Archive for October, 2012

The Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises

Wednesday, October 31st, 2012

The Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises  (SSRN)
Robert Novy-Marx, University of Rochester – Simon Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER);
Joshua D. Rauh, Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract: 
We calculate increases in contributions required to achieve full funding of state and local pension systems in the U.S. over 30 years. Without policy changes, contributions would have to increase by 2.5 times, reaching 14.1% of the total own-revenue generated by state and local governments. This represents a tax increase of $1,385 per household per year, around half of which goes to pay down legacy liabilities while half funds the cost of new promises. We examine sensitivity to asset return assumptions, wage correlations, the treatment of workers not currently in Social Security, and endogenous geographical shifts in the tax base.

Keywords: pensions, state and local government, public finance

The Use of Social Media by Business Leaders

Thursday, October 25th, 2012

2012 Social Media Survey


New Research Finds a Serious Gap Between Executives’ Knowledge About Social Media and Its Use at Their Companies  

Study by Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance, in conjunction with The Conference Board, surveyed CEOs, senior executives, and corporate directors

STANFORD, Calif. — Less than a third of companies today use social media to support their corporate strategy and risk management practices, according to new research conducted by Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance, the Center for Leadership Development and Research at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, and The Conference Board.

In the report titled “What Do Corporate Directors and Senior Managers Know about Social Media?” the authors detail the results of a survey of more than 180 senior executives and corporate directors of North American public and private companies. The findings reveal a disconnect between companies’ understanding of social media and the actions they are taking to apply it to their business. The report appears in the latest Directors Notes published by The Conference Board.

“Companies appreciate the potential that social media can have to transform all aspects of their business: branding, reputation, communication, outreach, and identifying strategic risks,” says Professor David F. Larcker of the Stanford Graduate School of Business and lead author of the study. “They also realize the serious threats that it can pose. They’re just not doing very much about it.”

“The world has changed, and consumers, employees, and stakeholders now expect to engage with companies and their brands through social media,” says Matteo Tonello, managing director of corporate leadership at The Conference Board. “That is why we are so pleased to be partnering with Stanford to support this research and help our membership better understand these evolving platforms.”

Conducted this summer, the survey included CEOs, senior executives, and directors across all major industries in the United States and Canada. Unlike most surveys on social media, which rely on a demographic of mostly young practitioners, the survey sample included only representatives from the highest levels of their respective organizations, with the average age of survey respondents in the mid-50s. Key findings include:

* While 90% of respondents claim to understand the impact that social media can have on their organization, only 32% of their companies monitor social media to detect risks to their business activities and 14% use metrics from social media to measure corporate performance.

* Only 24% of senior managers and 8% of directors surveyed receive reports containing summary information and metrics from social media. Approximately half of the companies do not collect this information at all.

* Nearly two-thirds of respondents (65%) use social media for personal purposes, and 63% for business purposes. Of those who use social media, 80% have a LinkedIn account and 68% have a Facebook account, demonstrating that executives and board members are familiar with this medium.

* Still, only 59% of companies in the survey use social media to interact with customers, 49% to advertise, and 35% to research customers. Approximately 30% use social media to research competitors, research new products and services, or communicate with employees and other stakeholders.

“We know that executives and board members are using social media. However, familiarity with social media is just not translating into systemic use at their companies,” Larcker explains. According to Larcker, the most frequently cited explanation for this gap is a lack of knowledge about how to set up a system to collect and distill information from social media into a useable form.

“The majority of those we surveyed don’t have social media guidelines in place at their companies, haven’t had a social media expert consult with their company, and don’t have systems in place for gathering key information. They are putting themselves at serious risk by not taking action,” Larcker concludes.

The study’s authors recommend that companies take the following steps to implement a social media strategy that integrates with their corporate strategy and risk management program:

  1. Assess their current capabilities with social media
  2. Determine how social media fits with their strategy and business model
  3. Map their companies’ key performance indicators and risk factors to information available through social media
  4. Implement a “listening” system to capture social media data and transform it into metrics
  5. Develop formal policies and guidelines for employees, executives, and directors
  6. Consider the legal and behavioral ramifications that could be involved if the company’s board receives summary data about social media

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

Katie Pandes, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 650-724-9152,  pandes_katie@gsb.stanford.edu

Peter Tulupman, The Conference Board, 212-339-0231,  peter.tulupman@conference-board.org

Which U.S. Market Interactions Affect CEO Pay? Evidence from U.K. Companies

Wednesday, October 24th, 2012

Which U.S. Market Interactions Affect CEO Pay? Evidence from U.K. Companies (SSRN)
Authors: 
Joseph Gerakos, University of Chicago – Booth School of Business;  Joseph D. Piotroski ,
Stanford University – Graduate School of Business; Suraj Srinivasan , Harvard Business School
Date: August 2012
Management Science, Forthcoming

Abstract: This paper examines how different types of interactions with U.S. markets by non-U.S. firms are associated with higher level of CEO pay, greater emphasis on incentive-based compensation, and smaller pay gap with U.S. firms. Using a sample of CEOs of U.K. firms and using both broad cross-sectional and narrow event-window tests, we find that capital market relationship in the form of an U.S. exchange listing is related to higher U.K CEO pay; however, the effect is similar when U.K. firms have a listing in any foreign country implying a foreign listing effect not unique to the U.S. Product market relationships measured by the extent of sales in the U.S. by U.K. companies are associated with higher pay, greater use of U.S.-style pay arrangements, and a reduction in the U.S.-U.K. pay gap. The product market effect is incremental to the effect of a U.S. exchange listing, the extent of the firm’s non-U.S. foreign market interactions, and the characteristics of the executive. The U.S-U.K. CEO pay gap reduces in U.K. firms that make U.S. acquisitions. Further, the firm’s use of a U.S. compensation consultant increases the sensitivity of U.K. pay practices to U.S. product market relationships.

Keywords: CEO compensation, international pay, globalization, corporate governance, incentives, cross-listing, United Kingdom

Sunday, October 21st, 2012

The Relation between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives
Authors: Chris Armstrong, University of Pennsylvania – Accounting Department;  David F. Larcker, Stanford University – Graduate School of Business;  Gaizka Ormazabal, IESE Business School of the University of Navarra; Daniel J. Taylor, University of Pennsylvania – The Wharton School.
Dated: August 25, 2012
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming

Abstract: 
Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm’s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager’s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.

Keywords: Equity Incentives, Executive Compensation, Misreporting, Earnings Management, Restatements, SEC Enforcement Actions

New in Stanford Closer Look Series: Fixed or Contingent: How Should “Governance Monitors” Be Paid?

Tuesday, October 2nd, 2012

Fixed or Contingent: How Should “Governance Monitors” Be Paid?  [PDF]
Authors: Professor David F. Larcker, Stanford Graduate School of Business, and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Center for Leadership Development and Research, Stanford GSB.
Published: October 2012

Corporate monitors are important participants in corporate governance systems.  Monitors include the board of directors, the general counsel, and internal and external auditors.  Monitors are paid by the organization but their responsibilities largely or mostly non-managerial.

How should monitors be paid?  Because their objective is to detect and mitigate agency problems, one could argue that they should be paid almost entirely on a fixed-salary basis.  On the other hand, an entirely fixed compensation system might not provide sufficient incentive to perform.

We discuss this issue in greater detail.  We ask:

  • Should corporate monitors be paid a bonus?
  • If so, what form should it take?
  • What performance targets should be used to calculate the bonus?
  • Do performance incentives enhance or impede the effectiveness of monitors?

Read the Closer Look and let us know what you think!

To view the entire collection of Stanford Closer Looks please click here. You can also follow more corporate governance and leadership news at @StanfordCorpGov and @StnfrdLeadrship.