Posts Tagged ‘corporate governance educationaland teaching material’

New Research on Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper Series on SSRN

Wednesday, April 11th, 2012
Rock Center for Corporate Governance Logo

Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper Series on SSRN (free registration may be required)

Vol. 4, No. 3: Apr 11, 2012

Table of Contents

Monitoring Risks Before They Go Viral: Is it Time for the Board to Embrace Social Media?

David F. Larcker, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business
Brian Tayan, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business

Direct Democracy and State Fiscal Crises: The Problem of Too Much Law

Peter Conti-Brown, Stanford University, Rock Center for Corporate Governance

Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation

Anat R. Admati, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Peter M. DeMarzo, Stanford Graduate School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Martin F. Hellwig, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, University of Bonn – Department of Economics
Paul C. Pfleiderer, Stanford Graduate School of Business

Boardroom Centrality and Firm Performance

David F. Larcker, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business
Eric C. So, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business
Charles C. Y. Wang, Stanford University, Harvard Law School

Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges

David F. Larcker, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business
Allan L. McCall, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business
Gaizka Ormazabal, IESE Business School of the University of Navarra

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: Seven Myths of Executive Compensation

Tuesday, June 21st, 2011

CGRP17 – Seven Myths of Executive Compensation (PDF)
by Stanford Graduate School of Business Professor David F. Larcker and researcher Brian Tayan, MBA 2003

Executive compensation has become one of the most contentious topics in corporate governance. However, public perception about executive pay suffers from many misconceptions. These include the notions that:

1. The ratio of CEO-to-average-worker pay is a useful statistic:

2. Compensation consultants cause pay to be too high:

3. It is easy to tell whether a compensation package encourages “excessive” risk taking:

4. Performance metrics and targets tie directly to the corporate strategy:

5. Discretionary bonuses should be eliminated:

6. Proxy advisory firms know how to evaluation compensation contracts:

7. The numbers in the financial statements for executive options accurately capture their cost and value :

We examine these myths in close detail and explain why they are false. Problems of excessive compensation and poorly structured contracts will not be remedied by artificial changes and congressional mandates. Why don’t experts rely on the research to arrive at informed and fact-based solutions? :

Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important.

 

Free Stanford GSB Corporate Governance educational material available on “Institutional Shareholders and Activist Investors”

Wednesday, June 15th, 2011

Institutional Shareholders and Activist Investors Authored by Professor David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Researcher, GSB Corporate Governance Research Program/MBA ’03.