

Japan

(JapanRN1.2)

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This is one of a set of “random narratives” to complement our statistical findings in regard to civil war onsets. This is a draft completed on June 17, 2005; comments welcome.

Japan has had no civil war in the post World War II world, and our model (see Figure 1) predicts over the course of forty-seven annual observations that it would have been highly unlikely for Japan to have experienced one.¹ High GDP per capita (reaching \$6,000 by 1969), lack of oil, and stable institutions that never bordered on anocracy have brought Japan’s probability of civil war below the world average by 1967 and below the average for the region of West Europe, North America and Japan – the region with the lowest mean probability of civil war – by 1977.

However, a reading of Japanese contemporary history with an eye to the graph on the probabilities of civil war for Japan helps raise several new questions about our predictive model. First we ask (in section II), given that Japan had more than twice the average world probability of civil war upon the end of the American occupation, what then constrained the onset of an insurgency? By our model, we should expect at least to see the makings of an insurgency. And if we had coded Japan as a new state (decolonized, as it were), the predicted probability of a civil war would have been higher. What were the factors that held back a successful insurgency at the point of political transition? Second (and discussed in section III), at a moment when Japan still had an above world average predicted probability for an insurgency in 1960, there was a massive wave of violent protest. However, there was only a single death associated with this wave. We ask of this moment whether the factors we identify in our model are useful in accounting for the success of the state in cauterizing a potential insurgency.

¹ . To be more precise, the model predicts that there should have been 0.51 civil wars in Japan over the course of post World War II history.

Third, we look (in section IV) at two cases of violent confrontations with state (the Narita airport protest of 1982) and society (Aum Shinrikō poison gas attack in the Tokyo subway system) in the period when our model shows a negligible chance of civil war. Do these events and the organizations that fostered them, we ask, suggest greater possibilities for insurgency than our model envisages? And does the fact they were so nonviolently cauterized lend support to our interpretation of the statistical model?

Before we examine these periods, we provide some historical background on Japan relevant to domestic security (in section I). We use this material to discredit notions of a peaceful (or a warlike) political culture, notions that are sometimes used to account for a particular era. Serious accounts of Japanese history show Japan's propensity to war coinciding with its propensity to peace. After examining these three periods with associated questions asked of our model, we sum up in the final section (in section V). In it, we point out that wealth and police effectiveness could not eliminate grievances, which have been expressed violently throughout the past half-century in Japan; however, the violent expression of grievances was powerfully delimited in large part due to wealth and to the modern organization of social order.

I. History, Culture and Violence in Japan

There is no standard narrative linking Japanese history or culture to the propensity toward violence. In fact, the record shows stunning contradictions.

Japanese History: A Contradictory Set of Lessons

- On the one hand, there are in Japanese history periods of peace. Subsequent to the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate, a loyal warrior caste, the samurai, provided a centuries-long stability. These samurai helped preserve low levels of violence and a regime (the *bakufu*) that remained in full control over society. The merchant classes, revolutionary in other societies, showed little interest in freeing themselves from feudal restraints. On the other hand, in the 19th century, those providing order undermined it. Lower level samurai, whose stipends were cut due to the reduction in revenues from their estates and the increasing cost of urban living, were restive, and especially angry with the weak national response to the western threat. These samurai groups were as a consequence “not infrequently

attacking Bakufu officials and foreigners, sometimes with fatal results” (Sims 2001, 5, 9).

- On the one hand, the Japanese peasantry, because it was more heavily taxed to support the enormous urban populations of nobles that grew steadily through the Tokugawa period, induced waves of protest especially over the bad harvests in the 1830s and again in the 1860s. On the other hand, the peasantry was insufficiently violent to challenge the *bakufu* or to make a revolution (Sims 2001, 5, 8).

- On the one hand, the Meiji overthrow of the Tokugawa regime does not earn the classification of revolution largely because it was largely peaceful and violence was restrained. On the other hand, the restorationists took incredible risks that could well have exploded into a blood bath. As Sims (2001, 10) analyzes the period, “it is hard to explain the [samurai coming from Choshu and Satsuma] willingness to embark upon a civil war of which the outcome was highly uncertain.” And risky. On 27 January, 1868, shortly after the coup d’état overthrowing the shogun, the Tokugawa vassals in Osaka, angered by the riots in Edo provoked by the Satsuma agents, mobilized troops towards Kyoto, and these troops were blocked by Satsuma and Choshu troops at the famous battle of Toba-Fushimi, leading to three days of fighting, with the rebel troops victorious. The Shogun Yoshinobu left his palace for Edo and in February, the Osaka Castle, the Tokugawa stronghold in central Japan, surrendered. On April 6, the shogun agreed to the surrender of his castle, warships and arms in return for a truce. Low-level military action continued; Edo castle was surrendered on 3 May, but Tokugawa resistance continued, and then in the summer an alliance of more than 30 *han* in the northeast rebelled and it took till December before its pacification. In Hokkaido (the northern island) Tokugawa forces held out through June 1869. In Choshu there was also unrest, in part caused by the irregular military units (*shotai*) that were in conflict with their upper-samurai commanders. In 1870, armed opposition by shotai units and simultaneous peasant uprisings had to be suppressed by Choshu forces. One of the leaders of Choshu’s renovators was Hirozawa Saneomi, who was assassinated by an extremist in early 1871. Even with violent unrest, reform was faster in Choshu, and conflict between it and less-advanced Satsuma increased. There continued in the post-Meiji period to be a series of rural uprisings, bordering on revolution. And in January 1877 in Satsuma, in response by the government attempt to disarm the province, the border separating the country from true revolution was just about crossed. Saigo, Satsuma’s

military leader, had about 30,000 troops and the rebellion lasted nine months. But it lost, and this signaled the hopelessness of challenging the Meiji government, and the long-term undermining of samurai status and power, in a government ruled by samurai. The restoration put Japan on the brink of civil war at several moments, and it is therefore imprudent to induce from the Meiji restoration a special Japanese model for nonviolent change (Sims 2001, pp. 10, 14, 17, 22-3, 37).

- On the one hand, once the Meiji oligarchs assumed power, they centralized the state with only minimal opposition from the regions. On the other hand, by one estimate, there were 86 peasant uprisings in 1868, 110 in 1869, 65 in 1870, 52 in 1871 and 30 in 1872. In these threatening times (with the added fear that a Satsuma/Choshu civil war might ignite) the *han* leaders sought to borrow or tax so as to buy more up-to-date weapons to fight their own peasants. Indeed, their acceptance of Meiji centralization was in large part due to fear of the aristocratic lords (the *daimyo*) of peasant based civil war (Sims 2001, p. 28-9).

- On the one hand, the Meiji government successfully and relatively peacefully established constitutional rule. Yet, on the other hand, terror was perpetually present. In the wake of the Japan/Russia war of 1904, many in Japan saw the peace treaty as a betrayal, given their exultation in Japanese victories. They got neither an indemnity nor the northern half of Sakhalien, despite the recognition of Japan's driving the Russians out of Korea and southern Manchuria. A rally at Hibiya Park was planned by a group of nationalist professionals in the Joint Council of Fellow Activists on the Peace Question. On the day of the proposed rally, the police closed the park, and the activists broke down the gates, leading to three days of riots, with seventeen killed. Although this took democratic politics outside an inner circle, the cabinet was able to ride out the crisis without falling, and contained politics again in the constrained party system led by the Meiji elder statesmen (Sims 2001, 89).

In May 1910 the government uncovered a plot to assassinate the Emperor, in the so-called Taijyaku Jiken (High Treason Incident). Heavy police repression followed, with left-wing groups held responsible, and this tended to drive radicalism underground but in no way eliminated it (Sims 2001, 98).

In 1918 rice riots began, involving 38 cities and hundreds of towns and villages, with 700,000 protestors, mostly in the lower classes as a result of a war boom in manufacturing, heavy inflation (especially for rice). The rioters had the tacit support of the police. The government jailed many protestors and censured the media, but organized massive pay-outs to the indigent coming from the imperial household and as contributions from the large integrated industrial firms (the *zaibatsu*). The united cabinet fell, and a party cabinet replaced it, showing the ability of the political class to address social unrest with elite agreement about institutional adjustment. But again, these riots almost got out of hand (Sims 2001, 120ff).

Facing economic crisis in the wake of the American depression, the government tried in the early 1930s to reduce military budgets. But the army was in open defiance against such cuts fearing the implications of increasing Chinese nationalism. Lt.-Col. Hashimoto Kingoro founded one of many nationalist societies and planned a coup d'état in 1931 (the "March plot"), a plan that involved bombing the Prime Minister's residence. After toying with supporting this plan, General Ugaki Kazushige ordered its termination. Instead of the plot, the officers set off an explosion on the South Manchurian Railway outside of Mukden, which they blamed on the Chinese and served to put the Japanese army into emergency operations. When the government still dithered, Hashimoto conceived an "October Plot" to assassinate the entire cabinet, which never reached fruition. The Prime Minister was nonetheless assassinated in May 1932, the third major public figure to be assassinated in 1932, all carried out by nationalistic students (Sims 2001, 154-60). In the 1930s, the discontent within the army against civilian restraint in regards to foreign affairs was bubbling, and then on February 26, 1936 about 100 lieutenants and a few captains (connected to the ordinary soldiers) who stood against the imperial tendencies (that they called fascistic) of the higher officers planned a coup d'état. It achieved some notable success, but then the navy entered on the side of the state and the emperor too backed the government. This insurrection revealed a deep division within the army in the 1930s (Sims 2001, 195). As Berger (1993, 132) recognizes, Japanese militarism exerted itself through political assassinations, attempted coups d'état, and engineered military emergencies abroad, and the ultranationalists in the army intimidated and killed opposition. These are hardly stories of a unified elite managing a restoration.

Japanese history therefore shows with clarity the problem of explaining violence or nonviolence through appeals to national cultures.

Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, Berger (1993, 144-45) points out, ideologues across the political spectrum argued over the precise content of *Nihonjinron* (“theory of Japaneseness”). From this point of concern, some common premises emerged. Most participants in this national dialogue for example pointed to the facts of Japanese homogeneity, of a country never invaded by foreigners, and explained from these facts why Japan experienced a far less bloody history than the countries of Western Europe. Of course, outside analysts listened to this debate with a sense of irony. Until their defeat in World War II, Japanese of most political stripes saw their country as exemplified by *bushido*, or the warrior spirit, and a factor that would help Japan defeat the weak and morally corrupt West. This is not necessarily a contradiction. However, a national myth that celebrates both warriors *and* bloodlessness can be employed to account for civil war onsets when conditions only weakly support them as well as the absence of civil war when conditions are propitious for them.

Japanese Culture: An Equally Equivocal Model

A cultural history of Japan prefaces the post World War II edition of his 1936 monograph (Sansom 1962, vii) by noting a similar contradictory pull of Japanese culture. “There is evidence in past history that the Japanese people are, despite the rigid structure of their society,” Samson writes, “by no means incapable of revolt against what they deem oppression. The record of agrarian risings and religious martyrdoms in the feudal period shows that they have not always submitted tamely to authority. Indeed their story tells perhaps as much of turbulence as of docility, and their fatalism has found expression not only in patient acceptance of misfortune but also in reckless disregard for life itself... The very fact that social pressure has in the past been so severe and unrelenting raises a presumption that, once the course of events removes that pressure, their reactions will be strong if not violent.” This is a cultural theory of the Japanese that can account for both violence and its suppression.

What about the Confucian tradition in Japan? This has been heralded by several analysts seeking to account for the astounding social order and low crime rates that mark contemporary Japanese society. On the one hand, crime rates per 100,000 population has Japan with far lower murder and rape cases than US and West Germany, and the data therefore show that economic development alone cannot explain Japan’s success. On the other hand Japan has far less murder than China and far less rape than South Korea (both with

far more poverty), and this shows that Confucianism is not an adequate explanation for the preservation of societal order.²

What about the unique notion of *kokutai*, implying “the Japanese state possessed a unique (almost tribalistic) character based on the special position of the Emperor and the unbroken imperial line.” On the one hand, it could be argued that this elite compact on what the state represents enables a strong state capable of fostering a stable order because the entire political elite agree that any time there is a threat to that state, even coming from citizens of it, the political class should not exploit internal fissures but should unify against the threat. On the other hand, this notion of *kokutai* does not stand outside of the political process conditioning elite behavior. In 1925, for example, the Diet passed the Peace Preservation Law, with up to 10 years’ imprisonment for organizations seeking to overthrow the *kokutai*. There indeed were dangers since 1922, with a Japanese Communist Party having formed, and an anarchist plot to kill General Fukuda Masataro, and then an attempted shooting of the Regent in December 1923. By raising the notion of *kokutai* into the political arena (it had been a rare constitutional term), the political class was using it as a weapon against enemies, and not as an agreed upon norm. The introduction of the Peace Preservation Law that openly appealed to *kokutai* induced not cultural compliance, but rather massive demonstrations against this “evil” law (Sims 2001, xix, 123, 139).

And what about cultural unity? On the one hand, cultural homogeneity has been theorized as a condition favoring lower levels of everyday violence (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Japan’s incredible homogeneity (with an index of ethnic fractionalization that puts it as less ethnically mixed than 95 percent of the countries in the world) should favor the maintenance of order in the society. From the point of view of this fractionalization index, the 600,000 Koreans and 300,000 former outcastes (*burakumin*), both of whom are hidden minorities, are too small to imply a potential for violent unrest that has not been realized.³ On the other hand, cultural homogeneity has no discernible effect on whether there will be a civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Therefore we should look for sources of civil war challenge not only in minorities but also within Japanese society itself.

² . These data are from Hechter and Kanazawa (1993, 462-3) from 1979 and 1988. Their source is the International Criminal Police Organization.

³ . On ethnic fractionalization, we use the Fearon/Laitin replication dataset “insursu.dta”. Japan’s score for ethnic fractionalization (on a scale from 0, with full homogeneity, to 1, with full heterogeneity) is .015465, which is in the 5th percentile for all countries in the dataset in 1990.

In the post World War II reckoning of Japan's violent potential, a group of distinguished American social scientists reached similarly equivocal results. Talcott Parsons (1946, 105-09), for example, traced contradictory paths. For him, there were three possible routes for Japan in the future: (1) reversion to a pre-industrial agrarian society, and the possibility of a return of ultra nationalism with external war; (2) communist revolution that would liquidate traditional patterns and induce internal war; and (3) continuing trends since the Meiji Restoration, putting limits on a nationalistic-militaristic revival, moving toward western democracy. Parsons feared that if the US allowed Japan to stew in its own juices, it would force the population back to the rural areas, which could not support them and "almost certainly the masses would be seething with unrest," especially given the fact of a weak middle class that would offer no resistance to a militaristic-nationalistic wave. Because of demilitarization, he foresaw a small, well-organized group that could seize power, probably communists. Here, he concluded, "Japan's underlying authoritarianism would not disappear but would reappear in another form..." For Parsons, as for other contributors to that volume, Japan's future peace and stability were not determined by its past and culture; the future was far more open-ended.

And a final contradiction leads up to our analysis of the post World War II era. On the one hand, as our Figure 1 illustrates, Japan has had no postwar insurgency. On the other hand, between 1945 and 1989, eight politicians were killed or injured in attacks. Between 1969 and 1989, more than 200 bombing attacks were reported. From 1978-90, Japanese society was victim to some 700 guerilla attacks (relying on such techniques as arson and Molotov cocktails). In 1991 the Japan Red Army (JRA) headquarters settled in Syria to secure international contacts for its revolutionary agenda (Katzenstein 1996, 59).

In sum, Japanese history is filled with violence, rebellion, and instability, showing no uniform disposition to peace. However, there has never been a civil war with mass killing, suggesting that there may well be some factor in Japanese society that does not forestall violence, but sets limits to its expansion.

II. The Post-Occupation Peace

Our model expects an above-average probability of a successful insurgency in Japan in the immediate postwar period up until 1964, yet none occurred. How can this be explained? To answer this question, we draw three lines of argument. First, there is indeed a peace to be explained in postwar Japan. Second, the early years of occupation were scary and chaotic, suggesting that our model captured a reality of potential insurgency. Third, the overall strategy of transitional authority in the office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) – and the commitment of the US to the stability of the transitional government that it fostered – best accounts for the containment of violence to a level far below insurgency.

The postwar peace in Japan is remarkable. Consider the following memory (Toshio 1982, 33). On August 30, 1945 Arthur Coladarci was in the advance group into Atsugi, the training ground for kamikaze pilots. He secured his own transport, and was the first American to enter Yokohama. He recalled to Toshio: “I was scared. In fact, terrified...” However, once he found a group of Japanese, and told them (through one man who knew some English) that he was lost, they were all kind and considerate. On that day, and throughout the American occupation, Americans did not have to hide behind tanks, afraid of the population. The population was docile.

Not even the communists could stir up the population. In the prewar years, the Peace Preservation Laws and Imperial Ordinances banned the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and its leaders were in jail or in exile. Under SCAP they returned and were popular, but they quickly began to lose vote share due to “the inherent nature of the movement and the revulsion of the Japanese people against its tactic of violent action under foreign attack.” After their failure at the polls, communist efforts to organize general strikes, taking control over unions, and use of mass violence, were uniformly unsuccessful (Napier 1952, 1, 63). The communists faced a sharper decline in the 1952 elections due to “strong public revulsion against the Party’s ‘fire-bottle’ tactics” and it was compelled to transform itself into a “peaceful” and “lovable” party (Passin 1962, 394).

In light of the postwar peace, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was able ultimately to establish itself as a “party which was basically safe and competent. Crime and drug use remained relatively low, as did divorce rates, thus allowing the Japanese to feel that their society was still quite stable...” (Sims 2001, 342). The acceptance of the Americans, the transformation of the communists, and the establishment of peace by the

LDP in a period when Japan was vulnerable to insurgency all demand explanation.

Consistent with our model's assessment of postwar Japan, the peace that in fact emerged teetered on chaos. Harry Emerson Wildes was a political advisor to SCAP, and left in frustration (to write an exposé of it for the American Political Science Review) due to SCAP's failure to eradicate the hoodlums (*gurentai*) who "controlled" the streets. He complained that political bullies (*soshi*) imitated the military lords of old (*ronin*) by forming terrorist gangs in the name of protecting the emperor. Rather than a banner of democratization that SCAP was entrusted to unfurl, Japan in Wildes' eyes was a massive but decentralized congeries of bullies, blackmailers, and clubs (Wildes 1948, 1157-59).

The Communists too, despite becoming lovable in later years, presented a challenge to the postwar peace. In the occupation period there were several violent incidents that were traced to JCP instigation. On January 21, 1946 the party led 2,000 of Tokyo's hungry to raid foodstuff from the Itabashi Government Supply Depot. On 7 April 1946, a mob entered the Prime Minister's residence. On 12 May 1948, another mob entered the imperial grounds. In early May 1949 due to an industrial dispute, yet another mob seized a railroad company's offices; and in June 1949 lay-offs induced communists to instigate forcible action that brought on the police. In Taira on 30 June 1949 after police ordered removal of a communist signboard that interfered with traffic, the JCP (and leftist Koreans) seized the police station, hoisted a red flag, and for four hours refused eviction. Simultaneously mobs demonstrated at the district assembly, at the police station, and at a Tokyo Steel factory. The communist-led League of Koreans in Japan got into a violent confrontation with the more moderate Korean Republic Association of Japan. On 31 July 1949, and 15 August 1949, and finally on 20 August 1949 skirmishes became violent "and the League was dissolved as a terroristic organization," its principal members purged, its properties seized (Napier 1952, 63).

MacArthur feared the Communist influence from the early days of his mission. But five years into it, on May 30, 1950, the JCP held a rally near the Imperial Palace, and some American soldiers were mingling about, taking photos. Someone started a scuffle that lasted a few minutes, and a handful of Americans received minor injuries. Immediately, eight Communists were arrested and brought before an Occupation court. One

defendant received ten years at hard labor, one seven, and the rest five years. On June 3, the JCP sent an open letter to MacArthur condemning the process. MacArthur was outraged, and demanded that Yoshida “remove and exclude...from public service” the 24-members of the Central Committee of the JCP, referring to the action as “mass violence”. When the JCP protested, MacArthur ordered Yoshida to fire the editors of the JCP newspaper *Akahata*, not yet being able (due to freedom of press) to shut it down; but he did on June 26 (and had the police raid Communist cells throughout the country), a day after the Korean War began. With anti-communist purges, some 22,000 Japanese lost their jobs (Toshio 1982, 248).

The Communists remained threatening to authorities even after MacArthur’s purge. Three days after Japan regained independence in 1952 and on the heels of Prime Minister Yoshida’s attempt to pass the Anti-subversive Activities Law, the Japanese Communists staged a “Bloody May Day”. Some 20,000 unionists, inspired by JCP, tried to storm the Imperial Palace plaza, with a rock-throwing melee. There were about 1,400 injuries, 759 of them police (Packard 1966, 25).

Inter-ethnic relations were also on a powder keg in the early postwar years. David Conde, who had served in the Civil Education and Information Section of SCAP (and disgruntled due to SCAP’s adopting the ultra-nationalist Japanese view of the Koreans), and became a Reuter’s correspondent, had his own exposé. “Today prejudice,” he wrote (1947, 41-5), “is mounting against the more than half-million Koreans remaining in Japan. Fanned by rumors, newspaper attacks, and Diet speeches, long-smoldering hatreds [for example, amid the earthquake of 1923, a mass killing [**GET DATA ON HOW MANY**] of Koreans by police or police-instigated mobs] have been inflamed against these former subject-people...In the books of right-wing extremists they are marked as victims on that day of ‘freedom’ when the Occupation Army leaves Japan.” Politicians and police were implicated. In the Diet, Saburo Shiikuma, a Progressive Party member from Hokkaido stated, “The actions of these Koreans and Formosans make the blood in our veins, in our misery of defeat, boil...” The police-sanctioned Stall-Keepers Associations excluded Koreans from the retail business, and the police were enforcing this by patrolling markets with revolvers. The law reinforced these prejudices. In the first years of occupation, nearly one million Koreans departed from Japan. Yet there were severe restrictions on how much money and valuables could be repatriated, so many stayed, and those who left were compelled to leave their

possessions, thereby retaining many Koreans too poor to leave and too angry to remain quiescent.

The sparks were visible. On July 19, 1946, in an armed incident at Shibuya Station in Tokyo, instigated by the Japanese police, five persons (mostly Formosan stall owners, but called black-marketers) were killed. *Mainichi* (a leading newspaper), reported on July 26th, 1946 that an armed gang of fourteen “non-Japanese nationals” was going around the county, robbing and plundering. A Committee for Protecting Korean Rights issued a statement listing sixteen violent acts perpetrated against Koreans, most by the Japanese police. Among them were the deaths of 272 Korean repatriates, who died of starvation, lack of medicine, and police brutality at the Sasebo Detention Camp in the summer of 1946 (Conde 1947, 42).

What factors help explain why the many sparks did not catch fire? Our model provides a clear answer in regard to the minorities. They were urban and had an exit option. Civil wars, our model shows, are not likely to be spawned by migrant groups without a regional (and rural) base.

But at least part of the answer is that SCAP had immense authority to decimate the opposition. MacArthur was given instructions that left one political adviser dumbfounded: “This was heady authority. Never before in the history of the United States had such enormous and absolute power been placed in the hands of a single individual” (Toshio 1984, 32). MacArthur quickly reconstituted conservative authority, more-or-less leaving the structure of the imperial armed services intact (Berger 1993, 133). SCAP spoke with a single voice. It sent to the government clear policy directives, e.g. to release political prisoners (including communists), removing the Home Minister, the enfranchising of women, the encouragement of labor unions, the trying of war criminals, the banning of some 200,000 purged officials. The constitutional provisions originally sent down by SCAP were so liberal that the Shidehara cabinet was unwilling to adopt it. General Whitney responded with the threat that adopting SCAP recommendations was the only way the emperor could be protected from trial (Sims 2001, 238-65). The strategy of transferring power to a regime and putting the full weight of the occupation’s power (in contrast with the ambiguity of the South Korean occupation led by General Hodge) yielded short-term peace when structural conditions were challenging. Coherent and powerful authority that managed the political transition and committed itself to its

stability after SCAP officially disbanded saved Japan from an insurgency when as a renewed state it was most vulnerable.

III. The Crisis of 1960 When Japan Remains Vulnerable to Insurgency

In 1960, Japan's predicted probability for a civil war onset was nearly three percent, about 50 percent higher than the world average for any year in our dataset. In that year, the Americans were putting immense diplomatic pressure on Japan to renew their security treaty, even though the domestic political environment in Japan made this an immensely touchy issue. The issue highlighted a polarization between left and right, creating a new "tactics of 'struggle,' of 'direct action,' and extra-parliamentary pressure that began to replace those of negotiation, compromise, and discussion." In analyzing this trend, various American and Chinese observers saw the subsequent protests as the beginning of a communist revolution (Passin 1962, 391, 393). And when President Eisenhower's celebratory trip to herald the new treaty was cancelled amidst security threats, Packard (1966, 3) relays "alarmist reports of a Japan on the eve of revolution." To be sure Packard calls these reports "nonsense", but our model should take them seriously, mainly to ask what factors made such predictions quite wrong.

Discontent surely was widespread in Japan's first major internal crisis after the end of the occupation. An analysis of voting for the Japanese Socialist Party noted, "the arena of discontent, within which revolutionary ideas have their play, has been growing." More to the point, the type of protest that resulted from this discontent was seen to be different from that in other industrial countries, as "in part it has the tone of an under-developed country—assertive nationalism and occasionally even racialism, the feeling of a struggle for 'true' national independence" (Passin 1962, 392, 395).

The security treaty was the perfect issue for a previously disheartened and divided left. In a sense, a long-term consequence of the US commitment to regime stability (helping to explain why there was no rebellion at the transfer of power) was a sense of resentment by those who were locked out of power. Relations with the US, and the security treaty with it, was thus an issue that polarized the Japanese left and right, enabling remnants of the radical left to form a loosely structured "People's Council." It was sufficiently organized to marginalize the democratic moderates in the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP); yet, without clear leadership, the Council

could not take responsibility for the violence that ensued, nor to direct it (Packard 1962, 131-2). And there was a constituency ready to be mobilized. There were 223 demonstrations in Tokyo alone involving 961,000 people from April 1959 through July 1960. Demonstrators came to rallies in groups, such as workers with factory locals, and students with members of their department.

On November 27, 1959 the first major salvo was unleashed.⁴ The People's Council organized a "storming of the Diet", the third of its kind since World War II. Already about ten "united action" drives were organized against the treaty revision in 1959, but all were duds. Then "hot head students", who had been expelled from the JCP, pushed for a more radical effort, namely a siege of the Diet. Meanwhile, the government was pushing for a quick signing of the treaty in Washington in January. Radicals were enraged by the inexorable move toward signing. Also, a Vietnam reparations issue (in which the radicals opposed giving the reparations only to the South Vietnamese government) was hot on the agenda. Given this confluence of issues, some 80,000 demonstrated in Tokyo alone, and a half million throughout Japan. Five thousand policemen were in the Diet vicinity, with barricades and armored cars. But when the police permitted JSP Diet members into the compound, a mass of demonstrators slipped through, and started snake dancing and violating property. The general chaos signaled a turning point in the anti-treaty movement.

Following November 27, a series of anti-police actions were taken by radical students, members of the radical student union (*zengakuren*). On January 15, the students tried to barricade the airport to stop Prime Minister's Kishi's flight to Washington to sign the treaty, but the police knocked down the barricades and dragged the students out. One student died from the injuries sustained. But Kishi was able to fly out without incident.

The students' union was paralyzed with the arrests of key leaders after the January 16 airport siege. Yet on February 25, it tried again to invade the Diet, provoking clashes with the police. Yet fissures in the movement became open, as the People's Council leadership struggled against the "Trotsky-ite" extremism of the student leaders. A moderate JCP delegation to the student union convention in March was refused admission, again showing tensions within the movement.

⁴ . The following description of the events of 1960 relies primarily on Packard (1966, 156-317).

An April 26 deadline for lower house approval of the treaty helped set the policy agenda (which was not met due to JSP opposition and LDP foot-dragging in the face of harsh debate) as well as the agenda for protest. Amid the debates, the Peoples Council agreed to a peaceful demonstration on April 26, and this was quite successful in bringing out large crowds. On that day, however, Zengakuren had 4,000 students organized to charge against the main Diet gate, throwing stones and meeting police clubs. Eighty-three police and forty-one students were injured in the resulting melee.

Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke was compelled by circumstance to seek extension of the Diet session, and this was met with the rapid disapproval of the JSP, whose leaders staged a mass sit-down, leading to skirmishes in the hallways between socialists and LDP parliamentarians. The People's Council quickly mobilized 15,000 demonstrators. Tied to the extension of the session vote, unbeknownst to the JSP, was the actual treaty vote. With the JSP Diet-members engaged in protest, the Chairman of the relevant Diet committee cleverly got a positive vote on the treaty. When the committee recommendation was sent to the floor at 11PM, the socialists locked arms, blocked entry, and refused to move. In response, the Speaker ordered 500 police officers to break up the blockade, and Socialist MPs were dragged out of the House in what Japanese call "uprooting" (gobōnuki). The speaker took his seat, with only LDP members present, and the treaty was approved after midnight. The JSP declared the passage null and void and began boycotting the Diet.

On May 20, 1960, Zengakuren students attacked the Prime Minister's official residence and surrounded his home (with 10,000 protesters, some throwing mud, stones, shoes and bottles at police; at the official residence some scaled the wall and others broke down the main gate). Meanwhile, the People's Council mobilized 20,000 around the Diet.

President Eisenhower's ceremonial visit, scheduled for June 19th, got implicated in the treaty issue as the treaty was scheduled to take effect the day Ike was to arrive. The broader international context also played directly into Japanese domestic politics. The U2 incident (in which the Soviets shot down an American spy plane) reactivated US/USSR hostility that sucked the blood out of the summit induced "Spirit of Camp David". The Cold War was refrozen. Furthermore, the White House decided to make the Japan trip part

of a presidential cavalcade that included Taiwan, Okinawa and South Korea, thus turning Japan into an unwilling pawn in the Cold War.

The overall scene in Japan in this political context was tense. Taking cognizance of this tension, the JSP leadership and many moderates privately urged Eisenhower to cancel the trip. When Press Secretary James Hagerty arrived as an advance man on June 10, he met a demonstration at the airport of about 8-10,000. The crowd enveloped and mauled his limousine while singing the “Internationale”. A Marine helicopter to rescue Hagerty was pelted with rocks, but eventually the crowd dissipated.

June 15, 1960 was the day of bloodshed, despite the fact that Prime Minister Kishi tried to reconcile with the leader of the Socialists, and he dropped plans to have the Upper House approve the treaty that day. The Security police told Kishi it could not assure the president’s safety. In light of the security fears, the police linked with organized crime to mobilize over 30,000 militias from gangster groups, and right-wing nationalist armies to create a partnership for peace (Katzenstein 1996, 73). Yet the Socialists and Communists tried to pull back on the confrontation, and leaders mooted the idea of giving Ike a warm welcome, and then going after the government of Kishi. But the Zengakuren mainstream extremists chose violence. On that day, some 70,000 were demonstrating at the Diet, and police had (of their own) 5,000. Wire cutters were used to challenge the South Gate, and stones were thrown at police inside the gate. A cadre from a rightist group called Renovation Action Corps drove a truck into the midst of the marchers. The South Gate went down, and in a pitched confrontation, a young student was crushed to death. Well past midnight protesters burned police trucks that were abandoned while strewn with rocks and broken placards. The police began using tear-gas, and used clubs on peacefully demonstrating professors (who later sued for attempted murder and abuse of authority leading to injury and won \$17,500 in damages from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government) as well as reporters and bystanders. The demonstration was broken up at 4:30AM, with hundreds hurt and one dead.

Though they had firearms, the police shot no bullets, and far more police were injured than demonstrators. They were courteous to the arrested students as well. The rest of the story is peaceful. A massive crowd of 330,000 stood vigil at the Diet on June 18, and the treaty was approved, but there was no violence. After getting the necessary changes in domestic law

to fulfill Japan's obligations in the treaty, Kishi resigned, and this defused the crisis.

But violence continued, now coming from the political right. Small ultra-patriotic groups formed. The police estimated 400 ultranationalist organizations with a total membership of 100,000 in 1960. Even during the treaty crisis, there were several right wing attacks: an 18-year old tried to assassinate Kishi on May 25th; a 17 year old tried to wreck Zengakuren headquarters on June 28; a bottle of ammonia was thrown at socialist leader Asanuma Inejirō on May 26; a stabbing of another socialist leader (Kawakami Jōtarō) on June 17; and the stabbing of former Prime Minister Kishi on July 15. Then came rumors of several "terrorist plots" from the right, and Asanuma was assassinated on October 12, 1960. The murderer stabbed him during a TV debate, and the killer committed suicide and became a martyr of the right. In December 1961 thirteen ultranationalists planned to kill the Prime Minister and take over the government.

How was all this violence contained? It should first be noted that however polarized and potentially violent, these demonstrations were largely in Tokyo with the rest of the country both moderate and apathetic in politics. By 1960, GDP per capita had nearly doubled since the end of the occupation. Japan had already become a mass society of consumers, which one student of the protests reported was an "objective situation" of a "leisure society" that is far from the world the socialists were then decrying (Passin 1962, 402). This is a "contentment" interpretation of GDP/cap. But, as we will elaborate in our general conclusion, the efficient organization of domestic security, enough to prevent the escalation of violence through the inadvertent creation of martyrs, is also a reflection of a country with a high GDP/cap.

IV. Crisis Events in Japan When Japan Is No Longer Vulnerable

By the 1980s, our model predicts a negligible probability that there would be a successful insurgency in Japan. Yet there have been deep grievances within Japanese society, leading to ugly violence challenging the security of the state. From 1965 through 1982, a wide variety of grievances within Japanese society congealed around a protest against the construction of a modern airport in Narita, culminating in violence and death. And in 1995, a quasi-political quasi-religious organization Aum Shinrikō – whose members were alienated from secular Japanese society – terrorized society

with a gas attack in the Tokyo subway that killed twelve and injured some 6,000 people. These cases show first that grievances and alienation can be powerful but they need not, if conditions are not welcoming to insurgents, lead to civil war. Second, the cases show how a coherent police force can keep violent protest in bounds so that it does not escalate into civil war. Japan's strong state, one in which the police and the military developed a "comprehensive view of security," has been immensely successful in defusing protest (Katzenstein 1996), a point we develop more fully in the concluding section.

The Narita Airport Saga

The Narita airport protest of 1982, an airport that was being built in Sanrizuka, a farming area that had once been grand imperial property, gathered farmers, anarchists, and peace-niks (who claimed the airport was for military purposes) against the state in what some saw as the beginnings of "a rebellion." Left-wing student union (Zengakuren) leaders had been searching for models of revolution, and the large-scale coal miners' strike against layoffs in the Miike mine in March 1960 became that model just at the time of the anti-Security Treaty campaign (Hwasoo, 1975, 202). The right moment arrived for the Zengakuren in 1965 with the anger that erupted amongst the peasantry when an airport at Tomisato was first proposed by the LDP (Apter and Sawa 1984, 2, 5).

Most of the anti-Narita protest activities involved building blockades to stop land surveys, buying from farmers tiny plots of land and refusing to sell them to the airport authority, symbolic activities like the pouring of urine and excrement on police (by a 90 year old woman), and the construction of tunnels and trenches for purposes of guerrilla warfare. In 1971, militants wielding bamboo spears killed three police who were engaged in a forced land expropriation; in 1977 a militant student was killed by a plastic gas grenade. In the spring of 1978 was the last-ditch effort by the movement to prevent the airport opening. The government mobilized 14,000 riot police, who faced stones and Molotov cocktails, slingshots and steel arrows. Militants used sewers to sneak into the control tower and smash equipment, and were shot at by police revolvers.

The government responded to these violent provocations with an effort carefully managed to emasculate the movement. First, the government offered generous compensation terms to the 360 households of displaced

farmers and induced first the most prestigious former landlord of the town to accept those terms. Government officials could then watch as a cascade of farmers bolted from the protest movement to accept a similar deal. To be sure, there were holdouts, those who felt betrayed by the LDP (whom they had supported for decades), and these holdouts increasingly made alliance with radical student groups. This alliance of holdout farmers and radical students caused much grief; but the people in whose name the battle lines were drawn were not visibly on the side of the insurgents.⁵

Second, Japanese police did everything possible to avoid creating martyrs. In the final battle over the control tower in 1978, police bullets did not kill any militants, and the police quietly allowed the movement its moment of victory. However, the airport authority quietly rebuilt the tower and increased security for it. The inaugural flight the following month was celebrated without popular protest. Indeed, even the leader of the protest movement, Tomonō Issaku, knew that there would be little escalation, as he “believed that the government was afraid that if farmers died this would be a political disaster of such magnitude that the entire project would have to be called off” (Apter and Sawo 1984, 101). The Japanese security forces understood well the costs of insurgent escalation, and had the organizational coherence to avoid those costs.

Aum Shinrikō

Aum Shinrikō’s origins were in a yoga and meditation group founded by Asahara Shōkō in Tokyo in 1984. It is one of the “new” new religions of Japan, popular in the 1980s among the young and urban. By 1995, it had some 10,000 adherents, with about 1,200 of them becoming ascetics. As early as 1988 it was involved in criminal activities. It had a hierarchical structure, each adherent with a rank, with strong penalties for defection. For example, in 1994 an adherent was deemed to be a spy, given truth drugs, and killed on Asahara’s orders; another adherent was killed by hanging him upside down, in an attempt to save his soul.

Asahara ran for office in 1990 but was defeated handily, and moved to the world of spiritual leadership. In June 1994 he formed an “alternative government” that was theocratic. However, he moved more to a nonpolitical orientation on the side of the good confronting directly evil in the world. His

⁵ . See Apter and Sawo (1984, 44) who put a different spin on the compensation packages.

attacks never had a serious political message. Aum's preferred world was a religiously based (and thus Aum was registered as a religious organization in Japan) ascetic one; not a political one to improve the world.

The spring of 1995 brought many other violent episodes, some of which were linked to Aum. For example, the head of the National Police Agency was shot outside his apartment; and then a murder of an Aum leader by a Korean resident belonging to a gangster organization; and on the day Asahara was finally captured, a letter bomb was posted to the Tokyo Governor's office. In this context, the subsequent poison gas attack that year was probably an ad hoc action to disrupt impending police raids on Aum, especially in light of police detainment of Aum officials due to one of its earlier attacks, and thus a "defense" of Aum's religious mission against threats by the state. These acts while politically unsettling to Japanese authorities, seemed not to be a strategy to fulfill some larger political goal.

Given Japan's extraordinary system of police surveillance, how did Aum succeed in its violent assaults on its rivals and innocent civilians? Katzenstein (1996, 71-2) suggests that the police constructed a vision of its mission coming out of the Cold War that the major threat to Japanese security was from the political left. There was in consequence an anti-left bias in its procedures. The police were especially careful not to infiltrate religious organizations that were thought to be on the side of conservatism and order. Thus the police kept careful watch on leftist radicals, but were laxer when it came to semi-fascist religious organizations, despite years of right wing extortion, gas attacks, assassination attempts.

After the hideous gassing, the government considered proscribing Aum under the Anti-Subversive Activities Law, passed in 1952 to deal with the communist threat. This draconian act had never been used on a Japanese group. However, once Asahara was in prison, there was no need to ban all spiritual practices of Aum as the 1952 law would have allowed the police to do. Aum was nonetheless stripped of its protected status under the Religious Corporations Law, and was declared bankrupt, with its assets seized to pay victims. Eventually that law was modified to build in safeguards against terrorist groups getting protection under its provisions. While the 1995 attacks represent police failure (due in part to ideological blindness), its handling of the aftermath reflects careful learning without overreaction.

V. Conclusion

Our model gives Japan a reasonably high probability of civil war (about twice the world average) at the time of transition from the American occupation to Japanese self-rule. To account for why this did not occur, we emphasized here the nature of the American occupation in committing large scale force to the new regime. There was clearly a threat of US intervention should there be an insurgency against the transferred authority. Thus our model overpredicts civil war due to Japan's low GDP in 1953. If, however, GDP is a proxy for state strength, we might see Japan in the 1950s as measured by our GDP variable as a measurement error, since US security protection (to the regime) gave Japan added state strength. Our model misses the IR component of state strength, in which a foreign power adds strength to its client by protecting that client's incumbents. To be sure, it is hard to code on credibility of threat by foreign powers. We can compare to US in Latin America in the Alliance for Progress era, where US intervention threat did not have same effect that it had in Japan. Clearly foreign support to the transition government in Japan deterred potential insurgents; but the conditions under which this will work remains to be examined.

If we had coded Japan as a "new state" in 1953, its predicted probability for civil war onset would have been even higher. Yet, in this case, new state would not have the general effect that our model attributes to it. Under conditions where the metropole (or in this case, the occupying power) commits to the integrity of the state and regime to which it has transferred power (as did the European powers for much of Africa in the early 1960s), the civil war inducing commitment problem is more easily resolved.

In examining the entire post World War II period in Japan, not for lack of grievances or for insurgent entrepreneurs did Japan survive the half-century without facing an insurgency. There can be no doubt that the economic miracle of postwar Japan played a significant role, as exemplified by the state's ability to compensate those people who paid a heavy cost for economic modernization, such as the displaced farmers due to airport construction. But as we have shown, economic success did not eradicate political entrepreneurs with revolutionary goals who sought to employ the standard tactics of insurgency. How was proto-insurgency cauterized?

The best explanation for the cauterization of radical insurgency is in the organization and procedures of the modern Japanese security system, and

especially the police. To be sure, there are historical traditions that support this impressive system of surveillance and security. In the rural areas, the practice of *isson ikka* (one village acting as a family) through the promotion of cooperatives and landlord provision of aid to tenants, can be seen as a system of mutual surveillance that worked to forestall rebellion (Sims 2001, 171). But the current system of surveillance has a modern organizational foundation, as described by Hechter and Kanazawa (1993). They point to two organizational innovations in modern Japan that help sustain order in society. The first is dependence. Consider the school system, where there are virtually no opportunities for students to transfer from one school (where they are doing poorly) to another. There is little investment in adult education, so if you don't succeed at first, there are few second chances. And finally, the schools link their students directly to employers. All these practices make Japanese highly dependent on the particular school in which they attend, and the consequences of developing a bad reputation in school are life long. Similarly with firms, which also are reluctant to accept transfers from competing firms. A high percentage of Japanese workers, Hechter and Kanazawa report, are dissatisfied with their condition, but not likely to leave their firms, on whom they are highly dependent.

The second organizational foundation for social order in modern Japan is the institutionalization of visibility. In the schools, there are no study halls, no free periods, and little independent work. Compared to the west, the week is longer as is the school year. In firms there is high visibility between workers and their supervisors at all times. Visibility is even more effective in the neighborhoods, as *chokai* (neighborhood association) vigilantly oversee a range of activities, even fire prevention and traffic safety. They specialize in crime prevention and snooping on youths. Even modern households, Hechter and Kanazawa report, have such thin walls that parents can oversee (and overhear) their children as part of everyday life. This makes surveillance among family much easier

This organization of surveillance (as reported by Katzenstein 1996) pervades the system of comprehensive security within the National Police Agency (NPA). Even though organized in a centralized bureaucratic manner,⁶ the police remain close to society. In 1984, almost half the

⁶ . The NPA has become a modern, hierarchical and stable bureaucracy. It operates in political secrecy (e.g. budget of Tokyo's Metropolitan Police Department is a state secret). The NPA has gone from a low status agency in 1965 to one that competes with MOF and MITI for top Tokyo University graduates (Katzenstein 1996, 62-3).

respondents in a national survey reported a direct contact with a police person during the previous year. This is largely due to the local police box in which some 40 percent of Japan's total police force work. These police are required to make semi-annual visits to each household and business in the box's district. Greater than 80 percent of the survey respondents claim to know the location of their nearest box, and about one-third of them knew the policeman who manned that box personally.

As the country became more urbanized, the box gave way to programs of "community relations." Also, the police have a system of crime prevention associations that are managed from every police station in the country, mostly run with volunteer labor. The police also have special offices in more than 90 percent of the schools, and in many workplaces. There are close links between police and the 5,000 private firms that employed 220,000 officers. And there are equally close links to the self-policing members of organized crime. Organized crime works with police to limit drug trading and importation of sex-workers.

Complementary to the impressive system of surveillance, the officers in charge of Japan's security have learned how to "apply force without violence" (Katzenstein 1996, 90). Japan's modern history is replete with stories of heroic police restraint not to kill civilians. In February 1972 several student radicals took a hostage, and the police organized to save him in a ten hour siege. Police were under instructions, despite rifles and 2,000 rounds of ammunition by the radicals, not to use their pistols, at least not until a radical killed a policeman. Over the course of the siege, the police fired only fifteen rounds. Two police and one TV cameraman were killed; but the hostage was saved and no radicals were killed. The police did not want to create martyrs (Katzenstein 1966, 88).

The ratios of injuries incurred by the police to those whom the police are seeking to control are high. As early as "Bloody May Day" of 1952, when some 20,000 unionists, inspired by JCP, tried to storm the Imperial Palace plaza in a rock-throwing melee, the police bore the brunt of the violence. On that day, there were about 1,400 injuries, 54 percent to the police. On May 20, 1960, when Zengakuren students attacked the Prime Minister's official residence and surrounded his home (with 10,000 protesters throwing mud, stones, shoes and bottles), 69 percent of the injuries were incurred by the police (Packard 1966, 25, 251).

Patience and caution complement heroic restraint. It took the Japanese authorities fifteen years before they authorized removal of anti-Narita symbols in the heart of the airport, so as avoid provoking radical groups into new mobilizations. The police arrested Osamu Maruoka fifteen years after his attack on Tel Aviv's airport, again to show restraint until the passions dissipated. But the patience is buttressed with a willingness to compromise on big questions to reduce short-term violence. For example, Japan has about 150,000 Korean residents who are sympathetic with the policies of North Korea. These Koreans run the legal pinball business, and from this business, some 600 million to 1.8 billion dollars are transferred from Japan to North Korea each year, abetting North Korea's defense goals. However, the Japanese government voted against sanctions leveled against North Korea in 1994 "because it feared violent protests and perhaps acts of terrorism" (Katzenstein 1996, 88, 96-7).

This analysis of incredible institutional patience brings to mind a Weberian notion of state strength that may be the mechanism. When a bureaucracy has a functionally distinct structure that is integrated through interagency committees, when crisis hits each branch must coordinate its proposed reaction with other branches of state service. This structure militates against any one branch taking brash action of responding to threat with maximal force that might quickly backfire. This structure militates against quick and angry over-reactions to crisis. Part of what GDP is measuring may well be a bureaucratic structure in which violence promoting over-reaction to early insurgency is minimized.

There has been no insurgency in postwar Japan. This result gives broad support to our statistical model's expectations. However, the narrative of this case allowed us to elaborate on the interpretation we gave to our statistical models. First, when Japan was most vulnerable to civil war insurgency, in the immediate post-occupation years, insurgency was avoided in large part because of the unequivocal transfer of power by an occupying state that was powerful vis-à-vis the newly independent state, committed to the management of the transition, and committed to the security of the regime to which it passed sovereignty. In a sense, the relatively low GDP/cap in the postwar years was a poor measure of state strength, because a good deal of state strength (in the capacity to deter potential rebels) came from an external source, a factor not measured in our model. Second, in the later years in which our model shows that there should be no expectation of insurgency, there were deeply felt grievances or at least alienation in the

society, and the expression of those grievances in proto-insurgency organizations. This helps illustrate why a census of grievances would yield poor predictions as to which countries are most susceptible to civil wars, and why “contentment” interpretations of the link between high GDP/cap and low probability of civil war are not convincing in this case. Third, although increasing wealth and economic opportunity certainly played a role in lowering the recruitment base for an insurgency that sought to address widely felt grievances, the modern system of surveillance coupled with an impressive police apparatus played a powerful role in nipping insurgency in its bud.

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
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Figure 1



cname	year	pr	gdpenl	pop	mtn~t	Oil	ins~b	anocl
JAPAN	1945	.	.	72147	14.7	0	0	.
JAPAN	1946	.	.	.	14.7	0	0	.
JAPAN	1947	.	.	.	14.7	0	0	.
JAPAN	1948	.	.	.	14.7	0	0	.
JAPAN	1949	.	.	.	14.7	0	0	.
JAPAN	1950	.	.	83627	14.7	0	0	.
JAPAN	1951	.	1.43	84869	14.7	0	0	.
JAPAN	1952	.	1.61	86111	14.7	0	.	.
JAPAN	1953	.0382509	1.741	87342	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1954	.0373062	1.832	88584	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1955	.036499	1.913	89816	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1956	.0350419	2.053	90682	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1957	.0336557	2.188	91537	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1958	.0322486	2.33	92393	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1959	.0312551	2.436	93249	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1960	.0294593	2.629	94104	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1961	.0266121	2.954	94950	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1962	.0234815	3.351	95837	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1963	.0220514	3.554	96818	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1964	.0198663	3.886	97830	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1965	.0171847	4.343	98894	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1966	.0164291	4.491	99792	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1967	.0143105	4.924	100731	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1968	.0122217	5.417	101065	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1969	.0098676	6.076	103183	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1970	.0081662	6.673	104345	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1971	.0066569	7.307	105697	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1972	.0062512	7.51	107188	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1973	.0053114	8.019	108079	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1974	.0044887	8.539	110162	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1975	.0048892	8.295	111940	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1976	.0047746	8.381	112771	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1977	.0043402	8.678	113863	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1978	.0039205	8.996	114898	14.7	0	0	0

Japan, Random Narrative, Fearon and Laitin, p. 29

JAPAN	1979	.0035105	9.34	115870	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1980	.0030692	9.756	116782	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1981	.0027725	10.072	117648	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1982	.0025107	10.38	118449	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1983	.0023131	10.635	119259	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1984	.0021657	10.841	120018	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1985	.0019027	11.24	120754	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1986	.0016003	11.771	121492	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1987	.0014886	11.996	122091	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1988	.0012922	12.43	122613	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1989	.0010186	13.156	123116	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1990	.0008508	13.706	123537	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1991	.0006932	14.331	123921	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1992	.0005684	14.936	124000	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1993	.0005377	15.105	124536	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1994	.0005366	15.115	124961	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1995	.0005292	15.16	125439	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1996	.0005017	15.325	125761	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1997	.0003945	16.057	126091	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1998	.0003679	16.271	126309.8	14.7	0	0	0
JAPAN	1999	.0004266	15.823	.	14.7	0	0	0

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	47	.0109275	.0126119	.0003679	.0382509
gdpenl	49	8.265347	4.847053	1.43	16.271
pop	50	107503	14567.36	72147	126309.8
mtnest	55	14.7	0	14.7	14.7
Oil	55	0	0	0	0

instab	54	0	0	0	0
anocl	47	0	0	0	0

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	1135	.0047723	.0082213	.0000724	.074105
gdpenl	1139	8.721369	4.182463	.704	20.613
pop	1121	32326.97	48112.3	1688	270029
mtnest	1155	15.44143	18.13401	0	66.90001
Oil	1155	.0190476	.1367516	0	1

instab	1153	.0346921	.1830782	0	1
anocl	1142	.0367776	.1882977	0	1

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
pr	6327	.0165329	.0229956	2.09e-10	.4913677
gdpenl	6373	3.651117	4.536645	.048	66.735
pop	6433	31786.92	102560.8	222	1238599
mtnest	6610	18.08833	20.96648	0	94.3
Oil	6610	.1295008	.3357787	0	1

instab	6596	.1464524	.353586	0	1
anocl	6541	.2256536	.418044	0	1