New working paper on SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1738083
Paper Date: January 2011
Abstract
This paper examines the extent that interactions with US markets impact the compensation practices of non-US firms. Using a sample of large UK companies, we find that the total compensation of UK CEOs is positively related to the extent of the firm’s interactions with US markets, as captured by the percentage of total sales generated in the US, the presence of prior US acquisition activity, the presence of a US exchange listing, and CEO and director-level US board experience. More importantly, we find that exposure to US product markets is associated with the adoption of US-style compensation arrangements (i.e., incentive-based pay packages). In contrast, we find no such association with exposures to other (non-US) foreign product markets.
Together, our evidence is consistent with US market interactions impacting UK compensation practices through two mechanisms: (1) to alleviate internal and external pay disparities arising from the presence of US operations and businesses (proxied by the percent US Sales and prior US acquisitions) and (2) to compensate CEOs for bearing the additional risk and responsibility associated with exposure to foreign securities laws and legal environment (proxied by both US and non-US exchange listings).
Authors
Joseph Gerakos
University of Chicago – Booth School of Business
Joseph D. Piotroski
Stanford University Graduate School of Business
Suraj Srinivasan
Harvard Business School
Tags: CEO compensation, corporate governance, cross-listing, globalization, incentives, international pay, United Kingdom