Archive for May, 2011

Why Does Corporate Governance Really Matter? New Book from Stanford Showcases Research into How Boards Can Govern Better

Thursday, May 19th, 2011

Corporate Governance Matters by Professor David Larcker and Brian Tayan

STANFORD, Calif.–(BUSINESS WIRE)–“The debate on the role of boards in the wake of the financial crisis has created a lot of hype and rhetoric about corporate governance,” says David Larcker, who is James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting and Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and coauthor with Brian Tayan of the new book Corporate Governance Matters (FT Press). According to Larcker, many so-called experts are heavy on opinions about governance, but light on the facts.

“The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”

“The FDA requires research on drug outcomes before approving a pharmaceutical,” he says. “Shouldn’t experts that prescribe ‘cures for bad governance’ be subject to a similar standard of review?”

In their book, Larcker and Tayan, a researcher at Stanford GSB, challenge the conventional wisdom of the many books, reports, and recommendations of blue-ribbon panels on what constitutes “good” governance. The authors researched hundreds of companies and interviewed many board directors to uncover the real-life consequences of corporate governance practices – from director independence to designing appropriate executive pay packages.

“A lot of people want to measure what’s measurable – we wanted to measure what’s informative,” says Tayan. “For example, certain lightning-rod issues, such as ‘excessive’ risk taking and CEO compensation, get a lot of attention from outside observers, while important issues that are considerably more difficult to assess – such as corporate strategy and succession planning – tend to get the short shrift.”

Trends Getting in the Way of Good Governance

“Our research shows that many emerging developments that were intended to improve governance – purportedly to avert the kind of financial disaster we just experienced – just don’t hold water,” Larcker explains. These include:

  1. Compliance drowning out strategy – “A check-the-box approach is not what we need from directors. We need instead their best thinking and ability to manage risk appropriately for corporate growth.”
  2. “Federalization of corporate governance” – “As corporate governance becomes increasingly, and probably inexorably, ‘federalized’ through regulations such as Dodd-Frank, there is a real question as to whether these laws make boards govern better,” he says. “We’re still debating whether the 10-year-old Sarbanes Oxley was good for the economy.”
  3. “Shareholder democracy” movement – “The fight for ‘say on pay’ and proxy access has gotten a lot of ink – but it is unclear whether it will actually create shareholder value.”
  4. Rise of proxy advisory firms – “Proxy advisory firms exhibit substantial influence over the proxy voting process. What is the evidence that their recommendations lead to the kinds of positive outcomes that stakeholders really care about?”

“We wrote our book for thinkers – for practitioners who want to see how important governance issues play out in the real world,” says Tayan.

“By integrating several different approaches to the topic – both business and legal – we have created a practical framework for directors that will help them make decisions that lead to organizational success.”

To speak with the authors, contact Davia Temin or Suzanne Oaks at 212-588-8788 or news@teminandco.com.

For information on Corporate Governance Research Program: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/about/

Contacts

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Helen Chang, 650-723-3358

chang_helen@gsb.stanford.edu

 

 

Free Stanford GSB Corporate Governance educational material available on “The Market for Corporate Control”

Wednesday, May 18th, 2011
  • Market for Corporate Control  (Powerpoint Presentation) 
    Authored by Professor David F.  Larcker and BrianTayan, Researcher, GSB Corporate Governance Research Program/MBA ’03.

Overview: A well-functioning governance system consists of more than just the board of directors and the external auditor. It includes all disciplining mechanisms—legal, regulatory, and market driven—that influence management to act in the interest of shareholders.

Examples include:

-Labor market. Failure leads to CEO termination.

-Capital market. Failure leads to higher cost of capital.

-Regulatory environment. Violations lead to litigation.

Similarly, the “market for corporate control” puts pressure on the CEO to perform, or risk sale of company to new owners.

The entire series of presentations, to date, can be found here: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/research/powerpoint_presentations.html

Stanford Closer Look: Tesla Motors: The Evolution of Governance from Inception to IPO

Monday, May 16th, 2011

In June 2010, Tesla Motors raised over $225 million in an initial public offering that valued the electric car manufacturer at $2 billion.  It was the first time a U.S. automobile company went public since Ford Motor in 1956.

The evolution of Tesla—first incorporated in 2003 by engineers Martin Eberhard and Marc Tarpenning—in some ways has been unique, given the nature of its business.  At the same time, Tesla has faced organizational challenges that are common to most public and private corporations.

We examine the prominent features of the company’s governance system as it has evolved from inception to IPO, including the board of directors, antitakeover protections, and executive compensation program.  In each case, the system changed to match the current needs of the company.

We ask:

  • Many experts prescribe a one-size-fits-all approach to governance.   Why don’t they do a better job of taking into account the company’s specific situation and needs?
  • Now that Tesla is public, how might we expect its governance system to change in the future?

Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!

Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance: The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important. To see the full series of  Stanford Closer Looks go here.

Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges: The Case of Institutional Shareholder Services

Monday, May 9th, 2011

STANFORD, Calif. — May 09, 2011

Many institutional investors rely on a proxy advisory firm to assist them in voting company proxies and fulfilling the fiduciary responsibility they have to vote in the interest of beneficial shareholders. But according to a new study at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, proxy advisory firm recommendations may actually decrease shareholder value.

The recommendation of proxy advisory firms is not inconsequential. Studies conducted by Stanford GSB faculty member David F. Larcker, who is Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program, and doctoral students Allan L. McCall and Gaizka Ormazabal, show that an unfavorable recommendation from the largest proxy advisory firm (Institutional Shareholder Services, ISS) can reduce shareholder support significantly, depending on the matter of the proposal.

While there are potential benefits and drawbacks to relying on the voting recommendations of proxy advisory firms, little empirical research to date has been performed on whether the voting recommendations of these firms are “correct.” That is, are shareholders really better off if they follow their recommendations?

To answer this question the researchers examined the impact of ISS voting policies on 264 exchange offers during 2004 to 2009. They find that companies that design their exchange offer so that it receives a positive recommendation from proxy advisory firms exhibit a statistically lower market reaction, lower operating performance, and higher executive turnover than those firms that do not design their plans in accordance with the proxy advisory firm guidelines. These results indicate that proxy advisory firm recommendations on stock option exchanges do not increase, and in fact actually decrease, shareholder value.

The research paper, “Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges: The Case of Institutional Shareholder Services,” and companion case study, “Do ISS Voting Recommendations Create Shareholder Value?” are available online from the Stanford Corporate Governance Research Program: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/topics/shareholder/closer_look.html.

Larcker is coauthor, with Brian Tayan, of the book, “Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and their Consequences” (FT Press-Pearson Prentice Hall, 2011).

Contact:

Stanford Graduate School of Business
Helen Chang, 650-723-3358
chang_helen@gsb.stanford.edu

Corporate Governance Matters – An evening with new book authors Professor David Larcker and Brian Tayan, MBA ’03

Friday, May 6th, 2011

Thursday May 26, 2011
5:30 Reception
6:00 – 7:00 pm Presentation
Room 190, Stanford Law School
(map)

Registration Information This event is free and open to the public, however registration is required. Please register by clicking here.

About the Event:

In recent years there has been significant news coverage of corporate fraud, accounting scandals, insider trading, excessive compensation, and other types of organizational lawsuits, resignations, and bankruptcy. Many of these reports suggest that companies’ failures are a result of a “breakdown in corporate governance.” In this economic climate, companies cannot afford scandals like that of Enron, American International Group, and Tyco to be played out in the media. To prevent abuse of executive power and promote organization-wide stability, leaders turn to corporate governance.

What is corporate governance? And how can it be used to make decisions in an organization’s best interest? Using the most current research and case studies, leading experts Professor David Larcker and research associate Brian Tayan will answer some of these questions from their new book. They will discuss some of the critical aspects needed to implement and sustain superior corporate governance—including compensation, CEO labor markets, board structure, succession, risk, international governance, reporting, audit, institutional and activist investors, and governance ratings.

Authors David Larcker and Brian Tayan will discuss their examination of organizational choices and related consequences from their new book from FT Press.

Check out an excerpt of the book online at: http://www.ftpress.com/store/product.aspx?isbn=013218026X. Books will be available for sale at the event.

About the Authors

David Larcker is James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting at the Graduate School of Business of Stanford University; Director of the Corporate Governance Research Program; Senior Faculty, Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance. David’s research focuses on executive compensation, corporate governance, and managerial accounting. He has published many research papers and is frequently quoted in both the popular and business press. He received his BS and MS in engineering from the University of Missouri-Rolla and his PhD in business from the University of Kansas. He previously was on the faculty of the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University and The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Larcker presently serves on the Board of Trustees for the Wells Fargo Advantage Funds.

Brian Tayan is a member of the Corporate Governance Research Program at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. He has written broadly on the subject of corporate governance, including case studies and other materials on boards of directors, succession planning, executive compensation, financial accounting, and shareholder relations. Previously, Brian worked as a financial analyst at Stanford University’s Office of the CEO and as an investment associate at UBS Private Wealth Management. He received his MBA from the Stanford Graduate School of Business and his BA from Princeton University.