Posts Tagged ‘corporate governance’

Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance

Thursday, April 18th, 2013

Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance (SSRN) 

Authors: Chris Armstrong, University of Pennsylvania – Accounting Department; Jennifer L. Blouin, University of Pennsylvania – Accounting Department; Alan D. Jagolinzer, University of Colorado – Leeds School of Business; David F. Larcker; Stanford University – Graduate School of Business
Paper Date: April 17, 2013
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 136 

Abstract:      

This paper examines the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities, unresolved agency problems may cause managers to over- or under-invest in tax avoidance relative to the preferences of shareholders. Using quantile regression, we find that the impact of corporate governance on tax avoidance is most pronounced in the upper and lower tails of the tax avoidance distribution, but not at the mean or median of this distribution.

Specifically, we find a positive relation between the financial sophistication and independence of boards and tax avoidance in the upper tail of the tax avoidance distribution, but a negative relation in the lower tail of the tax avoidance distribution. However, we find no relation between corporate governance and tax avoidance and either the conditional mean or median of the tax avoidance distribution. These results suggest that corporate governance tends to decrease extremely high levels of tax avoidance and increase extremely low levels of tax avoidance, which may be symptomatic of over- and under-investment, respectively, by managers. Our results also suggest that inferences about these relations that are drawn from the conditional mean and median and unlikely to be representative across the entire tax avoidance distribution.

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: Where Experts Get It Wrong: Independence vs. Leadership in Corporate Governance

Thursday, March 14th, 2013

Where Experts Get It Wrong: Independence vs. Leadership in Corporate Governance [PDF]
Authors: Professor David F. Larcker, Stanford Graduate School of Business, and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Center for Leadership Development and Research, Stanford GSB.
Date: March 14, 2013
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership No. CGRP- 32

Over the last few decades, researchers have taken a thorough and critical look at corporate governance from various perspectives.  For the most part, they have found that structural features of corporate governance have little or no relation to governance quality.

For example, there is no evidence that having an independent chairman benefits companies.  At the same time, there is evidence that CEOs with different personalities require different levels of oversight. 

We examine this issue in greater detail.  We ask:

  • Why isn’t more attention paid to contextual considerations in corporate governance?
  • Why don’t governance experts base their recommendations on research rather than subjective opinion?
  • How can corporate stakeholders take into account the quality of a company’s leadership to design more effective governance systems?

Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

Keywords: corporate governance, CEO and executive leadership, CEO personality, CEO-Chairman duality

Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership: The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important. Larcker and Tayan are co-authors of the book Corporate Governance Matters.

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: “And then a Miracle Happens!: How Do Proxy Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations?

Monday, February 25th, 2013

“And then a Miracle Happens!: How Do Proxy Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations? (PDF)

Authors: David F. Larcker, Allan L.McCall and Brian Tayan, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Date: February 25, 2013
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership No. CGRP- 31

Abstract:

Proxy advisory firms are independent, for-profit consulting companies that provide voting recommendations to individual and institutional investors.  Research shows that these firms have significant influence on voting outcomes.  Given this influence, it is important that investors ensure that the policies of these firms are “accurate”—i.e., that they successfully and reliably differentiate between good and bad future outcomes.

In this Closer Look, we carefully examine the process by which proxy advisory firms formulate their voting policies.  In doing so, we identify serious issues that raise questions about the accuracy of their recommendations.

We ask:

  • How exactly do proxy advisory firms determine that a policy is “correct”?
  • Who participates in the policy development process with these firms?  How do we know that their opinions are representative of shareholder broadly?
  • Why don’t proxy advisory firms disclose the research that supports each of their voting recommendations?

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: Union Activism: Do Union Pension Funds Act Solely in the Interest of Beneficiaries?

Tuesday, December 11th, 2012

Union Activism: Do Union Pension Funds Act Solely in the Interest of Beneficiaries? [PDF]

Response from Brandon Rees, Acting Director, AFL-CIO Office of Investment

Authors: Professor David F. Larcker, Stanford Graduate School of Business, and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Center for Leadership Development and Research, Stanford GSB.
Published: December 11, 2012

Union pension funds manage approximately $3.5 trillion in retirement assets on behalf of public and private sector employees covered by collective bargaining agreement.  They are also very active in the proxy process, sponsoring approximately one-third of the shareholder proposals that are included in corporate proxies each year.

Federal and state laws (including ERISA) require that the trustees and administrative bodies that oversee these funds manage their plans “solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries.”  Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Labor is clear that pension funds are not to use plan assets and their voting rights “to further legislative, regulatory or public policy issues through the proxy process.”

We examine this issue is greater detail, including the types of proposals put forward but union pension funds, the support these proposals receive, and the companies they target.  We ask:

  • Are union-sponsored proposals made solely in the interest of their pension beneficiaries?
  • How can the public or a pension beneficiary assess the motives of funds that sponsor proxy proposals?
  • How do union pension funds determine which positions to advocate and which companies to target?
  • Are unions violating their ERISA duties by sponsoring these proposals?

Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

New in Stanford Closer Look series: Shareholder Lawsuits: Where Is the Line Between Legitimate and Frivolous?

Tuesday, November 27th, 2012

Shareholder Lawsuits: Where Is the Line Between Legitimate and Frivolous? [PDF]

Authors: Professor David F. Larcker, Stanford Graduate School of Business, and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Center for Leadership Development and Research, Stanford GSB.
Published: November 27, 2012

Shareholders of public companies are not responsible for designing executive compensation packages. Still, a shareholder vote on compensation is required in two circumstances:  when a company wants to establish an equity-based compensation plan, and annually as part of the Dodd Frank requirement shareholders have an advisory “say on pay.”  In deciding how to vote, shareholders rely on information provided in the annual proxy.

Recently, shareholder groups have sued companies for inadequate disclosure.  They allege that the companies provide insufficient disclosure to determine how they should vote on these matters.

We explore this issue in closer detail and ask:

  • How much disclosure is too much disclosure?
  • If a company follows SEC guidelines, why is this not sufficient?
  • When do lawsuits cross the line from legitimate to frivolous?
  • If disclosure litigation is successful, what other board decisions would be subject to potential lawsuits?

Read the Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To view the entire collection of Stanford Closer Looks please click here. You can also follow more corporate governance and leadership news at @StanfordCorpGov and  @StnfrdLeadrship.

New in Stanford Closer Look series: Is a Powerful CEO Good or Bad for Shareholders

Tuesday, November 13th, 2012

Is a Powerful CEO Good or Bad for Shareholders  [PDF]

Authors: Professor David F. Larcker, Stanford Graduate School of Business, and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Center for Leadership Development and Research, Stanford GSB.
Published: November 13, 2012

Americans tend to admire powerful leaders.  Powerful leaders are seen as exerting influence over their organizations and shaping outcomes around them.  CEO power can be exercised across a wide spectrum of decisions, including those regarding corporate strategy, operations, acquisitions, organizational design, culture, and governance.

However, it is not clear the extent to which having a powerful CEO is beneficial to an organization.  CEO power can be positive or negative, depending how it is manifested and how it is exercised.

We examine this topic in greater detail, and ask:

  •        Are shareholders better or worse off with a powerful CEO?
  •        Where should the board draw the line between giving its CEO discretion and providing appropriate oversight?
  •        How much power is too much power?

Read the Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To view the entire collection of Stanford Closer Looks please click here. You can also follow more corporate governance and leadership news at  @StanfordCorpGov and  @StnfrdLeadrship .

Guest post by Dr. Richard Leblanc: Banking Directors Need To Be at the Top of Their Game

Saturday, November 10th, 2012

Banking Directors Need to be at the Top of Their Game

November 10, 2012
Dr. Richard Leblanc
BoardExpert.com

There’s an old maxim that corporations don’t fail, boards do. And when banks fail, the reason is poor management, which is the fault of a poor board.

Take the case of Lehman Brothers, the financial services firm that collapsed in 2008 and played a big role in the global economic downturn. Stanford University professors David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan noted that Lehman’s board was lacking financial services experience and current business acumen. In fact, the former CEOs on the board were, on average, 12 years into their retirement. “This raises the question of whether the professional experiences of Lehman board members were relevant for understanding the increasing complexity of financial markets,” wrote Larcker and Tayan.

Well, the job of a bank board isn’t getting any easier. Following the financial downturn, banks have been placed under greater scrutiny and new regulations, both in Canada and abroad.

That’s why, more than ever, banking board directors need to be at the top of their game.

Last week, I spoke to bank directors in Dallas, Texas, about banking governance best practices as a result of a review that I had conducted for the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. (The OFSI is Canada’s banking regulator.) Specifically, I looked at Canada’s governance guidelines and board assessment criteria and compared them with international financial regulatory practices and recent developments. I provided the OFSI with suggestions for revisions.

Some proposed board reforms to Canada’s deposit-taking institutions and insurance companies sectors under the new guidelines include:

-Having directors who possess risk management and relevant industry experience;

-A risk committee that oversees enterprise risks, and a chief risk officer who reports directly to this committee and the board;

-Board approval of the internal control framework to mitigate all material risks to the financial institution, and board monitoring of internal control effectiveness;

-Expert third party reviews of the board’s effectiveness, risk management effectiveness, and effectiveness of oversight functions (such as internal audit), with results reported to the board;

-Enhanced director orientation and training, self assessment and external reviews;

-A board-approved risk management statement that translates into cascading limits and thresholds for all material business risks (e.g., credit limits, loan losses, capital levels);

-The internal audit function should report directly to the audit committee; and

-The audit committee, not management, should approve the scope of the external auditor’s engagement and fees.

When I asked for a show of hands as to how many banking directors adopted at least some of the above best practices, about half the hands went up.

However, it’s apparent that many boards aren’t prepared for a new era of banking regulations.

Remember the JPMorgan board of directors that oversaw the derivative failure that cost the bank several billion dollars? Well, here is the current board. Last I checked, not a single director other than the CEO had banking experience. This is wrong.

In 2009 and 2010, there were a total of 297 bank failures in the U.S., according to the Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation. In the second quarter of this year, the FDIC identified 732 “problem” banks which are at risk of failing.

At the event in Dallas, one of the speakers brought up a good point. “Don’t get involved in something you don’t understand,” said Charles G. Cooper, commissioner of the Texas Department of Banking. He added: “The duties haven’t changed, but the topic is harder.”

And he’s right. That’s why it’s vital that banking boards are well-equipped with qualified directors for this increasingly complex environment.

The Use of Social Media by Business Leaders

Thursday, October 25th, 2012

2012 Social Media Survey


New Research Finds a Serious Gap Between Executives’ Knowledge About Social Media and Its Use at Their Companies  

Study by Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance, in conjunction with The Conference Board, surveyed CEOs, senior executives, and corporate directors

STANFORD, Calif. — Less than a third of companies today use social media to support their corporate strategy and risk management practices, according to new research conducted by Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance, the Center for Leadership Development and Research at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, and The Conference Board.

In the report titled “What Do Corporate Directors and Senior Managers Know about Social Media?” the authors detail the results of a survey of more than 180 senior executives and corporate directors of North American public and private companies. The findings reveal a disconnect between companies’ understanding of social media and the actions they are taking to apply it to their business. The report appears in the latest Directors Notes published by The Conference Board.

“Companies appreciate the potential that social media can have to transform all aspects of their business: branding, reputation, communication, outreach, and identifying strategic risks,” says Professor David F. Larcker of the Stanford Graduate School of Business and lead author of the study. “They also realize the serious threats that it can pose. They’re just not doing very much about it.”

“The world has changed, and consumers, employees, and stakeholders now expect to engage with companies and their brands through social media,” says Matteo Tonello, managing director of corporate leadership at The Conference Board. “That is why we are so pleased to be partnering with Stanford to support this research and help our membership better understand these evolving platforms.”

Conducted this summer, the survey included CEOs, senior executives, and directors across all major industries in the United States and Canada. Unlike most surveys on social media, which rely on a demographic of mostly young practitioners, the survey sample included only representatives from the highest levels of their respective organizations, with the average age of survey respondents in the mid-50s. Key findings include:

* While 90% of respondents claim to understand the impact that social media can have on their organization, only 32% of their companies monitor social media to detect risks to their business activities and 14% use metrics from social media to measure corporate performance.

* Only 24% of senior managers and 8% of directors surveyed receive reports containing summary information and metrics from social media. Approximately half of the companies do not collect this information at all.

* Nearly two-thirds of respondents (65%) use social media for personal purposes, and 63% for business purposes. Of those who use social media, 80% have a LinkedIn account and 68% have a Facebook account, demonstrating that executives and board members are familiar with this medium.

* Still, only 59% of companies in the survey use social media to interact with customers, 49% to advertise, and 35% to research customers. Approximately 30% use social media to research competitors, research new products and services, or communicate with employees and other stakeholders.

“We know that executives and board members are using social media. However, familiarity with social media is just not translating into systemic use at their companies,” Larcker explains. According to Larcker, the most frequently cited explanation for this gap is a lack of knowledge about how to set up a system to collect and distill information from social media into a useable form.

“The majority of those we surveyed don’t have social media guidelines in place at their companies, haven’t had a social media expert consult with their company, and don’t have systems in place for gathering key information. They are putting themselves at serious risk by not taking action,” Larcker concludes.

The study’s authors recommend that companies take the following steps to implement a social media strategy that integrates with their corporate strategy and risk management program:

  1. Assess their current capabilities with social media
  2. Determine how social media fits with their strategy and business model
  3. Map their companies’ key performance indicators and risk factors to information available through social media
  4. Implement a “listening” system to capture social media data and transform it into metrics
  5. Develop formal policies and guidelines for employees, executives, and directors
  6. Consider the legal and behavioral ramifications that could be involved if the company’s board receives summary data about social media

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

Katie Pandes, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 650-724-9152,  pandes_katie@gsb.stanford.edu

Peter Tulupman, The Conference Board, 212-339-0231,  peter.tulupman@conference-board.org

Which U.S. Market Interactions Affect CEO Pay? Evidence from U.K. Companies

Wednesday, October 24th, 2012

Which U.S. Market Interactions Affect CEO Pay? Evidence from U.K. Companies (SSRN)
Authors: 
Joseph Gerakos, University of Chicago – Booth School of Business;  Joseph D. Piotroski ,
Stanford University – Graduate School of Business; Suraj Srinivasan , Harvard Business School
Date: August 2012
Management Science, Forthcoming

Abstract: This paper examines how different types of interactions with U.S. markets by non-U.S. firms are associated with higher level of CEO pay, greater emphasis on incentive-based compensation, and smaller pay gap with U.S. firms. Using a sample of CEOs of U.K. firms and using both broad cross-sectional and narrow event-window tests, we find that capital market relationship in the form of an U.S. exchange listing is related to higher U.K CEO pay; however, the effect is similar when U.K. firms have a listing in any foreign country implying a foreign listing effect not unique to the U.S. Product market relationships measured by the extent of sales in the U.S. by U.K. companies are associated with higher pay, greater use of U.S.-style pay arrangements, and a reduction in the U.S.-U.K. pay gap. The product market effect is incremental to the effect of a U.S. exchange listing, the extent of the firm’s non-U.S. foreign market interactions, and the characteristics of the executive. The U.S-U.K. CEO pay gap reduces in U.K. firms that make U.S. acquisitions. Further, the firm’s use of a U.S. compensation consultant increases the sensitivity of U.K. pay practices to U.S. product market relationships.

Keywords: CEO compensation, international pay, globalization, corporate governance, incentives, cross-listing, United Kingdom

New research: On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership

Monday, August 27th, 2012

On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership  (SSRN)
Authors: Jordan M. Barry, University of San Diego School of Law; John William Hatfield, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Scott Duke Kominers, University of Chicago – Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics
Paper Date:  August 22, 2012

Abstract:  The prevailing view among many economists is that derivatives markets simply enable financial markets to incorporate information better and faster. Under this view, increasing the size of derivatives markets only increases the efficiency of financial markets.  We present formal economic analysis that contradicts this view. Derivatives allow investors to hold economic interests in a corporation without owning voting rights, or vice versa. This leads to both empty voters — investors whose voting rights in a corporation exceed their economic interests — and hidden owners — investors whose economic interests exceed their voting rights. We show how, when financial markets are opaque, empty voting and hidden ownership can render financial markets unpredictable, unstable, and inefficient. By contrast, we show that when financial markets are transparent, empty voting and hidden ownership have dramatically different effects. They cause financial markets to follow predictable patterns, encourage stable outcomes, and can improve efficiency. Our analysis lends insight into the operation of securities markets in general and derivatives markets in particular. It provides a new justification for a robust mandatory disclosure regime and facilitates analysis of proposed substantive securities regulations.