

## AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF CITIZENSHIP

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As both a philosopher and an economist, Adam Smith has made invaluable contributions to political and social theory. Despite this broad scope, a distinct theory of the citizen and citizenship, key sociopolitical concepts, are absent from his writings. Nevertheless, the overarching characteristics of a citizen as one who shares a relationship with the state and his fellow citizens are themes not unlike those of *Lecture of Jurisprudence*, *The Wealth of Nations*, and *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*.<sup>1</sup> Such themes not only make it possible to tease out a doctrine of citizenship from the major writings of Adam Smith; they also illustrate that the concept of the citizen is central to the understanding of the corpus of Smith's works.

I shall attempt to offer a formulation of citizenship, first, by constructing a definition of citizenship which, for Smith, would have meant something much greater than legal or residential status. Next, I will discuss the relationship of the citizen to the sovereign in order to demonstrate the role of the citizen within the operations of society. Afterwards, I shall consider the economic and moral agency of the individual and the ways in which these dimensions shape a doctrine of citizenship. What will emerge is a theory of the citizen as an agent imbued with political privilege and civic responsibility who takes on a significant role in Smith's piecemeal approach to politics and justice.

### I. The Citizen—A Definition

At a basic level, the citizen is a member of a particular nation-state. While it might appear banal to note that a citizen cannot truly be said to exist without government proper, this condition implies that there is a significant relationship between the sovereign (or government) and the particular citizen. If this relationship is taken for granted, a theory of citizenship could be reduced to a theory of human nature. A concept of citizenship underscores a political dimension to man, marked by his association with a state, that entails political privileges and responsibilities beyond those ordinarily considered in theories of human nature. In the context of Smithian historical jurisprudence, the sovereign/citizen relation cannot be overestimated because citizenship has not always existed. The emergence of the state, therefore, gives enormous insight into what Smith's concept of the citizen might be.

In the *LJ*, Smith points out that men, in their original condition, existed in primitive hunter societies absent government. Clear-

ly no notion of the citizen could be said to have existed. As societies evolved, associations of hunters morphed into shepherd states with centralized governmental authorities. But it was the newly acquired right of property in flocks and land that necessitated government: men needed an institutionalized way to protect their possessions and mediate conflicts.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the position of being a privilege holder necessitated government and thereby inaugurated the concept of a citizen.

As states progressed beyond shepherd societies into monarchies or republics, the expansion of privilege as well as population required that doctrines of citizenship become more formalized—some criterion had to exist in order to determine who is eligible for what privilege and by what justification. Historically, parentage, birthplace, and eventually naturalization became the recognized means for establishing citizenship. Indeed, it was thought that aliens could not assume the privileges of a citizen. For example, they were confined to lease rather than own property in a state, and they had no right of succession for their heirs; instead, land they might have held by lease would be surrendered to the king.<sup>3</sup> Thus, citizenship is marked not only by civic privilege, but one's status as a citizen—and only that status—implies the security of privilege through the laws and administration of a state.

The phenomenon of privilege, particularly as it has just been shown to relate to the administration of the state, is of final importance to the formulation of our definition. The security of individual rights and privileges by the state is tantamount to a concept of justice that Smith negatively defines as freedom from injury. I plan to return to the concept of justice in greater detail further down, but Smith's reference to injury can provide useful insight at this point. He divides injury into types that harm an individual as a man, as a family member, and as a citizen.<sup>4</sup> This division clearly limits the privileges that are carried along with citizenship qua citizenship. The rights of a man to his person, to reputation and to familial character are protected independent of a state. As Smith observes, "Men who have no property," or no other privileges of the citizen, "can injure one another only in their persons or reputations."<sup>5</sup> This suggests that different sorts of injuries imply different sorts of rights and points to Smith's distinction between the two types of rights: adventitious rights and natural rights. He equivocated natural rights to rights of man; thus, an injury to a man would be an injury to a natural right. All other rights—meaning those of a citizen—would be adventitious. While once a state comes to exist it may extend legal protection over natural rights by passing statutes against murder, for instance, and the right may be annexed to the citizen, a man can still have certain rights independent of a state.<sup>6</sup>

Within the confines of citizenship proper, what Smith considers to be strictly injury to a citizen is quite revealing. He states:

If one behaves disrespectfully and without due honor to the one that is dignified with an office or title, this is an injury done *as* a citizen, as his pre-eminence is founded on a civil constitution. If one who has no just right assumes any title of nobility, this is an injury to both his equals in taking upon him the character of one of a rank superior to them, and to his superiors in assuming to have himself reckon'd as their equal when he is their inferior; and the injury here proceeds from the quality of a citizen [my italics].<sup>7</sup>

There are many important implications that can be unpacked in this statement. First of all, Smith speaks of doing injury "as" a citizen rather than "to" a citizen. Indeed, based on what was just noted about injury, it appears that any moral injury that might be done "to" a citizen could be reduced to injury to a man or family member. The implication here is that the key denotation of a citizen is his legal status, moral status is a matter for mankind at large. By making this distinction, the realm of citizenship is reined in to sociopolitical considerations and Smith protects the non-citizen from being stripped of all natural rights. Moreover, the "as" distinction imbues the citizen with a new quality of being capable to do something injurious. From what follows in Smith's description, the capacity for injury depends on one's relation to his fellow citizens. The suggestion, therefore, is that a concept of citizenship carries along with it distinctions of rank and proper relationships to one's fellow-citizens. As a result of this distinction, it can be inferred that citizenship does not necessarily entail equality. Subordinated to the sovereign and his superiors, the position of the citizen may provide equality before the law but little more.

Second, from Smith's statement it can be observed that the citizen is expected to show deference to authority. Although imbued with privilege, the citizen clearly has a proper place in relation to authority that Smith believes is natural. As he notes: "It is very difficult to define what authority is, though everyone has an idea of it in his mind."<sup>8</sup> Not surprisingly, as a result of this principle Smith has a very strong doctrine of political obligation which creates this deferential position for the citizen. Of interest to our definition, Smith begins by dismissing the possibility that social contract or tacit consent theory can create an obligation to obey the law. For one, experience illustrates no such contract has ever been an actual foundation of government. For another, Smith argues it is morally improper to impose an obligation on an individual based on the actions of his grandparents or on some unknown rule. In doing so Smith rejects a theoretical justification for obedience and employs strictly pragmatic reasoning. This highlights the fact that the citizen is a concept with practical value rather than a purely idealized agent, and the obligation for the citizen to obey the law is grounded in practical considerations as well.

Smith seems to take the law at face value and asserts that resis-

tance is prohibited because a sovereign “would never have any thoughts of making any laws which should tell us that, when they went beyond such and such limits, the people were not bound to obey them but might resist.”<sup>9</sup> Since the sovereign does not legislate the scope of disobedience, it is impossible to presume one exists. Smith likely says this because he believed the authority of the sovereign to be absolute.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, the citizen is obliged to obey the law for its sheer utility: “This respect which I paid to the persons in power in every country makes the wheels of the government go more smoothly.”<sup>11</sup> In other words, obedience makes the operations of government more efficient, and citizens therefore have a social interest—and yet another social relation—in their mutual obedience; for this reason the citizen is obliged to obey the law.<sup>12</sup>

Interestingly, political obligation not only emerges as one of the key responsibilities of the citizen, but in one of a few instances where Smith hints at his own definition of citizenship, it is given as a central characteristic of the citizen. In *TMS* he states: “He is not a citizen who is not disposed to respect the laws and obey the civil magistrate; and he is not a good citizen who does not wish to promote by every means in his power, the welfare of his fellow-citizens.”<sup>13</sup> For the moment, I will bracket discussion of Smith’s idea of “the good citizen” until the section on Smith’s moral theory. What can be concluded at this point is that a citizen is defined as a political agent of a given state who is imbued with privileges and responsibilities that are determined by his relations to the sovereign and society.

## II. “The Science of the Legislator” and the Role of the Citizen

The political dimension of the citizen, as we have seen, largely shapes the concept of the citizen in terms of his relation to the sovereign. To examine the role of the citizen as a political agent, therefore, it is necessary to investigate the role of the sovereign. Indeed, not only is this step necessary to form an accurate picture of the citizen, but also because Smith spent a limited number of words discussing the citizen and a plethora of words discussing the sovereign, there is little other way to proceed.

While it has been shown that the role Smith envisions for the legislator is absolute in authority, it is limited in practice. In the *WN* and *LJ* he asserts that the primary roles of the legislator are to maintain justice, to have police, to levy taxes, and to provide for national defense. All of which are—or at least ought to be—largely administrative tasks; the sovereign is not meant to have authority over all aspects of social life. Indeed, Smith is highly critical of what he calls a “man of system” who tries to fit society into his own idealistic speculations of a social order.

The man of system, on the contrary is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government that he cannot suffer the small-

est deviation from any part of it. He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different pieces of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces on a chess-board. He does not consider that...in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to impress upon it.<sup>14</sup>

A man of practical wisdom, the legislator is expected to be engaged as an impartial spectator upon society but with limited refereeing power. Smith argues that while the sovereign “cannot establish the right, he will not disdain to ameliorate the wrong.”<sup>15</sup> For Smith, the distinction of what is right or wrong is one of propriety and impropriety respectively. Hence, the legislator is permitted to determine what has exceeded the boundaries of proper behavior, but the lawmaker is not permitted to be the original author of those boundaries. Establishing those boundaries is the task of the citizenry and stems from their social interactions which result in conventions of appropriate behavior. Involving both the sovereign and citizens in the maintenance of social order creates what Knud Haakonsen has called a “piecemeal” approach to politics in which the legislator acts as a “man of public spirit who will strike the perfect Smithian balance between enlightenment of ‘some general and even systematical, idea of perfection of policy and law’, and the piecemeal action to alleviate concrete evils.”<sup>16</sup> In short, where there is extreme injury or danger to justice in society, Smith would insist the legislator must realign justice within society; outside of such extremes, he legislator is “completely discharged from a duty” to interfere with the operations of society.<sup>17</sup>

This is not to say Smith completely removes political theorizing from the science of the legislator. On the contrary, Smith thinks speculation and wonder were natural features of the mind, but, where those speculations turn into utopian ideas imposed from the outside, Smith was enormously skeptical. However, Smith also did not think very highly of the possibility of the devolution of legislator into a man of systems, and, for this reason, likely suggested this piecemeal approach. As he states:

What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him.<sup>18</sup>

Reducing the role of the legislator in this way has important implications for the theory of the citizen. If the legislator is only to be concerned with the alleviation of only the greatest evils, the remaining social evils and the burden to look after the local situation is shifted onto the citizen. Smith did this for an important reason. In *WN* in particular, Smith places a very high premium on individual and situational knowl-

edge. “The attention of the sovereign can be at best but a very general and vague consideration of what is likely to contribute to the better cultivation of his greater dominions,” but the citizen, who has a specific rather than a vague understanding, would be better able to improve his piece.<sup>19</sup> Just as his impartial spectator cannot make a moral judgment without knowledge of the circumstances, political decisions, too, cannot be made without knowledge of local situations, and in some cases it is simply impossible for the legislator to acquire or mimic the situational knowledge of the particular citizen. But the value of the citizen neither begins nor ends there. Clearly, the citizen is an individual agent with situational knowledge, but as the complexity of the definition of citizen offered earlier implies, Smith had a much broader doctrine of citizenship. In fact, with these limits on the sovereign, the citizen becomes an essential piece to the piecemeal approach to justice and, in consequence, further necessitates the citizen be considered as a free and moral agent.

### III. The Free Agency of the Citizen – An Economic Dimension

Smith’s concept of the citizen would include a doctrine of freedom for both natural and pragmatic reasons that go hand in glove with his economic theory. In *WN*, Smith can be observed as a champion of the doctrine of individual liberty. Freedom, which took on a negative flavor of having one’s person and property secured from others, seemed to Smith to be a natural entitlement to mankind. Clearly holding this right in high esteem he argues: “Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way.”<sup>20</sup> As will be shown, a loss of economic freedom poses for Smith both an intrinsic and social problem, and with the rise of the state, the curtailing of economic liberty through governmental trade restriction, wage regulations, and other legislated measures it is a particularly important problem for the citizen. For these reasons, in order to protect this most treasured right, it seems clear Smith would have included economic freedom as a privilege of the citizen in his doctrine of citizenship.

Intrinsically, curtailing economic freedom would go against Smith’s theory of the nature of man. Smith alleges that there is a “propensity in human nature to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.”<sup>21</sup> This propensity is grounded in man’s natural vanity and aesthetic appreciation of “baubles and trinkets.” To be sure, men could not fulfill this tendency without personal freedom, and as the condition “as long as he does not violate the laws of justice” suggests, the perfect right of liberty is rolled into one’s rights as a man. Paradoxically, economic freedom can be translated into a right of a citizen, not strictly by nature, but because the notion of the citizen himself came about through the exercise of economic freedom.

The evolution of states, which was noted in section one as a reason

for the instantiation of citizenship, is a direct result of economic exchange. In Book III of *WN* Smith notes that with the expansion of trade and the rise of opulence, the commercial intercourse between groups created not only a need for domestic security, but also for leisure to pursue manufacture and trade as well. Hence, organized government and later branches of government were formed to handle civic matters, thus leaving individuals to invest their time and labor in commerce and trade. The logical consequence seems to be that the citizen, born out of economic freedom, would be said to continue to possess this right of freedom even within the context of a state.

Interestingly, the fact that governments have come about (at least in part) through specialization of social tasks is much like Smith’s theory of the division of labor. This latter theme was of such enormous importance for Smith that it opens the entire volume of *WN*. The mark of “every improved society,” the division of labor is of paramount importance for commercial society because of its efficiency in manufacture and industry. Like production of pins in a factory that assigns the task of fastening of the head and sharpening of the tip of a pin to different laborers, if civic tasks are assigned to government entities and divided among separate branches, the needs of society, too, will be met much more efficiently. In fact, as Smith notes: “In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the division of labor are similar to what they are in this trifling one [of pin making].”<sup>22</sup> The overarching emphasis on this principle and its basic operation provides room to draw a parallel between manufacture and government; by analogy, it also seems possible to compare the role of the citizen in society to that of a laborer in production. While the pin factory’s goal is to manufacture as many pins as possible, it must be asked what the chief production of society (i.e. government) would be. The answer will shed better light on the role of the citizen. As the formulation of societies and the science of the legislator have already alluded to, a chief production of society is justice. In this factory-dubbed-society, therefore, the citizen-laborer ought to work in order to create justice within society. It is this task, it will be shown, which provides further reasoning for the unhindered provision of economic freedom for the citizen.

In part because Smith was highly critical of governmental interference in the political economy of his time, a core thesis *WN* defends is the notion that free markets—which necessitates free agents—would be best able to advance individual and social interests. In fact, as other authors have noted, Smith’s economic writings could be recast as a theory of justice. The fact that freedom can produce social good is most famously catalogued by Smith’s theory of the invisible hand.

[A]nd by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was of no part

of his intention... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.<sup>23</sup>

Hence, so long as he is granted freedom, the citizen, like a laborer directing his industry, appears to have a passive power to produce justice as social good within society.

This production of justice, as may be expected, also has interesting implications for the science of the legislator and piecemeal approach to politics. It appears not only that the citizen's situational knowledge will imbue him with the potential to alleviate social evils, but also that the trickling down of the effects of his economic freedom are able to cure them as well. For example, Smith argued that famine, an issue of central importance at the time he wrote *WN*, was best prevented through free trade and that government regulation of the corn trade would in fact exacerbate the problem.<sup>24</sup> For that reason economic freedom of the citizen is both owning to and essential for the production of justice in society and would emerge as an important quality in Smith's theory of citizenship.

#### IV. The moral dimension of the citizen

While the exercise of individual freedom, guided by the invisible hand, serves social interest "by no means of [man's] intention," Smith's description of the good citizen quoted in Section I stipulates that the individual promote the interests of his fellow citizen "by every means in his power." Smith's language here is powerfully suggestive. While the economic dimension of acting in one's own self-interest is able to encourage the welfare of society blindly, the requirement to advance social interests as much as one is able demands citizens exhibit active other-regarding behavior. Smith's purpose in placing this constraint on the citizen stems from his moral theory and adds a moral dimension to the citizen which includes a responsibility to exhibit civic virtue.

To fully appreciate the moral dimension of the citizen, it is necessary to first say a few words about Smith's moral theory. Even prior to the formalization of the state, Smith argues men formed social relations with one another due to the fact that man is by nature a social animal. Not only does social collaboration improve his chances for survival, but man is naturally a sentimental creature who desires to engage with the feelings of others and, in turn, to be engaged by others.<sup>25</sup> This idea is of such central importance to Smith's *TMS* that it introduces the entire book. He states:

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.<sup>26</sup>

This "interest" is what Smith later refers to as sympathy, and it

is the sentiment upon which Smith's entire moral theory is built. At its core, sympathy consists in the harmonizing of the sentiments of men. To offer an image, one might envision sympathies like waves that tend to unite with and amplify others that are on the same sentimental wavelengths. Although Smith views the process of sympathizing as involuntary, eliciting perfect harmony requires more than just sentimental exchange: one individual's sentiments must be expressed at an appropriate level for another person to be able to fully appreciate that sentiment and harmonize with it. Sentiments of pain, for example, are difficult for the person not experiencing the discomfort to fully take part in; thus, the person who is in pain must moderate this extreme passion for another person to be able to harmonize with the painful feelings. To achieve the appropriate level of moderation, Smith argues men tend to judge things not through their own eyes—which may be bias by their circumstances or mood—but through the eyes of an imagined "impartial spectator" who recommends appropriate sentiments conducive to harmony.

It is also from harmony and the recommendations of the impartial spectator that morality is derived. When two sentiments come into harmony they evoke feelings of propriety that, for Smith, is the source of moral approbation. For example, if one were to encounter a father showing affection towards his children—even if the onlooker has no children of his own or never knew his own father—he can imagine what it would be like to be a party to that situation, approving of the display of affection as appropriate in the circumstance, and ultimately judging the behavior to be morally praiseworthy. Even if the observer was not immediately filled with sentiments of pleasure, he could consult the impartial spectator—the ultimate arbitrator of moral matters—who would appraise the behavior of the father to the son as morally praiseworthy.

With this in mind, the task at the hand of the citizen may be reconsidered. The promotion of his fellow-citizen's welfare, while it would elicit moral approbation to be sure, runs deeper than basic sympathetic attachment and drives at the heart of Smith's moral theory. Recommending that the "good" citizen actively "desire to render the condition of our fellow-citizens as safe, respectable, and happy as we can," Smith appears to be suggesting the good citizen displays the virtue of benevolence. Part of Smith's reason for doing so is that such behavior is the paradigm of his moral theory. He states: "To feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent actions, constitutes the perfection of human nature."<sup>27</sup> The Smithian citizen is therefore expected to aim at moral perfection by displaying the virtue of benevolence.

If we return to Smith's characterization of the citizen there is

point of further interest to be observed. The first requirement of the citizen is a condition which is strictly a matter of justice: the citizen must respect the law because it prevents injuries to the rights others and helps to maintain the social order. The latter half of the definition, as has just been shown, entails displaying benevolence towards one's fellow citizens. This distinction is noteworthy because Smith himself dwells on the difference between the value of justice and benevolence—the two qualities he has brought to bear on citizens. He notes:

Beneficence...is less essential to the existence of society than justice. Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice may utterly destroy it...[Beneficence] is the ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building...If [justice] is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society...must in a moment crumble into atoms.<sup>28</sup>

Here, Smith distinguishes justice from benevolence by examining what the lack either virtue would excite. The absence of justice, tantamount to injury, would do serious harm. The absence of benevolence, conversely, would merely excite hatred at worst. From our discussion of justice earlier it seems obvious why Smith is calling on the citizen to respect the laws of society, but if benevolence is solely and ornament, it must be asked why Smith is placing this responsibility on the citizen. His reason, it would appear, is that Smith was concerned with the production of happiness in society. Though not a pure utilitarian, much of Smith's moral theory is cast in terms of pleasures that are produced; as we have seen, moral praise itself is assigned according to its tendency to yield pleasure. While pleasure may not be absolutely requisite for society, it is no doubt a goal to which societies should aim. It is also for this reason that Smith is placing this responsibility on the citizen.<sup>29</sup> By intending citizens to support as well as decorate the framework of society, Smith seems to be expecting individuals to promote happiness in society from the bottom up.

The production of happiness in society would have further consequences for Smith's politics rooted in the piecemeal alleviation of social evils. He argues: "The state or sovereignty in which we have been born, educated, and under the protection of which we continue to live, is, in ordinary cases, the greatest society upon whose happiness or misery our good or bad conduct can have much influence."<sup>30</sup> The resident to whom Smith is referring would, no doubt, have the status of a citizen; hence, the moral agency and conduct of citizens emerges as an additional piece of the piecemeal alleviation of social evil and the thrust of Smith's political theory. As has already been shown, Smith was opposed to the top-down creation of social order by the man of systems. Of those evils which are not so egregious that they necessitate the intervention of the legislator,

social ills could be cured by the beneficence of citizens. A further reason for this position is that limited government would be vital to the development of authentic virtue. Indeed, Smith stresses in *TMS* that the appearance of virtue, which would be offered by the laws of the man of systems for example, is not the same as virtue itself. Instead, through life in a social setting, Smith expects the citizen will establish the habits of virtue over time. As Charles Griswold has noted, "Benevolence allows for warranted partiality toward members of our own circle, and is thus closely tied to a view of the contexts in which our moral identities and views of the good life are developed."<sup>31</sup> Hence, through Smith's moral theory, the citizen is given the responsibility to exhibit civic virtue, and, by doing so, he is able to promote happiness within society.

## V. Conclusion

Although Smith himself did not explicitly create a doctrine of citizenship, from what has been said it not only seems possible to create a theory from his ideas, but also that the latent Smithian citizen plays an important role in Smith's theory of justice and politics. Historically, the citizen has been shown to emerge as a political agent who is imbued with political privileges, and the citizen is given an important stature in society at large through his relationship with the sovereign. Naturally a free agent, the economic liberty of the citizen is essential to both his political status and the production of justice within society. Also a sentimental agent by nature, the moral sentiments of the citizen imbue him with civic virtues that are capable of producing happiness in society. When understood in this light, a Smithian theory of citizenship plays an essential role in the piecemeal alleviation of social evils, and the citizen emerges as a character which suffuses the great corpus of Adam Smith's political, economic, and moral theory.<sup>32</sup>

## END NOTES

1. *LJ*, *WN*, and *TMS* from this point forward.
2. *LJ* (A), i.35.
3. *LJ*(A), v.91-8.
4. *LJ*(A), i.10.
5. *WN*, V.i.b.2.2.
6. Historically speaking this may not always be the case. For example, in his discussion of the Roman Empire Smith notes that when the Romans conquered a new state they would often either enslave or kill the people they conquered. In this instance, it could be interpreted that the Empire was drawing a distinction of who is eligible for even "natural" rights based on citizenship. While this could be an objection to my conclusion above, it is most certainly the exception rather than the rule and further analyses of why this is so would distract us from the task at hand.
7. *LJ*(A), i.11.
8. *LJ*(A), v.129.
9. *LJ*(A), v. 113.

10. "In whatever place there is a sovereign, from the very nature of things the power must be absolute...as the sovereign had an undoubted title to the obedience of the subjects." LJ(A) v. 114.
11. LJ(A), V.122.
12. Smith does make a small allowance for resistance, but only in the case of "absurdity and outrage" (LJ(A) V.125) of the sovereign can his authority be contravened. His ensuing description and examples, however, severely limit the right of resistance. Using the term "lunacy" and offering Caligula as an example, Smith clearly believes only strict insanity can cause one to lose authority, all else demands the obedience of the citizen.
13. TMS, VI.ii.2.11.
14. TMS, VI.ii.2.17.
15. TMS, VI.ii.2.16.
16. Haakonsen, p. 97.
17. WN, IV.ix.51.
18. WN, IV.ii.10.
19. WN, V.ii.c.18.
20. WN, IV.ix.51.
21. WN, I.ii.1.
22. WN, I.i.4.
23. WN, IV.ii.10.
24. "The statute of Edward VI, therefore, by prohibiting as much as possible any middle man from coming in between the grower and consumer, endeavored to annihilate a trade, of which the free exercise is not only the best palliative of the inconvenienced of a dearth, but the best preventative calamity." WN IV.v.b.21
25. Smith notes that in seeking the sympathy of others what an individual is most in search of is sympathy with displeasing or painful sentiments – though these are the most difficult passions with which one can solicit sympathy. Pain, specifically in the form of resentment, is also the foundation for justice: Smith argues when one feels as though another has done him a wrong he seeks sympathy of another to validate his feelings of resentment which, in turn, helps him gain the moral authority to punish the wrongdoer. Thus, it would also be possible to discuss the role of sympathy in terms of justice and the development of society, but as it is my intention to focus this section on Smith's conditions of the "good citizen" I will be focusing strictly on the moral dimension of the citizen and setting this point aside.
26. TMS, I.i.1.1.
27. TMS, I.i.5
28. TMS, II.ii.3.3-4.
29. A reader may also wonder why, on the one hand, Smith indicates benevolence marks the perfection of human nature, but he also considers it to be merely a decoration of society on the other hand. I do not take this to be a contradiction in Smith's theory. Smith believes moral perfection to be a process of development and learning. For example, he notes that because proximity facilitates sympathy it is what originally gives strength to moral relations such that if my brother loses a finger I may feel worse about his suffering (at least initially) than I would if thousands of people are killed in an earthquake in China. It is only through a process of moral education that I come to appreciate that the death of thousands is truly a greater moral tragedy. Insofar as benevolence is ornamental, it is acting as steps in the process of moral development. After the process of moral education, it will ultimately rise to the paradigm of moral behavior.
30. TMS, VI.ii.2.
31. Griswold, p. 208.
32. I am extremely grateful to Professor Aaron Garret of Boston University for volunteering to supervise my independent study of Adam Smith without which this paper would not have been possible.

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