCorpGov .  To view the entire collection of  Stanford Closer Looks please click here.

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: Sudden Death of a CEO: Are Companies Prepared When Lighting Strikes?

Thursday, March 8th, 2012

Sudden Death of a CEO: Are Companies Prepared When Lighting Strikes? (PDF)
By Professor David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Corporate Governance Research Program, Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Published: March 6, 2012

It is very difficult for shareholders to know detailed information about CEO succession planning among the companies they have invested in.  Although CEO deaths are rare, the sudden death of a CEO can provide insight into the quality of succession planning and governance of a company.  Whereas some companies are able to appoint a successor immediately, others take weeks or months to do so.

In this Closer Look, we examine this issue in detail.

We ask:

* Why haven’t more companies done a “reality check” on whether they have a truly operational succession plan?
* What can a board learn and what should it do if the market reacts positively to the death of its CEO?
* Should the board revise its succession plan if its CEO engages in risky hobbies or lifestyle habits?

Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To receive monthly alerts about the Closer Look series, please email the Stanford Corporate Governance Research Program at corpgovernance@gsb.stanford.edu. You can also follow more corporate governance news on Twitter: @StanfordCorpGov .  To view the entire collection of  Stanford Closer Looks please click here.

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: “What Is CEO Talent Worth?”

Monday, January 23rd, 2012
  • What Is CEO Talent Worth?  (PDF)
    By Professor, David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Corporate Governance Research Program, Stanford Graduate School of Business, and Usman Liaqat
    January 24, 2012

The topic of executive compensation elicits strong emotions among corporate stakeholders and practitioners. On the one hand are those who believe that chief executive officers in the United States are overpaid. On the other hand are those who believe that CEOs are simply paid the going fair-market rate.

Much less effort, however, is put into determining whether total compensation is commensurate with the value of services rendered.

We examine the issue and explain how such a calculation might be performed. We ask:

* How much value creation should be attributable to the efforts of the CEO?
* What percentage of this value should be fairly offered as compensation?
* Can the board actually perform this calculation? If not, how does it make rational decisions about pay levels?

Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To receive monthly alerts about the Closer Look series, please email the Stanford Corporate Governance Research Program at corpgovernance@gsb.stanford.edu. You can also follow more corporate governance news on Twitter: @StanfordCorpGov .  To view the entire collection of  Stanford Closer Looks please click here.

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: The NCAA Adopts “Dodd-Frank”: A Fable

Wednesday, September 14th, 2011

 In recent years, NCAA football has been rocked by a string of high-profile violations, including those at USC, Ohio State, the University of Miami, and Auburn.  In many ways, these violations were similar to the governance breakdowns at financial and other corporations leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009.

In the corporate world, Congress responded to the financial crisis by enacting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, which among other things imposed various governance requirements on all publicly traded companies.

What would happen were the NCAA to adopt these same provisions and require them of all universities and their football programs?

In this fictitious tale, we explore what such a set of rules would look like.

We ask:

* If these requirements would not work in an athletic setting, should we expect them to work in business? 
* Why are the governance provisions of Dodd-Frank legally required, rather than voluntarily adopted by individual companies?
* Why does Dodd-Frank place such emphasis on executive compensation and disclosure?  Will its compensation requirements reduce governance failures?

Read the Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To receive monthly alerts about the Closer Look series, please email the Stanford Corporate Governance Research Program at corpgovernance@gsb.stanford.edu. You can also follow more corporate governance news on Twitter: @StanfordCorpGov .

To view the entire collection of  Stanford Closer Looks please click here.

Free Stanford GSB Corporate Governance educational material available on “Institutional Shareholders and Activist Investors”

Wednesday, June 15th, 2011

Institutional Shareholders and Activist Investors Authored by Professor David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Researcher, GSB Corporate Governance Research Program/MBA ’03.

Stanford Closer Look: Seven Myths of Corporate Governance (CGRP-16)

Thursday, June 2nd, 2011


 CGRP16 – Seven Myths of Corporate Governance (PDF) by Professor David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, MBA '03

In recent years, there has been much discussion over how to improve governance systems broadly. In the process, certain myths have developed that continue to be accepted, despite a lack of robust supporting evidence.

These myths include the beliefs that:

1. The structure of the board always tells you something about the quality of the board

2. CEOs in the U.S. are overpaid

3. Pay for performance does not exist in CEO compensation contracts

4. Companies are prepared to replace the CEO if needed

5. Regulation improves corporate governance

6. The voting recommendations of proxy advisory firms are correct

7. Best practices are the solution to bad governance

We examine each of these myths in closer detail and explain why they are false.

So long as these myths are accepted by practitioners and the public, how can we expect managerial behavior and firm performance to improve? Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

Larcker and Tayan are the authors of recently published book: Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and Their Consequences, FT Press

Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance: The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important. To see the full series of  Stanford Closer Looks click here.

Why Does Corporate Governance Really Matter? New Book from Stanford Showcases Research into How Boards Can Govern Better

Thursday, May 19th, 2011

Corporate Governance Matters by Professor David Larcker and Brian Tayan

STANFORD, Calif.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–“The debate on the role of boards in the wake of the financial crisis has created a lot of hype and rhetoric about corporate governance,” says David Larcker, who is James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting and Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and coauthor with Brian Tayan of the new book Corporate Governance Matters (FT Press). According to Larcker, many so-called experts are heavy on opinions about governance, but light on the facts.

“The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”

“The FDA requires research on drug outcomes before approving a pharmaceutical,” he says. “Shouldn’t experts that prescribe ‘cures for bad governance’ be subject to a similar standard of review?”

In their book, Larcker and Tayan, a researcher at Stanford GSB, challenge the conventional wisdom of the many books, reports, and recommendations of blue-ribbon panels on what constitutes “good” governance. The authors researched hundreds of companies and interviewed many board directors to uncover the real-life consequences of corporate governance practices – from director independence to designing appropriate executive pay packages.

“A lot of people want to measure what’s measurable – we wanted to measure what’s informative,” says Tayan. “For example, certain lightning-rod issues, such as ‘excessive’ risk taking and CEO compensation, get a lot of attention from outside observers, while important issues that are considerably more difficult to assess – such as corporate strategy and succession planning – tend to get the short shrift.”

Trends Getting in the Way of Good Governance

“Our research shows that many emerging developments that were intended to improve governance – purportedly to avert the kind of financial disaster we just experienced – just don’t hold water,” Larcker explains. These include:

  1. Compliance drowning out strategy – “A check-the-box approach is not what we need from directors. We need instead their best thinking and ability to manage risk appropriately for corporate growth.”
  2. “Federalization of corporate governance” – “As corporate governance becomes increasingly, and probably inexorably, ‘federalized’ through regulations such as Dodd-Frank, there is a real question as to whether these laws make boards govern better,” he says. “We’re still debating whether the 10-year-old Sarbanes Oxley was good for the economy.”
  3. “Shareholder democracy” movement – “The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”
  4. Rise of proxy advisory firms – “Proxy advisory firms exhibit substantial influence over the proxy voting process. What is the evidence that their recommendations lead to the kinds of positive outcomes that stakeholders really care about?”

“We wrote our book for thinkers – for practitioners who want to see how important governance issues play out in the real world,” says Tayan.

“By integrating several different approaches to the topic – both business and legal – we have created a practical framework for directors that will help them make decisions that lead to organizational success.”

To speak with the authors, contact Davia Temin or Suzanne Oaks at 212-588-8788 or news@teminandco.com.

For information on Corporate Governance Research Program: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/about/

Contacts

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Helen Chang, 650-723-3358

chang_helen@gsb.stanford.edu

 

 

Free Stanford GSB Corporate Governance educational material available on “The Market for Corporate Control”

Wednesday, May 18th, 2011
  • Market for Corporate Control  (Powerpoint Presentation) 
    Authored by Professor David F.  Larcker and BrianTayan, Researcher, GSB Corporate Governance Research Program/MBA ’03.

Overview: A well-functioning governance system consists of more than just the board of directors and the external auditor. It includes all disciplining mechanisms—legal, regulatory, and market driven—that influence management to act in the interest of shareholders.

Examples include:

-Labor market. Failure leads to CEO termination.

-Capital market. Failure leads to higher cost of capital.

-Regulatory environment. Violations lead to litigation.

Similarly, the “market for corporate control” puts pressure on the CEO to perform, or risk sale of company to new owners.

The entire series of presentations, to date, can be found here: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/research/powerpoint_presentations.html