

## THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF DREAMS IN BERKELEIAN METAPHYSICS

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### Introduction

The philosophical writings of Bishop George Berkeley have been widely criticized, notably by Immanuel Kant, for their deep reliance on revealed theology and their explicitly stated apologetic purpose. However, beneath the religious polemics and ad hominem attacks on theological opponents is a metaphysical system backed by solid, logical argumentation. This system would be not only viable but truly compelling if a few difficulties were to be solved. Two such difficulties arise for Berkeley on the subject of dreams. Firstly, the dream argument Berkeley employs to establish the non-existence of matter seems to contradict the argument used to establish the existence of other human minds, leaving him in a state of solipsism. Secondly, the most fundamental principle of Berkeley's immaterialism - "esse est percipi" - seems to imply that dreams are just as real as waking life, an assertion which Berkeley's commitment to "common sense" renders untenable for him. In answer to these difficulties, this paper will propose a possible metaphysical and phenomenological explanation of dreams based upon the principles of Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy. The first step will be to give an outline of the relevant points from the core of Berkeley's thought and the arguments he employs to get to them. It is in the course of this discussion that the alleged contradiction between Berkeley's dream argument and his argument for the existence of other minds will be dealt with. Next, the dream experience will be examined, and the characteristics of this experience that make it so problematic will be highlighted. In the third section, the general epistemological problem of dreams ("dream skepticism") will be examined, along with its transformation into a metaphysical problem by Berkeley's system. Section four will examine a possible solution to the epistemological problem that was proposed by Leibniz. Finally, in the fifth section, it will be shown that the differences between dreaming and waking perceptions on which Leibniz's epistemic criteria rely allow the Berkeleian to draw an ontological distinction between worlds and the actual world. In particular, an ontology will be proposed which will have four levels: the level M of minds (or spiritual substances), the level RP

of "real" (waking) perceptions, the level DP of dreamed or hallucinated perceptions, and the level T of thoughts. The bulk of that section will be used to demonstrate that Berkeley's basic view of the "real" world entails that it has certain properties which, according to Leibniz and our common use of language, dreams do not. Because perceptions must be definitive of reality in any Berkeleian ontology, the epistemic criteria proposed by Leibniz, whereby we apply certain tests to our perceptions to determine whether they form part of the "real" world, become a very natural definition of reality and unreality for the Berkeleian. This sort of explanation is necessary because I do not think it is possible for Berkeley to claim that dreams are generated internally by the mind of the dreamer; he must postulate an external source of dreams for the same reason he must postulate an external source of waking perceptions. The characteristics of dreams that make this the case will be discussed in section three.

### 1. The Berkeleian Position

Perhaps the most fundamental assumption made by Berkeley, and a possible weakness of his theory, is his assertion that "an idea can be like nothing but an idea."<sup>41</sup> This is essentially an axiom of the system and, while Berkeley takes some pains, in both the *Principles* and the *Dialogues* to show it to be the case with regard to specific sense perceptions, the only general defense of this premise given in Berkeley's published works is the statement that he, personally, cannot imagine how it could be otherwise.<sup>42</sup> However an argument is given in Berkeley's unpublished *Philosophical Commentaries* section 378.<sup>43</sup> The premises of the argument are that (1) two things cannot be alike unless they can be compared to one another and found to be similar, but (2) a mind can only compare its own ideas with one another, since they are its only direct objects<sup>44</sup>, and (3) nothing other than a mind could possibly make a comparison between any two objects. The conclusion of the argument is that (4) nothing that is not an idea can be an object for comparison, and, therefore, nothing other than an idea can be like anything.<sup>45</sup> It follows

<sup>41</sup> George Berkeley, *A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge*, 8

<sup>42</sup> See, e.g. *loc. cit.*

<sup>43</sup> See the discussion at Kenneth P. Winkler, *Berkeley: An Interpretation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 145-148.

<sup>44</sup> See n. 13 below and Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries* 808.

<sup>45</sup> To state the argument more formally, define the following predicates:

Lxy =df. x is like y

from this argument (though Berkeley does not explicitly assert this) that it is incoherent to say that a substance is like anything. Only ideas can be like or unlike because it is impossible for comparisons involving non-ideas to be made.

From this principle, it follows that, if matter as a metaphysical entity exists at all, it can in no way resemble our perceptions of it. In light of this, it is difficult to see how our perceptions can be said to be perceptions of matter at all. The course Berkeley anticipates his opponents will take is to argue that all properties of objects are what John Locke refers to as “secondary qualities;” that material objects in no way resemble our perceptions, but what the object really possesses is “only a power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves.”<sup>1</sup> However, Locke can assert this only because he thinks that there are other qualities, those he calls “primary,” which do resemble our perceptions. If Berkeley’s principle is accepted and primary qualities are annihilated, then the reason for our belief in matter, or what it is that this hypothesis is supposed to explain, is unclear. Berkeley points out that “it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without, resembling them.”<sup>2</sup> Next, Berkeley anticipates that someone might claim that

Though we might possibly have all our sensations without [material objects], yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable that there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds.<sup>3</sup>

This, however, does no good, as it only brings up the infamous “mind-

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Cxyz =df. x compares y to z

Mx =df. x is a mind

Ix =df. x is an idea

The argument can then be formulated as follows:

$\exists x \exists y (Lxy \supset \exists z Czxy)$

$\exists x (Mx \supset \exists y \exists z [(\sim Iy \wedge \sim Iz) \supset Cxyz])$

$\exists x (\sim Mx \supset \exists y \exists z \sim Cxyz)$

$\therefore \exists x (\sim Ix \supset \exists y \sim Lxy)$

1 John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* II.viii.15, emphasis original.

2 Principles 18

3 *ibid.* 19

body problem” which has vexed philosophers for centuries.<sup>4</sup> It is, in fact, incredibly difficult to explain the source of our sensations by appeal to physical objects. How is it possible for matter, which is, by definition, inert and non-thinking, to have any effect on a mind whatsoever? Some philosophers would solve the problem by considering the mind as merely a function of the physical brain, so that matter is only affecting other matter. Berkeley’s answer to this strays from pure deductive logic and makes implicit use of Occam’s Razor; that is, Berkeley claims that his immaterialism is a simpler hypothesis with greater explanatory power than the competing pure materialist view.<sup>5</sup>

Berkeley’s objection to the existence of matter is that if it exists it is by nature unknowable. This difficulty concerning our knowledge of matter had earlier been acknowledged by Locke who asserted in several places that we have no idea of substance in general, but only postulate its existence for explanatory purposes.<sup>6</sup> Berkeley’s dream argument shows that matter is unnecessary to an explanation of the phenomena in question; his argument from the mind-body problem purports to show that it is also unhelpful.

The line of reasoning Berkeley uses to establish his own view is something like the following: I have direct and immediate experience of only one thing: my own mind. My mind has two important properties: it is active (i.e. it wills), and it has ideas. I do not have an idea of my mind, and cannot, since my mind is the thing ideas exist in, and ideas cannot resemble anything that exists outside of a mind. I do, however, have what Berkeley calls a “notion,” which is to say a collection of mostly relational ideas, which give meaning to the word mind.<sup>7</sup> I have specific ideas, and from these can form a notion of an idea in general.<sup>8</sup> I also

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4 “Though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced: since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind,” *loc. cit.*

5 *ibid.* 26

6 See esp. *Essay* II.xiii.1-2

7 This technical usage of the word “notion” was introduced in the second edition of the Principles. See esp. sect. 142.

8 The “general notion,” which has the same function in Berkeley’s epistemology as what other philosophers call an “abstract idea,” since Berkeley rejects the concept of abstraction, seems to be a sort of decision procedure by which it can be determined whether a given idea or notion belongs to a class of ideas or notions denoted by a particular word or other symbol. For instance, the general notion of a triangle would be a list of ideas or notions that form a part of any (complex) idea that is to be called a triangle. See esp. the introduction to the Principles, sect. 15. Berkeley uses the word “idea” to signify any direct

have ideas of specific instances of the relationship called “inherence” (or “support,” intended in the sense in which substances support accidents in Aristotle), and from this I can form a general notion of inherence. From these two general notions, I can form a further notion; the notion of mind<sup>9</sup> as the substance in which ideas inhere. More information can be added to this notion by similar processes, based on the experience of my own mind that I have. I observe that some of my ideas, those classified as “perceptions,” are not generated by acts of my own will, but are pressed upon me. Accordingly, I conclude that they have a cause outside myself. This cause needs two characteristics: it must be active and it must have ideas. If I were to deny that it was active, then I would not have explained the phenomenon, as I would still need to explain what caused this inert object to do whatever it does to cause my ideas. If I were to deny that it had ideas, then where would the ideas come from?<sup>10</sup> Therefore, Berkeley concludes, my perceptions are caused by another mind.

Anyone who attempts to explain perceptions by means of matter, rather than of an external mind, faces great difficulties. First, we have no other reason to suppose that there is any matter anywhere than that it is allegedly useful in this explanation. By contrast, I already know that at least one mind (my own) exists. Second, matter is by definition inert, so we must explain how it was set in motion in order to ultimately cause my ideas. This is by no means impossible, but adds to the complexity of our hypothesis tremendously. Third, we still have to grapple with the mind-body problem somehow, because we have to get to our subjective experience of perceiving objects from the physical operation of those objects. This too is possible. The explanation can be made in terms of neurons, chemical activity in the brain, and so forth, but, again, the simplicity of the explanation is lost so that Occam’s Razor recommends that we choose Berkeley’s external mind hypothesis over the matter hypothesis.

The next difficulty Berkeley must face is another that has long plagued philosophy; he must escape from solipsism by providing an epistemological grounding for the belief that minds other than his own

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and immediate object of the mind, a convention adopted from Locke (see Locke, *Essay* I.i.8).

<sup>9</sup> Berkeley often prefers the term “spirit” which I have not used because its usage appears to be an attempt to insert additional theological doctrines not supported by the argument.

<sup>10</sup> One answer, of course, is to suppose that the ideas are innate, already being present in the mind and merely being excited by the presence of the objects. Berkeley, working as he is within a broadly Lockean framework, does not seriously consider this view.

exist. Berkeley’s case is somewhat different from many others, as he has already established the existence of one other mind, which he calls God.<sup>11</sup> Berkeley steps lightly over the difficulty in question, noting that “I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents like myself, which accompany them, and concur in their production.”<sup>12</sup> He later clarifies,

A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds: and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves.<sup>13</sup>

The key phrase in this passage is where Berkeley tells us that our perceptions “serve to mark out” the other minds. Early in his life, Berkeley developed the belief that sense perceptions form a language by which the originating mind (God) communicates information to us. This is one of the primary contentions of his *Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision*, the first major philosophical work he published.<sup>14</sup> His claim is that the whole of the physical world is a series of signs, which always have the same meaning. We shall later see that this consistency is a critical feature of reality. For now it suffices to say that we observe the physical world to be consistent; that is, we observe that bundles of sense perceptions always have the same meaning so that when we are mistaken in our predictions based upon them, there is always some error to be found in our reasoning.<sup>15</sup>

This is where the alleged contradiction in Berkeley’s argument takes place. It has been argued<sup>16</sup> that due to a contradiction between this part of his argument and his earlier dream argument, Berkeley either never

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<sup>11</sup> It has been established that this mind is more powerful than a human mind (as it can force ideas upon human minds directly, which human minds cannot, and it can apparently hold the entirety of the physical world in its memory at once, determining what perceptions to give humans next according to set consistent physical laws) and that it is responsible for sustaining the physical world. It has not, however, been shown to be in any way infinite, or even the originator of the world. As such, whether it resembles the traditional religious conceptions of God closely enough to justify the use of that name is an open question.

<sup>12</sup> *Principles* 145

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.* 148

<sup>14</sup> See especially sect. 147. Also see *Principles* 43.

<sup>15</sup> But see subsection 5.5 on mistaken judgments below.

<sup>16</sup> Charles Byron Cross, “Berkeley on Other Minds,” *Auslegung* 6 (1978): 45-50.

gets his system off the ground or is trapped in solipsism. The claim is that Berkeley first insists that no collection of sense-perceptions could count as evidence for the existence of matter, because we might be dreaming. He then says that a different set of sense-perceptions serves as evidence for the existence of another human mind. How can this be? Could we not likewise be dreaming the perceptions related to the existence of the other mind?

The critical flaw in an objection like the one above is that it does not take account of the differing contexts of the two arguments.<sup>17</sup> Berkeley's dream argument is an objection to the prevailing materialist view, whereas his argument for the existence of other minds takes place within his own system. As we shall see in section five, in any broadly Berkeleyian metaphysical theory, the criteria by which we know we are awake and not dreaming must become the criteria which define waking life and these criteria will include the assertion that the sense-perceptions of waking life are "effects or concomitant signs"<sup>18</sup> from which we can derive further information about the world. Thus Berkeley can assert that if we reject his view in favor of a materialist theory then no collection of sense-perceptions will necessarily entail the existence of anything, so that someone who defines reality in terms of matter will be stuck not only in solipsism, but also in absolute skepticism. When we are working within Berkeley's own system, on the other hand, any collection of sense-perceptions that satisfies the conditions for waking life will give us certain information about the world. The nature of these conditions will be one of the primary concerns of the remainder of this paper.

## 2. The Dream Experience

The dream experience has mystified philosophers, sages, and ordinary people alike for centuries. The troubling question of how we tell the difference, both in the moment, and in memories, between dreams and waking life will be the subject of section three. This current section will focus simply on describing the experience itself and coming to a general understanding of why it is so problematic for philosophy in general and Berkeley in particular. The first thing that must be done here is to define just what a dream is. This appears at first glance to be a very simple question, but has in fact been the subject of much debate.

Norman Malcolm, in line with his broader verificationist views, has asserted that a dream just is a dream narration.<sup>19</sup> This has a number of problems. First, this essentially assumes that dreams come into existence not during sleep but at the moment of waking. Dream memories are relevantly similar to waking memories, such that if we are to say that they are not generated at any definite time, then we must journey even deeper into skepticism, so that our memories do not necessarily conform even to subjective experiences. Second, Malcolm had little faith in the then-emerging technology of the electroencephalograph (EEG), which now shows great promise in the possibility of actually being able to map different individuals' subjective experiences, such that we might be able to detect the moment of dream generation. Third, Malcolm's view rejects a straightforward, intuitive, common sense view without any persuasive reason for doing so.

More recently, Brian O'Shaughnessy has suggested a more plausible account of the basic nature of dreams.<sup>20</sup> O'Shaughnessy asserts that dreaming "is the mind creating out of its own resources an unreal replica of waking consciousness."<sup>21</sup> In particular, he enumerates three characteristics of waking life that the dream experience counterfeits: a world in which events take place, mental processes, and perceptual awareness of the world. It is not clear, however, how these things are counterfeits. Dreams really do occur in a world (although not the real world), real mental processes seem to take place in them, and one of these mental processes is perceptual awareness of the world. Can we really be mistaken about the operations of our own conscious (or "as-if conscious" in O'Shaughnessy's terminology) minds? Does it make sense to say that these things do not really occur, that we are deceived in believing that we were having some subjective mental experience? Certainly there may be cases of false memory, even with regard to subjective experiences, but if our memory is so reliable a tool with regard to our internal mental experiences while awake, then how can we say that this is not the case in sleep?

Of course, dreaming is, by definition, not actual (physiological) consciousness, and this is the point O'Shaughnessy is getting at. The intuitive reasons for this are that dreams take place during sleep (the opposite of physiological consciousness) and the world perceived in dreams is not the same world perceived during physiological

<sup>17</sup> For more on this subject, see Russell Wahl and Jonathan Westphal, "Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley on Whether We Can Dream Marks on the Waking State," *Studia Leibnitia* 1992 24(2): 177-181.

<sup>18</sup> *Principles* 145

<sup>19</sup> See Norman Malcolm, *Dreaming* (New York: Humanities Press, 1959), esp. ch. 11

<sup>20</sup> Brian O'Shaughnessy, "Dreaming," *Inquiry* Dec. 2002, 45(4): 399-432

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* 399

consciousness. This is only the beginning of an explanation of the differences between dreams and waking life. Any rigorous explanation will require elaborate metaphysical underpinnings, and so will be postponed until the fifth section of this paper.

In dreams, as in waking life, we experience three types of mental objects: perceptions, thoughts, and volitions, where perceptions are ideas entering from the outside, thoughts are ideas of the understanding generated internally by an act of the will, and volitions are those ideas which are the direct objects of the will (as opposed to the understanding). In dreams, however, the distinction between these three categories is blurred. We know experientially that we dream both perceptively and propositionally. That is, we not only dream of having certain sense perceptions (i.e. dream ideas of the sort that might possibly be actual sense perceptions in waking life), but we also dream that certain propositions are true. For instance, in the course of preparing this paper I had a dream in which I was in my mother's house, but the house that I was in was most certainly not the one in which my mother lives. That is, I dreamed that the proposition expressed by the sentence "I am in my mother's house" was true, while simultaneously dreaming a bundle of sense perceptions which, were I awake, would count as conclusive evidence against the truth of that proposition. There is nothing unusual about this sort of dream, as dreams are most certainly not limited by any contingent facts of the actual world.<sup>22</sup> A particularly interesting point about this sort of dream is that within it the proposition expressed by "I am in my mother's house" is actually a perception rather than a thought. It is an idea that comes in from the outside, which is an immediate and inescapable "truth" of the dream world. I do not reason about my sense perceptions to come to this conclusion, but simply know its truth, in the same way that I know the truth of a statement such as "the door is brown." Furthermore, it seems to me that there are some dreams in which we perceive our own volitions, which is to say that ideas that would ordinarily be volitions, products of our will, are in fact imposed on us from without by the dream world. Likewise, the blurring sometimes goes the other direction. There are cases in which what would ordinarily be perceptions are, in the dream world, volitions.

These observations point out the wild variation in the degree of control we can exercise over our dream worlds. In some cases, everything in our dream world, including our own actions, is imposed from the outside

<sup>22</sup> Whether dreams are limited even by the laws of logic is a subject of debate. On this, see below and also O'Shaughnessy, "Dreaming" 409-410.

and we have no control over it. In other cases, a simple act of the will is able to drastically alter the world around us.

The above discussion makes clear one of the most serious problems with dreams for the Berkeleian. In dreams we do experience perceptions. There are certain ideas in dreams which we must acknowledge have, as was said above, "been imposed from without." They cannot be caused by the mind,<sup>23</sup> because they are not products of the will. The materialist can claim that they are caused by the purely physical functionings of the brain (which he may refer to as "the unconscious mind"), but the Berkeleian can obviously not claim this, as the physical functionings of the brain are merely so many sense perceptions of the individual observing the EEG. Rather, the Berkeleian must admit that they are caused by some external mind, just as are our waking perceptions. The obvious course to take is to say that they are caused by the same mind as our waking perceptions, and that this mind is operating in accordance with the physical laws it has devised so that from a physical (rather than metaphysical) perspective, we can indeed explain our dreams in terms of the physical functioning of the brain, while it is understood that the metaphysical reality is that dreams, like the rest of our perceptions, are caused by another mind. We will return to this discussion in greater detail in the section five.

Another important question about the dream phenomenon is the limit of "dreamability." Is there anything one cannot dream? Clearly one can dream things that are false. O'Shaughnessy has suggested that one can also dream the logically impossible,<sup>24</sup> but it is not clear that he is correct. Certainly one can dream various propositions simultaneously, and these propositions, taken together, may entail some contradiction, but to say that "one can dream that 1 and 1 make 3, [or] that one is looking point blank at a surface which is red and blue all over"<sup>25</sup> stretches the limits. Perhaps O'Shaughnessy is led into this belief by his subsequent assertion that one cannot dream of having a belief that is false within the context of the dream. I must disagree with this claim as I find that I sometimes have dreams in which I occupy two different perspectives in the dream world: the ordinary limited perspective of myself, and the perspective of a third-person omniscient narrator. In such a situation I have dreamed that, for instance, I was being chased and was not aware

<sup>23</sup> Where the mind is "a thinking thing," which is the normal usage of the word in early modern philosophy.

<sup>24</sup> p. 409

<sup>25</sup> loc.cit.

of it. Once dream-belief is separated from dream-truth it becomes clear that dreaming that “I heard the sentence ‘1 and 1 make 3’ and believed it” and dreaming that the proposition expressed by  $1+1=3$  was true are two different things, and the latter is probably not possible, even if there is such a proposition.

O’Shaughnessy is, however, correct in asserting that narratability is a critical characteristic of dreams; we cannot dream anything which we could not later narrate coherently. That is, one could probably dream of an invisible pink unicorn (in this case one would actually be dreaming the counter-factual conditional expressed by “if I could see the unicorn, it would be pink [but I can’t, since it’s invisible]”), but one could probably not dream Noam Chomsky’s infamous sentence, “colorless green ideas sleep furiously,” since the latter is so incoherent as to violate the narratability condition, and certainly does not express a proposition. (Although one might be able to dream the proposition “the sentence ‘colorless green ideas sleep furiously’ expresses a proposition, and that proposition is true,” but I would suggest that in this case one would in fact be dreaming that the sentence had syntactic structure and/or semantic content other than what it in fact has in English, and thus in an important sense would be dreaming up a new language. Of course, it is not necessary that one actually know the meaning of the language in question; the dream could merely claim that there was such a language without that language having any definite interpretation.)

To summarize, the dream experience is one very much like that of waking life, but conventional wisdom insists that dreams do not give information about the “real world.” It is not clear how the “real world” is to be defined, but clearly “the world we experience while awake” will not do. How would we then define wakefulness? Dreams involve every type of idea the mind is capable of experiencing, but these ideas may not function in the same way or have the same origin (internal or external to the dreamer) as they do in waking life. All of these characteristics lead to major philosophical problems, which will be the subject of the section to follow.

### 3. Dream Skepticism and the Associated Difficulties for Berkeleian Metaphysics

The primary problem of dreams, the one that has plagued philosophers of all stripes, is epistemological. How can I be certain that I am awake and not sleeping? If I can’t, how can I be sure of anything? This

problem is universal and deeply troubling. More troubling still are the metaphysical problems it creates for the Berkeleian and the Idealist/phenomenalist School of philosophy generally.

Part of what Wahl and Westphal say<sup>26</sup> in defense of the maneuvers taken by Descartes, Leibniz, and Berkeley to escape dream skepticism is that in dreams we do not actually reason but only dream of reasoning. Malcolm takes this even farther, to assert that dreamed experiences do not occur at all, even subjectively, so that we can always know we are not dreaming.<sup>27</sup> If, as I have argued, this is false, the problem runs deeper. From what has been said thus far, no obvious distinction can be made without begging the question. If dreams are distinguished from reality only in that they take place while we are asleep, and they involve very real mental activity, then how can we ever know that we are awake?

In Berkeleianism in particular, the problem becomes even more disturbing, due to the basic principle that “to be is to be perceived.” If this is the case, where is the Berkeleian to place dream perceptions in his ontology, and how can he avoid asserting that dream objects actually exist? Another idealist, Arthur Schopenhauer, faced the same problem, and, rather than making any attempt to overcome it, simply conceded dreams to have the same ontological status as waking life, being distinguished from it only by length.<sup>28</sup> For the Berkeleian, who is determined to “think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar,”<sup>29</sup> this answer is unacceptable. He is committed to the development of a theory of reality on which waking life is “real” and dreams are not; or, at the very least, on which dreams are less “real” than waking life.

Berkeley directly considers this problem only once in his major philosophical writings, at *Dialogues* 235, and dismisses it almost instantly:

The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they have besides an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are most vivid and clear, and being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not a like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the visions

<sup>26</sup> p. 178

<sup>27</sup> See esp. ch. 18

<sup>28</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, E. F. J. Payne, tr. (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), sect. 5

<sup>29</sup> Berkeley, *Principles* 51

of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet by their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish things from chimeras on your own scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference, and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

Berkeley's response is so obvious, and so characteristic of his writings, as to make it almost laughable. Philonous is responding to precisely the objection above, that Berkeley's immaterialism is unable to distinguish dreams from waking life, and the content of his response is simply that there must be a perceived difference between the two; if there weren't, the inability to distinguish between them would not be a problem. You perceive this experience to be a dream, therefore it is a dream. "Esse est percipii." We are sometimes mistaken about dreams, but the problem of apparently incorrect perceptions is one that Berkeley deals with at length, so this is not any new difficulty. However, there remains a critical difference between uncertainty about dreams and mistakes in other perceptions. While we do seem, in actual practice, to nearly always know correctly and with great certainty whether a given experience took place while we were dreaming or awake, it is not clear how we perceive a difference. All Berkeley has claimed to do is to reduce the problem of dreams in his system to the point of identity with the problem faced by other philosophers, but, while he does seem to have shown that any solution to the general problem will also solve his particular problem, the difficulty is nevertheless much more urgent for him: if the problem remains unsolved, materialists will merely have lost the ability to distinguish with certainty between dreams and waking life, but for the Berkeleian there will be no such distinction. The difficulty is not merely epistemological, but is a fundamental problem of metaphysics. Furthermore, what of other minds? If this distinction collapses, the Berkeleian will have to concede that either there is ground for thinking that the people we see in our dreams are real people with minds like our own, or else that there is no ground for thinking that other human minds exist at all.

Every one of Berkeley's discussions of "wrong" perceptions centers around the idea that it is not the perception that is mistaken, but our interpretation of it. The information given to us by means of the language of sense perception was all true, but we failed to understand it. It is not clear, however, that this "language" contains any certain indications as to whether we are dreaming or awake, while at the same

time it is necessary to interpret its symbols differently depending on which state we are in. Berkeley's own attempt to solve this problem, which appeals to the vividness of waking life and the ever-popular Cartesian (external) coherence criterion, is probably not sufficient to provide us with the kind of certainty needed to claim that dreams are less real than our waking experiences, and that the people we meet while awake are real while the people we meet in dreams are not. A stronger set of criteria is needed.

#### 4. The Leibnizian Solution

##### 4.1 *The Cartesian Coherence Criterion.*

Because of the universality of the problem of dreams, almost every major philosopher has dealt it with. The particular treatment of the subject we will focus on in this section is that given by Leibniz in his "On the Method of Distinguishing Real From Imaginary Phenomena." However, the first criterion he discusses was earlier proposed by Descartes in his Sixth Meditation, and it is in this context that it is best dealt with. Here, in concluding his work, Descartes finally deals with dream skepticism, the doubt that began his series of meditations. "I now notice that there is considerable difference between [dreams and waking life];" he insists, "dreams are never linked by memory with all the other actions of life, as waking experiences are."<sup>30</sup> This external coherence criterion has since been adopted by innumerable philosophers, and it is easy to see why. When asked how we know that something occurred in a dream, one of our most frequent answers is that we remember waking up afterward, and this is enough in and of itself for this test to be of the utmost significance in any philosophical discussion of dreams. However, this is far from sufficient for the kind of certainty that is required to succeed in escaping from dream skepticism.

The obvious objection, which has been given by philosophers since this criterion was first proposed, is that there is nothing to prevent someone from dreaming that this test was satisfied. Descartes' answer is that if the test were satisfied in a dream, then God would be a deceiver. Most philosophers have found this argument unconvincing. For instance, Leibniz summarily dismisses the argument, stating that "no one will fail to see how far it is from a demonstration having metaphysical certainty, for we are not deceived by God but by our judgment, asserting

<sup>30</sup> Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" 89 in John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, trs. *Descartes: Selected Writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 122

something without accurate proof.”<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, Nicolas Malebranche suggests a story<sup>32</sup> in which a man on several different occasions goes to sleep at night and dreams that he has risen from bed, gone out to a “black Sabbath,” and practiced sorcery. Because the events of the dream always occur at night, and always end with the dreamer returning to bed before morning, the external coherence criterion is no help, and he continues to believe that his experiences really occurred. Less outlandishly, one individual with whom I discussed the subject of this paper reported that from time to time he has dreamed the occurrence of various mundane events, especially conversations with friends, and later been surprised when the friends in question do not remember the conversation, or he otherwise discovers the event not to have actually occurred.<sup>33</sup> These sorts of dreams are not unlike the dreams we all experience regularly in any relevant way. This counts as clear evidence that the Cartesian coherence criterion alone is insufficient for the task at hand. Recognizing the deficiency of Descartes’ proposal, Leibniz gives three additional tests, which are different from the one discussed above in that they deal only with the internal content of the dream, and require no additional knowledge of the outside world.

#### 4.2 Vividness

The first of Leibniz’s internal criteria is vividness. It will be recalled that this was also one of the tests Berkeley mentioned. Clearly this test is not sufficient on its own. First, everyone has had dreams vivid enough that he believed the dream to be real (at least until he woke up at the end). Second, as Schopenhauer observes, “no one has ever held [dreams and waking life] up to comparison; only the recollection of the dream could be compared with the present reality.”<sup>34</sup> This comparison is clearly unfair. Our recollections of past waking life are not always vivid either; how can we be certain that the dream was not just as vivid as waking life at the moment it occurred? Nevertheless, the lack of vividness in dream memories is, in practice, a criterion we use to distinguish them from memories of waking life. Even if this is only because the disconnect between the dream and the moment at which it is being examined (i.e. the experience of waking up) causes the memory to lose its vividness,

31 G. W. Leibniz, “On the Method of Distinguishing Real From Imaginary Phenomena,” in *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, ed. Leroy F. Loemaker (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1956): 364.

32 The Search After Truth 2.3.6

33 Note that at this point new evidence has caused an experience, which previously fulfilled the Cartesian coherence criterion to no longer fulfill it, so that it is still this criterion that has informed him that he was mistaken.

34 Schopenhauer, *Will and Representation* 16

this still provides an important test for determining at least after the fact the proper interpretation of our sense experiences and, as we shall see later in this section, this is all that is needed in order for Berkeley’s general explanation of mistaken perceptions to apply.

#### 4.3 Complexity

The second internal criterion Leibniz proposes is complexity. In defining this criterion and distinguishing it from vividness, he says the following:

The phenomenon ... is vivid if its qualities, such as light, color, and warmth, appear intense enough. It will be complex if these qualities are varied and support us in undertaking many experiments and new observations; for example, if we experience in a phenomenon not merely colors but also sounds, odors, and qualities of taste and touch, and this both in the phenomenon as a whole and in its various parts which we can further treat according to causes. Such a long chain of observations is usually begun by design and selectively and usually occurs neither in dreams nor in those imaginings which memory or fantasy present, in which the image is mostly vague and disappears while we are examining it.<sup>35</sup>

In dreams, we rarely (or, more likely, never) undertake examinations of the depth Leibniz suggests, but his point is not that this in itself, the experience of examining the phenomenon, proves that it is not a dream. Rather, the suggestion is that if we consider (after the fact) our dreams, we quickly come to believe that if we had undertaken such a task, the dream would have quickly devolved into nonsense. This is essentially the same as saying that, unlike in waking life, what is not explicitly included in the dream is no part of it, and as such has no truth-value within the context of the dream.<sup>36</sup> Upon examination, dreams are found to be missing an enormous number of details we would think important in the narration of a waking experience, and it is not merely the case that we did not take note of them; they are altogether absent.

#### 4.4 Internal Coherence

The final test that Leibniz suggests is the internal coherence criterion. The idea here is that real phenomena operate according to what Leibniz would later call “the principle of sufficient reason.” That is, for any real event, there must be a reason why it occurred. This is not the case in dreams. In considering differences in our presumptions with regard to dream narrations and novels, O’Shaughnessy imagines the following

35 Leibniz, “On the Method” 363-364

36 On this, see O’Shaughnessy, “Dreaming” 401-404

scenario:

I dream of copper, of nitric acid, of an encounter between the two, and of nitrogen peroxide coming from the solution. Then whereas concerning a novel we can say 'Andre Bolkonsky died from wounds received at the Battle of Borodino', irrespective of whether it is explicitly stated that he did, we cannot say that 'in my dream the gas was caused by the encounter between the two reagents' - unless it is an explicit part of the dream. And even if it were, I might very well have embellished the report with the further detail that the gas was caused by the encounter of those two reagents only because it was Sunday.<sup>37</sup>

Similarly to the limitations on complexity discussed above, if these details are not explicitly included in the dream (e.g. if one does not dream a reason for the reaction) then there simply is no reason. We have no expectation of coherence or predictability in our dreams, as we do in waking life, and this is in practice perhaps the most important criterion for distinguishing dreams from reality: dreams, for the most part, fail to make sense.

### 5. Leibniz's Criteria as a Solution to the Metaphysical Difficulty

Leibniz is not particularly satisfied with the criteria offered above. In his own words,

We must admit it to be true that the criteria for real phenomena thus far offered, even when taken together, are not demonstrative, even though they have the greatest probability ... Thus by no argument can it be demonstrated absolutely that bodies exist, nor is there anything to prevent certain well-ordered dreams from being the objects of our mind, which we judge to be true and which, because of their accord with each other, are equivalent to truth so far as practice is concerned.<sup>38</sup>

Whatever his mature view may be, in this passage, which comes from a very early work, Leibniz seems to be speaking as a materialist,<sup>39</sup> and as such is prone to skepticism. He does suggest that the objects of our perceptions, if sufficiently well ordered, may be "equivalent to truth so far as practice is concerned," but implicit here is the idea that they are not actually truth for theoretical, rather than practical, purposes unless

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. 403

<sup>38</sup> Leibniz, "On the Method" 364

<sup>39</sup> In Berkeley's sense: that is, as one who believes in matter as a metaphysical entity, not as one who denies the existence of the immaterial.

they correspond to mind-independent physical objects. Because he here seems to link the veracity of our perceptions to accurate representation of external physical bodies, he does not seem to be in a position to banish dream skepticism completely. The Berkeleian is now in a much stronger position, and once again able to take advantage of the greatest virtues of his system: namely, its simplicity, and its compatibility with "common sense."

Because the Berkeleian asserts that "to be is to be perceived," once we have demonstrated that there exist criteria for differentiating dreams from waking life, and it can be seen that we do in fact use these criteria, he is in a position to differentiate dreams from reality ontologically. After all, he is "not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive," and if you do in fact apply the above criteria, then you perceive a difference between dreams and waking life. The Berkeleian position is further strengthened by the exact nature of these criteria, in that, given various other basic principles of Berkeley's philosophy, particularly the view of sense perception as a language, it is perfectly natural that some of them, in particular the internal coherence criterion, should be used to define reality.

#### 5.1 A Berkeleian Ontology

The Berkeleian will want an ontology with at least four basic levels: The level M of minds, the level RP of "real" perceptions, the level DP of dreamed or hallucinated perceptions, and the level T of thoughts and volitions. There may be differentiation within these levels. For instance, there may be reason to suppose that the mind, which is the source of our perceptions, is on a higher ontological level than we are. However, there will most likely not be so sharp a divide between this mind and our own as there is between our minds and their ideas.

The divide between M and the other levels is a simple and straightforward consequence of Berkeley's overall theory. Ideas are real (i.e. they occupy some level in our ontology), but they exist only within minds, and are dependent upon minds. Therefore, they are "less real" than minds. What is not so clear is why ideas are to be subdivided into the three levels mentioned. What relevant features of RP distinguish it from DP, or even T?

The entities at level T are unique in that they are dependent only upon the will of the mind in which they reside. They are not imposed on that mind from without, nor does that mind impose them upon or share them with others. They also lack the vividness of perceptions. These characteristics all seem relevant, and sufficient to distinguish them

from perceptions. The division between RP and DP is more difficult. The four criteria listed by Leibniz are all used by human beings to distinguish between the two in practice, but is any of them relevant to the ontological problem? In fact, all of these criteria lead to important differences between entities at RP and entities at DP, and can be used to ascribe to RP several qualities essential to the conception of physical reality implicit in Berkeley's writings.

### 5.2 *The External Coherence of Entities at RP*

Entities existing at level RP, that is, perceptions of the "real" physical world, satisfy the Cartesian coherence criterion. They form part of a long chain of perceptions that fit together to form a unified picture of a world with a history and consistent laws of cause and effect. If this were not the case, if our perceptions grouped themselves into discrete incidents, each internally consistent but not connecting to the others in any way, we could never learn the "language" of the physical world, and so we could not conclude anything from our perceptions. One long sense experience with room for experimentation is needed in order for this communication to take place. Dreams may be meaningful, that is, they may communicate true information to us, but because they are so short we cannot derive the language of a dream from the dream itself. This is why every scheme of dream interpretation throughout all of history has somehow incorporated information external to the individual dream. Today, while it is no longer popular to believe that dreams predict the future, many people believe that dreams are of psychological importance, that they reveal deep truths about the mental state of the dreamer. This sort of dream interpretation relies on the meaning of the dream content to the dreamer himself, meaning he has attached to these symbols while awake. Other types of dream interpretation have relied upon standardized types of symbols, which are thought to be applicable to dreams in general, independent of their meaning for the individual dreamers. Still others, particularly the Hebrew prophets, have claimed to have dreams or visions that ended in an encounter with a figure that interpreted the foregoing dream content in normal spoken language. These dreams have a limited degree of external coherence which assigns to them some limited degree of meaningfulness. If a sense experience were completely isolated, having no external coherence whatsoever, we would be unable to assign any significance to it. Thus the connectedness of one period of wakefulness to another is what makes waking perceptions meaningful, and, since one dream is generally not connected with another, dream perceptions become meaningful only insofar as they too share some limited connection with the series of perceptions making up waking life.

### 5.3 *The Vividness and Complexity of Entities at RP*

The Berkeleian wants very much to assign responsibility for the generation of our perceptions to a mind much greater than our own. In particular, Berkeley himself wants to say that the source of our perceptions is the God of orthodox Christianity. It is not at all clear that Berkeley's arguments get us nearly so far as this, but he has certainly provided sound footing for a theory of natural theology. Every perception we have reveals to us information about the mind that is its source. The external coherence of our waking perceptions, and also Occam's Razor, makes it rational for us to assume that all of our waking perceptions are caused by a single mind. Their vividness is indicative of the additional powers that mind possesses beyond our own, and their complexity is indicative of that mind's intelligence. Vividness is indicative of the power of the divine mind, in that not only is that mind able to place ideas in our minds, but the ideas it places there are actually stronger than the ideas we create ourselves. The complexity of our waking perceptions are indicative of the intelligence of the divine mind in that this mind is able to hold the entirety of the physical world within it, remembering every detail and being able to determine on the basis of these details what perceptions to give next.

What has been said in this section leads to a startling conclusion. Dreams may not, in fact, have the divine mind as their origin at all. Dreams are so small, so simple, so incoherent, and so often copied from waking experiences that they need not be caused by a mind very much greater than our own. All a mind needs to cause dreams is the ability to impress perceptions on other minds, and that vaguely. Our own level of creativity and intelligence will suffice. However, we here run afoul of Occam's Razor again. Remember that, for all the same reasons that waking perceptions cannot have their origins in our own minds, dreaming perceptions must also have an external source. If a Berkeleian had independent reason to believe in the existence of minds comparable in intelligence to our own but having the power to impose their ideas on others,<sup>40</sup> it would be perfectly natural for him to suppose that these were the cause of his dreams, and not the mind, which causes his waking perceptions. However, in the absence of such independent ground, it

<sup>40</sup> I have in mind angels or other "spiritual" beings as possible sources of dreams. In fact, theories stating that dreams are caused by some sort of angel or minor deity are not uncommon in the history of thought about dreams. See Ian Hacking, *Historical Ontology* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002) 235-236, 254, and also *Iliad* 2.1-34 where Zeus addresses an (apparently sentient) dream and commands it (him?) to deceive Agamemnon. Some editors of the Greek text even capitalize the word for dream, treating it as a proper noun.

is far better for the Berkeleian to stick close to the orthodox scientific viewpoint that dreams can be explained in psychological terms and claim that the divine mind causes them in accordance with the set laws all of our other perceptions obey. This has the added advantage that it successfully fits dreams into the same world as the rest of our perceptions.

#### 5.4 *The Internal Coherence of Entities at RP*

Our waking perceptions make sense. They obey predictable laws. As Leibniz tells us, in waking life we are never deceived when we make good use of reason. If a false conclusion is formed from our waking sense perceptions, a reasoning mistake has been made. This is for the Berkeleian, even more so than for Leibniz, the critical feature of waking life. To say that a set of perceptions has internal coherence is simply to say, in Berkeley's terminology, that they form a single language with a single correct interpretation. Not only does this property get the Berkeleian the general view of sense perception he wants; it is also critical to establishing the existence of other human minds. The argument might be given as follows:

- 1) The entities at level RP are (by definition) the vocabulary items of a language
- 2) The vocabulary items of a language must have a consistent interpretation in order for successful communication to occur.<sup>41</sup> If no successful communication occurs, the system in question is not a language.
- ∴ 3) The entities at level RP have a consistent interpretation
- 4) There exists a set B of entities at level RP (namely, my body) which is properly interpreted as communicating information about my mind
- 5) There exist other sets of entities at level RP that are relevantly similar to B (i.e. other human bodies)
- 6) If two sets of vocabulary items are relevantly similar to one another, they will have relevantly similar interpretations
- ∴ 7) There exist other minds relevantly similar to my own

The first premise of this argument can be objected to on the ground that, while it is clearly legitimate to define RP in this way, there may not be a

<sup>41</sup> Lexical ambiguity notwithstanding. Lexical ambiguity dampens effective communication, such that when the ambiguity goes unresolved the intended piece of information is not communicated. As a result, it is conceivable that there could be a system of sounds or visible symbols intended as a language that had so much unresolvable lexical ambiguity that it might not truly qualify as a language at all.

collection of perceptions meeting this requirement. That is, it may follow that nothing is, in the relevant sense, "real." I do not think this objection is particularly important. What it points out is that a consequence of this sort of ontology is that if none of our sense perceptions give us information about the world, then there is no physical world. For any philosopher of the idealist/phenomenalist persuasion, this should be a perfectly acceptable conclusion. After all, any materialist should concede that if an individual's sense perceptions do not communicate any information about the world to him then he is not connected to physical reality. Since "to be is to be perceived," a physical reality disconnected from minds is no reality at all. Besides this, it is an everyday experience that we are able to apply reason on the basis of standard interpretations of our sense perceptions to come to correct conclusions about the world, and in particular about what sense perceptions we will experience next.

The second obvious objection is that the phrase "relevantly similar" in (5) through (7) is doing a lot of work. It is not clear what "relevantly similar" means in these differing contexts (the context of a body and the context of a mind). There is an extent to which this objection is valid. We are arguing from a relevantly similar body to a relevantly similar mind, when the mind in no way resembles the body and, in fact, cannot resemble anything.<sup>42</sup> Indeed if the body were a purely static entity this objection would probably be inescapable; but if the body were purely static we would say it was dead and not attempt to claim that there was any mind associated with it. Instead, I observe that other human bodies look enough like my own for me to conclude that they are the same sort of thing (an object which might conceivably be the instrument of my mind or of another like it), and that they are dynamic. They act. In observing the actions of other bodies, I notice that they are similar to my own in that they seem to act intelligently based upon definite goals, and they also speak intelligently, producing at least the illusion of communication. In the case of my own body, I know that all of these things occur only when I will them to, and I know that a rational thought process often precedes these volitions. Thus I may correctly conclude that these other bodies are controlled by minds that are similar to my own in various ways corresponding to the similarities in the actions undertaken by the bodies.<sup>43</sup> Since the external and internal coherence

<sup>42</sup> See sect. 1 above.

<sup>43</sup> But how can they be "similar" to my mind if they are not "alike" and do not "resemble" each other? What is the difference between these words? I believe that a response can be given by resorting to Berkeley's theory of "notions" and claiming that we are able to form notions of minds and notions, being ideas, can be compared to one another, but we do not truly have even a notion of matter.

of our total waking experience, features not shared by dreams, permit waking perceptions to function as a language while dream perceptions cannot (except insofar as they are connected with waking life), it is correct to conclude that the human bodies we see while awake are animated by human minds, while those we see while dreaming are not.

### 5.5 Mistaken Judgments

An unfortunate problem with all of this, a difficulty the Berkeleian must face constantly, is the fact of mistaken perceptions. I do not believe I've ever spoken with an individual who has believed himself to be dreaming when he is in fact awake, but we frequently are certain we are awake while we are dreaming, and I have already mentioned the case of an individual who has sometimes confused dream memories with waking memories. The solution to the Berkeleian metaphysical problem given above relies heavily on our ability to judge correctly whether we are awake or sleeping. What about these mistakes in our judgment?

At *Dialogues* 238, we have the following exchange:

HYLAS. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked?

PHILONOUS. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. Thus in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude, that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch, as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that in case he advances toward the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances.

The above considerations have reduced the problem of mistaken judgments about dreams to be the same problem as mistaken judgments about oars. Because there are definite perceived criteria that must be satisfied by waking life, the Berkeleian can now tell the confused dreamer that he was correct in thinking he saw a purple dragon, but his

judgment that this purple dragon would form a coherent part of his life, connecting with his other perceptions, was flawed. When there is any confusion at all, it is generally because the four tests outlined generate mixed results, and the external coherence criterion will sometimes change results over time as new events occur which the experience must fit with in order to be judged real. There may also be times when judgment ought to be withheld, but this, again, is no different than with other types of perceptions and so does not undermine Berkeley's thought to any significant degree.

## 6. Conclusion

The philosophy of George Berkeley is riddled with simple answers to complex questions, and this is one of the greatest strengths of his system. However, these answers are often vague and incomplete and in his focus on simply establishing the core of his immaterialist thought Berkeley is often content to show that an apparent difficulty in his system reduces to a problem also faced by the materialist, rather than actually proposing a solution. The case of dreams is particularly troubling in that it appears at first glance to bring Berkeley's philosophy to innumerable absurd conclusions. Despite this, Berkeley brushes over it with ease, as though it were nothing. His treatment of the subject is unfortunate in its brevity and lack of detail, but, like most of Berkeley's simple answers, his treatment of dreams at *Dialogues* 235 has the potential to be expanded into a rigorous defense of the immaterialist position. Much more is at stake in the question of dreams for the Berkeleian than the materialist; if the Berkeleian fails to solve the epistemological problem, he is trapped in the assertion that dreams are just as real as waking experiences. I have argued in this paper that not only is there a solution easily available to the Berkeleian, but this solution provides one of many possible examples of how Berkeleian philosophy, for all its simplicity, is essentially stronger than the prevailing views.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> This paper was prepared during the 2004-2005 school year as part of an undergraduate research fellowship from the Penn Humanities Forum, under the supervision of Professor Karen Detlefsen, for which the author is grateful.