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Attitudes De Se cover

Attitudes De Se

Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics

edited by Neil Feit and Alessandro Capone

In English, we use the word “I” to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns “himself” and “herself” to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se.

De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of de se thought, various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of our discourse about it, and also what it reveals about how humans think about themselves and the world around them.

Neil Feit is chair of the Department of Philosophy at SUNY Fredonia and the author of Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Alessandro Capone teaches semantics at the University of Palermo.

Contents

  • The Problem of De Se Attitudes Neil Feit and Alessandro Capone
  • I Linguistics and Philosophy of Language
    1. Indexicals and De Se Attitudes Wayne A. Davis
    2. Speaking (and Some Thinking) of Oneself James Higginbotham
    3. Contextualism and Minimalism on De Se Belief Ascription Kasia M. Jaszczolt
    4. Belief Reports and the Property Theory of Content Neil Feit
    5. The Myth of the Problematic De Se Michael Devitt
    6. In Defense of Propositions: A Presuppositional Analysis of Indexicals and Shifted Pronouns Denis Delfitto and Gaetano Fiorin
    7. De Se Attitude/Belief Ascription and Neo-Gricean Truth-Conditional Pragmatics: Logophoric Expressions in West African Languages and Long-Distance Reflexives in East, South, and Southeast Asian Languages Yan Huang
    8. Empathy as a Psychological Guide to the De Se/De Re Distinction Eros Corazza
    9. Consequences of the Pragmatics of ‘De Se Alessandro Capone
  • II Epistemology and Metaphysics
    1. The Epistemology of De Se Beliefs Igor Douven
    2. Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time Darren Bradley
    3. De Se Epistemology Michael G. Titelbaum
    4. The Role of Motivational Force and Intention in First-Person Beliefs Pietro Perconti
    5. Time and Person in Thought Michael Nelson
    6. Self-Locating Belief John Perry

September 2013

ISBN (Paperback): 9781575866642
ISBN (Cloth): 9781575866659
ISBN (electronic): 9781575866666

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