Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics
Summer 2008 Workshop
Segment 2: Market Design
June 23 - 25
Organized by Parag Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Alvin E. Roth, Harvard University; Michael Ostrovsky, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Muriel Niederle, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
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The conference took place in Landau Economics Building,
third floor, room 351
Monday, June 23, 2008
12:00-1:30 Lunch, at the Lounge, room 257, second floor
1:30-2:20 Assignment Exchanges presented by Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
2:30-3:20 Towards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement presented by Michael Schwarz, Yahoo! Research and NBER and co-authored with Kyna Fong, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
3:20-3:50 Coffee break
3:50-4:40 Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation presented by Parag Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and co-authored with Tayfun Sönmez, Boston College
4:50-5:40 Matching Through Decentralized Markets presented by Muriel Niederle, Stanford University and co-authored with Leeat Yariv, California Institute of Technology
6:30 Dinner
Tuesday, June 24, 2008
8:30-9:00 Breakfast, in Room 351
9:00-9:50 Position Auctions with Consumer Search presented by Susan Carleton Athey, Harvard University and co-authored with Glenn Ellison, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
10:00-10:50 Asymmetric Common-Value Auctions with Applications to Auctions with Resale presented by Harrison Cheng and co-authored with Guofu Tan both University of Southern California
10:50-11:20 Coffee break
11:20-12:10 Mechanism Design with a Restricted Action Space presented by Liad Blumrosen, Microsoft Research and The Hebrew University and co-authored with Michal Feldman, The Hebrew University
12:10-2:00 Lunch, at the Lounge, room 257, second floor
2:00-2:50 The Market for IP Addresses presented by Benjamin G. Edelman, Harvard Business School
3:00-3:50 Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google presented by Eric Zitzewitz, Dartmouth College and co-authored with Bo Cowgill, Google and Justin Wolfers, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
3:50-4:20 Coffee break
4:20-5:10 Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions presented by Dirk Bergemann, Yale University and co-authored with Xianwen Shi, University of Toronto and Juuso Valimaki, Helsinki School of Economics
5:30 Dinner
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
8:30-9:00 Breakfast, in Room 351
9:00-9:50 On Efficient and Almost Budget Balanced Allocation Mechanisms presented by Hervé Moulin, Rice University
10:00-10:50 Social Networks and Unraveling in Labor Markets presented by Itay P. Fainmesser, Harvard University
10:50-11:20 Coffee break
11:20-12:10 A Theory of School Choice Lotteries: Why Ties Should Not Be Broken Randomly presented by Onur Kesten, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University and M. Utku Ünver, University of Pittsburgh
12:20-1:10 Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms presented by Fuhito Kojima, Harvard University and co-authored with Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
1:10 Box Lunch, at the Lounge, room 257, second floor
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