Posts Tagged ‘CEO Succession’

Rock Center Working Paper Series Vol. 4 No. 2, 03/19/2012

Monday, March 19th, 2012

Rock Center for Corporate Governance Logo

New working research papers via SSRN, the Social Science Research Network

Table of Contents

A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements

James Darrell Duffie, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business
David A. Skeel, University of Pennsylvania Law School, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Failure is an Option: Failure Barriers and New Firm Performance

Robert Eberhart, Stanford University – Management Science & Engineering, Stanford University Shorenstein APARC / SPRIE
Charles E. Eesley, Stanford University
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Stanford University – Management Science & Engineering

Knowledge, Compensation, and Firm Value: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Communication

Feng Li, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor – Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Michael Minnis, University of Chicago – Booth School of Business
Venky Nagar, University of Michigan – Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Madhav V. Rajan, Stanford Graduate School of Business

Reforming Money Market Funds

Martin N. Baily, Brookings Institution
John Y. Campbell, Harvard University – Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
John H. Cochrane, University of Chicago – Booth School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Douglas W. Diamond, University of Chicago – Booth School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
James Darrell Duffie, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business
Kenneth R. French, Dartmouth College – Tuck School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Anil K. Kashyap, University of Chicago – Booth School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Frederic S. Mishkin, Columbia Business School – Finance and Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
David S. Scharfstein, Harvard Business School – Finance Unit, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Robert J. Shiller, Yale University – Cowles Foundation, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Yale University – International Center for Finance
Matthew J. Slaughter, Dartmouth College – Tuck School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Hyun Song Shin, Princeton University – Department of Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Jeremy C. Stein, Harvard University – Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Rene M. Stulz, Ohio State University (OSU) – Department of Finance, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans

Chris S. Armstrong, University of Pennsylvania – Accounting Department
Ian D. Gow, Harvard Business School
David F. Larcker, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business

Sudden Death of a CEO: Are Companies Prepared When Lightening Strikes?

David F. Larcker, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business
Brian Tayan, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: Sudden Death of a CEO: Are Companies Prepared When Lighting Strikes?

Thursday, March 8th, 2012

Sudden Death of a CEO: Are Companies Prepared When Lighting Strikes? (PDF)
By Professor David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Corporate Governance Research Program, Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Published: March 6, 2012

It is very difficult for shareholders to know detailed information about CEO succession planning among the companies they have invested in.  Although CEO deaths are rare, the sudden death of a CEO can provide insight into the quality of succession planning and governance of a company.  Whereas some companies are able to appoint a successor immediately, others take weeks or months to do so.

In this Closer Look, we examine this issue in detail.

We ask:

* Why haven’t more companies done a “reality check” on whether they have a truly operational succession plan?
* What can a board learn and what should it do if the market reacts positively to the death of its CEO?
* Should the board revise its succession plan if its CEO engages in risky hobbies or lifestyle habits?

Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To receive monthly alerts about the Closer Look series, please email the Stanford Corporate Governance Research Program at corpgovernance@gsb.stanford.edu. You can also follow more corporate governance news on Twitter: @StanfordCorpGov .  To view the entire collection of  Stanford Closer Looks please click here.

New in Stanford Closer Look series: Leadership Challenges at Hewlett-Packard: Through the Looking Glass

Monday, October 10th, 2011

The board of directors has a long list of responsibilities in all areas of governance.  However, to many, the fundamental obligations of the board are simple and distill down to two: 1) evaluate and approve the corporate strategy and 2) hire and fire the CEO. The Hewlett-Packard Company has had four leadership changes over the last twelve years.  It has also faced numerous strategic changes, as well as controversies and challenges at the senior management and board levels.

We examine these issues and ask:

* Does the board of directors understand the skills and experiences needed to run the company?

* Have they settled on a corporate strategy?

* Why has the board repeatedly appointed an external, rather than internal, executive as CEO?

Read the Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To receive monthly alerts about the Closer Look series, please email the Stanford Corporate Governance Research Program at corpgovernance@gsb.stanford.edu. You can also follow more corporate governance news on Twitter: @StanfordCorpGov .

To view the entire collection of  Stanford Closer Looks please click here.

Stanford Closer Look: Seven Myths of Corporate Governance (CGRP-16)

Thursday, June 2nd, 2011


 CGRP16 – Seven Myths of Corporate Governance (PDF) by Professor David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, MBA '03

In recent years, there has been much discussion over how to improve governance systems broadly. In the process, certain myths have developed that continue to be accepted, despite a lack of robust supporting evidence.

These myths include the beliefs that:

1. The structure of the board always tells you something about the quality of the board

2. CEOs in the U.S. are overpaid

3. Pay for performance does not exist in CEO compensation contracts

4. Companies are prepared to replace the CEO if needed

5. Regulation improves corporate governance

6. The voting recommendations of proxy advisory firms are correct

7. Best practices are the solution to bad governance

We examine each of these myths in closer detail and explain why they are false.

So long as these myths are accepted by practitioners and the public, how can we expect managerial behavior and firm performance to improve? Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

Larcker and Tayan are the authors of recently published book: Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and Their Consequences, FT Press

Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance: The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important. To see the full series of  Stanford Closer Looks click here.

Why Does Corporate Governance Really Matter? New Book from Stanford Showcases Research into How Boards Can Govern Better

Thursday, May 19th, 2011

Corporate Governance Matters by Professor David Larcker and Brian Tayan

STANFORD, Calif.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–“The debate on the role of boards in the wake of the financial crisis has created a lot of hype and rhetoric about corporate governance,” says David Larcker, who is James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting and Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and coauthor with Brian Tayan of the new book Corporate Governance Matters (FT Press). According to Larcker, many so-called experts are heavy on opinions about governance, but light on the facts.

“The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”

“The FDA requires research on drug outcomes before approving a pharmaceutical,” he says. “Shouldn’t experts that prescribe ‘cures for bad governance’ be subject to a similar standard of review?”

In their book, Larcker and Tayan, a researcher at Stanford GSB, challenge the conventional wisdom of the many books, reports, and recommendations of blue-ribbon panels on what constitutes “good” governance. The authors researched hundreds of companies and interviewed many board directors to uncover the real-life consequences of corporate governance practices – from director independence to designing appropriate executive pay packages.

“A lot of people want to measure what’s measurable – we wanted to measure what’s informative,” says Tayan. “For example, certain lightning-rod issues, such as ‘excessive’ risk taking and CEO compensation, get a lot of attention from outside observers, while important issues that are considerably more difficult to assess – such as corporate strategy and succession planning – tend to get the short shrift.”

Trends Getting in the Way of Good Governance

“Our research shows that many emerging developments that were intended to improve governance – purportedly to avert the kind of financial disaster we just experienced – just don’t hold water,” Larcker explains. These include:

  1. Compliance drowning out strategy – “A check-the-box approach is not what we need from directors. We need instead their best thinking and ability to manage risk appropriately for corporate growth.”
  2. “Federalization of corporate governance” – “As corporate governance becomes increasingly, and probably inexorably, ‘federalized’ through regulations such as Dodd-Frank, there is a real question as to whether these laws make boards govern better,” he says. “We’re still debating whether the 10-year-old Sarbanes Oxley was good for the economy.”
  3. “Shareholder democracy” movement – “The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”
  4. Rise of proxy advisory firms – “Proxy advisory firms exhibit substantial influence over the proxy voting process. What is the evidence that their recommendations lead to the kinds of positive outcomes that stakeholders really care about?”

“We wrote our book for thinkers – for practitioners who want to see how important governance issues play out in the real world,” says Tayan.

“By integrating several different approaches to the topic – both business and legal – we have created a practical framework for directors that will help them make decisions that lead to organizational success.”

To speak with the authors, contact Davia Temin or Suzanne Oaks at 212-588-8788 or news@teminandco.com.

For information on Corporate Governance Research Program: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/about/

Contacts

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Helen Chang, 650-723-3358

chang_helen@gsb.stanford.edu

 

 

Do You Have a Plan for Finding Your Next CEO?

Wednesday, September 8th, 2010

The Corporate Board, September/October 2010 — Vol. XXXI      No. 184

by Stephen A. Miles, Heidrick & Struggles  and Professor David F. Larcker, James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting, Director of Stanford Graduate School of Business Corporate Governance Research Program, and Senior Faculty, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University

Many boards have done shockingly little on CEO succession. Some of our largest public companies harbor a dirty little boardroom secret—their boards of directors have done shockingly little to assure sound, effective CEO succession. Research by Heidrick & Struggles and Stanford University finds boards often have vague succession “plans,” or are overly optimistic about the ability of CEO prospects to step up to the role. Plus, their top candidates may not even know about (or want) the job.