Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind

This is a collection of essays on the philosophical questions put forward by the anti-individualist and externalist perspectives in Philosophy of Mind and of Language. The book shows the different philosophical treatments about meaning, basic self-knowledge, and mental states coherent with these perspectives, and on it there are especially discussed the most famous theses defended by Tyler Burge on these topics. Anti-individualist and externalist views are considered as incompatible to some traditional Cartesian views on mind and knowledge, and to some Neo-Fregean views on sense and meaning. Burge's works intend to trace bridges between these paradigms (Anti-individualism vs. Cartesian theory of knowledge, on the one hand, and Externalism vs. Fregean theory of sense, on the other). On the book, Burge's proposals are discussed and their scope is assessed. The importance of Burge's proposals and of the comments included on the book do not only rest on their originality but also on the way in which it is showed that what appeared to be disadvantages of the externalist and anti-individualist views are now seen on a new light under which they are neutralized and assumed as positive features.

This is a book on one of the most recent, famous, widely accepted and discussed, paradigm on the theory of meaning and mind, and on the latest positions on Epistemology. It expounds the advantages and disadvantages of externalism on meaning, anti-individualism as a theory of mental states, and the problem of basic self-knowledge in Epistemology and Theory of Knowledge. Its main purpose is to expound these positions clearly and also Burge's versions of them, and show the most important consequences of externalism and anti-individualism for contemporary philosophy.

María J. Frápolli and Esther Romero are Lecturers in Logic and Philosophy of Science at the Philosophy Department, University of Granada, Spain

Contents

5/1/2003